Patent Grant
11943240
The technology disclosed generally relates to cloud environments. More specifically, but not by limitation, the present disclosure relates to improved systems and methods of cloud security posture management (CSPM), cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM), cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP), and/or cloud-native configuration management database (CMDB).
The subject matter discussed in this section should not be assumed to be prior art merely as a result of its mention in this section. Similarly, a problem mentioned in this section or associated with the subject matter provided as background should not be assumed to have been previously recognized in the prior art. The subject matter in this section merely represents different approaches, which in and of themselves can also correspond to implementations of the claimed technology.
Cloud computing provides on-demand availability of computer resources, such as data storage and compute resources, often without direct active management by users. Thus, a cloud environment can provide computation, software, data access, and storage services that do not require end-user knowledge of the physical location or configuration of the system that delivers the services. In various examples, remote servers can deliver the services over a wide area network, such as the Internet, using appropriate protocols, and those services can be accessed through a web browser or any other computing component.
Examples of cloud storage services include Amazon Web Services™ (AWS), Google Cloud Platform™ (GCP), and Microsoft Azure™, to name a few. Such cloud storage services provide on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable resources. These resources can include networks, servers, storage, applications, services, etc. The end-users of such cloud services often include organizations that have a need to store sensitive and/or confidential data, such as personal information, financial information, medical information. Such information can be accessed by any of a number of users through permissions and access control data assigned or otherwise defined through administrator accounts.
The discussion above is merely provided for general background information and is not intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.
The technology disclosed relates to streamlined analysis of security posture of a cloud environment. In particular, the disclosed technology relates to accessing permissions data and access control data for pairs of compute resources and storage resources in the cloud environment, tracing network communication paths between the pairs of the compute resources and the storage resources based on the permissions data and the access control data, accessing sensitivity classification data for objects in the storage resources, qualifying a subset of the pairs of the compute resources and the storage resources as vulnerable to breach attack based on an evaluation of the permissions data, the access control data, and the sensitivity classification data against a set risk criterion, and generating a representation of propagation of the breach attack along the network communication paths, the representation identifying relationships between the subset of the pairs of the compute resources and the storage resources.
Example 1 is a computer-implemented method of streamlined analysis of security posture of a cloud environment, the method comprising:
Example 2 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein generating a representation of propagation of the breach attack comprises:
Example 3 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the cloud attack surface map graphically depicts a subject vulnerability signature.
Example 4 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, and further comprising:
Example 5 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, further comprising:
Example 6 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the subject vulnerability signature comprises a subject vulnerability signature of containing private and sensitive content.
Example 7 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, and further comprising:
Example 8 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, and further comprising:
Example 9 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the subject vulnerability signature comprises a subject vulnerability signature of being accessible by a vulnerable compute resource that is in turn publicly accessible.
Example 10 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the subject vulnerability signature comprises a subject vulnerability signature of having a prevalence of accessibility of a given role within a network that exceeds a set threshold.
Example 11 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the subject vulnerability signature comprises a subject vulnerability signature of being accessible by users outside a company network.
Example 12 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the subject vulnerability signature comprises a subject vulnerability signature of being accessible by more than a threshold numbers of users inside a company network.
Example 13 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the subject vulnerability signature comprises a subject vulnerability signature of being accessible by inactive users inside a company network who have not accessed the subject subset of the storage resources over a predetermined temporal period.
Example 14 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, and further comprising:
Example 15 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the network communication paths include one or more of:
Example 16 is the computer-implemented method of any or all previous examples, wherein the risk criterion indicates at least one of:
Example 17 is a computing system comprising:
Example 18 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the instructions configure the computing system to:
Example 19 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the instructions configure the computing system to:
Example 20 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the cloud attack surface map graphically depicts the anomalous access of the first compute resource.
Example 21 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the cloud attack surface map graphically returns the anomalous access of the first compute resource in response to a query requesting identification of compute resources with anomalous accesses.
Example 22 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the instructions configure the computing system to:
Example 23 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the propagation of the breach attack along the network communication paths is scored for likelihood and impact based on the evaluation.
Example 24 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the instructions configure the computing system to:
Example 25 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the cloud attack surface map graphically stratifies one or more of the breach likelihood scores or the breach impact scores into categories representing levels of severity.
Example 26 is the computing system of any or all previous examples, wherein the instructions configure the computing system to:
Example 27 is a method performed by a computing system for streamlined analysis of security posture of a cloud environment, the method comprising:
Example 28 is the method of any or all previous examples, wherein the cloud attack surface map graphically depicts a subject vulnerability signature.
Example 29 is the method of any or all previous examples, and further comprising:
Example 30 is the method of any or all previous examples, further comprising:
This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter. The claimed subject matter is not limited to implementations that solve any or all disadvantages noted in the background.
In the drawings, like reference characters generally refer to like parts throughout the different views. Also, the drawings are not necessarily to scale, with an emphasis instead generally being placed upon illustrating the principles of the technology disclosed. In the following description, various implementations of the technology disclosed are described with reference to the following drawings, in which:
The following discussion is presented to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the technology disclosed, and is provided in the context of a particular application and its requirements. Various modifications to the disclosed implementations will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other implementations and applications without departing from the spirit and scope of the technology disclosed. Thus, the technology disclosed is not intended to be limited to the implementations shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and features disclosed herein.
As noted above, cloud computing environments are used by organizations or other end-users to store a wide variety of different types of information in many contexts and for many uses. This data can often include sensitive and/or confidential information, and can be the target for malicious activity such as acts of fraud, privacy breaches, data theft, etc. These risks can arise from individuals that are both inside the organization as well as outside the organization.
Cloud environments often include security infrastructure to enforce access control, data loss prevention, or other processes to secure data from potential vulnerabilities. However, even with such security infrastructures, it can be difficult for an organization to understand the data posture and breadth of access to the data stored in the cloud in the organization's cloud account. In other words, it can be difficult to identify which users have access to which data, and which data may be exposed to malicious or otherwise unauthorized users, both inside or outside the organization.
The present system is directed to a cloud security posture analysis system configured to analyze and take action on the security posture of a cloud account. The system discovers sensitive data among the cloud storage resources and discovers access patterns to the sensitive data. The results are used to identify security vulnerabilities to understand the data security posture, detect and remediate the security vulnerabilities, and to prevent future breaches to sensitive data. The system provides real-time visibility and control on the control data infrastructure by discovering resources, sensitive data, and access paths, and tracking resource configuration, deep context and trust relationships in real-time as a graph or other visualization. It is noted that the technology disclosed herein can depict all graph embodiments in equivalent and analogous tabular formats or other visualization formats based on the data and logic disclosed herein.
