Patent Application
20230343231
This Application claims the benefit of EP Patent Application 22305594.8, filed Apr. 21, 2022, the entire content of which is incorporated herein by reference.
The project leading to this application has received funding from the SESAR Joint Undertaking under grant agreement No 874474 under European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.
The disclosure relates to aviation collision warning systems.
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a surveillance technology in aerospace that is based on sharing position information with surrounding users, for example for detect and avoid (DAA). The ADS-B system uses a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver onboard an aircraft to determine the position of the aircraft. ADS-B regularly transmits messages that include the aircraft own position, based on the GNSS position, speed, identification or other information to other aircraft.
In general, the disclosure describes a system that receives ADS-B messages using a directional antenna. The system may be configured to track and analyze the direction and as well as the signal strengths of the received messages to validate that the digital position information included in the ADS-B messages conform to the direction of the source of the ADS-B message. The system may use existing directional antennae used for traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS) that are configured to receive transponder responses at 1090 MHz (the same frequency as ADS-B messages) or any other antenna that can measure bearing and signal strength. The system of this disclosure may be valuable to validate ADS-B messages transmitted by nearby aircraft, especially for those aircraft that do not include TCAS transponders, such as smaller general aviation (GA) aircraft, some helicopters and some unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Nearby aircraft that may pose a collision risk are referred to as “intruders” by some airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS), including TCAS.
The directional ADS-B of this disclosure may also estimate range rate based on signal strength of received ADS-B messages of an intruder. In contrast to other systems that may attempt to estimate range of a target from the signal strength, the directional ADS-B may estimate “range rate” based on tracking signals strengths for each intruder.
In one example, this disclosure describes an airborne system comprising: receiver circuitry configured to receive automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) messages; a directional antenna; and processing circuitry configured to: receive an ownship position and attitude based on ownship navigation and avionics systems; receive an ADS-B message, of a sequence of ADS-B messages from an intruder via the directional antenna; compute a bearing to the intruder based on: phase analysis of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna; and from the ownship position; incorporate the computed bearing to the track of measured bearings of the intruder, wherein the track of measured bearings is based on the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder; receive from the receiver circuitry, a position of the intruder decoded from digital content of the ADS-B message, calculate a second bearing to the intruder based on the decoded position; compare the track of measured bearings to the second bearing; and in response to the track of measured bearings matching the second bearing: determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder are valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a validated bearing to the intruder.
In another example, this disclosure describes a device comprising receiver circuitry configured to: receive automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) messages; and connect to a directional antenna; and processing circuitry configured to: receive an ownship position and attitude based on ownship navigation and avionics systems, receive an ADS-B message, of a sequence of ADS-B messages from an intruder via the directional antenna; compute a bearing to the intruder based on: phase analysis of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna; and from the ownship position; incorporate the computed bearing to the track of measured bearings of the intruder, wherein the track of measured bearings is based on the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder; receive from the receiver circuitry, a position of the intruder decoded from digital content of the ADS-B message, calculate a second bearing to the intruder based on the decoded position; compare the track of measured bearings to the second bearing; and in response to the track of measured bearings matching the second bearing: determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder are valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a validated bearing to the intruder.
In another example, this disclosure describes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions that, when executed, cause processing circuitry of a computing device to: receive an ownship position and attitude based on ownship navigation and avionics systems; receive automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) messages from receiver circuitry operatively coupled to a directional antenna; compute a bearing to the intruder based on: phase analysis of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna; and from the ownship position; incorporate the computed bearing to the track of measured bearings of the intruder, wherein the track of measured bearings is based on the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder; receive from the receiver circuitry, a position of the intruder decoded from digital content of the ADS-B message, calculate a second bearing to the intruder based on the decoded position of the intruder; compare the track of measured bearings to the second bearing; and in response to the track of measured bearings matching the second bearing: determine that the ADS-B message is valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a validated bearing to the intruder.
The details of one or more examples of the disclosure are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the description below. Other features, objects, and advantages of the disclosure will be apparent from the description and drawings, and from the claims.
