PHYSICAL LAYER SECURE COMMUNICATION AGAINST AN EAVESDROPPER WITH ARBITRARY NUMBER OF EAVESDROPPING ANTENNAS

Abstract

A method for physical layer secure transmission against an arbitrary number of eavesdropping antennas includes: S1: communication between legitimate transmitter Alice and legitimate receiver Bob is confirmed; S2: Alice randomly generates a key bit bk with MS bits, maps the key bit bk into a key symbol K, and performs an XOR on the key bit bk and to-be-transmitted confidential information b to obtain an encrypted bits bs; S3: Bob transmits a pilot sequence to Alice, and Alice calculates a candidate precoding space W and transmits modulated symbol streams s=(s1, . . , sN) by using precoding W(e); S4: Bob measures received signal strength of each antenna, estimates the corresponding antenna vector e, inversely maps the vector e to obtain key symbols and key bits, and demodulates the received symbol streams in sequence at each activated antenna to obtain demodulated ciphertext bits; S5: Bob performs an XOR on observed key bits and the demodulated ciphertext bits to obtain the confidential information.

Description

CROSS :REFERENCE TO THE RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is based upon and claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 202010010737.7, filed on Jan. 6, 2020, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to the field of information security, and more particularly, to a method for physical layer secure transmission against an arbitrary number of eavesdropping antennas.

BACKGROUND

With the rapid development of wireless networks, such as 5G, :Internet of Things (IoT), wireless communication security is gradually growing as a prerequisite for various applications. Compared with traditional wired networks, wireless communications face serious threat of eavesdropping attacks, due to its broadcast nature. In wireless communication networks, cryptographic techniques are typically used at the network layer above the physical layer to ensure communication security.

Conventional cryptographic mechanisms employ pre-shared keys to encrypt/decrypt the confidential information. While the eavesdropper (Eve) is assumed to be with limited computational resources and it is computationally infeasible to decipher the encrypted information without knowledge of pre-shared keys. However, the future wireless networks support ultra-high speed and ultra-low latency communications among massive source-constrained devices, which makes cryptographic key distribution and management highly challenging. Second, massive number of wireless nodes, e.g., the sensor nodes or IoT devices, typically operate with low power consumption under unattended setting and have extremely limited computational resources. As a result, highly complex encryption technique is insufficient to adapt to such kinds of applications in future wireless mobile networks. Moreover, with the rapid development of quantum computers, current cryptographic mechanisms can be compromised. Under this case, physical layer secure communication (PLS) that exploits physical characteristics of wireless channel to secure the communication, but regardless of eavesdroppers' computational power, has attracted considerable research attentions.

The security of PLS transmission schemes depends on the advantage of received signal quality of the legitimate channel comparing to that of eavesdropping channel, such as the instantaneous/average received SNRs (signal-to-noise ratio) of the signals that bear the confidential information. Such advantages can be measured by the so called secrecy capacity, which is the maximum achievable secrecy rate, under which the legitimate transmitter (Alice) is able to send confidential information to the legitimate receiver (Bob) with both security and reliability.

Currently, mainstream techniques for physical layer secure transmission include multi-antenna beamforming and precoding, artificial noise, cooperative interference and others. However, current PLS communication schemes cannot defend against a. passive eavesdropper (Eve) with arbitrary number of antennas. This is due to the fact that when Eve keeps increasing the number of antennas, and if the antenna number of Eve is far more than the total antenna number of Alice and Bob, Eve can achieve the higher reception quality by jointly combining the received signals at each antenna. As a result, the channel advantages of Bob comparing to that of Eve are gradually decreasing. Especially, when a stronger Eve equips with much more antennas than Alice and Bob, the advantages of the legitimate channels are vanished, Which results in the unachievability of secure communication.

In the real communications, a passive Eve would never inform Alice and Bob about her number of antennas to expose her ability. Moreover, with the rapid development of SG massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) and distributed MIMO, an eavesdropper with rich antenna resources is able to deploy a large number of antennas or distributed antennas for eavesdropping, But in real applications, it is impossible for both Alice and Bob to know how many antennas are specifically deployed by the eavesdropper. In this regard, it is difficult for Alice and Bob to use more antennas to defend against the eavesdropper. Current techniques for physical layer secure communications cannot defend against eavesdropper with more antennas than the total number of antennas of legitimate transmitter and receiver. Hence, the present invention proposes a method for physical layer secure communication to defend against eavesdroppers with arbitrary number of eavesdropping antennas, which has strong practicability.