The system can further score breach paths based on sensitivity, volume, and/or permissions to show an attack surface and perform constant time scanning, by deploying scanners locally within the cloud account. Thus, the scanners execute in the cloud service itself, with metadata being returned indicative of the analysis. Thus, in one example, an organization's cloud data does not leave the organization's cloud account. Rather, the data can be scanned in place and metadata sent for analysis by the cloud security posture analysis system, which further enhances data security.
Further, cloud services 108-1, 108-2, 108-N can include the same type of cloud service, or can be different types of cloud services, and can be accessed by any of a number of different actors 104. For example, as illustrated in
Architecture 100 includes a cloud security posture analysis system 122 configured to access cloud services 108 to identify and analyze cloud security posture data. Examples of system 122 are discussed in further detail below. Briefly, however, system 122 is configured to access cloud services 108 and identify connected resources, entities, actors, etc. within those cloud services, and to identify risks and violations against access to sensitive information. As shown in
Users 110, administrators 112, developers 114, or any other actors 104, can interact with cloud environment 102 through user interface displays 123 having user interface mechanisms 124. For example, a user can interact with user interface displays 123 provided on a user device (such as a mobile device, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, etc.) either directly or over network 106. Cloud environment 102 can include other items 125 as well.
Cloud service 108-1 includes a plurality of resources 126 and an access management and control system 128 configured to manage and control access to resources 126 by actors 104. Resources 126 include compute resources 130, storage resources 132, and can include other resources 134. Compute resources 130 include a plurality of individual compute resources 130-1, 130-2, 130-N, which can be the same and/or different types of compute resources. In the present example, compute resources 130 can include elastic compute resources, such as elastic compute cloud (AWS EC2) resources, AWS Lambda, etc.
An elastic compute cloud (EC2) is a cloud computing service designed to provide virtual machines called instances, where users can select an instance with a desired amount of computing resources, such as the number and type of CPUs, memory and local storage. An EC2 resource allows users to create and run compute instances on AWS, and can use familiar operating systems like Linus, Windows, etc. Users can select an instance type based on the memory and computing requirements needed for the application or software to be run on the instance.
AWS Lambda is an event-based service that delivers short-term compute capabilities and is designed to run code without the need to deploy, use or manage virtual machine instances. An example implementation is used by an organization to address specific triggers or events, such as database updates, storage changes or custom events generated from other applications. Such a compute resource can include a server-less, event-driven compute service that allows a user to run code for many different types of applications or backend services without provisioning or managing servers.
Storage resources 132 are accessible through compute resources 130, and can include a plurality of storage resources 132-1, 132-2, 132-N, which can be the same and/or different types of storage resources. A storage resource 132 can be defined based on object storage. For example, AWS Simple Storage Service (S3) provides highly-scalable cloud object storage with a simple web service interface. An S3 object can contain both data and metadata, and objects can reside in containers called buckets. Each bucket can be identified by a unique user-specified key or file name. A bucket can be a simple flat folder without a file system hierarchy. A bucket can be viewed as a container (e.g., folder) for objects (e.g., files) stored in the S3 storage resource.
Compute resources 130 can access or otherwise interact with storage resources 132 through network communication paths based on permissions data 136 and/or access control data 138. System 128 illustratively includes identity and access management (IAM) functionality that controls access to cloud service 108-1 using entities (e.g., IAM entities) provided by the cloud computing platform.
Permissions data 136 includes policies 140 and can include other permissions data 142. Access control data 138 includes identities 144 and can include other access control data 146 as well. Examples of identities 144 include, but are not limited to, users, groups, roles, etc. In AWS, for example, an IAM user is an entity that is created in the AWS service and represents a person or service who uses the IAM user to interact with the cloud service. An IAM user provides the ability to sign into the AWS management console for interactive tasks and to make programmatic requests to AWS services using the API, and includes a name, password, and access keys to be used with the API. Permissions can be granted to the IAM user to make the IAM user a member of a user group with attached permission policies. An IAM user group is a collection of IAM users with specified permissions. Use of IAM groups can make management of permissions easier for those users. An IAM role in AWS is an IAM identity that has specific permissions, and has some similarities to an IAM user in that the IAM role is an AWS identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do in AWS. However, instead of being uniquely associated with one person, a role is intended to be assumable by anyone who needs it. Roles can be used to delegate access to users, applications, and/or services that don't normally have access to the AWS resources. Roles can be used by IAM users in a same AWS account and/or in different AWS accounts than the role. Also, roles can be used by computer resources 130, such as EC2 resources. A service role is a role assumed by a service to perform actions in an account on behalf of a user. Service roles include permissions required for the service to access the resources needed by the service. Service roles can vary from service to service. A service role for an EC2 instance, for example, is a special type of service role that an application running on an EC2 instance can assume to perform actions.
Policies 140 can include identity-based policies that are attached to IAM identities can grant permissions to the identity. Policies 140 can also include resource-based policies that are attached to resources 126. Examples include S3 bucket policies and IAM role trust policies. An example trust policy includes a JSON policy document that defines the principles that are trusted to assume a role. In AWS, a policy is an object that, when associated with an identity or resource, defines permissions of the identity or resource. AWS evaluates these policies when an IAM principal user or a role) makes a request. Permissions in the policy determine whether the request is allowed or denied. Policies are often stored as JSON documents that are attached to the IAM identities (user, groups of users, role).
A permissions boundary is a managed policy for an IAM identity that defines the maximum permissions that the identity-based policies can grant to an entity, but does not grant the permissions. Further, access control lists (ACLs) control which principles in other accounts can access the resource to which the ACL is attached. ACLs can be similar to resource-based policies. In some implementations of the technology disclosed, the terms “roles” and “policies” are used interchangeably.
