Authentication is an important aspect of on-line communication between various parties, such as service providers and individual users. In order to use a web service offered by a service provider, a user may need to confirm his identity to the service provider. The service provider may implement an authentication service locally or use an external identity provider to confirm the user's identity. When using an external identity provider, the service provider may request the identity confirmation via a standard API and may receive a verified user identity as a response. When using the web service, the user may share personal data with the service provider.
A common way for implementing authentication for both local implementations and external identify provider services is based on the use of a username and a password as authentication credentials. Password-based authentication, however, can be problematic. Usernames or passwords can be forgotten, stolen, or unintentionally exposed.
This disclosure provides methods and apparatuses for creating a verified mutually authenticated transaction between a service provider and an on-line identity for a physical client person. A dynamic optical mark may be displayed on a device screen where the physical client person is using a web service. The dynamic optical mark may be recognized via scanning the dynamic optical mark by a personal mobile device equipped with a camera.
The verified mutually authenticated transaction between the service provider and the on-line identity for the physical client person may be used for sharing personal data of the physical client person by using out-of-band optical mark recognition of the dynamic optical mark. The verified mutually authenticated transaction may be initiated with a time-limited one-time password comprising a sequence of numbers encoded in the dynamic optical mark.
The on-line identity for the physical client person may be authenticated to the web service by signing a transaction completion request with a private key and a corresponding public key stored within the web service may be used for verification. The on-line identity may be verified by personal biometry. The private key may be stored at a hardware encrypted storage (TPM) of the personal mobile device.
An authorization assertion may be constructed and passed to the service provider. The authorization assertion may be in a form of a OAuth2 token, SAML token, RP token or another provider supported technology.
In the following description of examples, reference is made to the accompanying drawings which form a part hereof, and in which it is shown by way of illustration specific examples that can be practiced. It is to be understood that other examples are can be used and structural changes can be made without departing from the scope of the disclosed examples.
According to one aspect, a cloud-based service, or cloud service, is described which implements means to create a verified mutually authenticated transaction between a service provider and an on-line identity securely tied to a physical person with a custom mandatory security step integrated. In one example, the custom step involves displaying of a specially formed dynamic optical mark on the device where client is using web service (e.g., authorized email), and recognition of this mark via scanning it by client personal smartphone.
The client personal smartphone may hold a personal client certificate created during enrollment procedure. The personal smartphone may manage client authorization, provide full control of the stored personal data, manage the access to personal data from third-parties. Client can revoke the third-party access at any time. On the other hand, the communication between client personal smartphone and the cloud service (implemented via, e.g., an API layer and a database) may be encrypted by personal client certificate and can be performed by public networks without security flaw too.
Instead of directly providing authorization credentials, a client may use his/her personal smartphone as identity provider after mark recognition. User may specify the part of the personal data that he/she wants to share with the third-party. No sensitive data (including client credentials, client profile list, etc.) other than explicitly allowed by user for this third-party may be transferred through the computer and network used for accessing of third-party service. No direct communication may be performed between the computer and client smartphone apart from optical mark recognition. Sensitive data management may be leveraged to the client smartphone.
Client may have a number of personal data sets (profiles) stored in the single account. When a personal data is requested by the third-party, the client may have the ability to choose the profile to be shared.
Additional security level can be enabled at the smartphone by using available built-in capabilities such as device-wide password protected lock, retina scanning, fingerprint scanning. Moreover, additional security level can be enabled for different profiles separately.
In one example, the solution uniquely features ability to initiate each transaction with a sequence of numbers encoded in a proprietary dynamic optical code (see, e.g., U.S. Ser. No. 62/248,605, entitled “Palette-Based Optical Recognition Code Generators and Decoders,” the entire content of which is incorporated by reference herein). These numbers may represent the time-limited one-time password (TOTP) represented in a form of a series of static optical marks. Only third-parties who are authenticated to the service can initiate transactions. Dynamic nature of the optical code may provide sufficient encoding depth and channel robustness for the high level of password security.
To complete the transaction, the code may be read through a mobile phone camera. The optical nature of the code recognition may create an out-of-band transaction verification channel air-gapped from the network over which the digital service is provided.
Client's on-line identity may authenticate to the service by signing its transaction completion request with its private key stored in the phone's hardware encrypted storage (TPM). Corresponding public key needed for verification may be stored within the service.
Once the client is authenticated, authorization assertion, which could take a form of a OAuth2 token, SAML token, RP token or another provider supported technology, may be passed to the third-party, creating a closed-loop process.
In case the mobile phone is compromised, a new set of private/public key pair may be issued. A key pair may correspond to the mobile device, or can be created individually for each of the on-line identities (profiles) registered for the physical person.
Transactions that require lower level of security can implement the protocol partially. Transactions that require multiple independent providers can also be supported.
The cloud service can be implemented via, e.g., API layer(s) and database(s) that are run on server(s), such as Linux server(s). The client personal smartphone or mobile phone may be examples of a personal mobile device. The functionalities of each computing device mentioned in this disclosure (e.g., server, personal mobile device, computer) can be performed by suitable logic circuitry in or for that computing device. For example, suitable logic circuitry may include processor(s) that, when executing instruction implemented in software program(s) stored in processor-readable storage medium(s) (e.g., memory) in or for that computing device, performs that computing device's functionalities. As another example, suitable logic circuitry may include hardware logic circuitry, such as a programmable logic device or an application-specific integrated circuit, implementing logic designs that provide that computing device's functionalities. As yet another example, suitable logic circuitry for that computing device may include an implementation that combines both processor(s) running software and hardware logic circuitry.
The following workflows describe exemplary processes of partner registration, user registration, user authorization on the example of OAuth2 protocol used for data sharing.
Third-Party Partner Registration
To get personal information about particular client, third-party partner may need to be registered providing administrator email, service name, service base URL, URL for OAuth2 redirect required access level and arbitrary secret key. These registration data may be stored in the database 160.
Third-party administrator may provide additional information on how to verify the owner of the domain and payment information.
Workflow for User Registration at Mobile Application
User may install the application 120 at his smartphone 140 and start it.
A Sign Up view of application 120 may be displayed.
User may navigate to the Sign Up screen and follow the sign up procedure providing his email.
Application 120 may send the given email to the cloud service 180 over TLS connection using temporary asymmetric RSA key pair for this communication. TLS connection can also be known as SSL connection.
An account record may be created for the user, having stored user email. An activation link may be sent to user email.
A message may be shown to the user informing him that the enrollment procedure is pending and he should check email. A scanner view of the application 120 may be displayed with all UI controls related to user profile disabled.
User may navigate to the activation link on another computer. A special dynamic optical mark 122 for enrollment procedure may be displayed. Optical mark 122 may encode registration session identifier.
User may scan the given optical mark 122 by pointing smartphone camera 142 to the optical mark 122 having application 120 in the foreground.
Application 120 may send the scanned code to the cloud service 180 over TLS (or SSL) connection using temporary asymmetric RSA key pair for this communication.
If recognized code matches to stored registration session identifier then cloud service 180 may return the unique user identifier and certificate signing token to the application 120.
Application 120 may generate a new personal asymmetric RSA key pair and store the private key at the smartphone 140 in protected storage space 144.
X.509 certificate signing request may be created using the personal key pair and given user identifier.
Application 120 may send the X.509 certificate signing request and certificate signing token to the cloud service 180 over TLS (or SSL) connection using temporary asymmetric RSA key pair for this communication.
Cloud service 180 may match user identifier with X.509 certificate signing request and certificate signing token, sign the X.509 certificate and return signed personal X.509 certificate to the application 120.
Application 120 may store the personal X.509 certificate at the smartphone 140 in protected storage space 144 and enable UI controls related to user profile.
User may create and fill in at least one profile in the application 120.
Application 120 may send profile data to the cloud service 180 over TLS (or SSL) connection using personal X.509 certificate.
Cloud service 180 may identify user by personal X.509 certificate and store the profile information.
Application 120 may be ready to scan optical marks to perform user authorization at third-parties.
Workflow for User Certification Invalidation
Personal user certificate invalidation may be performed at the following circumstances.
When mobile application 120 tries to perform any request over TLS (or SSL) connection using revoked/expired personal X.509 certificate, the cloud service 180 may return special error code denoting the using certificate is invalid and should be deleted.
Application 120 may check if the server certificate matches the one stored at the application 120, removes certificate and RSA key pair from the keychain and show Sign Up view.
User may have to follow the “Workflow for user authorization at the application using another device (or in the case of personal X.509 certificate revocation/expiration)” below.
Workflow for User Authorization at the Application Using Another Device (or in the Case of Personal X.509 Certificate Revocation/Expiration)
User may install the application 120 at a new smartphone 140 and start it, or User may start the application 120 having invalid (e.g., revoked or expired) personal X.509 certificate.
A Sign Up view of the application 120 may be displayed.
User may navigate to the Sign Up screen and may follow the sign up procedure providing his email.
Application 120 may send the given email to the cloud service 180 over TLS (or SSL) connection using temporary asymmetric RSA key pair for this communication.
Cloud service 180 may find user account by given email. An activation link may be sent to user email.
A message may be shown to the user informing him that the enrollment procedure is pending and he should check email. A scanner view of the application 120 may be displayed with all UI controls related to user profile disabled.
User may navigate to the activation link on another computer. A special dynamic optical mark 122 for enrollment procedure may be displayed.
User may scan the given optical mark 122 by pointing smartphone camera 142 to the optical mark 122 having application 120 in the foreground.
Application 120 may send the scanned code to the cloud service 180 over TLS (or SSL) connection using temporary asymmetric RSA key pair for this communication.
Cloud service 180 may return the unique user identifier and certificate signing token to the application 120.
Application 120 may generate a new personal asymmetric RSA key pair and store the private key at the smartphone 140 in protected storage space 144.
X.509 certificate signing request may be created using the personal key pair and given user identifier.
Application 120 may send the X.509 certificate signing request and certificate signing token to the cloud service 180 over TLS (or SSL) connection using temporary asymmetric RSA key pair for this communication.
Cloud service 180 may match user identifier with X.509 certificate signing request and certificate signing token, sign the X.509 certificate and return signed personal X.509 certificate to the application 120.
Application 120 may store the personal X.509 certificate at the smartphone 140 in protected storage space 144 and enable UI controls related to user profile.
User may create and fill in at least one profile in the application 120.
Application 120 sends profile data to the cloud service 180 over TLS (or SSL) connection using personal X.509 certificate.
Cloud service 180 may identify user by personal X.509 certificate and store the profile information.
Application 120 may be ready to scan optical marks to perform user authorization at third-parties.
Workflow for User Authorization at a Partner Web Service
User may click at the special link at the partner web service.
Third-party may redirect user browser to a special web page for custom authorization.
A new authorization session may be created in the cloud service 180. A random session code, random dynamic optical mark code, access token, and one-time OAuth2 code may be generated and stored in the authorization session record.
The custom authorization page may display special dynamic optical mark 122 to user and display information on which data will be available to the partner. A polling may be performed to check if mark 122 is already recognized.
User may start the application 120 and direct smartphone camera 142 to the dynamic optical mark 122 displayed at the page.
Application 120 may recognize the dynamic optical mark 122 and send its code over TLS (or SSL) connection using personal X.509 certificate.
Cloud service 180 may identify source user by personal X.509 certificate and associate user identifier with the authorization session.
If user has already authorized with this partner:
If user has not already authorized with this partner:
If the selected profile and access levels require multi-factor procedure:
Cloud service 180 may return “finish” state to the application 120.
Application 120 may return to the main scanner view.
Custom authorization page may redirect user browser back to the partner web service (HTTPS back redirect URL is mandatory) with the one-time OAuth2 code in the GET parameter.
Partner web service may make a request to cloud service 180 via TLS (or SSL) connection providing partner web service identifier, given one-time OAuth2 code and secret partner key.
Cloud service 180 may search the given one-time OAuth2 code and returns the stored authorization session access token to the partner if match and the state of the authorization session is active.
Partner web service may now have an access token which may enable it to make requests to the cloud service 180.
Partner web service may make a request to cloud service 180 using given access token to fetch user unique identifier, first and last name and any other required private information. Cloud service 180 may return requested data if the state of the authorization session is active.
User may see his name at the partner website and can act as an authorized user.
Partner website may contain a link that makes user to logout. This link may pass the session code for the authorization session to be invalidated in the cloud service 180. Alternatively, user can break the authorization session at the partner web service at any time using “Remove Application” feature in the mobile application 120.
It should be noted that the practice of the present disclosure is not limited to the above-described examples. Those of ordinary skill in the art may perform modification or variation in accordance with the foregoing description, and all such modifications and variations should fall into the scope of the appended claims of the present disclosure.
This application is a continuation of co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/721,899, filed Sep. 30, 2017, and titled “AUTHENTICATION AND PERSONAL DATA SHARING FOR PARTNER SERVICES USING OUT-OF-BAND OPTICAL MARK RECOGNITION” which claims benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/402,728, filed Sep. 30, 2016, which are all hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety for all purposes.