SUMMARY

In view of the above-mentioned issues, an objective of the present invention is to provide a method for physical layer secure communication against an eavesdropper with arbitrary number of eavesdropping antennas. The invention is applied in a typical TDD (time division multiplexing) communication system.

In the proposed scheme, a legitimate transmitter Alice and a legitimate receiver Bob apply a protected zone with a radius R to surround themselves to prevent an eavesdropper Eve from entering the protected zone for eavesdropping, The method includes the following steps:

S1: The legitimate transmitter Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob confirm communication parameters;

S2: First, Alice independently generates random bits b_k to encrypt (exclusive-OR: XOR) the binary confidential information b to obtain b, Alice maps the key bit b_k into the key symbol K, and modulate b_s=(b_s,1, b_s,2, . . . , b_s,N) to modulated symbols (s₁, s₂, . . . , s_N);

S3: Bob transmits a pilot sequence to Alice. Alice estimates channel H_AB and process it to get a preceding weights space matrix W. According to K, Alice constructs the precoding matrix W(e). Then Alice transmits s=(s₁, . . . , s_N) by multiplying precoding W(e);

S4: Bob measures the received signal pule noise strength (SPN) of each receive antenna to obtain the antenna index vector, and inversely mapping the antenna index vector to obtain key symbols K and key bits b_k . Bob demodulates the received modulated symbol at each activated antenna;

S5: Bob performs XOR on the observed key bits b_k and the demodulated bits b_s=(b_s,1, b_s,2, . . . , b_s,N) to obtain the confidential information bits b; and

S6: repeating steps S2-S5.

Further, step S1 includes the following steps:

S11: Alice presents the confidential bits as b=(b₁, b₂, . . . , b_N), where each b_i, i=1, 2, . . . , N, contains M_S=log₂ M independent bits (M_S and M denote the modulation order and the total number of constellation symbols in the modulation set); and

S12: Alice and Bob confirming parameters: the number of symbol streams N and receive antennas N_B, such that

$N_K=\left(\begin{array}{c}N\\ N_B\end{array}\right),M_S={\log }_2\left(N_K\right);$

Where M_S denotes the order of a constellation signal of the modulation type used by the communication.

Further, in Step S2, Alice obtains b_s as follows:

b _s=(b_s,1, b_s,2, . . . , b_s,N)=(b₁ ⊕ b_k, b₂ ⊕ b_k, . . . , b_N ⊕ b_k).

Further, step S3 includes the following steps:

After receiving the pilot sequence, Alice estimates an uplink channel H_BA and transposes the uplink channel H_BA to obtain a downlink channel H_AB=H_B4^T; and the precoding weights space W is calculated as follows:

$\tilde{W}={H_{\mathrm{AB}}^H\left(H_{\mathrm{AB}}H_{\mathrm{AB}}^H\right)}^{-1}=\left({\tilde{w}}_1,{\tilde{w}}_2,\dots {\tilde{w}}_{N_B}\right);\mathrm{and}$ $W=\left(\frac{{\tilde{w}}_1}{{\tilde{w}}_1},\frac{{\tilde{w}}_2}{{\tilde{w}}_2},\dots \frac{{\tilde{w}}_{\mathrm{NB}}}{{\tilde{w}}_{\stackrel{\_}{N}}}\right)=\left(w_1,w_2,\dots w_{N_B}\right).$

Further, according to the value of K, Alice selects the (K+1)-th column in E. It is selected as e=E(:, K+1), which is used as a selection criterion for constructing the precoding. Further, Alice selects N column vectors from W corresponding to the subscript position of the N non-zero elements in e to construct W(e). Further in Step S3, Alice transmits the symbol streams s=(s₁, . . . , s_N) by using the precoding W(e), and the received signals, which are expressed as:

$y=\sqrt{\frac{P_T}{N}}H_{\mathrm{AB}}W\left(e\right)s+n=\sqrt{\frac{P_T}{N}}\sum _{k=1}^NH_{\mathrm{AB}}w_is_k+n,i\in ℐ\left(e\right),$

where I (e) denotes the subscript position of the non-zero elements in e=E(:, k+1).