Cloud service 108-1 includes one or more deployed cloud scanners 148, and can include other items 150 as well. Cloud scanner 148 run locally on the cloud-based services and the server systems, and can utilize elastic compute resources, such as, but not limited to, AWS Lambda resources. Cloud scanner 148 is configured to access and scan the cloud service 108-1 on which the scanner is deployed. Examples are discussed in further detail below. Briefly, however, a scanner accesses the data stored in storage resources 132, permissions data 136, and access control data 138 to identify particular data patterns (such as, but not limited to, sensitive string patterns) and traverse or trace network communication paths between pairs of compute resources 130 and storage resources 132. The results of the scanner can be utilized to identify subject vulnerabilities, such as resources vulnerable to a breach attack, and to construct a cloud attack surface graph or other data structure that depicts propagation of a breach attack along the network communication paths.
Given a graph of connected resources, such as compute resources 130, storage resources 132, etc., entities (e.g., accounts, roles, policies, etc.), and actors (e.g., users, administrators, etc.), risks and violations against access to sensitive information is identified. A directional graph can be built to capture nodes that represent the resources and labels that are assigned for search and retrieval purposes. For example, a label can mark the node as a database or S3 resource, actors as users, administrators, developers, etc. Relationships between the nodes are created using information available from the cloud infrastructure configuration. For example, using the configuration information, system 122 can determine that a resource belongs to a given account and create a relationship between the policy attached to a resource and/or identify the roles that can be taken up by a user.
System 122 includes a cloud account onboarding component 202, a cloud scanner deployment component 204, a cloud data scanning and analysis system 206, a visualization system 208, and a data store 210. System 122 can also include one or more processors or servers 212, and can include other items 214 as well.
Cloud account onboarding component 202 is configured to onboard cloud services 108 for analysis by system 122. After onboarding, cloud scanner deployment component 204 is configured to deploy a cloud scanner (e.g., deployed cloud scanner(s) 148 shown in
Query engine 218 is configured to execute queries against the received metadata and generated cloud security issue data. Policy engine 220 can execute security policies against the cloud data and breach vulnerability evaluation component 222 is configured to evaluate potential breach vulnerabilities in the cloud service. APIs 224 are exposed to users, such as administrators, to interact with system 122 to access the cloud security posture data.
Component 226 is configured to identify cloud security issues and component 228 can prioritize the identified cloud security issues based on any of a number of criteria.
Historical resource state analysis component 230 is configured to analyze a history of states of resources 126. Component 230 includes a triggering component 234 configured to detect a trigger that to perform historical resource state analysis. Triggering component 234 is configured to identify an event that triggers component 230 to analyze the state of resources 126. The event can be, for example, a user input to selectively trigger the analysis, or a detected event such as the occurrence of a time period, an update to a resource, etc. Accordingly, historical resource state can be tracked automatically and/or in response to user input.
Component 230 includes a resource configuration change tracking component 236 configured to track changes in the configuration of resources 126. Component 230 also includes an anomalous state detection component 238, and can include other items 240 as well. Component 238 is configured to detect the occurrence of anomalous states in resources 126. A resource anomaly can be identified where a given resource has an unexpected state, such as a difference from other similar resources identified in the cloud service.
Visualization system 208 is configured to generate visualizations of the cloud security posture from system 206. Illustratively, system 208 includes a user interface component 242 configured to generate a user interface for a user, such as an administrator. In the illustrated example, component 242 includes a web interface generator 244 configured to generate web interfaces that can be displayed in a web browser on a client device.
Visualization system 208 also includes a resource graph generator component 246, a cloud attack surface graph generator component 248, and can include other items 250 as well. Resource graph generator component 246 is configured to generate a graph or other representation of the relationships between resources 126. For example, component 246 can generate a cloud infrastructure map that graphically depicts pairs of compute resources and storage resources as nodes and network communication paths as edges between the nodes.
Cloud attack surface graph generator component 248 is configured to generate a surface graph or other representation of vulnerabilities of resources to a breach attack. In one example, the representation of vulnerabilities can include a cloud attack surface map that graphically depicts propagation of a breach attack along network communication paths as edges between nodes that represent the corresponding resources.
Data store 210 stores the metadata 252 obtained by metadata ingestion component 216, sensitive data profiles 254, and can store other items 256 as well. Examples of sensitive data profiles are discussed in further detail below. Briefly, however, sensitive data profiles 254 can identify data patterns that are categorized as sensitive or meeting some predefined pattern of interest. Pattern matching can be performed based on the target data profiles. For example, pattern matching can be performed to identify social security numbers, credit card numbers, other personal data, medical information, to name a few. In one example, artificial intelligence (AI) is utilized to perform named entity recognition (e.g., natural language processing modules can identify sensitive data, in various languages, representing names, company names, locations, etc.).
Resource identification component 262 is configured to identify the resources 126 within cloud service 108-1 (and/or other cloud services 108) and to generate corresponding metadata that identifies these resources. Permissions data identification component 264 identifies the permissions data 136 and access control data identification component 266 identifies access control data 138. Cloud infrastructure scanning component 268 scans the infrastructure of cloud service 108 to identify the relationships between resources 130 and 132 and cloud data scanning component 270 scans the actual data stored in storage resources 132. The generated metadata is output by component 272 to cloud security posture analysis system 122.
Referring again to
Display 324 includes a user interface mechanism 326 configured to receive input to select or otherwise define a particular cloud account provider. In the illustrated example, mechanism 326 includes a plurality of selectable controls representing different cloud providers including, but not limited to, AWS, GCP, Azure.
Display 324 includes a user input mechanism 328 configured to receive input defining a cloud account identifier, and an account nickname. User input mechanisms 330 allow the user to define other parameters for the on-boarding. A user input mechanism 332 is actuated to generate a cloud formation template, or other template, to be used in the on-boarding process based on the selected cloud account provider.
Once the cloud account is connected to system 122, display 304 in
Referring again to
At block 360, the cloud scanners are deployed to run locally on the cloud service, such as illustrated in
At block 368, if more cloud services are to be on-boarded, operation returns to block 310. At block 370, the scan results from the deployed scanners are received. As noted above, the scan results include metadata (block 372) generated by the scanners running locally on the cloud service.
At block 374, one or more actions are performed based on the scan results. At block 376, the action includes security issue detection. For example, a breach risk on a particular resource (such as a storage resource storing sensitive data) is identified. At block 378, security issue prioritization can be performed to prioritize the detected security issues. Examples of security issue detection and prioritization are discussed in further detail below. Briefly, security issues can be detected by executing a query against the scan results using vulnerability or risk signatures. The risk signatures identify criterion such as accessibility of the resources, access and/or permissions between resources, and data types in accessed data stores. Further, each risk signature can be scored and prioritized based impact. For example, a risk signature can include weights indicative of likelihood of occurrence of a breach and impact if the breach occurs.