Number | Name | Date | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
D607009 | McEnaney | Dec 2009 | S |
D614192 | Takano | Apr 2010 | S |
7885635 | Laursen | Feb 2011 | B2 |
7992102 | De Angelo | Aug 2011 | B1 |
8363259 | Gilboa | Jan 2013 | B2 |
8417642 | Oren | Apr 2013 | B2 |
8543834 | Barra | Sep 2013 | B1 |
8621209 | Johansson | Dec 2013 | B1 |
8639785 | Kiley | Jan 2014 | B2 |
8892871 | Cho | Nov 2014 | B2 |
D719176 | Cohen | Dec 2014 | S |
D719177 | Cohen | Dec 2014 | S |
D723050 | Minsung et al. | Feb 2015 | S |
9112835 | Isozaki | Aug 2015 | B2 |
9210156 | Little | Dec 2015 | B1 |
9219732 | Baghdasaryan | Dec 2015 | B2 |
9392460 | Blake | Jul 2016 | B1 |
9419951 | Felsher et al. | Aug 2016 | B1 |
D765669 | Shaw | Sep 2016 | S |
9706406 | Adams | Jul 2017 | B1 |
D800764 | Thoreson | Oct 2017 | S |
9852418 | Mardikar | Dec 2017 | B2 |
D813884 | Penker | Mar 2018 | S |
9959694 | Lindsay | May 2018 | B2 |
9961547 | Molina-Markham | May 2018 | B1 |
10019561 | Shelton | Jul 2018 | B1 |
10200364 | Ketharaju et al. | Feb 2019 | B1 |
D847857 | Elatta | May 2019 | S |
10402800 | Lucas | Sep 2019 | B2 |
10521223 | Bogushefsky, III | Dec 2019 | B1 |
10810290 | Minter et al. | Oct 2020 | B2 |
D916890 | Nagpal | Apr 2021 | S |
10970607 | Xue | Apr 2021 | B2 |
11005839 | Shahidzadeh | May 2021 | B1 |
11030618 | Budko | Jun 2021 | B1 |
11038694 | Kleinman | Jun 2021 | B1 |
D925602 | Xu | Jul 2021 | S |
D928803 | Faller | Aug 2021 | S |
D928820 | Bodduluri | Aug 2021 | S |
11121878 | McCarty | Sep 2021 | B2 |
20020099955 | Peled | Jul 2002 | A1 |
20030016844 | Numaoka | Jan 2003 | A1 |
20040223616 | Kocarev | Nov 2004 | A1 |
20060031301 | Herz et al. | Sep 2006 | A1 |
20060196950 | Kiliccote | Sep 2006 | A1 |
20080301057 | Oren | Dec 2008 | A1 |
20090194592 | Ming et al. | Aug 2009 | A1 |
20090315671 | Gocho | Dec 2009 | A1 |
20100079591 | Lee | Apr 2010 | A1 |
20110072142 | Herz et al. | Mar 2011 | A1 |
20110167255 | Matzkel | Jul 2011 | A1 |
20110187642 | Faith | Aug 2011 | A1 |
20110233284 | Howard | Sep 2011 | A1 |
20110302405 | Marlow | Dec 2011 | A1 |
20120214442 | Crawford | Aug 2012 | A1 |
20120221859 | Marten | Aug 2012 | A1 |
20120272058 | Wang et al. | Oct 2012 | A1 |
20130086625 | Driscoll | Apr 2013 | A1 |
20130111208 | Sabin | May 2013 | A1 |
20140039892 | Mills | Feb 2014 | A1 |
20140040628 | Fort | Feb 2014 | A1 |
20140244514 | Rodriguez | Aug 2014 | A1 |
20140278077 | Levin | Sep 2014 | A1 |
20150089568 | Sprague | Mar 2015 | A1 |
20150242601 | Griffiths | Aug 2015 | A1 |
20150242605 | Du | Aug 2015 | A1 |
20150271679 | Park | Sep 2015 | A1 |
20150278805 | Spencer, III | Oct 2015 | A1 |
20150294092 | Balasubramanian | Oct 2015 | A1 |
20150347734 | Beigi | Dec 2015 | A1 |
20150356289 | Brown | Dec 2015 | A1 |
20150373007 | Shelter | Dec 2015 | A1 |
20160011224 | Pollack | Jan 2016 | A1 |
20160057623 | Dutt | Feb 2016 | A1 |
20160065570 | Spencer | Mar 2016 | A1 |
20160110528 | Gupta | Apr 2016 | A1 |
20160180078 | Chhabra | Jun 2016 | A1 |
20160182503 | Cheng | Jun 2016 | A1 |
20160227411 | Lundblade | Aug 2016 | A1 |
20160239649 | Zhao | Aug 2016 | A1 |
20160239657 | Loughlin-Mchugh | Aug 2016 | A1 |
20160283406 | Linga | Sep 2016 | A1 |
20160342873 | Feld et al. | Nov 2016 | A1 |
20170013453 | Lee | Jan 2017 | A1 |
20170041309 | Ekambaram | Feb 2017 | A1 |
20170063528 | Seo | Mar 2017 | A1 |
20170193211 | Blake | Jul 2017 | A1 |
20170272419 | Kumar | Sep 2017 | A1 |
20170289168 | Bar | Oct 2017 | A1 |
20170339118 | Hwang | Nov 2017 | A1 |
20180005239 | Schlesinger | Jan 2018 | A1 |
20180012003 | Asulin | Jan 2018 | A1 |
20180025135 | Odom | Jan 2018 | A1 |
20180039990 | Lindemann | Feb 2018 | A1 |
20180114221 | Karantzis | Apr 2018 | A1 |
20180135815 | Rowles | May 2018 | A1 |
20180167816 | Kusens et al. | Jun 2018 | A1 |
20180285879 | Gadnis | Oct 2018 | A1 |
20180302416 | Einberg | Oct 2018 | A1 |
20180329857 | Ko | Nov 2018 | A1 |
20190207918 | Kurian | Jul 2019 | A1 |
20190268774 | Kusens et al. | Aug 2019 | A1 |
20190281025 | Harriman | Sep 2019 | A1 |
20190281036 | Eisen | Sep 2019 | A1 |
20190342092 | Handschuh | Nov 2019 | A1 |
20200042723 | Krishnamoorthy | Feb 2020 | A1 |
20200050745 | Kim | Feb 2020 | A1 |
20200053096 | Bendersky | Feb 2020 | A1 |
20200162435 | Kubo | May 2020 | A1 |
20200175157 | Wilding | Jun 2020 | A1 |
20200358787 | Barker | Nov 2020 | A1 |
20200403787 | Islam | Dec 2020 | A1 |
20200403992 | Huffman | Dec 2020 | A1 |
20210014314 | Yamada | Jan 2021 | A1 |
20210250759 | Ziv | Aug 2021 | A1 |
Number | Date | Country |
---|---|---|
107924475 | Apr 2018 | CN |
2016179433 | Nov 2016 | WO |
Entry |
---|
Magoon, Owais, “iOS app.” Behance, published Sep. 7, 2015 (Retrieved from the Internet Mar. 22, 2021). Internet URL: <https://www.behance.net/gallery/27383661/iOS-app> (Year: 2015). |
Bywater Films. “Winkk: Emotion to Action.” Vimeo, published Oct. 7, 2015 (Retrieved from the Internet Mar. 22, 2021). Internet URL: <https://vimeo.com/141695923> (Year:2015). |
Schiff, Eli, “Unofficial Apple Icon Design Awards.” Eli Schiff Blog, published Jan. 5, 2016 (Retrieved from the Internet Mar. 22, 2021), Internet URL: <www.elischiff.com/blog/2016/1/5/apple-icon-design-awards> (Year: 2016). |
Li et al., “Addressable Metasurfaces for Dynamic Holography and Optical Information Encryption”, Jun. 15, 2018, http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/6/eaar6768.full.pdf. |
International Search Report and Written Report for the International Application No. PCT/JS2020/064099 dated Mar. 16, 2021. |
International Report on Patentability from International Application No. PCT/US2020/064099, dated Jun. 23, 2022, 7 pages. |
Erdem Alkim et al., “Post-Quantum key exchange—a new hope”, International Association For Cryptologic Research, vol. Nov. 16, 2016:063839, Nov. 16, 2016, pp. 1-22. |
Joppe W. Bos et al., “Post-quantum key exchange for the TLS protocol from the ring learning with errors problem”, International Association for Cryptologic Research, vol. Mar. 16, 2015:235249, Mar. 17, 2015, pp. 1-28. |
International Search Report dated Aug. 11, 2016, for PCT Application No. PCT/US2016/031055, filed May 5, 2016, five pages. |
International Search Report dated Oct. 9, 2019, for PCT Application No. PCT/US2019/041871, filed Jul. 15, 2019, four pages. |
International Search Report and Written Report for the International Application No. PCT/US2020/064099 dated Mar. 16, 2021. |
Number | Date | Country | |
---|---|---|---|
20210264418 A1 | Aug 2021 | US |
Number | Date | Country | |
---|---|---|---|
62402728 | Sep 2016 | US |
Number | Date | Country | |
---|---|---|---|
Parent | 15721899 | Sep 2017 | US |
Child | 17314900 | US |