Further, step S4 includes:

The number of the receive antennas of Bob is N_B; after receiving a signal y ∈ C^Ns×1=[y₁, y₂, . . . y_NB]^T, Bob measures the strength of signal-plus-noise (SPN) of each antenna as α_i=|y_i|², i=1, 2, . . . N_B.

S41: Bob Obtains the indexes of N maximum values of α_i

S42: Bob obtains the observed key symbols {circumflex over (K)} and key bits {circumflex over (b)}_k according to the observed ê;

S43: Bob independently demodulating the symbols ŝ at the activated antennas corresponding to N non-zero elements in the observed ê to obtain bits {circumflex over (b)}_s; wherein ŝ_i=arg min_s1∈S∥y_i−s₁∥², i=1, 2, . . .N.

Further in Step S5, an XOR is performed by Bob on the observed key bits {circumflex over (b)}_k and the decrypted bits {circumflex over (b)}_s to obtain the confidential bit transmitted by Alice as:

{circumflex over (b)}=({circumflex over (b)}_s,1 ⊕ {circumflex over (b)}_k, {circumflex over (b)}_s,2 ⊕{circumflex over (b)}_k, . . . , {circumflex over (b)}_s,N ⊕ {circumflex over (b)}_k).

Further, the radius R of the protected zone is larger than the uncorrelated distance of the wireless channel, and the radius R is determined by the channel propagation environment and carrier frequency.

The advantages of the present invention are as follows. The method of the present invention can defend against eavesdroppers with an arbitrary number of eavesdropping antennas without the use of any pre-shared keys by legitimate transmitter and receiver. In this way, regardless of how many antennas the eavesdropper uses for eavesdropping, the lower bound of bit error rate (BER) is always guaranteed to be 0.5 at eavesdroppers, while the BER of legitimate receiver trends to zero, thus realizing high-intensity physical layer secure and reliable communication simultaneously, which is a superiority that cannot be achieved by existing physical layer secure transmission methods.

This method has the advantages such as low power consumption, low complexity, and low interference, and is capable of realizing physical layer secure communication to defend against eavesdroppers with an arbitrary number of antennas without any additional artificial noise or cooperative interference, which will not add extra power consumption to the network or cause unnecessary interference to other users.

BRIEFDESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication system model of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of mapping key symbols to different antenna. vectors of Bob under the condition of N_B=2 according to the present invention; and

FIG. 4 is a graph showing the bit error rate performance of Bob and the lower bound BER of Eve when Eve sequentially increases the number of eavesdropping antennas according to the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

In order to facilitate a clearer understanding of the technical features, objectives and effects of the present invention, the specific embodiments of the present invention will be described hereinafter with reference to the drawings,

In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the present invention, the physical layer where the method is implemented is explained below. Those skilled in the art should understand that the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto.

The legitimate transmitter Alice and receiver Bob each employs a protected zone with a radius R to surround themselves, The radius R of the protected zone must be greater than the uncorrelated distance of the channel to prevent eavesdropper Eve from entering the protected zone for eavesdropping. Namely, the distances from Eve to Alice and Bob are both larger than R, thereby ensuring that Eve's channel is independent from the channel of Alice and the channel of Bob, respectively. The radius R is determined by the channel propagation environment and carrier frequency, and is generally 10 cm-100 cm in a rich scattering environment.

The legitimate transmitter Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob each need to be equipped with at least 2 antennas. N_A and N_B below denote the number of antennas of Alice and the number of antennas of Bob, respectively, where N_A>N_B>1. A downlink communication is taken as an example for illustration, where Alice transmits confidential binary information b=(b₁, b₂, . . . ), (b_i ∈ {0,1}) to Bob, and the eavesdropper Eve eavesdrops from her received signals. The eavesdropper Eve employs arbitrary number of receive antennas as N_E.

As shown in FIG. 1, the legitimate transmitter Alice communicates with the legitimate receiver Bob through the downlink channel H_AB, and the eavesdropper's channel is H_{A E}.

As shown in FIG. 2, a method for physical layer secure transmission against an eavesdropper with arbitrary number of eavesdropping antennas includes the following steps:

S1: The legitimate transmitter Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob confirm communication parameters. The parameters include N, which is the stream number of the transmitted symbols where 1≤N≤N_B−1. The modulation order M_S and the total number of constellation symbols M.