The various versions of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) provide a last-resort safety net to reduce the risk of mid-air collisions or near mid-air collisions between aircraft. ACAS serves as a back-up and co-exists with air traffic control (ATC) separation standards. In some examples, ACAS is an aircraft system based on secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponder signals. An ACAS may interrogate the Mode C and Mode S transponders of nearby aircraft (intruders') and from the replies tracks their altitude and range and issues alerts to the pilots, as appropriate. Most versions of ACAS will not detect non-transponder-equipped aircraft. One version of an ACAS is called the traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS). Similarly, in some examples, intruders fitted with Mode A-only transponders are not tracked nor detected by TCAS because TCAS does not use Mode A interrogations. However, non-transponder equipped aircraft may output ADS-B messages that include the aircraft ID, position and other information.
Aircraft equipped with ACAS may have one or two antennae. Larger aircraft may locate the antennae on the top and bottom of the aircraft to avoid the body of the ownship aircraft from shielding incoming ACAS signals. In some examples the antennae used by ACAS may include a directional antenna mounted on the top of the aircraft and either an omni-directional or a directional antenna mounted on the bottom of the aircraft. The ACAS device onboard the ownship aircraft may transmit interrogations on 1030 MHz from the antennae. Target aircraft equipped with transponders may receive interrogations at 1030 MHz and reply to the received interrogations at 1090 MHz. The ownship antennae receive transponder replies, at 1090 MHz, and send these replies to processing circuitry of the ACAS device. ACAS surveillance of Mode S equipped aircraft is based on the selective address feature of the Mode S transponder. TCAS II listens for the spontaneous transmissions (squitters) sent once per second by Mode S transponders. Following receipt of a squitter, the ownship ACAS may send a Mode S interrogation to the Mode S address for the intruder contained in the squitter message. ACAS uses the reply received to measure bearing and determine range of the intruder aircraft from the measured round-trip time. The altitude is decoded from the digital information in the message. Similarly, ADS-B IN systems may decode the digital information in an ADS-B OUT message to determine the location of an intruder aircraft.
However, ADS-B OUT messages can contain erroneous position information from intruder aircraft. In some examples errors may be caused by equipment issues on intruder vehicles, or ADS-B messages may be intentionally spoofed to output erroneous information. For Mode S equipped intruder aircraft, an ACAS equipped ownship may validate an ADS-B message with ACAS interrogations, described above. For aircraft with no transponder, or Mode A-only transponders, the ownship may not be able to validate the ADS-B message from the intruder. The techniques of this disclosure include receiving ADS-B messages through a directional antenna, e.g., a directional antenna configured to receive ACAS messages or some similar directional antenna. Processing circuitry on the ownship may perform phase and/or amplitude analysis on the ADS-B IN message received by the directional antenna to validate that the reported location in the digital portion of the ADS-B message corresponds to a calculated bearing based on the phase and/or amplitude analysis of the received ADS-B message.
The techniques of this disclosure may be applied to several example applications. Some example applications, or use cases, may include bearing and/or range rate validation to avoid inconsistent position of intruder on the display of a collision warning system. Other examples may also include bearing and/or range rate validation of intruder, where the intruder does not have transponder, and ownship may have no intruder detection radar to independently validate ADS-B messages, even if the ownship has a weather radar. For ownship aircraft with radar, the techniques of this disclosure may provide faster detection of intruder by radar based on a validated, e.g., a true bearing to an intruder when the digital position in ADS-B message is wrong.
Aircraft and other vehicles operating near the airport may receive position information from, for example one or more Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as the Global Positioning System (GPS). A constellation of satellites 102A, 102B, 102C, and other satellites not shown in
Aircraft, and other vehicles, may receive ADS-B IN signals from other vehicles describing the vehicle location, altitude, speed, heading and so on. In some examples, ADS-B IN signals may come directly from the transmitting vehicle, e.g., from aircraft 104 to aircraft 106, and vice versa. In other examples, ADS-B IN signals may come from ADS-B ground stations, e.g., ground stations 112A and 112B. Because any location errors from the GPS is encoded in the ADS-B message from the target, the ownship vehicle may not be able to validate and check for multipath, intentional spoofing or other GPS errors with a standard ADS-B configuration. Many different GPS receiver manufactures may have differences in sensitivity, error correction and other functions. In some examples, data points that may be corrupted or erroneous may be referred to as jams, or jammed data.
In some examples, the ADS-B OUT signals broadcast from the vehicles may include inaccuracies, such as the GPS issues or spoofing described above. In some examples, ADS-B system inaccuracy in the transmitted ADS-B messages may cause nuisance alerts from traffic collision warning systems, e.g., ACAS, for an aircraft. Some of received traffic data may be erroneous and should not be used in the prediction algorithms of the traffic collision warning systems. In some examples, the traffic collision systems may be onboard an aircraft, or other vehicle, and may process traffic data received via ADS-B to provide an alert to the vehicle operator, e.g., the flight crew of an aircraft. In the example of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), in some examples, the traffic collision warning system may be onboard the UAV, similar to an onboard traffic collision warning system for a manned aircraft. In other examples, traffic collision system for the vehicle may be at some other location, such as a ground control station for the UAV. In either case, the traffic collision alerting system may provide alerts to the vehicle operator. To simplify the explanation, in this disclosure all collision warning systems may be referred to as ACAS. Though an airborne collision avoidance system may be primarily directed to preventing airborne collisions, some traffic collision systems may also be configured to avoid collisions on the ground with other aircraft or other ground vehicles, e.g., fuel trucks, maintenance vehicles and so on.
The directional ADS-B of this disclosure may use the directional 1090 MHz antenna used for active interrogations for ACAS to determine the bearing of an incoming ADS-B In message. The directional ADS-B may validate the incoming ADS-B IN message by comparing the measured bearing from the directional antenna with a calculated bearing based on the digital latitude and longitude in the ADS-B message. In other words, an airborne system may include receiver circuitry configured to receive and interpret ADS-B messages, along with a directional antenna configured to receive ACAS responses from a transponder, e.g., ACAS.
The airborne system may determine the ownship position, e.g., geographical location, altitude, heading, and attitude based on ownship navigation and avionics systems. Some examples include GPS, radio navigation, inertial navigation, radar navigation, altimeter, gyroscopic instruments and other equipment including in ownship avionics. The processing circuitry of the system may include the ownship position as part of the calculation to determine the intruder bearing.
The airborne system may further include processing circuitry that may receive any one or more of ADS-B message, a Mode S reply or an interrogation from an intruder via the directional ACAS antenna. The processing circuitry may calculate a bearing to the intruder based on phase and amplitude analysis of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna. The processing circuitry may incorporate the calculated bearing based on the phase and/or amplitude analysis of the received ADS-B message into the track of measured bearing of the intruder stored at the memory. In a similar manner, the processing circuitry may store and update the tracked bearings for numerous intruders in the system memory.
The processing circuitry may then decode the position of the intruder from digital content of the ADS-B message and calculate a second bearing to the intruder based on the decoded position, as well as the ownship current position. The processing circuitry may compare the track of measured bearings to the second bearing, and in response to the track of measured bearings matching the second bearing, determine that a sub-set of the sequence of ADS-B messages is valid. In response to the first bearing not matching the second bearing, the processing circuitry may determine that the ADS-B message is invalid. In some examples, the receiver circuitry for the ADS-B messages may include the processing circuitry to perform the independent ADS-B validation, and so the receiver circuitry may connect to the directional antenna.
In some examples the processing circuitry may determine whether the first (tracked) bearing matches the second calculated bearing to within some tolerance, because the first and second bearing calculations may not result in the exact same bearing. For example, the processing circuitry may determine that the ADS-B message is not valid unless the first bearing is within one degree, two degrees, five degrees, ten degrees or some other predetermined threshold range of the second bearing.
The ADS-B directional and range rate validation techniques of this disclosure may support extended hybrid surveillance or similar features that allows the aircraft, and other vehicles, to reduce the usage of the 1090 MHz frequency, which may result in less interference in busy airspace, fewer garbled messages, reduced power consumption and other advantages. Extended hybrid surveillance may also include adding passive surveillance intervals that reduce the need for active ACAS interrogations.
