1. Field of Invention
The present invention relates to an anti-virus method based on a security chip. By taking the security chip as a trusted root, a computer key file such as a BIOS code file, a MBR code file, a trusted file, etc is made a safe backup and intelligently restored, and a function for monitoring a file is executed when an operating system is run, so as to implement a safe start of the operating system. Therefore, the running of a malicious program is avoided, in order to achieve a purpose for defending known and unknown viruses.
2. Description of Prior Art
Currently, there are various solutions for achieving similar purpose. For example, in a common anti-virus method known in the prior art, a virus scanning engine is used to scan and monitor memory and hard disk files; a comparison is made according to a signatures database; and an alarm and a clean-up operations are performed when a virus is found. However, the disadvantage of this method is that only known viruses may be found, and processes before and during which the operating system is started could not be monitored, since this method works after the operating system is started.
There is also an operating system restoration method. In this method, a kernel file of the operating system is made a backup by using HPA of a hard disk. When the kernel file and the backup file are verified not in accordance with each other, a user is prompted to make a restoration or backup. The disadvantage of this method is that it doesn't take TPM security chip technique and is lack of security, while there are so many possibilities of HPA being attacked or changed and it is also hard to find backup files has being tampered.
Therefore, an anti-virus method based on a security chip is desirable, which could prevent a malicious program from running before and during the operating system is started, so as to implement the purpose for defending known and unknown viruses.
The present invention is proposed in order to overcome defects in the prior art. An object of the present invention is to provide an anti-virus method based on a security chip. By taking the security chip as a trusted root, a computer key file such as a BIOS code file, a MBR code file, a trusted file, etc is made a safe backup and intelligently restored, and a function for monitoring a file is executed when an operating system is run, so as to implement a safe start of the operating system. Therefore, the running of a malicious program is avoided, in order to achieve a purpose for defending known and unknown viruses.
For achieving the object of the present invention as discussed above, an anti-virus method based on a security chip is provided according to the present invention. The method comprises steps of: storing, in a memory of the security chip, a hash value obtained by a hashing operation for a computer key file and a system control program; and storing, in a backup storage area, a backup file of the computer key file; verifying the integrity of the system control program by using the hash value of the system control program stored in the memory of the security chip, when power up; if the system control program is integral, executing a control, and verifying the integrity of the computer key file, by the system control program, with the hash value of the computer key file stored in the memory of the security chip; and if all the computer key files are integral, starting an operating system; on the contrary, if any of the computer key files is not integral, restoring the computer key file by using the backup file of the computer key file stored in the backup storage area.
Preferably, the computer key file comprises a BIOS code file, a MBR code file, and trusted files.
Preferably, the step of verifying the integrity of the computer key file by the system control program using the hash value of the computer key file stored in the memory of the security chip comprises a step of: verifying integrity of the BIOS code file, the MBR code file and the trusted file sequentially, by the system control program, with hash values of the BIOS code file, the MBR code file and the trusted file stored in the memory of the security chip.
Preferably, the backup storage area is a hard disk protected area.
Preferably, the method further comprises steps of: when operating system is started, verifying the integrity of the trusted file in real-time, by the system control program, using the hash value of the trusted file stored in the memory of the security chip; if the trusted file is integral and a file which is to be run exists in a trusted list, allowing the running of the file which is to be run; otherwise, forbidding the running of the file which is to be run.
Preferably, the step of verifying the integrity of the system control program by using the hash value of the system control program stored in the memory of the security chip comprises steps of: obtaining a hash value of current system control program by performing a hashing operation which is the same as said hashing operation for the current system control program; comparing this hash value with the hash value of the system control program stored in the memory of the security chip; and if the two hash values are in accordance with each other, the current system control program is integral.
Preferably, the step of verifying the integrity of the computer key file with the hash value of the computer key file stored in the memory of the security chip comprises a step of: obtaining a hash value of a current computer key file by performing a hashing operation which is the same as said hashing operation for the current computer key file; comparing the hash value with the hash value of the computer key file stored in the memory of the security chip; and if the two hash values are in accordance with each other, the current computer key file is integral.