S2: First, Alice independently generates random bits b_k to encrypt (exclusive-OR: XOR) the binary confidential information b to obtain b_s. Alice modulate b_s=(b_s,1, b_s,2, . . . , b_s,N) to modulated symbols (s₁, s₂, . . . , s_N), s_i denotes the specific constellation symbol. Alice maps the key bits b_k into the key symbol K.

S3: Bob transmits a pilot sequence to Alice, Alice estimates channel H_AB, and processes it to get a precoding weights space matrix W. According to K, Alice obtains the corresponding antenna index vector e. According to e, Alice chooses different column vectors from W to construct the precoding matrix W(e). Then Alice transmits s=(s₁, . . . , s_N) by multiplying precoding W(e);

S4: Bob measures the received signal plus noise strength (SPN) of each receive antenna, estimates the antenna index vector, inversely mapping the antenna index vector to obtain key symbols K and key bits b_k. Bob demodulates the received modulated symbol s=(s₁, . . . , s_N) at each activated antenna to obtain b_s=(b_s,1, b_s,2, . . . , b_s,N);

S5: Bob performs XOR. on the observed key bits b_k and the demodulated bits b_s=(b_s,1, b_s,2, . . . , b_s,N) to obtain the confidential information bits b; and

S6: repeating steps S2-S5.

Further, step S1 includes the following steps:

S11: Alice presents the confidential bits as b=(b₁, b₂, . . . , b_N), where each b_i, i=1, 2, . . . , N, contains M_S=log₂ M independent bits (M_S and M denote the modulation order and the total number of constellation symbols in the modulation set); and

S12: Alice and Bob confirm parameters: the number of symbol streams N and receive antennas N_B, such that

$N_K=\left(\begin{array}{c}N\\ N_B\end{array}\right),M_S={\log }_2\left(N_K\right);$

Where M_S denotes the order of a constellation signal of the modulation type used by the communication. For example, for binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), M_S =1.

Further, in Step S2, Alice obtains b_s as

b _s=(b_s,1, b_s,2, . . . , b_s,N)=(b₁ ⊕ b_k, b₂, ⊕ b_k, . . . , b_N ⊕ b_k).

Further in Step S2, each key symbol K corresponds to different receive antennas

K={0, 1., 2, . . ., N_k−1}.

As shown in FIG. 3, the key symbols are mapped to different antenna vectors of Bob. For example, under the condition of N_B=2, if N_B=2, N=1 then K ∈ {0, 1}, and all possible antenna combinations E are denoted as:

$K\in \left(\begin{array}{c}0\\ 1\end{array}\right)\iff E=\left(\begin{array}{cc}1& 0\\ 0& 1\end{array}\right);$

wherein. “1” in the first column vector e₁ of E denotes Bob's first antenna that is activated, “0” in the first column vector e₁ of E denotes Bob's second antenna that is non-activated, and so on.

Further, according to the value of K, Alice selects the (K+1)-th column in E as e=E(:, K+1) and used it as a selection criterion for constructing the precoding. Further, Alice selects N column vectors from W corresponding to the subscript position of N non-zero elements in e to construct precoding W(e) to transmit s=(s₁, . . . , s_N).

Further, step S3 includes the following steps:

After receiving the pilot sequence, Alice estimates an uplink channel H_BA and transposes the uplink channel H_BA to obtain a downlink channel H_AB=H_BA^T; and the precoding weights space W is calculated as follows:

$\tilde{W}={H_{\mathrm{AB}}^H\left(H_{\mathrm{AB}}H_{\mathrm{AB}}^H\right)}^{-1}=\left({\tilde{w}}_1,{\tilde{w}}_2,\dots {\tilde{w}}_{N_B}\right);\mathrm{and}$ $W=\left(\frac{{\tilde{w}}_1}{{\tilde{w}}_1},\frac{{\tilde{w}}_2}{{\tilde{w}}_2},\dots \frac{{\tilde{w}}_{\mathrm{NB}}}{{\tilde{w}}_{\stackrel{\_}{N}}}\right)=\left(w_1,w_2,\dots w_{N_B}\right).$

Further in Step S3, Alice transmits s=(₁, . . . , s_N) by multiplying the precoding W(e), and the received signals are expressed as:

$y=\sqrt{\frac{P_T}{N}}H_{\mathrm{AB}}W\left(e\right)s+n=\sqrt{\frac{P_T}{N}}\sum _{k=1}^NH_{\mathrm{AB}}w_is_k+n,i\in ℐ\left(e\right),$

wherein I (e) denotes the subscript position of a non-zero element in e=E(:, K+1).