Extended hybrid surveillance is a feature which may be included as optional functionality in some ACAS units. Hybrid surveillance is a method to decrease the Mode S surveillance interrogations by an aircraft's ACAS unit. Specifically, ACAS units equipped with hybrid surveillance may use passive surveillance instead of active surveillance to track intruders that meet validation criteria and are not projected to be near-term collision threats.
With active surveillance, ownship ACAS may transmit interrogations at 1030 MHz to the transponder for one or more intruder vehicles. The intruder transponder reply transmission, on 1090 MHz, may include digital information with identity, altitude and other information for the intruder. The ACAS system may estimate range based on round-trip time from interrogation to receiving the response. With passive surveillance, position data in the broadcast message from the transponder of the intruder come from an onboard navigation source, such as GPS. The ownship may receive the broadcast (ADS-B) by the use of Mode S extended squitter, also known as 1090ES. In some examples, the ownship ACAS may track an intruder with passive surveillance while the intruder is not a collision threat. When the calculated collision risk is increased, the ACAS system may increase the number of interrogations, e.g., from every minute to every few seconds to full active interrogation rate of an interrogation every second. The intent of hybrid surveillance is to reduce the ACAS interrogation rate through the judicious use of the ADS-B data provided via the Mode S extended squitter without any degradation of the safety and effectiveness of the ACAS. The ADS-B directional validation features of this disclosure may provide additional information to allow a reduced interrogation rate e.g., for validated intruders the validation rate can be further reduced; and to identify spoofed ADS-B data.
In addition to being useful for validating intruder aircraft locations for intruder aircraft that do not have an ACAS transponder on board for validation by the ownship aircraft, the techniques of this disclosure may also be compatible with other collision avoidance systems. For example, ACAS X is a system in development that is expected to provide improvements over the current ACAS II systems. ACAS X variants detect nearby aircraft by receiving sensor measurements from onboard surveillance systems and estimate the relative position and speed of these aircraft by using tracking algorithms. ACAS X definition contains in particular variations including ACAS Xa for large aircraft, and ACAS Xu, for unmanned aircraft, ACAS-Xr, for rotorcraft and ACAS-sXu, for small unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
In some examples, the ADS-B directional validation techniques may support other equipment used by aircraft to detect intruder aircraft. For example, some of detect and avoid systems use other surveillance methods, with more direct measurement processes to validate ADS-B data before the received ADS-B data is used for certain functions. An example surveillance system may include radar that may directly measure relative range, bearing, elevation angle, and range rate of intruders. Some examples of weather radar may include some intruder detection capability. In some examples, radar has faster detection of an intruder when the probable position of the intruder is known. The directional ADS-B of this disclosure may validate the probable position of an intruder what may result in less frequent validation by radar. Moreover, the ADS-B validation disclosure can improve the detection of intruders by radar, e.g., by providing accurate bearing of the intruder if the position in the ADS-B message is not valid.
The directional ADS-B of this disclosure may also estimate range rate based on signal strength of received ADS-B messages of an intruder. In contrast to other systems that may attempt to estimate range of a target from the signal strength, the directional ADS-B may estimate “range rate” based on tracking signals strengths for each intruder.
Some examples of systems that estimate range based on signal strength may include collision warning systems that switch to active interrogation if the signal strength of received messages is too high, which may indicate the intruder might close enough to be a collision hazard. Another example system may include FLARM where range of some intruders is estimated from the signal strength.
FLARM is a proprietary electronic system used to selectively alert pilots to potential collisions between aircraft with features directed to the specific needs of light aircraft. FLARM obtains its position and altitude readings from an internal GPS and a barometric sensor and then broadcasts the position together with forecast data about the future 3D flight track. At the same time, the FLARM receiver listens for other FLARM devices within range and processes the information received to provide collision prediction alerts, if needed, to the pilot of powered aircraft, helicopters, gliders, and similar general aviation aircraft as well as UAVs. However, estimation of range-only purely from the signal strength can be inaccurate for various reasons. Some reasons may include the signal can be attenuated by body of the aircraft, not all intruders send the messages with the same strength e.g., some ADS-B Out equipment can use one of various available signal strengths.
In contrast, processing circuitry for the ADS-B directional validation system of this disclosure may receive, store and track signal strengths of received ADS-B messages for each intruder separately. In other words, based on changes in the signal strength for a particular intruder over time, the processing circuitry may track a range rate for the particular intruder. The processing circuitry may compare the tracked range rate from measurements to the range rate computed for stored track of the intruder from data in the digital portion of the received ADS-B messages. In response to the tracked range rate based on signal strength differing from the computed range rate based on the transmitted data in the ADS-B message by a threshold amount, the processing circuitry of this disclosure may determine that the sequence of received ADS-B messages from the intruder is not valid.
The processing circuitry may store each respective determined signal strength at a memory location, which is operatively coupled to the processing circuitry. The processing circuitry may further track the range rate in memory from changes over time between the respective determined signal strength stored at the memory location and calculate a second range rate to the intruder based on the decoded position from ADS-B message bodies of the sequence of ADS-B messages. The processing circuitry may compare the tracked range rate in memory to the calculated second range rate. In response to the tracked range rate matching the calculated second range rate, the processing circuitry may determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages of the intruder are valid, e.g., the ADS-B messages from the intruder are not spoofed or do not contain errors in the digital portion. This range rate comparison may be additional source for ADS-B consistency reporting by the ADS-B directional validation system of this disclosure. The processing circuitry may further output an electronic signal that includes a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages and the track of range rate from measurements. The electronic signal may be received by, for example, a collision warning system which may take several different actions depending on the level of consistency, including ignoring the sequence of ADS-B messages.
As described above, a discrepancy between the computed range rate and measured (and tracked) range rate or bearing may be caused by multi-path issues, which may cause duplicate ADS-B messages received by the ownship aircraft. In some examples, the processing circuitry of the system will ignore duplicate ADS-B messages that likely were received due to multipath.
Estimating the range rate in this manner may provide several advantages compared to estimation of range alone, based on signal strength. The calculated range rate based on signal strength may be significantly more sensitive that range-only estimates because the signal strength decreases quadratically with distance. Other advantages may include that the different signal transmission strengths from different intruders may have no effect on the calculation of range rate. In other words, the signal strength tracking for a first intruder is separate from the tracking for a second intruder. Therefore, the signal strength tracking only depends on the signal strength from each respective intruder, rather than inaccuracies in the estimate because of different signal strength transmissions from different intruders. In some examples, the range rate tracking function of the ADS-B directional validation function may overcome the inaccuracies caused by attenuation from bodies of the ownship aircraft, or the intruder aircraft. Processing circuitry executing the ADS-B directional validation functions of this disclosure may reduce attenuation inaccuracies by tracking and logic that considers relative positions of the aircraft and the maneuvering or relative flight path of each of the ownship and intruder aircraft.
Antenna elements 204A-204D are arranged such that a received signal at antenna 200 may have a difference between the different antenna elements. For example, RF signal 242 may arrive at antenna element 204D before antenna element 204B and element 204C receives RF signal 242. Therefore, there may be a phase difference between the signal conducted to a beamforming network of antenna 200 from antenna element 204B and antenna element 204D. Processing circuitry coupled to antenna 200 may use these differences to calculate one or more characteristics of RF signal 242, such as an angle of arrival (AOA), e.g., bearing to the intruder that transmitted RF signal 242. Similarly, the arrangement of antenna elements 204A-204D may form spatial beams for signals transmitted from antenna 200 by varying the phase and amplitudes of signals sent by a transmission/receiving unit.
As described above in relation to
In the example of an intruder that is a commercial aircraft with ACAS, the ownship vehicle may validate the received ADS-B message by broadcasting an ACAS interrogation and waiting for a response. The ownship vehicle may also validate ADS-B messages from intruders with no ACAS capability by use of radar, but not many aircraft have intruder detection radar. However, an aircraft configured to receive ADS-B messages with the directional antenna, and with the independent ADS-B validation features of this disclosure may validate the received ADS-B message, in some examples with improved size, weight, power, and cost (SWaP-C) when compared to other surveillance technologies, such as radar.
Similarly, as described above in relation to
In some examples ownship aircraft 302 may include a stand-alone device 340 with processing circuitry 342 coupled to a memory 346 that performs the independent ADS-B validation of this disclosure.
In some examples, antenna 306 may be configured as a directional antenna, as described above in relation to
In some examples, ownship aircraft 302 may include a stand-alone device 340 with processing circuitry 342 coupled to memory 346 that performs the independent ADS-B validation of this disclosure, described above in relation to
In other examples, memory 322 may store programming instructions (344) at a memory location within memory 322 that when executed, cause one or more processors of processing circuitry 320 of aircraft existing avionics system 304 to perform the functions of the independent ADS-B validation of this disclosure described above in relation to
In some examples, processing circuitry of ownship 302 may perform the ADS-B validation function for each received ADS-B IN message. In other examples, the processing circuitry may only perform the independent ADS-B validation as needed, e.g., when the processing circuitry detects an anomaly, when the processing circuitry attempts to output an ACAS interrogation and gets not response, or based on some other criteria.
In other examples, ownship 302 may include ADS-B IN and OUT circuitry that only includes a standard omni-directional ADS-B antenna and is separate from processing circuitry 320. The directional antenna may connect to processing circuitry 320 which performs ACAS functions, but may also perform the ADS-B independent validation functions described above, e.g., receive the ADS-B IN message via the directional antenna and calculate an angle of arrival based on phase and/or amplitude differences between the antenna elements of the directional antenna. Processing circuitry 320 may communicate with the separate ADS-B circuitry to receive a location of the intruder based on the decoded ADS-B message. Processing circuitry 320 may compare the angle of arrival and the calculated bearing to the intruder based on the decoded location. As described above in relation to
Examples of processing circuitry 320, and 342, may include any one or more of a microcontroller (MCU), e.g. a computer on a single integrated circuit containing a processor core, memory, and programmable input/output peripherals, a microprocessor (μP), e.g. a central processing unit (CPU) on a single integrated circuit (IC), a controller, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a system on chip (SoC) or equivalent discrete or integrated logic circuitry. A processor may be integrated circuitry, i.e., integrated processing circuitry, and that the integrated processing circuitry may be realized as fixed hardware processing circuitry, programmable processing circuitry and/or a combination of both fixed and programmable processing circuitry. Accordingly, the terms “processing circuitry,” “processor” or “controller,” as used herein, may refer to any one or more of the foregoing structures or any other structure operable to perform techniques described herein.
Examples of memory 322 may include any type of non-transitory computer-readable storage media, such as random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), programmable read only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM), one-time programable (OTP) memory, electronically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM), flash memory, or another type of volatile or non-volatile memory device. In some examples the computer readable storage media may store instructions that cause processing circuitry 320 to execute the functions described herein. In some examples, the computer readable storage media may store data, such as configuration information, temporary values and other types of data used to perform the functions of this disclosure at a memory location of memory 322.
Processing circuitry 320, or 342, may receive traffic data comprising target state information of a target, e.g., aircraft 332, derived from received ADS-B messages. As described above in relation to
In some examples, processing circuitry 320, or 342, may determine from the ADS-B receiver with directional antenna: measured bearing and signal strength for each ADS-B message; and latitude, longitude, heading, and velocity from corresponding ADS-B digital message bodies. The processing circuitry may track the inputs for each intruder to rule out temporal sensor malfunctions or incorrect bearing readings caused by multipath issues. In some examples, the processing circuitry may ignore duplicate ADS-B messages that likely were received due to multipath. As noted above, the processing circuitry may compare the measured, e.g., tracked, bearing to the digital values from the ADS-B message bodies. The processing circuitry may report the true bearing, true range rate and the level of consistency, e.g., the degree to which the digital/computed and measured bearings and range rates match, to the receiving systems of aircraft avionics systems 304 that depend on ADS-B positions. The report may be included in an electronic signal sent to the receiving systems. The receiving systems of avionics 304 may use the consistency information for different use cases. For instance, a receiving system may ignore inconsistent ADS-B messages when performing traffic collision prediction calculations, which may avoid nuisance alerts to the flight crew. In some examples, inconsistent ADS-B messages describing an aircraft location may still be displayed to the flight crew, but the display may include an indication that the displayed location is suspect, e.g., a color code, a flag or some similar indication.
As described above in relation to
As described above in relation to
The techniques of this disclosure may also be described in the following examples.
Example 1: An airborne system comprising: receiver circuitry configured to receive automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) messages; a directional antenna; and processing circuitry configured to: receive an ownship position and attitude based on ownship navigation and avionics systems; receive an ADS-B message, of a sequence of ADS-B messages from an intruder via the directional antenna; compute a bearing to the intruder based on: phase analysis of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna; and from the ownship position and/or attitude; incorporate the computed bearing to the track of measured bearings of the intruder, wherein the track of measured bearings is based on the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder; receive from the receiver circuitry, a position of the intruder decoded from digital content of the ADS-B message, calculate a second bearing to the intruder based on the decoded position and from the ownship position and/or ownship attitude; compare the track of measured bearings to the second bearing; and in response to the track of measured bearings matching the second bearing: determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder are valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a tracked bearing to the intruder.
Example 2: The system of example 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages is invalid in response to determining that the track of measured bearings fails to match the second bearing.
Example 3: The system of any of examples 1 and 2, wherein the processing circuitry of the system is further configured to ignore received ADS-B messages that the processing circuitry determines are invalid.
Example 4: The system of any of examples 1 through 3, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to determine that the ADS-B message is not valid based on the track of measured bearing differing from the second bearing by more than a predetermined threshold.
Example 5: The system of any of examples 1 through 4, wherein the directional antenna is configured to receive airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) responses from a transponder at a first time, and wherein the directional antenna is configured to receive the ADS-B message at a second time different from the first time.
Example 6: The system of any of examples 1 through 5, wherein the receiver circuitry comprises the processing circuitry.
Example 7: The system of any of examples 1 through 6, wherein the receiver circuitry is configured to receive the ADS-B messages via an omni-directional antenna.
Example 8: The system of any of examples 1 through 7, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to: determine a signal strength for each respective received ADS-B message of the sequence of ADS-B messages from the intruder; store each respective determined signal strength at a memory location operatively coupled to the processing circuitry; track the range rate in memory from changes over time between the respective determined signal strength stored at the memory location and history of attitudes; and calculate a second range rate to the intruder based on the decoded positions from ADS-B message bodies of the sequence of ADS-B messages and ownship positions; compare the tracked range rate in memory to the calculated second range rate; and in response to the tracked range rate matching the calculated second range rate: determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages of the intruder are valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a tracked range rate to the intruder.
Example 9: A device comprising receiver circuitry configured to: receive automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) messages; and connect to a directional antenna; and processing circuitry configured to: receive an ownship position and attitude based on ownship navigation and avionics systems, receive an ADS-B message, of a sequence of ADS-B messages from an intruder via the directional antenna; compute a bearing to the intruder based on: phase analysis of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna; and from the ownship position; incorporate the computed bearing to the track of measured bearings of the intruder, wherein the track of measured bearings is based on the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder; receive from the receiver circuitry, a position of the intruder decoded from digital content of the ADS-B message, calculate a second bearing to the intruder based on the decoded position and from the ownship position and/or attitude; compare the track of measured bearings to the second bearing; and in response to the track of measured bearings matching the second bearing: determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder are valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a tracked bearing to the intruder.
Example 10: The device of example 9, wherein the device is configured to connect between the directional antenna and one or more avionics systems on an aircraft.
Example 11: The device of any of examples 9 and 10, wherein the directional antenna is configured to receive airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) responses from a transponder at a first time, and wherein the directional antenna is configured to receive the ADS-B message at a second time different from the first time.
Example 12: The device of any of examples 9 through 11, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages is invalid in response to determining that the track of measured bearings fails to match the second bearing.
Example 13: The device of any of examples 9 through 12, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to ignore received ADS-B messages that the processing circuitry determines are invalid.
Example 14: The device of any of examples 9 through 13, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to determine that the ADS-B message is not valid based on the track of measured bearing differing from the second bearing by more than a predetermined threshold range.
Example 15: The device of any of examples 9 through 14, wherein the received ADS-B message is a first ADS-B message of a sequence of ADS-B messages from the intruder, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to: determine a signal strength for each respective received ADS-B message of the sequence of ADS-B messages from the intruder; store each respective determined signal strength at a memory location operatively coupled to the processing circuitry ; track the range rate in memory from changes over time between the respective determined signal strength stored at the memory location and history of attitudes; and calculate a second range rate to the intruder based on the decoded positions from ADS-B message bodies of the sequence of ADS-B messages and ownship positions; compare the tracked range rate in memory to the calculated second range rate; and in response to the tracked range rate matching the calculated second range rate: determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages of the intruder are valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a tracked range rate to the intruder.
Example 16: A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions that, when executed, cause processing circuitry of a computing device to: receive an ownship position and attitude based on ownship navigation and avionics systems; receive automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) messages from receiver circuitry operatively coupled to a directional antenna; compute a bearing to the intruder based on: phase analysis of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna; and from the ownship position; incorporate the computed bearing to the track of measured bearings of the intruder, wherein the track of measured bearings is based on the sequence of ADS-B messages received from the intruder; receive from the receiver circuitry, a position of the intruder decoded from digital content of the ADS-B message, calculate a second bearing to the intruder based on the decoded position of the intruder and from the ownship position and/or an ownship attitude; compare the track of measured bearings to the second bearing; and in response to the track of measured bearings matching the second bearing: determine that the ADS-B message is valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a tracked bearing to the intruder.
Example 17: The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of example 16, further comprising instructions for causing the processing circuitry to ignore the sequence of received ADS-B messages that the processing circuitry determines are invalid.
Example 18: The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of any of examples 16 and 17, further comprising instructions for causing the processing circuitry to determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages is not valid based on the track of measured bearings differing from the second bearing by more than a predetermined threshold.
Example 19: The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of any of examples 16 through 18, wherein the received ADS-B message is a first ADS-B message of a sequence of ADS-B messages from the intruder, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to: determine a signal strength for each respective received ADS-B message of the sequence of ADS-B messages from the intruder; store each respective determined signal strength at a memory location operatively coupled to the processing circuitry; track the range rate in memory based on changes over time between the respective determined signal strength stored at the memory location and history of attitudes; and calculate a second range rate to the intruder based on the decoded positions from ADS-B message bodies of the sequence of ADS-B messages and ownship positions; compare the tracked range rate in memory to the calculated second range rate; and in response to the tracked range rate matching the calculated second range rate: determine that the sequence of ADS-B messages of the intruder are valid; and output an electronic signal that includes: a validity status for the sequence of ADS-B messages; and a tracked range rate to the intruder.
Example 20: The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of any of examples 16 through 19, wherein the processing circuitry is configured compute the bearing to the intruder based on the phase analysis and an amplitude of the received ADS-B message from the directional antenna and the tracked range rate.
In one or more examples, the functions described above may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. For example, the various components of
Instructions may be executed by one or more processors, such as one or more digital signal processors (DSPs), general purpose microprocessors, application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), Field programmable gate array (FPGAs), or other equivalent integrated or discrete logic circuitry. Accordingly, the term “processor,” and “processing circuitry” as used herein, such as may refer to any of the foregoing structure or any other structure suitable for implementation of the techniques described herein. Also, the techniques could be fully implemented in one or more circuits or logic elements.
The techniques of this disclosure may be implemented in a wide variety of devices or apparatuses, including a wireless handset, an integrated circuit (IC) or a sequence of ICs (e.g., a chip set). Various components, modules, or units are described in this disclosure to emphasize functional aspects of devices configured to perform the disclosed techniques, but do not necessarily require realization by different hardware units. Rather, as described above, various units may be combined in a hardware unit or provided by a collection of interoperative hardware units, including one or more processors as described
Various examples of the disclosure have been described. These and other examples are within the scope of the following claims.
| Number | Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22305594.8 | Apr 2022 | EP | regional |