Preferably, the hash value stored in the memory of the security chip is obtained by performing the hashing operation twice.
Preferably, two hashing functions are identical in the hashing operation which is performed twice.
Preferably, two hashing functions are different in the hashing operation which is performed twice.
Preferably, the trusted file is a clean operating system core file.
Preferably, the memory of the security chip is protected by authentication of the security chip.
Hereinafter, the present invention will be further described in detail by referring to the drawings and the preferred embodiments in order to make the objects, technical scheme and advantages of the present invention more apparent. In the figures:
The technical principle of the present invention is in that: by taking a security chip as a trusted root, an integrity check is performed to respective sectors during the start of a system, and a trusted relationship is transferred to establish a trusted computing environment for a whole computer system, thereby to achieve an anti-virus purpose.
A preferred embodiment according to the present invention will be described by referring to the drawings.
As shown in
Similarly, a correct MBR code file and its hash value are pre-stored in the HPA area, and a hash value obtained by further performing a hashing operation for the original hash value is stored in a memory of a security chip.
Similarly, a trusted file list is pre-created. Trusted files (they are mainly clean operating system core files) in the list and their hash value are pre-stored in the HPA area, and hash values obtained by further performing a hashing operation for the original hash values of the trusted file are stored in a memory of a security chip.
Finally, a system control program file and its hash value are also stored in the HPA area, and a hash value obtained by further performing a hashing operation for the original hash value is stored in a memory of a security chip.
In summary, hash values obtained by performing the hashing operation once for the BIOS code file, the MBR code file, the trusted file and the system control program file are stored in the HPA area. Furthermore, the BIOS code file, the MBR code file, the trusted file and the system control program file are also stored in the HPA area, which are used for restoration when they are tampered. Hash values obtained by performing the hashing operation twice for the BIOS code file, the MBR code file, the trusted file and the system control program file are stored in the memory of a security chip, which are used for verifying before and after the computer is started, as described in detail below.
It should be noted that by way of an example, as shown in
As illustrated in
After the operating system is started (step 219), the system control program monitors state of the trusted file in real-time (step 221). That is to say, the hash value of the trusted file obtained by the hashing operation which is performed twice is compared with the corresponding hash value stored in the memory of the security chip, in order to check the integrity of the trusted file. If the hash value is not in accordance with the hash value stored in the security chip (“No” in step 221), it may be restored or updated automatically according to the selection of the user (step 229). The restoration process is similar to the restoration process as described above. On the contrary, if they are in accordance with each other (“Yes” in step 221), it is checked whether the file to be run is in the trusted list (step 223). If the file is not in the trusted list (“No” in step 223), it may not be run according to the selection of the user (step 231). This approach may achieve the purpose for defending the known or unknown viruses without depending on the virus feature library, so that various viruses can not be run in the system. On the contrary, if the program exists in the trusted list (“Yes” in step 223), the program is allowed to be run.
It should be noted that two hashing functions used by the hashing operation which is performed twice as mentioned above may be either identical or different.
According to the present invention, the security chip is used to store system key information, which is of high security and may guarantee the security of the HPA, and an integrity measurement approach at the hard drive level may be provided. Furthermore, in the present invention, independent of the protected operating system, the integrity measurement is performed to the key sectors on system start-up (such as the hard disk information and the operating system core file) sequentially since BIOS, which may provide a protection in a lower-level and more thoroughly than common anti-virus software.
The above is only the preferred embodiments of the present invention and the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. Therefore, any modifications, substitutions and improvements to the present invention are possible without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.
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2005 1 0136600 | Dec 2005 | CN | national |
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PCT/CN2006/000477 | 3/23/2006 | WO | 00 | 9/11/2008 |
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WO2007/085137 | 8/2/2007 | WO | A |
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