The action can further include providing user interfaces at block 380 that indicate the scan status (block 382), a cloud infrastructure representation (such as a map or graph) (block 384), and/or a cloud attack surface representation (map or graph) (block 386). The cloud attack surface representation can visualize vulnerabilities based on the low.
Remedial actions can be taken at block 388, such as creating a ticket (block 390) for a developer or other user to address the security issues. Of course, other actions can be taken at block 392. For instance, the system can make adjustments to cloud account settings/configurations to address/remedy the security issues.
Display element 420 illustratively categorizes the risks based on impact as well as the likelihood of occurrence of those risks. Risk categorization is discussed in further detail below. Briefly, however, display element 420 stratifies one or more of breach likelihood scores or breach impact scores categories representing different levels of severity, such as high, medium, and low severity levels. In one example, display element 420 is color coded based on the degree of impact of the risk (e.g., high impact is highlighted in red, medium impact is highlighted in yellow, and low impact is highlighted in green).
An example constant time scanner runs an algorithm in which the running time does not depend, or has little dependence on, the size of the input. The scanner obtains a stream of bytes and looks for a multiplicity of patterns (one hundred patterns, two hundred patterns, three hundred patterns, etc.) in one pass through the stream of bytes, with the same or substantially similar performance.
Further, the scanner can return real-time results at block 456. Accordingly, cloud security posture analysis 122 receives updates to the security posture data as changes are made to the cloud services.
At block 458, the scanner discovers the compute resources 130 and, at block 460, the storage resources 132. Sensitive data can be discovered at block 462. The agent-less scanner does not require a proxy or agent running in the cloud service, and can utilize server-less containers and resources to scan the documents and detect sensitive data. The data can be accessed using APIs associated with the scanners. The sensitive data can be identified using pattern matching, such as by querying the data using predefined risk signatures.
At block 464, access paths between the resources are discovered based on permissions data 136 (block 466), and/or access control data 138 (block 468). A rule processing engine, such as using JSON metadata, can be utilized to analyze the roles and policies, and can build access relationships between the nodes representing the resources. The policies can be decoded to get access type (allow, deny, etc.) and the policy can be placed in a node to link from a source to target node and create the access relationship. At block 470, metadata indicative of the scanning results is generated and outputted by metadata output component 272.
At block 502, permissions data and access control data are accessed for pairs of compute and storage resources. The permissions and access control data can include identity-based permissions at block 504, resource-based permissions at block 506, or other permissions as well.
At block 508, network communication paths between the pairs of resources are traced based on the permissions and access control data. For example, the permissions and access control data can identify which paths have read access from a compute resource from a particular compute resource to a particular storage resource, as represented at block 510. Similarly, paths with write access from compute to storage resources can be identified at block 512, paths with synchronization access between storage resources can be identified at block 514. Of course, other types of paths can be identified as well.
For sake of example, but not by limitation, a directional graph is constructed to captures all resources as nodes, with labels assigned to the nodes for search and retrieval. In the AWS example, labels can mark a node as a database or S3 resource. Similarly, labels can represent actors as normal users, admins, developers, etc. Then, known relationships are identified between the nodes, for example using the information available from the cloud infrastructure configuration (e.g., defining a resource belongs to a given account). Similarly, a relationship can be created between the policy attached to a resource, and/or the roles that can be taken up by a user. In addition to storing static information, a rule processing engine (e.g., using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) metadata) to analyze the roles and policies and build the “access” relationship between the nodes. The analysis can be used to decode the policy to get the access type (e.g., allow, deny, etc.), and the placement of the policy in a node can be used to link from the source node to target node and create the access relationship (e.g., allow, deny, etc.). Similarly, role definitions can be analyzed to find the access type. The graph can therefore include various types of nodes, updated to reflect direct relationships.
An iterative process can be performed to find transitive relationships between resources (e.g., resource access for a given entity/actors/resources). In one example, for each access relationship from a first node N1 to a second node N2, the process identify all incoming access relationships of N1. Then, the access types targeting node N1 are analyzed and updated. Using the relationships identified to access N1, the relationships to N2 are updated, and a new set of access relationships are identified to N2 through N1. The process continues to proceed to identify all such relationships with the goal of creating relationships to all nodes that have sensitive data.
In one example, block 508 identifies “access types” which include normalized forms of access permissions. For example, an access type “can read” can be defined to include a plurality of different read objects within AWS (e.g., defined in terms of allowable APIs). Similarly, the AWS permissions “PutObject” and “PutObjectAcl” are transformed to a normalized access type “can write” within system 122.
At block 516, sensitivity classification data is accessed for objects in the storage resources. The sensitivity classification data can include sensitive data profiles at block 518.
At block 520, crawlers can be selected for structured and/or unstructured databases. Crawling the databases can include executing a snapshot of structured databases, creating a dump of structured databases, and scanning the dump for sensitivity classification, as represented at block 524.
At block 526, a subset of the pairs of resources are qualified as vulnerable to a breach attack. The qualification can be based on the permissions data at block 528, the access control data at block 530, and/or risk criterion at block 532. The risk criterion can include any of a wide variety of different types of criteria. For example, a risk criterion can indicate a variety of access to the resources at block 534. One example includes a number of different roles with access to the resource, as represented at block 536.
Also, a risk criterion can indicate a width of configured access to the resources, at block 538. For example, the width of configured can include a number of workloads with access to the resources (block 540) and/or a type of workload with access to the resources (block 542).
A risk criterion can also indicate a number of users with access to the resources at block 544, a volume of sensitive data in the resources at block 546, and/or types of categories of sensitive data at block 548. Of course, other types of risk criterion can be utilized as well.
In one example, the risk criterion can be defined based on user input.
For sake of illustration, a first user input mechanism 556 allows a user to set a weight that influences a likelihood score for variations in the variety of access to the resources (e.g., block 534). Similarly, controls 558, 560, and 562 allow a user to set weights that influence likelihood scores for a width of configured access, a number of principles or users with access, and the type of workloads with access, represented by reference numerals 558, 560, and 562, respectively.
Similarly, controls 563, 564, 566, 568, and 570, allow a user to set weights on impact scores for risk criterion associated with a volume of sensitive data, a type of sensitive data, and categories of sensitive data (i.e., legal data, medical data, financial data), respectively.
Referring again to
A risk signature can be defined based upon any of a wide variety of criteria. For example, a risk signature can identify one or more configurations or settings of compute resources 130. Examples include, but are not limited to, a configuration that indicates whether the compute resource provides accessibility to a particular type of data, such as confidential data, medical data, financial data, personal data, or any other type of private and/or sensitive content. In another example, a risk signature indicates that a compute resource is publicly accessible, includes a public Internet protocol (IP) address, or has IP forwarding enabled. In another example, a risk signature indicates that a compute resource has monitoring disabled, has no IAM role assigned to the compute resource, has backup disabled, data encryption disabled, and/or a low or short backup retention policy. Also, a risk signature can identify password policies set for the compute resource. For instance, a risk signature can indicate a lack of minimum password policies, such as no minimum password length, no requirement of symbols, lowercase letters, uppercase letters, numbers, or password reuse policy. Also, a risk criterion can indicate a location of the compute resource, such as whether the compute resource is located outside of a particular region.
Risk signatures can also indicate configurations and/or settings of storage resources 132. For example, the configurations and settings can indicate authentication or permissions enforced by the storage resource, such as whether authentication is required for read, write, delete, synchronization, or any other operation. Also, the risk signature can indicate whether multi-factor authentication is disabled for the storage resource, as well as a breadth of permissions grants (e.g., whether all authenticated users are granted permissions within the storage resource). Also, a risk signature can indicate whether encryption is enabled by default, a password policy enforced by the storage resource, whether the storage resource is anonymously accessible, publicly accessible, has a key management service disabled, has logging disabled, life cycle management disabled, whether the storage resource is utilized for website hosting, has geo-restriction disabled, or has backup functionality disabled. Also, the risk signature can indicate a type of data stored by the storage resource, such as the examples discussed above.
Referring again to
Also, the subject vulnerability signature can indicate that the storage resources are accessible by more than a threshold number of users, as represented at block 608. Also, the subject vulnerability signature can indicate that the storage resources are accessible by a vulnerable compute resource that is publicly accessible, as represented at block 610. This determination can be based on identifying that the compute resource is accessible through a public portal, at block 612 and/or is accessible by users outside a given company network at block 614.
As represented at block 616, the subject vulnerability signature can indicate that the storage resources are accessible by inactive users. For example, inactive users can include users who have not accessed the resources within a threshold time, at block 618.
At block 620, a second subset of storage resources are identified that synchronization data from the first subset. At block 622, a particular compute resource is determined to have anomalous access to a given storage resource. The identification of anomalous access can be based on a comparison of a network communication path of the particular compute resource against paths of other compute resources. For example, the paths of other compute resources can be used to identify an expected communication path for the particular compute resource and/or expected permission for the particular resource. Then, if a difference above a threshold is identified, the particular compute resource is identified as anomalous.
At block 624, a representation of the propagation of the breach attack along the network communication paths is generated. In one example, the representation includes a cloud attack surface map, as represented at block 626. An example cloud attack surface map includes nodes representing the resources (block 628) and edges representing the breach attack propagation (block 630). The map graphically depicts the subset of storage resources (block 632) and the subject vulnerability signature (block 634). Also, the map can graphically depict the anomalous access to the particular compute resource (block 636). For example, public accesses to the subset of storage resources can be graphically depicted at block 638 and storage resources that grant external access and/or resources that are initialized from outside a particular jurisdiction can be identified at blocks 640 and 642, respectively.
Display 650 includes a user input mechanism 652 to specify a time range for visualizing the risk, and includes a description 654, a resource identifier 656, and an account identifier 658 for the cloud service account. The display can also indicate the impact 660 and likelihood 662 of the vulnerability risk, as well as signature identifier 664 that identifies the particular risk signature that was matched. Display 650 also includes a details control 666 that is actuatable to display details of the identified risk. One example of a details display pane 668 is illustrated in
Referring again to
At block 682, the query is executed against the cloud attack surface map. For example, the cloud attack surface map can be filtered to identify results that match the query. The query results (e.g., the filtered map) is returned at block 684. The filtered results can include identifying a subset of storage resources that match the query (block 686) and/or resources having anomalous access at block 688.
The cloud attack surface graph is graphically filtered based on the results at block 690. For example, the graph can be filtered based on applications running on the pairs of resources in the identified subset (block 692). Breach likelihood scores and breach impact scores are determined for the resources at block 694, and the scores can be depicted on the cloud attack surface map at block 696. In one example, the scores are graphically categorized or stratified at block 698 into high, medium, or low risk. One example is discussed above with respect to
At block 818, network communication paths are traced between the pairs of resources. Tracing the network communication path can be based on the permissions data at block 820, the access control data at block 822, the policy data at block 824, and/or other data at block 826.
At block 828, a cloud infrastructure map is constructed. An example of a cloud infrastructure map includes nodes that graphically represent pairs of compute and storage resources (block 830), and edges that represent network communication paths between the resources (block 832). At block 834, the map graphically depicts metadata associated with the pairs of resources. For example, a graphical metadata depiction is expandable or collapsible via user selection, as represented at block 836. The metadata can be grouped across metadata categories at block 838, such as based on cloud-sourced metadata at block 840, derived metadata at block 842, locally annotated metadata at block 844, or based on other metadata categories at block 846.
The cloud infrastructure map can also graphically depict anomalous configured access instances at block 848. For example, block 848 can detect different levels of access among resources that connect to a common network component, as represented at block 850. At block 852, the map graphically depicts anomalous actual access instances in the cloud environment. For instance, the instances can be detected from access logs at block 854. User annotated tags for the resources can be depicted in the map at block 856 as well.
At block 858, a query is received. The query can include a search term 860, a content category (block 862), a data privacy policy (block 864), a temporal period (block 866), and can include other items 868 as well.
The query is executed at block 870 and query results are returned at block 872. For example, the query results can identify a subset of the pairs of resources that contain the searched content at block 874. At block 876, resources are identified that do not have the search content, but have access to the subset. At block 878, the query results can identify a subset of the pairs of resources that contain a searched content category. For example, at block 880, resources are identified that do not have the content from the content category, but that have access to the subset of resources that have the searched content category.
At block 882, the query results can identify a subset of resources as complying with a given data privacy policy, specified in the query. Additionally, the results can identify resources that have access to the identified subset, at block 884. At block 886, a prior state of the resources is identified. Of course, the query results can identify other data 888 as well.
At block 890, a filter criterion is received. The filter criterion can be based on the metadata (block 892), based on applications running on at least one pair of resources (block 894), and/or based on one or more networks in the cloud environment (block 896). The networks can include virtual private clouds (VPCs) 898, regions 900, Internet gateways 902, network access control lists 904, sub networks 906, or other networks 908.
The filter criterion can also be based on tags at block 910, such as users annotated tags represented at block 912. The filter criterion can also be based on owners of the resources (block 914), a creation date and/or time of the resources (block 916), an inactive/stale criterion (block 918), or other filter criterion (block 920). At block 922, the cloud infrastructure map is filtered based on the filter criterion and a filtered cloud infrastructure map is rendered at block 924.
Referring again to
A scanner is triggered and recognizers for sensitive entity detection are loaded, along with profiles for analysis. Text is extracted and entity detection is performed. In one example, the scanning is performed locally on the cloud service so that the organization's data does not leave the organization's cloud account, which can increase privacy and conformance with data policies. The scanners can be encapsulated as containers, that are deployed in the cloud environment using elastic compute instances, such as EC2 resources, Lambda resources, etc.
At block 1030, objects in the cloud environment are queued and, at block 1032, the objects are partitioned into a plurality of object chunks. At block 1034, a number (M) of object chunks are identified. At block 1036, depending upon the number M, a number (N) of instances of the server-less container-less scanners are initialized. In one example, the number M is significantly larger than the number N (block 1038). For example, the number M can be ten times more (block 1040) than the number N, one hundred times more (block 1042) than the number N, etc. Of course, other numbers of object chunks and instances of the scanners can be utilized, as represented at block 1044.
The scanners are dynamically scalable (block 1046), and each scanner can be portable and independently executable as a microservice (block 1048).
At block 1050, a multiplicity of different data patterns to scan are obtained. For example, the data patterns can include sensitive string patterns (block 1052), social security numbers (block 1054), credit card numbers (block 1056), or other data patterns (block 1058).
For each scanner, a corresponding object chunk is scanned exactly once to detect the multiplicity of different data patterns, as represented at block 1060. Accordingly, each scanner can identify a number of different data patterns, through a given pass through the object chunk. This single pass scanning increases efficiency by decreasing scanning latency. In one example, a multiplicity of object metadata can be detected at block 1062.
Sensitivity metadata is generated at block 1064 based on the detected data patterns. The system is controlled based on the sensitivity metadata at block 1066. For example, the sensitivity metadata is sent to a metadata store in a control plane in the cloud environment at block 1068. Alternatively, or in addition, the cloud attack surface graph is modified at block 1070. For example, sensitivity annotation is applied to the graph at block 1072.
At block 1108, user-to-role mappings for roles assigned to the plurality of users is obtained. For example, access management and control system 128 is used to identify roles defined at a particular resolution or level of the cloud environment, as represented at block 1110.
The access sub-networks are traversed at block 1112 and a number (U) of user-to-resource mappings between the users and the resources are built based on traversing the sub-networks, as represented at block 1114.
At block 1116, the number U of user-to-resource mappings is evaluated against the user-to-role mappings to accumulate a number (R) of role-to-resource mapping. In one example, the number U is significantly larger than the number R, as represented at block 1118. For example, the number U can be ten times more (block 1120) or one hundred times more (block 1122) than the number R. Of course, other numbers of mappings can be utilized as well, as represented at block 1124.
In one example, at block 1126 a role-to-resource mapping maps a particular role to a particular subset of resources. Also, new resources that are assigned to the particular role are automatically mapped to the particular subset, as represented at block 1128.
At block 1130, access communication paths between the roles and the plurality of resources are traced based on the number R of role-to-resource mapping.
At block 1132, a compact access network graph is constructed that graphically depicts access links along the traced access communication path. For example, the graph can include nodes that represent roles and resources (block 1134), and edges that represent access links along the access communication paths (block 1136). At block 1138, the compact access network graph can be graphically updated to reflect the new resource assigned at block 1128.
At block 1140, a history of resource configuration changes and/or anomalous state (e.g., risks) detected for various resources is tracked. For example, this tracking can be manually triggered at block 1142, or programmatically triggered at block 1154. Further, the history can be tracked over a timeline, such as to indicate when a particular risk opened and/or closed, as represented at block 1146.
At block 1148, a difference between a non-anomalous state and a successive anomalous state is tracked. The tracking can also include tracking a difference between successive anomalous states at block 1150 and/or a difference between successive versions of the resources at block 1152. For example, the versions can be determined based on respective resource configurations of the successive versions, at block 1144. The tracked difference can be compared to a threshold difference at block 1156, to determine whether to track the instance of the resource configuration and/or state change.
At block 1158, the tracked history can be graphically rendered, such as on a timeline at block 1160. The tracked difference can be graphically rendered at block 1162. Further, the tracked history can be provided with a playback feature 1164 or a play forward feature 1166, which allow a user to navigate through the tracked history.
As shown in
Based on these relationships between compute and storage relationships, display elements can be rendered along, or otherwise visually associated with, the edges 1208 and/or 1210, to identify and graphically depict the propagation of breach attack. For instance, vulnerability display elements can be rendered in association with edges 1208 and/or 1210 to identify that a subject vulnerability signature (e.g., one or more risk signatures shown in
The graph can be interactive at a plurality of different resolutions or levels. For example, a user can interact with the graph to zoom into a specific subset, e.g., based on cloud vendor concepts of proximity (regions, virtual private clouds (VPCs), subnets, etc.). Node 1212 includes an expand actuator 1214 that is actuatable to expand the display to show additional details of the roles, role groups, and/or users represented by node 1212.
When zooming into one region, such as when using the actuators discussed below, other regions can be zoomed out. This can be particularly advantageous when handling large diagrams. Further, the graph includes one or more filter mechanisms configured to filter the graph data by logical properties, such as names, values of various fields, IP addresses, etc. For example, a free form search box 1215 is configured to receive search terms and filter out all resources (e.g., by removing display of those resources) except those resources matching the search terms. In one example, the search terms include a subject vulnerability signature (e.g., containing private and sensitive content, public accessibility, accessibility by a particular user and/or role, particular applications running on the resources, access types, etc.).
An input mechanism 1217 is configured to receive a temporal filter or search criterion. For example, a filter criterion is entered by a user to represent at least one of a creation time or date of computer resources and storage resources. Further, a query can be entered specifying at least one temporal period, wherein the cloud infrastructure map is updated to graphically return at least one prior state (e.g., a permissions state, an access control state, and/or a sensitivity data classification state) of compute resources and storage resources based on the temporal period.
A checkbox (not shown in
In one example, a user interface control allows user to define critical data (e.g., crown jewel data), such as through a filter mechanism (e.g., search box 1215). The display then visually highlights that critical data along with all entities with access (defined by a filter such as CAN_READ/CAN_WRITE/CAN_SYNC etc) to the critical data. Anomalous configured access (different levels of access among similar resources can be visually highlighted in the display. For example, if there are four EC2 instances in a worker group connected to the same load balancer, all of the EC2 instances are expected to have the same type of access. However, if one of the EC2 instances has different access, the EC2 instance is identified as anomalous and visually highlighted to the user. Similarly, the display can visually highlight anomalous actual access. That is, instead of inspecting configured access, the system looks at actual access determined using, for example, access logs (e.g., cloudtrail logs, S3 access logs, etc.).
Further, the display can be configured to allow the user to add tags to one or more selected resources in the diagram. For instance, when users visualize cloud assets in context, the user can add additional tags that let the user write policies, perform filtering etc. that further aid in visualization and understanding. The user interface allows the user to choose one or more resources and add tags (keys and values in AWS Tags, for example) to selected resources.
Referring again to
Referring again to
Referring again to
At block 1308, compute resources-to-role mappings for roles assigned to the plurality of compute resources is obtained. Each mapping, in one example, maps a particular resource to a particular role defined in the cloud environment. The roles can be defined at a resolution or level of the cloud environment, as represented at block 1310.
At block 1312, the access sub-networks are traversed to build, at block 1314, a number (U) of compute resources-to-storage resource mappings between the compute resources and storage resources. Each mapping, in one example, maps a particular compute resource to a particular storage resource.
At block 1316, the number U of compute resources-to-storage resource mappings is evaluated against the compute resource-to-role mappings to accumulate a number (R) role-to-storage resource mappings between the roles and the plurality of storage resources. Each mapping, in the number R, maps a particular role to a particular storage resource and indicates which storage resource that particular role can access. In one example, the number U is significantly larger than the number R, as represented at block 1318. For example, the number U can be greater than approximately ten times the number R, as represented at block 1320. In another example, the number U is greater than approximately one hundred times the number R, as represented at block 1322. These, of course, are for sake of example only.
At block 1324, the access communication paths are traced between the roles and the plurality of storage resources based on the number R of the role-to-storage resource mappings.
At block 1326, a compact access network graph is constructed that graphically depicts access links along the traced access communication paths. Examples of a network graph are discussed above. Briefly, in one example, nodes in the graph represent roles and storage resources (block 1328), and edges represent access links along the access communication paths (block 1330).
It can thus be seen that the present disclosure describes technology for security posture analysis of a cloud account. In some described examples, the technology can discover sensitive data among the cloud storage resources and as well as access patterns to the sensitive data, using local scanners that reduce or eliminate need to send the cloud data outside the cloud environment. This improves data security. Further, the technology facilitates the discover of security vulnerabilities to understand the data security posture, detect, and remediate the security vulnerabilities, and to prevent future breaches to sensitive data. The system provides real-time visibility and control on the control data infrastructure by discovering resources, sensitive data, and access paths, and tracking resource configuration, deep context, and trust relationships in real-time as a graph or other visualization.
One or more implementations of the technology disclosed or elements thereof can be implemented in the form of a computer product, including a non-transitory computer readable storage medium with computer usable program code for performing the method steps indicated. Furthermore, one or more implementations and clauses of the technology disclosed or elements thereof can be implemented in the form of an apparatus including a memory and at least one processor that is coupled to the memory and operative to perform exemplary method steps. Yet further, in another aspect, one or more implementations and clauses of the technology disclosed or elements thereof can be implemented in the form of means for carrying out one or more of the method steps described herein; the means can include (i) hardware module(s), (ii) software module(s) executing on one or more hardware processors, or (iii) a combination of hardware and software modules; any of (i)-(iii) implement the specific techniques set forth herein, and the software modules are stored in a computer readable storage medium (or multiple such media).
Examples discussed herein include processor(s) and/or server(s). For sake of illustration, but not by limitation, the processors and/or servers include computer processors with associated memory and timing circuitry, and are functional parts of the corresponding systems or devices, and facilitate the functionality of the other components or items in those systems.
Also, user interface displays have been discussed. Examples of user interface displays can take a wide variety of forms with different user actuatable input mechanisms. For instance, a user input mechanism can include icons, links, menus, text boxes, check boxes, etc., and can be actuated in a wide variety of different ways. Examples of input devices for actuating the input mechanisms include, but are not limited to, hardware devices (e.g., point and click devices, hardware buttons, switches, a joystick or keyboard, thumb switches or thumb pads, etc.) and virtual devices (e.g., virtual keyboards or other virtual actuators). For instance, a user actuatable input mechanism can be actuated using a touch gesture on a touch sensitive screen. In another example, a user actuatable input mechanism can be actuated using a speech command.
The present figures show a number of blocks with corresponding functionality described herein. It is noted that fewer blocks can be used, such that functionality is performed by fewer components. Also, more blocks can be used with the functionality distributed among more components. Further, the data stores discussed herein can be broken into multiple data stores. All of the data stores can be local to the systems accessing the data stores, all of the data stores can be remote, or some data stores can be local while others can be remote.
The above discussion has described a variety of different systems, components, logic, and interactions. One or more of these systems, components, logic and/or interactions can be implemented by hardware, such as processors, memory, or other processing components. Some particular examples include, but are not limited to, artificial intelligence components, such as neural networks, that perform the functions associated with those systems, components, logic, and/or interactions. In addition, the systems, components, logic and/or interactions can be implemented by software that is loaded into a memory and is executed by a processor, server, or other computing component, as described below. The systems, components, logic and/or interactions can also be implemented by different combinations of hardware, software, firmware, etc., some examples of which are described below. These are some examples of different structures that can be used to implement any or all of the systems, components, logic, and/or interactions described above.
The elements of the described figures, or portions of the elements, can be disposed on a wide variety of different devices. Some of those devices include servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, or other mobile devices, such as palm top computers, cell phones, smart phones, multimedia players, personal digital assistants, etc.
One or more communication links 1402 allows device 1400 to communicate with other computing devices, and can provide a channel for receiving information automatically, such as by scanning. An example includes communication protocols, such as wireless services used to provide cellular access to a network, as well as protocols that provide local wireless connections to networks.
Applications or other data can be received on an external (e.g., removable) storage device or memory that is connected to an interface 1404. Interface 1404 and communication links 1402 communicate with one or more processors 1406 (which can include processors or servers described with respect to the figures) along a communication bus (not shown in
Components 1410 facilitate input and output operations for device 1400, and can include input components such as microphones, touch screens, buttons, touch sensors, optical sensors, proximity sensors, orientation sensors, accelerometers. Components 1410 can include output components such as a display device, a speaker, and or a printer port.
Clock 1412 includes, in one example, a real time clock component that outputs a time and date, and can provide timing functions for processor 1406. Location system 1414 outputs a current geographic location of device 1400 and can includes a global positioning system (GPS) receiver, a LORAN system, a dead reckoning system, a cellular triangulation system, or other positioning system. Memory 1408 stores an operating system 1416, network applications and corresponding configuration settings 1418, communication configuration settings 1420, communication drivers 1422, and can include other items 1424. Examples of memory 1408 include types of tangible volatile and non-volatile computer-readable memory devices. Memory 1408 can also include computer storage media that stores computer readable instructions that, when executed by processor 1406, cause the processor to perform computer-implemented steps or functions according to the instructions. Processor 1406 can be activated by other components to facilitate functionality of those components as well.
In one implementation, cloud security posture analysis system 5018 is communicably linked to the storage subsystem 5010 and the user interface input devices 5038.
User interface input devices 5038 can include a keyboard; pointing devices such as a mouse, trackball, touchpad, or graphics tablet; a scanner; a touch screen incorporated into the display; audio input devices such as voice recognition systems and microphones; and other types of input devices. In general, use of the term “input device” is intended to include all possible types of devices and ways to input information into computer system 5000.
User interface output devices 5076 can include a display subsystem, a printer, a fax machine, or non-visual displays such as audio output devices. The display subsystem can include an LED display, a cathode ray tube (CRT), a flat-panel device such as a liquid crystal display (LCD), a projection device, or some other mechanism for creating a visible image. The display subsystem can also provide a non-visual display such as audio output devices. In general, use of the term “output device” is intended to include all possible types of devices and ways to output information from computer system 5000 to the user or to another machine or computer system.
Storage subsystem 5010 stores programming and data constructs that provide the functionality of some or all of the modules and methods described herein. These software modules are generally executed by processors 5078.
Processors 5078 can be graphics processing units (GPUs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), and/or coarse-grained reconfigurable architectures (CGRAs). Processors 5078 can be hosted by a deep learning cloud platform such as Google Cloud Platform™, Xilinx™, and Cirrascale™. Examples of processors 5078 include Google's Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)™, rackmount solutions like GX4 Rackmount Series™, GX50 Rackmount Series™, NVIDIA DGX-1™, Microsoft' Stratix V FPGA™, Graphcore's Intelligent Processor Unit (IPU)™, Qualcomm's Zeroth Platform™ with Snapdragon processors™, NVIDIA's Volta™, NVIDIA's DRIVE PX™, NVIDIA's JETSON TX1/TX2 MODULE™, Intel's Nirvana™, Movidius VPU™, Fujitsu DPI™, ARM's DynamicIQ™, IBM TrueNorth™, Lambda GPU Server with Testa V100s™, and others.
Memory subsystem 5022 used in the storage subsystem 5010 can include a number of memories including a main random access memory (RAM) 5032 for storage of instructions and data during program execution and a read only memory (ROM) 5034 in which fixed instructions are stored. A file storage subsystem 5036 can provide persistent storage for program and data files, and can include a hard disk drive, a floppy disk drive along with associated removable media, a CD-ROM drive, an optical drive, or removable media cartridges. The modules implementing the functionality of certain implementations can be stored by file storage subsystem 5036 in the storage subsystem 5010, or in other machines accessible by the processor.
Bus subsystem 5055 provides a mechanism for letting the various components and subsystems of computer system 5000 communicate with each other as intended. Although bus subsystem 5055 is shown schematically as a single bus, alternative implementations of the bus subsystem can use multiple busses.
Computer system 5000 itself can be of varying types including a personal computer, a portable computer, a workstation, a computer terminal, a network computer, a television, a mainframe, a server farm, a widely-distributed set of loosely networked computers, or any other data processing system or user device. Due to the ever-changing nature of computers and networks, the description of computer system 5000 depicted in
It should also be noted that the different examples described herein can be combined in different ways. That is, parts of one or more examples can be combined with parts of one or more other examples. All of this is contemplated herein.
The technology disclosed can be practiced as a system, method, or article of manufacture. One or more features of an implementation can be combined with the base implementation. Implementations that are not mutually exclusive are taught to be combinable.
One or more features of an implementation can be combined with other implementations. This disclosure periodically reminds the user of these options. Omission from some implementations of recitations that repeat these options should not be taken as limiting the combinations taught in the preceding sections—these recitations are hereby incorporated forward by reference into each of the following implementations.
Although the subject matter has been described in language specific to structural features and/or methodological acts, it is to be understood that the subject matter defined in the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features or acts described above. Rather, the specific features and acts described above are disclosed as example forms of implementing the claims.
The present application is a continuation of and claims priority to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 17/858,903, filed Jul. 6, 2022, which is based on and claims the benefit of U.S. provisional patent application Serial Nos. 63/246,303, filed Sep. 20, 2021, 63/246,310, filed Sep. 21, 2021, 63/246,313, filed Sep. 21, 2021, and 63/246,315, filed Sep. 21, 2021; the contents of these applications are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.
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| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20230134945 A1 | May 2023 | US |
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 63246310 | Sep 2021 | US | |
| 63246313 | Sep 2021 | US | |
| 63246315 | Sep 2021 | US | |
| 63246303 | Sep 2021 | US |
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent | 17858903 | Jul 2022 | US |
| Child | 18090195 | US |