Step S4 includes the following sub steps:

Further, the number of the receive antennas of Bob is N_B; after receiving a signal y ∈^NB×1=[y₁, y₂, . . . y_NB]^T, Bob measures the strength of signal-plus-noise (SPN) of each antenna as:

α_i=|y_i|², i=1, 2, . . . N_B.

S41: Bob selects N maximum values of α_i, wherein the subscript of α_i denotes the position corresponding to the non-zero elements in e and then obtaining the observed e according to the subscripts,

For example, when N=1,

$\stackrel{\_}{E}\left(i,\text{:}\right)=\underset{\mathrm{antenna}\mathrm{index}\mathrm{with}\mathrm{the}\mathrm{maximum}\mathrm{SPN}}{\left(0,0,\dots ,\underset{\bigvee }{1}\dots 0\right)}$ $\mathrm{Max}\left({\alpha }_i\right)=i\Rightarrow \tilde{E}\left(i,\text{:}\right)\Rightarrow {\tilde{k}}_i$

S42: Bob accordingly obtains his own observed ê, and then obtains the observed key symbols {circumflex over (K)} and key bits {circumflex over (b)}_k according to the observed; and

In Step S5 Bob independently demodulates the symbols ŝ at the activated antennas corresponding to N non-zero elements in the observed e to obtain the demodulated bits {circumflex over (b)}_s; wherein ŝ_i=arg min_{s, ∈S} ∥y_i−s₁∥², i=1, 2, . . . N.

Further in Step S5, an XOR is performed by Bob on the observed key bits {circumflex over (v)}_k and the decrypted bits {circumflex over (b)}_s to obtain the confidential bit information transmitted by Alice:

{circumflex over (b)}=({circumflex over (b)}_s,1 ⊕{circumflex over (b)}_k, {circumflex over (b)}_s,2 ⊕ {circumflex over (b)}_k, . . . {circumflex over (b)}_s,N ⊕ {circumflex over (b)}_k).

Steps S2 to S5 are repeated to securely transmit confidential information between legitimate transmitter and receiver.

FIG. 4 shows the final bit error rate performance of Bob and the lower bound of BER of Eve, where Eve uses 1 (labeled as “Eve NK”), 2 (labeled as “Eve OK”), 4, 8, and 100 antennas, respectively, and she processed the signals by using optimal-ratio combining(MRC).

The basic principles and main features and advantages of the present invention have been shown and described above. Those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention is not limited by the foregoing embodiments. The foregoing embodiments and the description in the specification only illustrate the principle of the present invention. The present invention may have various changes and improvements without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, and these changes and improvements shall fall within the scope claimed by the present invention. The scope of protection claimed by the present invention is defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for physical layer secure transmission against a number of eavesdropping antennas, comprising the following steps: S1: confirming a communication between a legitimate transmitter Alice and a legitimate receiver Bob;S2: randomly generating, by the legitimate transmitter Alice, a key bit bk with MS bits, mapping, by the legitimate transmitter Alice, the key bit bk into a key symbol K, and performing, by the legitimate transmitter Alice, an XOR on the key bit bk and to-be-transmitted binary confidential bit information b to obtain an encrypted ciphertext bits bs, and modulating, by the legitimate transmitter Alice, the encrypted ciphertext bits bs into modulated symbols s=(s1, . . . , sN)S3: transmitting a pilot sequence to the legitimate transmitter Alice by the legitimate receiver Bob, calculating a candidate precoding space W by the legitimate transmitter Alice, and transmitting, by the legitimate transmitter Alice, the modulated symbols s=(s1, . . . , sN) by using a precoding W(e);S4: independently measuring, by the legitimate receiver Bob, a received signal strength of each receive antenna, estimating, by the legitimate receiver Bob, a vector of the each receive antenna, inversely mapping, by the legitimate receiver Bob, the vector of the each receive antenna to obtain observed key symbols and observed key bits, and demodulating, by the legitimate receiver Bob, the modulated symbols in sequence at each activated antenna to obtain demodulated ciphertext bits;S5: performing, by the legitimate receiver Bob, an XOR on the observed key bits and the demodulated ciphertext bits to obtain the to-be-transmitted binary confidential bit information b; andS6: repeating steps S2-S5;wherein, the legitimate transmitter Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob are each surrounded by a protected zone with a radius R to prevent an eavesdropper Eve from entering the protected zone for eavesdropping, and a channel of the eavesdropper Eve is independent from a channel of the legitimate transmitter Alice and a channel of the legitimate receiver Bob, respectively.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, step S1 comprises the following steps:S11: dividing, by the legitimate transmitter Alice, the to-be-transmitted binary confidential bit information b=(b1, b2, . . . , bN) into N parts, wherein each part bi, i=1, 2, . . . , N of the N parts contains bits; andS12: determining, by the legitimate receiver Bob, a number NB of receive antennas and a number N of streams of the modulated symbols, wherein the legitimate transmitter Alice transmits the streams of the modulated symbols simultaneously, wherein 1≤N≤NB−1:

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein, the encrypted ciphertext bits bs, is calculated as follows: bs=(s,1, bs,2, . . . , bs,N)=(b1 ⊕ bk, b2, ⊕ bk, . . . , bN ⊕ bk).

4. The method according to claim 2, wherein, after receiving the pilot sequence, the legitimate transmitter Alice estimates an uplink channel HBA and transposes the uplink channel HBA to obtain a downlink channel HAB=HBAT; and the candidate preceding space W is calculated as follows:

5. The method according to claim 2, wherein, the key symbol corresponds to different receive antennas K={0, 1, 2, . . . , Nk−1} activated at the legitimate receiver Bob, and antenna combinations are denoted by a vector E.

6. The method according to claim 5, wherein, the key symbols K ∈ κ, according to a value of the key symbol K, a (K+1)-th column in the vector E is selected as E(:, K+1) and used as a selection criterion for transmitting the precoding W(e).

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein, N non-zero column vectors corresponding to the E(;. K+1) are selected, from the candidate precoding space W, as the precoding W(e).

8. The method according to claim 4, wherein, the legitimate transmitter Alice transmits the modulated symbols s=(s1, . . . , sN) by using the precoding W(e), and received signals are expressed as:

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein, step S2 further comprises:S21: modulating the encrypted ciphertext bits bs into the modulated symbols s=(s1, . . ., sN) to be transmitted.

10. The method according to claim 1, wherein, a number of receive antennas of the legitimate receiver Bob is NB; after receiving a signal y ∈NB×1[y1, y2, . . . , yNB]T, the legitimate receiver Bob measures an intensity of signal-plus-noise (SPN) of the each antenna as: αi=|yi|2, i=1, 2, . . . NB.

11. The method according to claim 10, wherein, step S4 comprises the following steps:S41: selecting, by the legitimate receiver Bob, N maximum values of αi, and obtaining observed e according to a subscript of the αi;S42: obtaining the observed key symbols K and the observed key bits {circumflex over (b)}k according to the observed e; andS43: independently demodulating, by the legitimate receiver Bob, symbols ŝ at antennas corresponding to N non-zero elements in the observed e to obtain the demodulated ciphertext bits {circumflex over (b)}s; wherein ŝ1=arg mins11|S ∥yi−s1∥2, i=1, 2, . . . N.

12. The method according to claim 11, wherein, an XOR is performed on the observed key bits {circumflex over (b)}k and the demodulated ciphertext bits {circumflex over (b)}s to obtain the to-be-transmitted binary confidential bit information to be transmitted by the legitimate transmitter Alice as follows: {circumflex over (b)}=({circumflex over (b)}s,1 ⊕ {circumflex over (b)}k, {circumflex over (b)}s,2 ⊕ {circumflex over (b)}k, . . . , {circumflex over (b)}s,N ⊕ {circumflex over (b)}k).

13. The method according to claim 1, wherein, the radius R of the protected zone is larger than a channel uncorrelated distance, and the radius R is determined by a channel propagation environment and a carrier frequency.

14. The method according to claim 6, wherein, the legitimate transmitter Alice transmits the modulated symbols s=(s1, . . . , sN) by using the precoding W(e), and received signals are expressed as: