Patent Grant
8700010
With the advent of mass market digital communications and content distribution, many access networks such as wireless networks, cable networks and DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) networks are pressed for user capacity, with, for example, EVDO (Evolution-Data Optimized), HSPA (High Speed Packet Access), LTE (Long Term Evolution), WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), and Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) wireless networks increasingly becoming user capacity constrained. Although wireless network capacity will increase with new higher capacity wireless radio access technologies, such as MIMO (Multiple-Input Multiple-Output), and with more frequency spectrum being deployed in the future, these capacity gains are likely to be less than what is required to meet growing digital networking demand.
Similarly, although wire line access networks, such as cable and DSL, can have higher average capacity per user, wire line user service consumption habits are trending toward very high bandwidth applications that can quickly consume the available capacity and degrade overall network service experience. Because some components of service provider costs go up with increasing bandwidth, this trend will also negatively impact service provider profits.
Various embodiments of the invention are disclosed in the following detailed description and the accompanying drawings.
The invention can be implemented in numerous ways, including as a process; an apparatus; a system; a composition of matter; a computer program product embodied on a computer readable storage medium; and/or a processor, such as a processor configured to execute instructions stored on and/or provided by a memory coupled to the processor. In this specification, these implementations, or any other form that the invention may take, may be referred to as techniques. In general, the order of the steps of disclosed processes may be altered within the scope of the invention. Unless stated otherwise, a component such as a processor or a memory described as being configured to perform a task may be implemented as a general component that is temporarily configured to perform the task at a given time or a specific component that is manufactured to perform the task. As used herein, the term ‘processor’ refers to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing cores configured to process data, such as computer program instructions.
A detailed description of one or more embodiments of the invention is provided below along with accompanying figures that illustrate the principles of the invention. The invention is described in connection with such embodiments, but the invention is not limited to any embodiment. The scope of the invention is limited only by the claims and the invention encompasses numerous alternatives, modifications and equivalents. Numerous specific details are set forth in the following description in order to provide a thorough understanding of the invention. These details are provided for the purpose of example and the invention may be practiced according to the claims without some or all of these specific details. For the purpose of clarity, technical material that is known in the technical fields related to the invention has not been described in detail so that the invention is not unnecessarily obscured.
In some embodiments, secure device data records (DDRs) are provided. In some embodiments, secure DDRs for device assisted services are provided. In some embodiments, secure DDRs for device assisted services are provided for service usage monitoring of a wireless communication device (e.g., firmware based monitoring of network service usage, such as based on a 5-tuple of a source address, port address, destination address, destination port, and protocol). In some embodiments, secure DDRs for device-assisted services are provided for service usage monitoring of a wireless connection and other input/output (I/O) connections or ports of a wireless communication device (e.g., firmware-based monitoring of network service usage, such as based on a 5-tuple of a source address, port address, destination address, destination port, and protocol). In some embodiments, a system for secure DDRs includes a processor of a wireless communication device for wireless communication with a wireless network, in which the processor is configured with a secure execution environment, and in which the secure execution environment is configured to: monitor service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network; and generate a plurality of device data records of the monitored service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network, in which each device data record is associated with a unique sequence order identifier; and a memory coupled to the processor and configured to provide the processor with instructions. In some embodiments, a system for secure DDRs includes a processor of a wireless communication device for wireless communication with a wireless network, in which the processor is configured with a secure execution environment, the secure execution environment configured to: monitor service usage of the wireless communication device with one or more of the networks and I/O connections for the device including but not limited to a wide area wireless network (e.g., 2G, 3G, 4G, etc.), a WiFi network or connection, a USB network or connection, an Ethernet network or connection, a Firewire connection, a Bluetooth connection, a near field communication (NFC) connection or another I/O connection or port; and generate a plurality of device data records of the monitored service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network, in which each device data record is associated with a unique sequence order identifier; and a memory coupled to the processor and configured to provide the processor with instructions. In some embodiments, the secure execution environment including the secure DDR processor is located in an application processor, in a modem processor, and/or in a subscriber identity module (SIM).
In many of the disclosed embodiments, a secure device data record processing system acts on communications that flow over a wide area wireless network connection to the device (e.g., a 2G, 3G, or 4G connection) or a wide area wireless modem (e.g., a 2G, 3G, or 4G modem). As would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, the secure device data record processing system can also act on communications that flow over one or more additional I/O networks, connections, ports or modems (e.g., a WiFi network, connection, port, or modem; a USB network, connection, port, or modem; an Ethernet network, connection, port, or modem; a Firewire network, connection, port, or modem; a Bluetooth network, connection, port, or modem; a near field communication (NFC) network, connection, port, or modem; or another I/O connection, port, or modem).
In some embodiments, a system for secure DDRs includes a processor of a wireless communication device for wireless communication with a wireless network, in which the processor is configured with a secure execution environment, and in which the secure execution environment is configured to: monitor service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network (and possibly one or more additional I/O connections for the device); and generate a plurality of device data records of the monitored service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network (and possibly one or more additional I/O connections for the device), in which each device data record is one of an ordered sequence of device data records with each sequential device data record providing an accounting of service usage over a service usage interval spanned by the device data record, and in which each device data record is associated with a secured unique sequence order identifier; and a memory coupled to the processor and configured to provide the processor with instructions. In this manner, communication activity over a device wireless access network connection (or other I/O port communication connection) is securely monitored and reported to a network server for further processing to determine if device access service policies are being properly enforced, or to determine of malicious software in the device operating environment is accessing the network (or other I/O connection or port). In some embodiments, the secure execution including the secure DDR processor environment is located in an application processor, in a modem processor, and/or in a subscriber identity module (SIM).
In some embodiments, a communication channel for delivering secure device data records to a network server for further analysis and processing includes a secure message receipt feedback loop, and if the secure message feedback loop is interrupted, a device environment security error condition is detected and acted on. In some embodiments, the ordered sequence of device data records is communicated to a service controller using a signed or encrypted communication channel. In some embodiments, the service controller observes the device data records to determine compliance with a device-based access network (or other I/O connections or ports) access policy. In some embodiments, the service controller also observes the integrity of the ordered sequence of device data records to determine if device data records have been tampered with or omitted. In some embodiments, if the service processor determines that the device data records have not been tampered with or omitted, the service controller sends back a signed or encrypted device data record receipt message. In some embodiments, if the service processor determines that the device data records have been tampered with or omitted, the service controller sends back an error message or does not send back a signed or encrypted device data record receipt message. In some embodiments, if the system for secure DDRs receives an error message from the service controller, or does not receive a signed or encrypted device data record receipt message within a certain period of time or within a certain number of transmitted device data records or within a certain amount of communication information processed, then (i) a device configuration error message can be generated for delivery to a security administrator or server, or (ii) one or more of the wireless network connections (or other I/O connection or port) for the wireless communication device are either blocked or restricted to a pre-determined set of safe destinations. In this manner, if a device service processor, the device operating environment, device operating system or device software is tampered with in a manner that produces wireless network (or other I/O port) access service usage characteristics that are not compliant with expected policy or allowed policy, a device configuration error message can be generated or device wireless network access (or other I/O connection access) can be restricted or blocked. Such embodiments can be helpful in securing device based network access (or I/O control) policies and can also be helpful in identifying device software that has been tampered with or any malware that is present on the device. In some embodiments, the restriction on wireless network access (or other I/O access) results in access to a limited number of network destinations or resources sufficient to allow further analysis or troubleshooting of the device configuration error condition.
Various techniques for providing device assisted services (DAS), are disclosed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/380,780, entitled AUTOMATED DEVICE PROVISIONING AND ACTIVATION, filed on Mar. 2, 2009, published as U.S. Pub. App. No. 2010/0192212, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/695,019, entitled DEVICE ASSISTED CDR CREATION, AGGREGATION, MEDIATION AND BILLING, filed on Jan. 27, 2010, published as U.S. Pub. App. No. 2010/0197266, and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/694,445, entitled SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES filed on Jan. 27, 2010, published as U.S. Pub. App. No. 2010/0199325, which are incorporated herein by reference for all purposes.
In some embodiments, a DDR processor is provided for wireless communication devices (e.g., for assisting in implementation of device assisted services (DAS) for wireless network service usage for wireless communication devices, such as a cellular phone, smart phone, laptop, PDA, gaming device, music device, tablet, computer, and/or any other device with wireless communication access) as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, a secure DDR processor (e.g., implemented/executed in a secure execution environment) is provided. In some embodiments, a DDR processor is secured using various techniques described herein. In some embodiments, the DDR processor includes a DDR generator. In some embodiments, the DDR processor generates DDRs. In some embodiments, the DDR processor reports DDRs to a network element (e.g., a service controller, a DDR network storage system, and/or another network element). In some embodiments, the secure DDR processor reports the DDRs to a device element/function, such as a service processor, which aggregates the DDRs (e.g., and can include other service usage and/or other information) in a report (e.g., or service processor reports) that is communicated to a network element. In some embodiments, DDRs as well as service processor reports are generated and communicated to a network element. In some embodiments, a DDR processor is secured using various techniques described herein.
In some embodiments, DDRs include device assisted and/or device based monitored service usage (e.g., based on various criteria, such as for a specified time interval, and/or event) as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, DDRs are periodically reported. In some embodiments, DDRs are reported based on an event and/or a request from a network element (e.g., a service controller or another network element/function). In some embodiments, DDRs are communicated to a device service processor (e.g., or another device element/function), which aggregates such DDRs and periodically provides service usage reports including such DDRs or providing such service usage reports based on a request and/or an event. In some embodiments, each DDR includes a unique identifier (e.g., a unique sequence identifier). In some embodiments, a missing DDR can be detected using the unique identifiers (e.g., sequence count and/or time stamp information associated with each DDR allows for detection of a potentially suspicious service usage event, such as a missing, delayed, and/or compromised device data record determined using the sequence count and/or time stamp information, and responsive/corrective actions can be performed upon detection of the suspicious service usage event, as described herein). In some embodiments, if a DDR is not received within a certain time period, then an access controller is activated to limit network access until DDRs are properly generated and reported (e.g., a network element, such as a service controller, sends a keep alive signal to the device to implement a time out period for verifying receipt of properly generated and validated DDRs from the device, and if the keep alive signal is not received within a specified time period, then the device based secured access controller can implement the restricted network access control function).
In some embodiments, a DDR network storage system is provided as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, a service controller is provided that includes the DDR network storage system and a DDR reconciliation function (e.g., for reconciling DDR records and/or DDR reports or other device based and/or network based service usage reports, such as CDRs, micro CDRs, and/or IPDRs or other service usage reports). In some embodiments, a network based reconciliation function reconciles DDRs (e.g., aggregated DDRs and/or DDR reports) with one or more network based service usage measures. In some embodiments, the network based reconciliation function reconciles DDRs with two or more network based service usage measures. In some embodiments, the network based reconciliation function reconciles DDRs with two or more network based service usage measures (e.g., CDRs, FDRs, IPDRs, DPI based measures including traffic related events, such as NBS and/or QoS, and/or other network based service usage measures). In some embodiments, the network based reconciliation function reconciles two or more device based service usage measures (e.g., DDRs, service processor reports, and/or other device based service usage measures including traffic related events, such as NBS and/or QoS) with a network based service usage measure. In some embodiments, the network based reconciliation function reconciles two or more device based service usage measures with two or more network based service usage measures. In some embodiments, the network based reconciliation function reconciles two or more device based service usage measures, in which one of the device based service usage measures is secured (e.g., deemed as secured and/or trusted based on various techniques described herein, such as for secure DDRs) and one or more of the other device based service usage measures is not secured (e.g., not completely trusted, such as a service processor reports generated by a service processor that is not implemented in a secure execution environment). In some embodiments, the reconciliation function reconciles based on various different reporting formats, such as time measure intervals, units of measure, and/or other different criteria used by different device and network based various service usage measures.
In some embodiments, a secure access controller is provided as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, the DDR processor includes the secure access controller. In some embodiments, the secure access control ensures that a wireless communication device with DAS does not have open network access until and/or unless the device is properly generating and reporting secure DDRs.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor includes a network busy state (NBS) monitoring and reporting function that is secured as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, a network element aggregates NBS information received from one or more wireless communication devices from the same sector and/or from various sectors within the service vicinity and establishes either the same network busy state rules (e.g., access control, charging and notification) and/or changes the exiting NBS rules appropriately.
In some embodiments, a secured boot sequence is provided. In some embodiments, the secured boot sequence ensures that the DDR processor is secured and properly generating DDRs prior to providing open network access control to the wireless communication device. In some embodiments, the secured boot sequence includes using the secure access controller to restrict network access until the secured boot sequence is completed. In some embodiments, the secure boot sequence includes verifying DDR ACK and receipt frames.
In some embodiments, a processor of a wireless communication device for wireless communication with a wireless network is provided, in which the processor is configured with a secure software or firmware instruction execution environment, and in which a program in the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment is configured to: monitor service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network; generate a plurality of device data records (DDRs) of the monitored service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network, in which the device data records are secure device data records for the monitored service usage, in which each device data record forms a portion of an ordered sequence of device data records with each sequential device data record providing an accounting of service usage over a service usage interval spanned by the device data record, and in which each device data record is associated with a unique sequence order identifier that is also secured.
In some embodiments, the sequence of device data records forms a contiguous and uninterrupted reporting of device service usage while the device is active on the network. In some embodiments, the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment is located and configured such that the network can only be accessed through a data path that is monitored by the program in the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment. In some embodiments, the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment is located in a modem processor (e.g., MPU). In some embodiments, the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment is located in an application processor (e.g., APU). In some embodiments, the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment is located in a subscriber identity module (SIM) (e.g., SIM card). In some embodiments, the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment is located in a combination of an APU, MPU, and/or SIM.
In some embodiments, the device data records are secured using various cryptographic techniques described herein, such as using one or more of the following: encryption, digital signatures, and integrity checks.
In some embodiments, a DDR processor located in a secure execution environment is configured to communicate a sequence of device data records to a device data record storage function, such as within a network element (e.g., a service controller), in which the plurality of secure device data records in combination with the unique sequence identifier provides traceability to identify if one or more usage records have been tampered with or omitted from the sequence of data records transmitted to the storage function. In some embodiments, the unique sequence identifier includes one or more of the following: sequence count, time stamp, start time indicator, stop time indicator, contiguous time interval identifier, and aggregate usage count at the beginning or end of the record, reference time, or elapsed time at the beginning or end of the record.
In some embodiments, the generation of a new device data record is determined by one or more of the following: a predetermined time, elapsed period of time, elapsed period of time since last report, maximum limit on elapsed period of time since last report, amount of one or more aspects of aggregate data usage, amount of one or more aspects of data usage since last report, maximum limit for one or more aspects of data usage since last report, a request to generate a DDR, a limit on maximum amount of memory or storage media required to contain or process DDR information prior to transmission, device power on or power off, modem or device subsystem power on or power off, modem or device subsystem entering or exiting a power save state, device or device subsystem authentication with a network element or server, or a detected event triggered by one or more service usage activities or detection of a service usage record tampering or fraud event or transition to a new network busy state and/or QoS traffic event.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor, service processor, or another device based element/function transmits DDRs based on one or more of the following: maximum time increment, maximum service usage increment, polling from service processor, and/or polling from service controller. In some embodiments, a maximum time increment on DDR transmissions is established to ensure minimal or no services can be hijacked once service controller authentication takes place. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the restricted set of network service activities includes access to the service controller or other network elements necessary to manage the ability of the device to access the network once the service controller authenticates with the service processor and conforms proper operation of the secure DDR generator. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the restricted set of network service activities includes access to a minimum set of roaming network service activities required to initiate the process for a roaming network to authenticate access privileges for the device. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the restricted set of network service activities includes access to a minimum set of roaming network service activities required to initiate the process for a corporate network to authenticate access privileges for the device. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the restricted set of network service activities includes access to a minimum set of roaming network service activities required to initiate the process for an MVNO network to authenticate access privileges for the device. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the more permissive set of service activities is the available to access at least a subset of the services available on a roaming network. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the more permissive set of service activities is the available to access at least a subset of the services available on an MVNO network. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the more permissive set of service activities is the available to access at least a subset of the services available on a corporate network.
In some embodiments, the device data record service usage information includes measurement of one or more of the following: voice service (e.g., VOIP) usage records; text service usage records; data network service usage records; data network flow data records; data network general purpose, aggregate or bulk service usage records; service usage classified at least in part by far end destination; service usage records classified at least in part by layer 3 network communications information such as IP address or ATM address; service usage classified at least in part by layer 4 network communications information such as IP address and port combinations; data network service usage records comparable to network based flow data records such as network based FDRs, CDRs or IPDRs; service usage classified at least in part by time of day; service usage classified at least in part by geographic location; service usage classified at least in part by the active network servicing the device; service usage classified at least in part by a roaming network connected to the device; service usage classified at least in part by network busy state or network congestion; service usage classified at least in part by QoS, service usage records classified at least in part by layer 7 network communications information such as server name, domain name, URL, referrer host or application service flow information; service usage classified at least in part by network communications protocol such as TCP, UDP, DNS, SMTP, IMAP, POP, FTP, HTTP, HTML, VOIP; service usage classified at least in part by the application name or the application identifier assigned by the operating system or another application identifier unique to the application acquiring or requesting service (e.g., device user identifier, such as Android user ID on an Android based device); and service usage classified at least in part by service activity.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to send the device data records to a network element (e.g., storage function located in the network). In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to provide a secure communication channel between the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment and the storage function located in the network (e.g., a network element, such as a service controller), in which the communication channel security protocol is configured to avoid tampering with the secure device data records (DDRs). In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution is configured to perform an authentication sequence or process with a network element (e.g., a service controller) in which a secure device data record sequence initiation message is sent to a network destination followed by authentication protocol exchange sequences to authenticate the network element before transmitting the secure data records.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to perform the following: send the device data record sequence to a network element (e.g., via a secure channel); implement a secure access controller for restricting network access to a predetermined subset of available network destinations; receive a secure message from a trusted network element (e.g., either directly from the network element or from another function on the device that forwards the secure messages from the network element to the DDR processor in the secure execution environment); if a validated (e.g., properly secured and configured) message is received that acknowledges receipt of one or more secure device data records or acknowledges an access network authentication sequence, then the secure access controller allows unrestricted or less restricted access to the network; if a validated message is not received that acknowledges receipt of one or more secure device data records or acknowledges an access network authentication sequence, then the secure access controller restricts access to a predetermined set of network destinations or functions until a validated message is received that acknowledges receipt of one or more secure device data records or acknowledges an access network authentication sequence.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured with an access controller that restricts access to a predetermined set of network destinations or functions if a predetermined maximum amount of time passes between: the time that a first message acknowledging receipt of one or more secure device data records or an authentication sequence is received by the DDR processor in the secure execution environment and the time that a second message acknowledging receipt of one or more secure device data records or an authentication sequence is received by the DDR processor in the secure execution environment; or the time that one or more secure device data records are sent by the DDR processor in the secure execution environment and the time that a message acknowledging receipt of one or more secure device data records or an authentication sequence is received by DDR processor in the secure execution environment; and the access controller otherwise allows unrestricted or less restricted access to the network.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to send the device data record to the device data record storage function located in the network by first sending it to a second program function located on the device that then forwards the device data record to the device data record storage function located in the network. In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to provide a second service usage report sequence in addition to the secure device data record sequence. In some embodiments, another client function/element (e.g., a service processor function/element or agent) is configured to provide a second service usage report sequence in addition to the secure device data record sequence. In some embodiments, the second service usage report sequence includes service usage classification that is different at least in part from the secure device data records. In some embodiments, the difference between device data usage classification includes at least in part that one record includes one or more of the following: application information, layer 7 network information, service flow association information, user defined input information, network busy state information, active network information or other information while the other record does not.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to send the device data record sequence and the second device data record sequence in a manner that allows for simplified reconciliation of the two records. In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to provide the second service usage report sequence in a manner that provides approximate alignment of a measurement interval start time and stop time spanned by one or more of the second service usage reports and the measurement interval spanned by one or more of the secure device data records.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor located in the secure execution environment is configured to: be based on the monitoring of service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless communication network, create and record characterizations of network performance; analyze the characterizations of network performance and reduce the performance characterizations into one or more network performance statistics that characterize in summary form the performance level or congestion level of the network as experienced by the device; generate a plurality of network performance report messages that include a sequence of the network performance statistics created at different times; in which the network performance report messages are secured network performance reports; and send the secured network performance reports to the storage function located in the network.
In some embodiments, a processor of a network device configured as a device data record storage and processing function, for wireless communication with a wireless network in wireless communication with a plurality of wireless communication devices, with each wireless device including a secure device data record generator, in which the processor of the network device is further configured to: provide individual secure communication channels between each of the plurality of secure device data record processor and the network device, in which the communication channel security protocol is configured so that tampering with the device data records may be detected; receive over the secure communications channel a plurality of device data records from each of the secure device data record processors, in which the plurality of secure device data records are service usage records of monitored service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network, and in which each device data record forms a portion of an ordered sequence of device data records with each sequential device data record providing an uninterrupted accounting of service usage over the service usage interval spanned by the device data record, and in which the sequence of device data records forms a contiguous and uninterrupted reporting of device service usage, and in which each device data record is associated with a unique sequence order identifier; provide a device data record storage function in which the device data record sequence for each device is stored; for each device, analyze the stored sequence of device data records to determine if one or more of the device data records have been compromised by verifying that the information in the service usage record is properly configured according to the secure communication channel protocol; for each device, determine if one or more of the device data records have been removed or blocked from the device data record sequence originally transmitted from the device by determining if the secure contiguous sequence identifiers for the aggregate sequence are all present in the sequence; and if any device data record has been compromised, delayed or removed, set a fraud detection error flag for that device to restrict network access and also signals network apparatus or a network administrator to take further action.
In some embodiments, the secure device data records included in the device data record sequence include a secure network performance report that characterizes the network performance or congestion at the time the secure device data record was generated. In some embodiments, the device data record sequence is used at least in part as a record of service usage that forms an input factor in the business logic or rules used to compute a service usage bill. In some embodiments, the device data record sequence is used at least in part as a record of service usage that forms an input factor in the business logic or rules used to determine if one or more device access network service policies are being properly enforced. In some embodiments, the device data record sequence is used at least in part as a record of service usage that forms an input factor in updating an end user service usage notification message, service usage notification display or service purchase message trigger event.
In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to receive a device data record sequence from a second device program function that forwards the device data record after receiving it from the secure device data record generator. In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to receive a second service usage data record sequence from a second device program function. In some embodiments, the two device data record sequences possess service usage classification that is different at least in part (e.g., use of classification parameters; layer 3/4 and/or layer 7) over the same (or approximately the same or overlapping) time span. In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to compare the two data record sequences and determine if the two sequences of service usage reports match one another to within an allowable tolerance limit.
In some embodiments, the secure device data record(s) can accompany the corresponding layer-7 classification information (e.g., domain names, application identifier, HTTP information, associative classification, and/or other information as described herein) with the 5-tuple classification information (e.g., source address, port address, destination address, destination port, and protocol) received from the Service Processor included in the DDR report, which, for example, can be sent to the Service Controller (e.g., or another network element) to assist in the service usage reconciliation and/or verification, using various techniques described herein. In some embodiments, one or more of the service usage reconciliation and/or verification operations using the layer-7 classification information and the 5-tuple classification information are performed locally in the client (e.g., in a secure execution area). In some embodiments, one or more of the service usage reconciliation and/or verification operations using the layer-7 classification information and the 5-tuple classification information are performed locally in the client (e.g., in a secure execution area), and one or more of the service usage reconciliation and/or verification operations using the layer-7 classification information and the 5-tuple classification information are performed in the network (e.g., at one or more network elements, such as the Service Controller).
In some embodiments, a portion of the matching criteria is determining if the two sequences of service usage reports match in the reported network performance levels or network congestion levels. In some embodiments, the tolerance limit is based on total data usage over the usage interval spanned by the two data record sequences.
In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to identify the amount of service usage for one or more classification categories in the second service usage record sequence that can be reconciled with service usage for one or more classification categories in the secure device data record sequence. In some embodiments, a criteria in the classification category reconciliation includes determining if the two sequences of service usage reports match in the reported network performance levels or network congestion levels.
In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to identify the amount of service usage from the second service usage record sequence that cannot be reconciled with known service usage classifications in the secure device data record sequence. In some embodiments, a criteria in the classification category reconciliation includes determining if the two sequences of service usage reports match in the reported network performance levels or network congestion levels.
In some embodiments, a minimum tolerance limit is placed on the amount, relative amount or percentage of service usage for one or more classification categories in the second service usage record sequence that can be matched to or correlated with one or more classification categories in the secure device data record sequence. In some embodiments, when the minimum tolerance limit is not met a fraud detection error flag for that device is set to restrict network access and also signals network apparatus or a network administrator to take further action.
In some embodiments, a maximum tolerance limit is placed on the amount, relative amount or percentage of service usage for one or more classification categories in the second service usage record sequence that cannot be matched to or correlated with one or more classification categories in the secure device data record sequence. In some embodiments, when the maximum tolerance limit is exceeded a fraud detection error flag for that device is set to restrict network access and also signals network apparatus or a network administrator to take further action.
In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to determine if the service usage report spanned by the secure device data record sequence is consistent to within predetermined tolerance limits with one or more device service usage enforcement policies intended to be in place. In some embodiments, if the tolerance limits are exceeded a fraud detection error flag for that device is set to restrict network access and also signals network apparatus or a network administrator to take further action. In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to determine if the service usage report spanned by the second device service usage report sequence is consistent to within predetermined tolerance limits with one or more device service usage enforcement policies intended to be in place. In some embodiments, if the tolerance limits are exceeded a fraud detection error flag for that device is set to restrict network access and also signals network apparatus or a network administrator to take further action.
In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to provide one or more secure messages to each of multiple device programs running in a secure software or firmware instruction execution environment, in which the secure messages either acknowledge receipt of one or more secure device data records or acknowledge an access network authentication sequence. In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to send, for each device, a series of secure messages that directly or implicitly instruct the programs running in a secure software or firmware instruction execution environment to allow unrestricted or less restricted network access for a period of time that is either predetermined or is specified in a message from the network device processor to the program running in a secure software or firmware instruction execution environment. In some embodiments, the network device processor is further configured to send, for each device, a secure message that instructs the program running in a secure software or firmware instruction execution environment to restrict network access to a predetermined set of network destinations or functions.
In some embodiments, a secure network busy state (NBS) monitoring and reporting is provided. In some embodiments, the secure NBS monitoring and reporting facilitates NBS charging and control enforcement. In some embodiments, a processor of a wireless communication device for wireless communication with a wireless network, in which the processor is configured with a secure software or firmware instruction execution environment, and in which a DDR processor in the secure execution environment is configured to: monitor service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network; based on the monitoring of service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless communication network, create and record characterizations of network performance; analyze the characterizations of network performance and reduce the performance characterizations into one or more network performance statistics that provide indications of the performance level or congestion level of the network as experienced by the device; generate a plurality of network performance report messages that include a sequence of the network performance statistics created at different times; in which the network performance report messages are secured network performance reports; and send the secured network performance reports to the storage function located in the network.
In some embodiments, the measures of network busy state or network congestion are formed by observing one or more of: the number of network access attempts, the number of access successes the number of access failures, the delay between access attempt and access success, network throughput data rate, data error rate, packet error rate, packet repeat rate, one way or round trip delay, one way or round trip delay jitter, TCP traffic back off parameters, TCP window parameters, modem channel quality, modem channel power, modem channel signal to noise ratio, modem over the air data rate, or network throughput data rate versus modem over the air data rate, and the sub network of the network that the device is connected to.
In some embodiments, the measures of service usage are obtained from observing the network traffic generated by the service usage of the device user. In some embodiments, the measures of service usage are obtained from: communicating one or more network traffic sequences between the device and a network function; and using the subset of service usage monitoring that includes the network traffic sequences to create and record characterizations of network performance.
In some embodiments, a processor of a network device configured as a device secure network performance record storage and processing function, for wireless communication with a wireless network in wireless communication with a plurality of wireless communication devices, with each wireless device including a secure network performance record generator, in which the processor of the network device is further configured to: provide individual secure communication channel between each of the plurality of secure network performance record generators and the network device, in which the communication channel security protocol is configured so that tampering with the secure network performance record may be detected; receive over the secure communications channel a plurality of secure network performance records from each of the secure network performance record generators, in which the plurality of secure network performance record are network performance statistics that provide indications of the performance level or congestion level of the network as experienced by the device; provide a device secure network performance record function in which the secure network performance record sequence for each device is stored; determine the sub network of the network that each device is connected to, and analyze the secure network performance records received from multiple devices connected to the same sub network to determine an aggregate characterization of the performance level or congestion level for the sub network, and perform the same operation to determine an aggregate characterization of the performance level or congestion level for other sub networks connected to the network; store the results of the aggregate characterization of the performance level or congestion level for each sub network that is characterized, and make the stored results available to other network devices or functions; and if any device data record has been compromised, delayed or removed, set a fraud detection error flag for that device to restrict network access and also signals network apparatus or a network administrator to take further action.
In some embodiments, a network performance characterization system is provided. In some embodiments, the network performance characterization system includes a processor of a wireless communication device for wireless communication with a wireless network, in which the processor is configured with a secure software or firmware instruction execution environment, and in which a program in the secure software or firmware instruction execution environment is configured to: communicate a plurality of traffic sequences between the device and a network device, in which the traffic sequences are secured; and initiate each traffic sequence based on one or more of the following: a pre-determined time or time interval, a service usage event or service usage condition that arises on the device, and as a response to a message communicated from the network device; and a processor of the network device in secure communication with the program (e.g., DDR processor) in the secure execution environment is configured to: monitor the plurality of the secure traffic sequences between service usage of the wireless communication device with the wireless network; use the monitoring results of the secure traffic sequences, create and record characterizations of network performance; analyze the characterizations of network performance and reduce the performance characterizations into one or more network performance statistics that provide indications of the performance level or congestion level of the network as experienced by the device; generate a plurality of network performance reports that include a sequence of the network performance statistics created at different times; in which the network performance reports are stored in a network performance report storage function; and the network performance report storage function is made available to other network devices or functions.
In some embodiments, the DDRs are applied to one or more of the following activities: service billing, service control, and/or access control; service usage measurement (e.g., fraud resistant and scalable device measurement of service usage); verifying monitored service usage; verifying that service usage control policies are properly implemented on the device; and a source of performance monitoring and/or measurement.
In some embodiments, the DDRs are communicated to a network element based on a configured time interval; based on a configured usage size (e.g., buffer size limit or predefine size limit for a device or based on other criteria); when modem resources reach a predefined threshold (e.g., usage threshold, such as out of memory or approaching a threshold limit usage of memory); in response to a request from a service processor executed on an application processor of the wireless communication device; in response to a request from a service controller (e.g., either directly or indirectly through a service processor executed on an application/general processor of the wireless communication device).
In some embodiments, a reconciliation process is provided for reconciling a plurality of device data records and service processor usage reports for monitored wireless communication devices to verify reported service usage for each of the monitored wireless communication devices, which includes one or more of the following: reconcile the received device data records from each of the plurality of monitored wireless communication devices and service processor usage reports for a predefined time period or based on a comparison for each received service processor usage report and associated device data records or based on a predefined service usage amount/bulk usage amount or based on a predefined period of time or based on a service policy verification setting; verify that the monitored wireless communication device has not been tampered with or compromised (e.g., missing, modified, delayed, and/or unreconciled DDRs or a discrepancy between received micro-CDRs and DDRs outside of tolerances); verify that the monitored wireless communication device's service usage is compliant with an associated service policy and/or service plan; verify that the monitored wireless communication device properly implemented a traffic control policy of an associated service policy/service plan for a period of time (e.g., QoS, NBS, throttling); verify an accuracy of the received service usage measures using the received plurality of device data records and service processor usage reports for each of the monitored wireless communication devices; and reconcile using a tolerance threshold. In some embodiments, the tolerance threshold (e.g., fixed amount, percentage based) accounts for variances between the received device data records and service processor usage reports for synchronized monitored time periods, including one or more of the following: a service provider configured tolerances, a configured tolerance in the reconciliation process for unclassified service usage in the received device data records and/or service usage that cannot be correlated with known service activities, redirected service usage activities for content distribution network services, and/or other possible differences and/or variations.
In some embodiments, a reconciliation engine performs one or more of the following: determine one or more patterns to account for synchronization errors or traffic classification errors over time (e.g., training period, periodic refining using heuristics); determine if the received device data records are properly associated within policy service usage activities (e.g., reverse DNS lookup, white list, or web crawler); perform a classification operation on the received plurality of device data records that is similar to a service processor classification (e.g., layer 7 service usage activity classification, such as reported in micro-CDRs/uCDRs), then group the received plurality of device data records usage into service usage activity classifications used by the service processor; determine the service processor usage reports' service usage measures for each service activity classification, then determine a percentage of each service usage activity that can be verified by classifying the received device data records' service usage measures; implement adaptive ambient techniques for reconciliation (e.g., using threshold based comparison techniques, for example, with DDRs and the use of reverse DNS for packet classification, then using the ratio of allowed usage for host sponsored service vs. ALL white-listed host names, vs. all unknown host names, vs. synchronization error tolerance, perform a comparison (with acceptable percentage of error) and identify potential fraud scenarios; perform reconciliation for one or more of the following classified services: sponsored services, user (e.g. open access) services, carrier services, network protection services (e.g., services that can be classified as background and thus be delayed in order to protect network bandwidth/resources for foreground/higher priority services) that are a part of the service plan classification definition; and reconcile using a third service usage measure (e.g., network based CDRs, FDRs, and/or IPDRs). In some embodiments, the secure device data record(s) can accompany the corresponding layer-7 classification information (e.g., domain names, application identifier, HTTP information, associative classification, and/or other information as described herein) with the 5-tuple classification information (e.g., source address, port address, destination address, destination port, and protocol) received from the Service Processor included in the DDR report, which, for example, can be sent to the Service Controller (e.g., or another network element) to assist in the service usage reconciliation and/or verification, using various techniques described herein.
In some embodiments, DDRs include one or more of the following: 5-tuple classification information, including a source address, a port address, a destination address, a destination port, and a protocol (e.g., inbound and outbound) and byte counts, and the tolerance threshold accounts for one or more of the following: usage measurement differences, time synchronization differences and/or information that is classified by the service processor with the advantage of information not available in the DDR processor classifier (e.g. application information, associative information, simpler classification implementations/algorithms in the DDR processor, etc.). In some embodiments, the service processor usage reports include one or more of the following that is not included in the received device data records: layer 7 monitored service usage information (e.g., domain names, application identifier, HTTP information, associative classification, and/or other information as described herein), and only a certain percentage of the received device data records are identified as associated traffic with a service usage activity, and for each service usage activity an allowance for unclassified traffic that varies by activity is provided (e.g., Amazon is “closed” while CNN is very diverse), in which a sum of all unclassified allowances does not exceed a total of unclassified received device data records information, and relaxing the tolerance for a first time interval and tightening the tolerance for a second time interval, in which the second time interval is longer than the first time interval. In some embodiments, the secure device data record(s) can accompany the corresponding layer-7 classification information (e.g., domain names, application identifier, HTTP information, associative classification, and/or other information as described herein) with the 5-tuple classification information (e.g., source address, port address, destination address, destination port, and protocol) received from the Service Processor included in the DDR report, which, for example, can be sent to the Service Controller (e.g., or another network element) to assist in the service usage reconciliation and/or verification, using various techniques described herein.
Advanced Wireless Service Platform (AWSP)
In some embodiments, an Advanced Wireless Service Platform (AWSP) is provided. In some embodiments, AWSP provides an enhanced networking technology platform that supports existing services and also provides for various new Internet and data service capabilities for wireless networks (e.g., 4G, 3G, and/or 2G networks), as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, wireless devices, processor(s), firmware (e.g., DDR firmware, as described herein with respect to various embodiments), and software provide an enhanced role in wireless network service policies for charging, access control and service notification to implement AWSP, as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, AWSP supports a wide range of services, devices, and applications for consumer, enterprise, and machine to machine markets, as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, AWSP supports various device types, including the following: 4G and 3G smart phones, 4G and 3G feature phones, 4G and 3G USB dongles and cards, 4G-to-WiFi and 3G-to-WiFi bridge devices, 4G and 3G notebook and netbook computing devices, 4G and 3G slate computing devices, 4G and 3G consumer electronics devices (e.g., cameras, personal navigation devices, music players, and home power meters), and machine to machine devices (e.g., various types of consumer and industrial devices with minimal user interface (UI) capabilities such as geo-location tracking devices, parking meters, and vending machines).
In some embodiments, AWSP includes a device data record (DDR) processor. In some embodiments, the DDR processor includes firmware that is integrated into a secure hardware execution environment within an AWSP compliant processor (e.g., a processor or set of processors that are compatible with, support, approved for and/or certified for AWSP, such as through a wireless carrier AWSP chipset certification program). In some embodiments, the AWSP compliant processor is certified to qualify the processor for proper services delivery over AWSP, as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, a DDR Firmware Developer's Kit (DDR FDK) is provided. In some embodiments, the DDR FDK includes firmware code (e.g., written in C), detailed DDR Processor specifications, detailed chipset Secure Execution Environment (SEE) specifications, DDR Processor chipset test criteria, and DDR Processor chipset certification procedures. For example, an approved chipset partner can integrate the DDR firmware into a Chipset Certification Device (CCD) for approved or certified processor(s) (e.g., chipsets that have been approved or certified under an AWSP Chipset Certification Program). In some embodiments, the CCD includes an approved chipset partner chipset Board Support Package (BSP) for a smart phone/feature phone device that includes the chipset submitted to the AWSP Chipset Certification Program. In some embodiments, the CCD includes a smart phone/feature phone device that includes the Approved Chipset Partner chipset submitted to the AWSP Chipset Certification Program. In some embodiments, various Operating Systems (OSs) are supported (e.g., Linux, Android, Apple, Microsoft, Palm/HP, Symbian, and/or various other operating systems and/or platforms).
In some embodiments, enhanced functionality includes integration of a Service Processor (SP) kernel program and application. In some embodiments, in addition to the DDR firmware, a Service Processor Software Developers Kit (SP SDK) is provided. In some embodiments, the SP SDK includes software and descriptive information for integrating the SP SDK kernel program and application software into a device OEM as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, an Approved Chipset Partner CCD connects to either Wireless Carrier's 3G (EVDO/UMTS) network or Wireless Carrier's 4G LTE network using a mutually agreeable WWAN wireless modem chipset that is certified for operation on Wireless Carrier's network.
DDR Processor Overview
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor is implemented within secure firmware embedded in either an applications processor unit (APU) or a modem processor unit (MPU). In some embodiments, the DDR Processor is provided as part of the device firmware build installed by an OEM at time of manufacture. In some embodiments, the DDR Processor monitors incoming and outgoing IP packets and gathers various statistics (e.g., Device Data Records (DDRs)). In some embodiments, a DDR is, in part, a record of the amount of data transmitted or service usage consumed along an IP flow. In some embodiments, an IP flow is specified by a source address, a destination address, a source port, a destination port, and a protocol type. In some embodiments, the secure device data record can also accompany the corresponding layer-7 classification information (e.g., domain names, application identifier, HTTP information, associative classification, and/or other information as described herein) with an IP flow (e.g., source address, port address, destination address, destination port, and protocol) received from the Service Processor. In some embodiments, DDRs also include other types of classification for network service usage, as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, DDRs also include various statistics related to or based on network service usage, as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, DDRs are used in 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless networks in both home and roaming network conditions for various service usage accounting, access control, and service policy enforcement verification functions, as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, a wireless communication device includes a DDR processor 114 in a secure execution environment. In some embodiments, the DDR processor 114 includes a DDR generator function (e.g., a function for generating secure DDRs, which can be reported to another element/function in the device and/or to a network element/function, such as a service controller 122) as described herein with respect to various embodiments. Various architectures are provided for implementing the DDR Processor in a secure execution environment.
Device architecture 101 includes the DDR processor 114 in a zone of data path security 140 (e.g., located in an application/general processor unit (APU)) as shown. Application programs 130 are monitored (e.g., service usage based monitoring) using a service processor application program 112. Kernel programs 132 are monitored using a service processor kernel program 113. An operating system (OS) 134 resides above a network stack 136 for network access, which is monitored by the DDR processor 114 for any network access through a modem bus driver and physical bus 142. As shown, 3G or 4G wireless network access is provided through a 3G or 4G modem 150 to a 3G or 4G networks 104, respectively. This device architecture and similar device architectures are described herein in more detail below.
Device architecture 102 includes the DDR processor 114 in a zone of data path security 143 (e.g., located in a modem processor unit (MPU)) as shown. Device architecture 102 is similar to device architecture 101 except that in device architecture 102 the zone of data path security 143 is located in 3G or 4G modem 151. Network communication via the modem 151 through modem bus driver and physical bus 149 and modem I/O 156 is monitored using the DDR processor 114 for any network access through a modem data path and signal processing 154. This device architecture and similar device architectures are described herein in more detail below.
Device architecture 103 includes the DDR processor 114 in a zone of data path security 145 (e.g., located in an APU or another processor/memory, such as a SIM card)) as shown. Device architecture 103 is similar to device architecture 101 except that in device architecture 103 the APU's modem bus driver and physical bus does not need to be in a secure zone and instead a data path security verifier 152 is included in the zone of data path security 147 in the MPU to restrict network access to only traffic that has been monitored by the DDR Processor 114 within APU. This device architecture and similar device architectures are described herein in more detail below.
Device architecture 103A includes the DDR processor 114 in a zone of data path security 918 (e.g., located SIM 913) as shown. Device architecture 103A is similar to device architectures 101 and 102, except that in device architecture 103A, as in device architecture 103, there are two zones of data path security. Zone of data path security 143 is located in 3G or 4G modem 151, and zone of data path security 918 is located on SIM 913. In device architecture 103A, modem bus driver and physical bus 149 does not need to be in a secure zone, and instead data path security verifier 152 is included in zone of data path security 143 in the MPU to restrict network access to only traffic that has been monitored by the DDR Processor 114 within SIM 913. This device architecture and similar device architectures are described herein in more detail below. Device architecture 103A enables a carrier to have complete control of the DDR processor functionalities, because the SIM considered in the industry to be a “carrier-owned” entity on the device.
As would be appreciated by a person having ordinary skill in the art, DDR processor 114 may be embedded in a secure zone of any other functional processor with a companion MPU to enforce network access. Such functional processors in which DDR processor 114 may be embedded include, for example, video processors, audio processors, display processors, location (e.g., GPS) processors, and other special-purpose processors as well as general-purpose processors such as digital signal processors (DSPs), microprocessors, etc.
In some embodiments, a Service Controller 122 is provided as shown. In some embodiments, Service Controller 122 is provided as an AWSP network server cloud system. In some embodiments, Service Controller 122 is provided as an AWSP network server cloud system that is used to perform one or more of the following: collect device service usage reports; manage certain aspects of device based network service policy; ascertain the Network Busy State (NBS) for various base stations on the network (e.g., wireless network(s)); manage the user notification and service plan selection UI processes configured on the device(s) (e.g., wireless communication device(s)); and manage certain aspects of service fraud detection. In some embodiments, the service controller 122 includes a secure DDR processing, usage reconciliation, and fraud detection function 124 as shown. In some embodiments, the service controller 122 communicates monitored service usage (e.g., reconciled service usage based on processed and reconciled secure DDRs) to network service usage reporting systems 180. In some embodiments, the reported service usage is aggregated and communicated to network billing systems 190 (e.g., for billing for the reported service usage).
In some embodiments, the Service Controller 122 communicates with various device-based elements of the AWSP system. In some embodiments, the Service Controller 122 communicates with various device-based elements of the AWSP system, including the following: the DDR Processor 114 and a Service Processor. In some embodiments, the Service Processor 112 includes an application Service Processor 112 (e.g., an application space or framework space program) and a kernel service processor 113 (e.g., a kernel space or driver space program). In some embodiments, the application service processor 112 and the kernel service processor 113 execute or perform in an OS partition on an application processor unit (APU) of a device (e.g., a wireless communication device). In some embodiments, the Service Processor is not generally in a secure execution area.
In some embodiments, the Service Processor performs various functions for the carrier network including collecting Network Busy State (NBS) information, service usage classification and reporting, certain network service policy enforcement functions, and/or certain user notification functions and roaming access policy enforcement functions, as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, the Service Processor also logs and reports device service usage information that assists a carrier (e.g., a service provider for a wireless network service or other services) in determining how to provide users with optimized services, information, and/or content.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor 114 communicates DDRs to the Service Controller 122. In some embodiments, the DDR Processor 114 communicates DDRs to the Service Controller 122 via the Internet, a carrier network, and/or other network. In some embodiments, the DDR Processor 114 does not send DDRs directly to the Service Controller 122, but instead the DDR Processor 114 forwards the DDRs to the Service Processor. The Service Processor then forwards or relays the DDRs to the Service Controller 122 and, in some embodiments, along with additional service usage reports and/or other service policy management and user notification communications generated by or received by the Service Processor.
For example, the APU OS execution environment is generally not considered secure or trusted even though the Service Processor can be protected by the OS and/or other security elements within the system. In addition, the network data path between the DDR Processor 114 to the Service Processor is generally not considered to be secure or trusted and neither is the data path between the Service Processor and the Service Controller 122. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the DDR Processor 114 and the Service Controller 122 use cryptographic techniques to provide a secure link from the DDR Processor 114 to the Service Controller 122. In some embodiments, the DDR Processor 144 is considered secure and trusted based on various implementations and techniques as described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, various techniques for securing the service usage monitoring and control performed by the DDR Processor 114 on a network data path, and securing the DDR reporting channel from the DDR Processor 114 to the Service Controller 122 are described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, a secure access controller function within the DDR Processor 114 is employed as described below to ensure that if the DDR flow is tampered with or blocked, then the device network access data path connection managed by the DDR Processor 114 is restricted to only those network destinations required to manage the DDR Processor 114 communication with the Service Controller 12. In some embodiments, the access controller function within the DDR Processor 114 receives feedback from the Service Controller 122 to restrict access or allow full access. For example, the restricted access list (e.g., a list of host names, IP addresses, and/or other identifiers for an access list) can either be pre-provisioned within the DDR Processor SEE or configured through the secure path as described in more detail herein.
In some embodiments, a secure, reliable, and trusted transmission of DDRs from the DDR processor 114 is provided by DDR reporting techniques, including the following: (1) the DDR Processor firmware is securely loaded and executed in a Secure Execution Environment (SEE); (2) the data path between the DDR Processor to the wireless modem antenna connection (e.g., a 3G or 4G network modem antenna connection) is secured to prevent fraudulent software or firmware from forming data paths that circumvent the DDR Processor data path processing; (3) the DDRs transmitted from the DDR Processor 114 to the Service Controller 122 are integrity checked in a manner that protects them from being tampered with or replayed; and (4) an authentication process between the DDR Processor 114 and the Service Controller 122 combined with a set of unique DDR report sequence identifiers and authentication session keep alive timers are used to maintain and verify the secure connection between the DDR Processor 114 and the Service Controller 122. For example, if the secure session or the flow of DDR records between the DDR Processor 114 and the Service Controller 122 are interrupted, then the secure access control function in the DDR Processor 114 can restrict access to the modem data path to the network destinations necessary to re-establish a securely authenticated session between the DDR Processor 114 and the Service Controller 122.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor 114 also includes a secure Network Busy State Monitor function (e.g., NBS Monitor) as similarly described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, the NBS Monitor logs and reports various network and modem performance parameters and also computes and reports a measure of network congestion referred to herein as the Network Busy State (NBS). In some embodiments, the NBS is a measure that indicates the level of network congestion at a give base station sector over a given measurement time interval. In some embodiments, all of this information is included in a Network Busy State Report (NBSR) that is part of the DDR message reports sent to the Service Controller 122 via the Service Processor 112.
Overview of Secure Image Programming, Secure Boot, Secure Execution, and Secure Firmware Update
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor system includes a dedicated Secure Execution Environment (SEE) within the Application Processor Unit (APU) or modem chipset. In some embodiments, the SEE provides for a secure, trusted generation of DDRs as described herein. The basic functionality of the SEE in accordance with some embodiments is described below.
In some embodiments, the SEE is a secure memory execution partition that cannot be accessed by any external program, bus, or device port. In some embodiments, the secure memory execution partition includes code space and data space. In some embodiments, a secure boot loader executes within the SEE. In some embodiments, the only other code images allowed to execute in the SEE are secure images, meaning digitally-signed images whose signature is verified by the secure boot loader. In some embodiments, at time of device manufacture, the secure boot loader is programmed into nonvolatile memory in the on-chip SEE. For example, the secure boot loader can fetch a secure image from nonvolatile memory and install it in the SEE in a trusted and secure manner. In some embodiments, the secure boot loader is the only element capable of loading an image into the SEE.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor 114 is implemented as a secure image. Installation of the DDR Processor image into the SEE using the secure boot loader is described below. Other secure images can be similarly installed as will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the embodiments described herein.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor image is digitally signed by the device OEM. For example, the secure boot loader can verify the signature using a boot loader verification key and reject the image if the signature is invalid. In some embodiments, the boot loader verification key is a 2048-bit RSA public key embedded within the secure boot loader image.
In some embodiments, the signed DDR Processor image is stored in on-chip nonvolatile memory. In some embodiments, the signed DDR Processor image is stored in off-chip nonvolatile memory (e.g., if the on-chip storage capacity of the chipsets is too constrained to store this image).
In some embodiments, the data path from the non-secure OS stack elements to the modem(s) being monitored and controlled by the DDR Processor must pass into the SEE and be made available to the DDR Processor, such as shown at 220 in
In some embodiments, a communication channel (e.g., a DDR mail box) provides communication between the DDR Processor program executing in the SEE to a Service Processor application program executing in the non-secure OS environment (e.g., application space or user space), such as shown at 230 in
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor firmware image is updated, such as shown at 240 in
Overview of DDR Processor Implementation Embodiments
The DDR Processor can be provided using different configurations for secure embedded DDR firmware (e.g., in AWSP chipsets) including in an APU implementation, an MPU implementation, and a combined APU/MPU implementation as described herein in accordance with various embodiments. Those of ordinary skill in the art will also appreciate that similar and various other secure partition configurations for providing secure embedded DDR firmware can be provided in view of the various embodiments described herein.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor is provided using an integration into the APU chipset SEE and nonvolatile memory, such as an APU implementation shown in device architecture 101 in which the DDR processor 114 and a modem bus driver and physical bus 142 are implemented in the zone of data path security 140 as shown in
In some embodiments, the DDR processor is provided using an integration into the 2G, 3G, or 4G MPU chipset SEE and nonvolatile memory, such as an MPU implementation shown in device architecture 102 in which the DDR processor 114 and a modem data path and signal processing 154 are implemented in a zone of data path security 143 as shown in
In some embodiments, the DDR processor is provided using an integration into the APU chipset SEE and nonvolatile memory, such as an APU and MPU implementation shown in device architecture 103 in which the DDR processor 114 is implemented in the zone of data path security 145, and a data path security verifier 152 and the modem data path and signal processing 154 are implemented in a zone of data path security 147 as shown in
Embedded DDR Processor Implementation on an Application Processor
In some embodiments, embedding the DDR processor in an Application Processor Unit (APU) (e.g., smart phone APU or other wireless communication device APU) provides a single secure DDR Processor location in the wireless network data path (e.g., 2G/3G/4G wireless network data path or other device I/O connection or port) that provides for service usage monitoring and access control for multiple wireless modems. Also, the APU implementation approach can allow APU chipset suppliers who may not necessarily have WAN modem components or technology to implement solutions compliant with the various AWSP techniques described herein. Further, the APU implementation approach generally more easily allows for OTA and OTN firmware updates for APU implementations as described herein (e.g., which can be more complicated to provide in certain MPU implementations). Many disclosed embodiments describe DDR APU implementations where the DDR acts on communications flows through one or more wide area network networks, connections, or modems. As would be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art, the APU embodiments for a secure device data record processing system can also act on communications that flow over one or more additional I/O networks, connections, ports, or modems (e.g., a WiFi network, connection, port, or modem; a USB network, connection, port, or modem; an Ethernet network, connection, port, or modem; a Firewire network, connection, port, or modem; a Bluetooth network, connection, port, or modem; a near field communication (NFC) network, connection, port, or modem; or another I/O connection, port, or modem).
Referring to device architecture 101 as shown in
Referring to
The APU chipset application programs 302 include user application programs 130, service processor application program 112 (e.g., for performing various service processor functions that need not be implemented in the kernel, as described herein), and OEM application programs 310. The APU chipset kernel programs 304 include OEM kernel program 312, service processor kernel program 113 e.g., for performing various service processor functions that are preferably implemented in the kernel, as described herein), APU system kernel program 314, and APU device drivers and other BSP kernel programs 316. As also shown, OS 134 includes user/application space and kernel space implemented portions as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. Network access (e.g., 3G or 4G wireless network access) is communicated through APU network stack device driver 318, which resides in kernel space 304 as shown.
The APU SEE 306 includes a secure execution memory 322 for executing/storing secure DDR processor programs 326, APU secure device system programs (e.g., modem bus driver, modem driver) 328, and OS/OEM secure device system programs 330. The APU SEE 306 also includes a program signature verifier 332 for verifying the secure DDR processor programs 326 and/or other secure programs in the secure execution memory 322 as described herein. The APU SEE 306 also includes NV memory I/O 334 as shown. The APU SEE 306 also includes a secure execution boot loader and updater (e.g., secure on-board NVRAM) 336 for implementing a secure execution boot processes and secure update processes as described herein.
In some embodiments, the network data path 324 for any user or kernel mode applications or services are communicated from the APU networking stack device driver 318 and monitored using secure DDR processor programs 326.
As further described herein, secure DDR processor programs 326 communicate to the service processor application program 112 using a DDR mailbox function and communication channel as shown via DDR mailbox data 320. In some embodiments, the DDR mailbox function provides a secure communication channel using various techniques as described herein. In some embodiments, the DDR mailbox function is used to communicate secure DDRs generated using secure DDR processor programs 326 for monitored network service usage to the service processor application program 112. In some embodiments, the service processor application program 112 communicates the secure DDRs to a network element/function, such as the service controller 122. In some embodiments, the service processor application program 112 communicates the secure DDRs with a service processor report (e.g., which includes device based micro-CDRs/uCDRs based on monitored service usage based on service processor application programs 112 and/or service processor kernel programs 113, such as application based monitoring/layer-7 or application layer based monitoring, as described herein) to a network element/function, such as the service controller 122. In some embodiments, the service processor application program 112 communicates the secure DDRs with a service processor report for overlapping and/or common time periods/intervals (e.g., which facilitates reconciliation of device assisted service usage monitoring based on the two DAS assisted service usage measures by the service controller or other network elements/functions).
As similarly described above, the secure execution boot loader and updater 336 loads DDR Processor 114 and modem bus driver images from nonvolatile (NV) memory 334 into the execution memory within SEE, shown as DDR secure execution memory 420, to execute (e.g., after code signature verification using secure program signature verifier 332). DDR Processor 114 and modem bus driver image and other secure images are all part of secure boot load to be signature verified before such are executed.
As shown, the DDR Processor sits in line with the 2G, 3G or 4G modem data path and all traffic between the OS stack and the 2G, 3G or 4G network is monitored by DDR Processor 114. DDR Processor OS stack data path interface 424 is provided that bridges between DDR secure execution environment (SEE) 420 and the unsecure OS stack in the kernel. Also, DDR Processor modem data path interface 426 is provided that similarly connects DDR Processor 114 to the modem data path fed by modem bus driver 428. In some embodiments, DDR Processor 114, which is provided in line on the data path and not simply a clone/monitor/drop function, also implements an access controller function to maintain the integrity of network access, for example, in the event that the DDR reports are tampered with or blocked from reaching the service controller 122 or DDR Processor 114 is tampered with, or Service Processor 112 is tampered with, as described herein.
As also shown, DDR processor mailbox interface 422 is provided that implements a mailbox function for passing DDR mailbox data 320 between secure DDR SEE 420 and unsecure Service Processor application 112. As would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the various embodiments described herein, the DDR mailbox function can be implemented in a variety of ways.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor and USB driver execute in a secure environment on the application processor chipset, such as DDR secure execution memory 420. In some embodiments, the secure environment ensures no unauthorized ability to replace or modify the DDR Processor code or modem bus driver/controller code (e.g., a USB driver/controller or another device I/O driver/controller, such as a 2G/3G/4G modem driver/controller, an SDIO driver/controller, an Ethernet driver/controller, a Firewire driver/controller, a WiFi driver/controller, a Bluetooth driver/controller, or a near field communication driver/controller). In some embodiments, the secure environment also ensures that the data path from the DDR Processor to the physical modem bus driver (e.g., USB port, Ethernet port, Firewire port, WiFi port, Bluetooth port, NFC port, or another I/O bus port) is isolated from firmware outside the secure environment. That is, no firmware outside the secure environment has the ability to affect the accurate gathering of statistics by the DDR Processor. In some embodiments, the secure environment further ensures that there is no ability for code other than the DDR Processor to access sensitive crypto storage, such as keys. For example, this can include shielding sensitive storage from debug monitors and/or other monitoring/access activities or techniques. As would also be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art, APU firmware, not just the DDR Processor, must be secured and not include bugs or vulnerabilities that can be exploited to allow for unauthorized access. For example, a common attack is buffer overflow, in which an attacker chooses inputs that cause an unchecked buffer to exceed its bounds, resulting in unintended behavior that the attacker can exploit.
There are various examples of APU chipset SEE Implementation techniques that can be used to meet these requirements as described above. For example, a conventional CPU with upgradeable firmware (e.g., including the DDR Processor) can be provided. The firmware can be stored in nonvolatile (NV) memory, or can be stored in flash memory in which the flash memory can be reprogrammed/updated with new or upgraded firmware. The firmware can be installed at time of manufacture and by design provides a compliant secure environment. Rigorous quality-assurance testing is required to ensure that bugs are unlikely to provide a means for compromising the secure environment. A new firmware image can be accepted for installation only if it has a valid digital signature. Version control checking can be included to prevent rollback to older versions. The firmware that validates the signature and version resides in firmware that can also be upgradeable. As another example, a security partitioned CPU can be provided, such as an ARM Trustzone or Intel Smart & Secure (e.g., or another suitable substitute including potentially supplier custom security environment CPU partitioning techniques). The DDR Processor, modem bus driver (e.g., a USB driver/controller or another device I/O driver/controller such as a 2G/3G/4G modem driver/controller, an SDIO driver/controller, an Ethernet driver/controller, a Firewire driver/controller, a WiFi driver/controller, a Bluetooth driver/controller, or a near field communication driver/controller), and any intervening code can execute in the secure partition, such as Trustzone's (e.g., or Smart & Secure's) secure mode. A secure boot procedure enforces the requirement that the DDR Processor, modem bus driver (e.g., a USB driver/controller or another device I/O driver/controller such as a 2G/3G/4G modem driver/controller, an SDIO driver/controller, an Ethernet driver/controller, a Firewire driver/controller, a WiFi driver/controller, a Bluetooth driver/controller, or a near field communication driver/controller), and intervening code can be included in a digitally signed, version-controlled code image. In such approaches, hardware firewalls can shield sensitive crypto storage from normal mode firmware. Also, the hardware firewalls ensure that normal mode firmware cannot tamper with the data path between the DDR Processor and the physical modem bus driver (e.g., USB port), thus, preventing interference with the gathering of service usage measure data and/or statistics as described herein.
Embedded DDR Processor Implementation on a Modem Processor
In some embodiments, in an MPU implementation, the DDR Processor resides in the modem processor with other secure modem data path processing code and hardware functions. For example, in an MPU-based secure DDR Processor implementation, once the data path below the modem bus driver interface is secured, it is relatively difficult to hack the device to create a data path that reaches the network by circumventing the DDR Processor. Also, for some MPU chipset families, it can be more straightforward to implement a secure execution environment, secure boot loader, and secure nonvolatile memory as compared to implementing the same functions in some APU families that do not have standard hardware security partition features, such as ARM Trust Zone and Intel Smart & Secure. Further, an MPU implementation can have less interaction with the OS kernel builds than in the case of an APU implementation. In some embodiments with an MPU implementation, DDR Processor 114 resides in a wireless wide area network modem such as a 2G, 3G or 4G modem, or in a local area or personal area modem such as a USB modem, an Ethernet modem, a Firewire modem, a WiFi modem, a Bluetooth modem, an NFC modem, or another I/O modem. Many of the described embodiments are for MPU implementations with wireless wide area network modem, but, as would be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art, other variations involving other I/O device modems are possible without departing from the scope of the disclosure.
However, it should also be observed that in a MPU DDR Processor implementation, the modem processor environment may not have a CPU with the same performance and secure execution memory space as an APU solution. This apparent disadvantage can be mitigated by designing and optimizing the DDR Processor firmware so that the code memory size is small and the CPU performance requirement is appropriate for a typically relatively low powered modem processor chipset CPUs. Also, as mentioned above, the OTA and OTN update process may be more complex than that achieved by certain APU chip set suppliers and their OEMs.
Similar to the APU based approach discussed above,
As also shown in
Modem chipset unsecure execution environment 602 includes a modem bus communication driver 610. In some embodiments, a logical communication channel for modem data path traffic 622 and above DDR modem data path processing 624 is also provided. In some embodiments, a logical communication channel for modem control settings and status reports 612, modem status data 614, modem control data 616, modem diagnostics data 618, and other unsecured modem functions 620.
As shown, APU chipset application programs 702, which includes DDR mailbox data 710 communicated to the service processor application program 112 as similarly described herein. APU chipset kernel programs 704 includes service processor kernel program 113 along with APU stack interface for 3G/4G modem 712, APU stack interface for other modems 714, and 3G or 4G modem bus driver 716 for communication via modem bus 718 to 3G or 4G modem bus driver 722 of modem chipset unsecure execution environment 706 as shown.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor 114 is in line with the data path allowing for secure network/service usage measure and/or access control as similarly described herein with respect to various embodiments. In some embodiments, a DDR Processor OS stack data interface (IF) 728 is provided that bridges between the DDR secure execution environment (SEE) and the (potentially) unsecure modem bus driver interface 722 in modem chipset unsecure execution environment 706. As also shown, a DDR Processor modem data path interface 730 is provided that similarly connects the DDR Processor 114 to the modem data path processing and the modem signal processing 740 that occurs between the DDR and the antenna. As described herein, the DDR is in line on the data path and is not simply a clone/monitor/drop function, as the DDR Processor also implement an access controller function in accordance with some embodiments to maintain the integrity of network access in the event that the DDR reports are tampered with or blocked from reaching the Service Controller, or the DDR Processor is tampered with, or the Service Processor is tampered with.
As also shown, a mailbox function is provided that passes data between the secure DDR SEE 725 and the unsecure Service Processor application program 112. In particular, a DDR Processor mailbox interface (IF) 724 is in communication with a DDR mailbox 720, which is located in the modem chipset unsecure execution environment 706. DDR mailbox data 710 is shown as provided to the unsecure Service Processor application program 112, which is provided through the modem communication path via the modem bus driver 722 and the modem bus 718 as shown. The DDR Processor mailbox interface (IF) 724 is in communication with the DDR Processor 114 and is located in the DDR SEE 725. As would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the various embodiments described herein, the mailbox function can be implemented in a variety of ways. As similarly described above with respect to the various APU based embodiments, in accordance with some embodiments, the secure region is inclusive of all data path processing steps below the DDR Processor, and there is not any data path through the modem to the network that circumvents the DDR Processor.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor executes in a secure environment in the MPU based embodiments, as similarly described above with respect to the APU based embodiments. In some embodiments, the secure environment ensures no unauthorized ability to replace or modify the DDR Processor code. In some embodiments, the secure environment also ensures that the data path from the DDR Processor to the antenna is isolated from firmware outside the secure environment. That is, no firmware outside the secure environment has the ability to affect the accurate gathering of statistics by the DDR Processor. In some embodiments, the secure environment further ensures that there is no ability for code other than the DDR Processor to access sensitive crypto storage, such as keys. For example, this can include shielding sensitive storage from debug monitors and/or other monitoring/access activities or techniques. As would also be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art, MPU firmware, not just the DDR Processor, must be secured and not include bugs or vulnerabilities that can be exploited to allow for unauthorized access. For example, a common attack is buffer overflow, in which an attacker chooses inputs that cause an unchecked buffer to exceed its bounds, resulting in unintended behavior that the attacker can exploit.
Examples of secure execution environment (SEE) implementations in the MPU embodiments include the examples similarly discussed above for various secure execution environment (SEE) implementations in the APU embodiments.
Embedded DDR Processor Implementation on an Application Processor Combined with a Data Path Security Verifier on a Modem Processor
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor is embedded in a SEE APU chipset, and a Data Path Security Verifier (DPSV) is embedded in the MPU chipset, such as shown in device architecture 103 of
As mentioned above, this approach does not require securing the APU 3G or 4G modem bus driver and physical bus. For example, some vendors and/or chipset suppliers (e.g., AWSP APU chipset suppliers) may consider it easier to create two firmware images and two zones of data path security rather than securing the data path between the DDR Processor SEE and the modem antenna connection. As compared to the APU implementation based approach, the firmware for the APU is somewhat simplified and the security design work involved with securing the modem bus driver and physical bus can be eliminated. As compared to MPU implementation based approach, the modem firmware is also simplified. For example, in some APU chipset architectures, it may be difficult to secure the data path from the DDR Processor through the modem bus driver, the modem physical bus, and the modem itself. Also, in some MPU chipsets, as similarly discussed above, there may be a need to simplify or reduce the size of the secure firmware program image required on the MPU. Simpler and smaller firmware can reduce the frequency of required updates or perhaps eliminate them altogether. The APU DDR Processor and MPU DPSV implementation approach described herein reduces the firmware required on the MPU down to the DPSV. This allows more complex data path processing by the DDR Processor to be implemented on the APU, in which (i) secure firmware execution memory is typically larger and CPU performance is typically higher, and (ii) the firmware update system is typically more capable and more flexible. However, there are also drawbacks with the APU DDR Processor and MPU DPSV implementation approach. The primary drawback is that firmware generally must be embedded in both the wireless network chipset (MPU) and the device Application Processor (APU) chipset.
As shown in
Referring to APU SEE 810, a program signature verifier 820, nonvolatile memory I/O 822, and secure execution boot loader and updater 824 as similarly described herein with respect to various embodiments. The APU SEE 810 also includes a DDR secure execution memory 812. The DDR secure execution memory 812 includes the DDR processor 114 for monitoring the data path through OS stack data path interface 816 and modem data path interface 818 for data path communications via modem bus driver 826 to modem bus 818 as shown. The DDR secure execution memory 812 also includes a DDR processor mailbox interface for providing DDR mailbox data 810 from DDR processor 114 to service processor application program 112 as shown and as similarly described herein. Similarly, the DPSV 836 uses the DPSV mailbox interface 842 as a communication channel to authenticate the DDR processor 114 and establish a secret session key to be used for message integrity check between the two. Various techniques for implementing the security binding between DDR Processor 114 and DPSV 836 are described herein.
In some embodiments, the DDR Processor executes in a secure environment in the APU based embodiments, as similarly described above with respect to the APU based embodiments. In some embodiments, the secure environment ensures no unauthorized ability to replace or modify the DDR Processor code. In some embodiments, the secure environment further ensures that there is no ability for code other than the DDR Processor to access sensitive crypto storage, such as keys. For example, this can include shielding sensitive storage from debug monitors and/or other monitoring/access activities or techniques. As would also be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art, APU firmware, not just the DDR Processor, must be secured and not include bugs or vulnerabilities that can be exploited to allow for unauthorized access. For example, a common attack is buffer overflow, in which an attacker chooses inputs that cause an unchecked buffer to exceed its bounds, resulting in unintended behavior that the attacker can exploit.
Similarly, in some embodiments, the DPSV executes in a secure environment. In some embodiments, the secure environment ensures no unauthorized ability to replace or modify the DPSV code. In some embodiments, the secure environment further ensures that there is no ability for code other than the DPSV to access sensitive crypto storage, such as keys. In some embodiments, the secure environment further ensures that there is no ability for any code to interfere with the proper crypto functions of the DPSV or communications between the DPSV and the DDR Processor. For example, this can include shielding sensitive storage from debug monitors and/or other monitoring/access activities or techniques. As would also be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art, MPU firmware, not just the DPSV, must be secured and not include bugs or vulnerabilities that can be exploited to allow for unauthorized access. For example, a common attack is buffer overflow, in which an attacker chooses inputs that cause an unchecked buffer to exceed its bounds, resulting in unintended behavior that the attacker can exploit.
In some embodiments, the APU includes a Data Path Processor (DPP) that includes the DDR Processor function, which is secured in an APU SEE as described herein. In some embodiments, the APU DPP also includes other service monitoring, control, and notification functions. In some embodiments, the modem includes a Data Path Security Verifier (DPSV) that secures the path between the APU DPP and the modem network data path so that only the DPP can transmit over the modem even if other software, firmware, buses, or ports have access to the modem. In some embodiments, the modem DPSV is bound to the APU DPP by one or more of the techniques described herein and/or similar or other techniques as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the various embodiments described herein. For example, the APU DPP can be provided in a secured data path to the modem network connection that cannot be circumvented by software, firmware, buses, or ports on the device. This can be a hardwired data path via hardware design or a data path secured with a secure firmware or software execution environment for all the data path elements below the APU DPP. The APU DPP and modem exchange public keys and/or digital certificates and then execute a key exchange process to authenticate each other which results in a secret shared session key to be used as the basis for message integrity checking.
Once the secret shared session key is established between APU DPP and DSPV, the APU DPP uses the session key to append an integrity check on each frame to be transmitted, and the modem uses the session key to validate the integrity check. The modem only allows frames that have a valid integrity check to be transmitted, and it blocks frames that do not include a valid integrity check, meaning that only frames that were processed by the APU DPP get transmitted. Similarly, the modem DPSV uses the session key to append an integrity check to each received frame, and the APU DPP uses the session to validate the integrity check before it is sent to the higher layer (e.g., application layer, etc.).
In some embodiments, modem downstream data path messages between DPSV and DPP are sequenced. In some embodiments, APU DPP upstream messages include downstream sequence information so that modem DPSV can confirm that APU DPP is receiving all downstream packets, and if not, then the modem DPSV can inform the APU DPP, inform the Service Controller, and/or take action such as restricting access and/or other appropriate actions.
In some embodiments, the APU DPP generates secure DDRs and communicates the secure DDRs to the Service Controller in a sequenced and secure manner as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, the Service Processor application and/or Service Processor kernel program informs the APU DPP as to which sockets/flows belong to which applications (e.g., can be or should be associated with which applications for application based service usage monitoring, billing, and/or control) so that the APU DPP knows which application is generating or receiving traffic in order to assist in application classification tag for charging, traffic control, and/or user notification policies.
In some embodiments, the APU DPP performs a variety of functions. In some embodiments, the APU DPP can perform DDR Processor functions. The APU DPP can perform any or all of the service monitoring functions of the Charging Agent (CA) and/or Policy Decision Agent (PDA). The APU DPP can count all network traffic, and in some examples, classifying traffic by application and/or destination, NBS, time of day, active network, and/or various other criteria as described herein. The APU DPP can generate charging records. The APU DPP can communicate charging records to the Service Controller (e.g., or another network charging function) and/or device notification UI.
In some embodiments, the APU DPP performs access controller functions. For example, the APU DPP can instruct the service processor application and/or kernel program to either allow or block/kill or background an application or destination. The service processor application and/or kernel program can either allow/block or background an application by manipulating the application access to the network or by intercepting the application program boot/start sequence, or from suspending/resuming the application. The service processor application and/or kernel program can perform the intercept functions by reprogramming or intercepting application management functions in the OS (e.g., such as the Android activity manager and/or the service manager functions). The APU DPP either instructs service processor application/kernel program to control application and/or traffic, or controls traffic directly in the DPP. The APU DPP can perform policy enforcement functions as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, the APU DPP can perform NBS monitor functions and/or reporting functions. For example, the APU DPP can detect NBS, modem performance parameters, network assets involved in link, and/or geo-location information.
In some embodiments, the APU DPP obtains network time from network with “secure” ping-loop system to verify that network time stamp is not intercepted and delayed. For example, the APU DPP can either have a local reliable clock or can perform a ping-loop each time a report is started and/or stopped.
Examples of secure execution environment (SEE) implementations in the APU DDR Processor and MPU DPSV embodiments include the examples similarly discussed above for various secure execution environment (SEE) implementations in the APU embodiments. Specific examples are also listed below. Example commercially available APUs include the following: Intel Atom (e.g., Z5xx, Z6xx, D4xx, D5xx series) based solutions with Intel Trusted Execution Technology including TPM support; and ARM based solutions with ARM Trusted Zone Architecture. Example APU specification requirements can also include: common hardware security blocks (e.g., AES, DES, RSA, Diffie-Hellman, SHA, and a random generator). Example commercially available MPUs include the following: EVDO chip set based solutions (e.g., ARM 11-based CPU architecture, including ARM Trusted Zone Architecture with many common hardware crypto blocks); HSPA chipset based solutions (e.g., Snapdragon/ARM based CPU architecture, including ARM Trusted Zone Architecture with many common hardware crypto blocks); and LTE chipset based solutions (e.g., Snapdragon/ARM based CPU architecture, including ARM Trusted Zone Architecture with many common hardware crypto blocks).
As shown in
As also shown in
In some embodiments, the SIM includes a Data Path Processor (DPP) that embeds the DDR function, which is secured in the SIM SEE. For example, the SIM DPP can also include other service monitoring, control, and notification functions. In some embodiments, the modem includes a Data Path Security Verifier (DPSV) that secures the path between the SIM DPP and the modem network data path so that only the DPP can transmit over the modem even if other software, firmware, buses, or ports have access to the modem.
In some embodiments, the modem DPSV is bound to the SIM DPP by one of the following techniques and/or similar or other techniques as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the various embodiments described herein.
For example, the SIM DPP can be provided in a secured data path to the modem network connection that cannot be circumvented by software, firmware, buses, or ports on the device. The secured data path can be a hardwired data path via hardware design or a data path secured with a secure firmware or software execution environment for all the data path elements below the SIM DPP. In some embodiments, the communication between the DPSV 936 and DDR Processor 114 is secured using various secure communication techniques, such as those described herein. In some embodiments, the DPSV has a unique private/public key pair and a digital certificate (cert) that attests to the authenticity of its public key. The DDR Processor has a unique private/public key pair and a digital certificate (cert) that attests to the authenticity of its public key. The DPSV and the DDR Processor exchange public keys and certs, then execute a key exchange process that authenticates each other and results in a secret, shared session key. The DDR Processor receives upstream network data flows from the device OS networking stack and, using the session key, it appends an integrity check to each upstream data message that it sends to the DPSV. The DPSV blocks any upstream data path information that does not have a valid integrity check from the DDR Processor and informs the DDR Processor that it is receiving invalid upstream data so that the DDR Processor may inform the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DPSV receives downstream network data flows and, using the session key, it appends an integrity check to each downstream data message that it sends to the DDR Processor. Each downstream data message is, for example, sequenced so that data messages cannot be blocked or replayed without being detected by the DDR Processor. If the DDR Processor receives a downstream data message with an invalid integrity check, the DDR Processor rejects the message and informs the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DDR Processor acknowledges each non-rejected downstream data message in the next upstream data message it sends to the DPSV. If the DPSV stops receiving downstream data message acknowledgements, it blocks downstream network data flows and informs the DDR Processor so that the DDR Processor may inform the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DDR Processor securely sends DDR reports to the Service Controller by way of the Service Processor as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, the modem downstream data path messages between the DPSV and DPP are sequenced. In some embodiments, the SIM DPP upstream messages include downstream sequence information so that modem DPSV can confirm that the SIM DPP is receiving all downstream packets and, if not, then modem DPSV can inform the SIM DPP, inform the Service Controller, and/or take action such as restricting access or another appropriation action(s).
In some embodiments, the SIM-MPU interface is a physical interface (e.g., a bus). In some embodiments, the SIM-MPU interface is a logical interface (e.g., via untrusted APU). In some embodiments, the SIM is logically an independent security hardware module (e.g., part of a secure execution environment) embedded into any device processing element (e.g., a SIM, video processor, audio processor, display processor, etc.).
In some embodiments, a SIM and MPU exchange comprises several components. In some embodiments, each of the MPU and the SIM has its own public/private encryption key pair with a certificate. In some embodiments, the MPU and SIM exchange keys using a key exchange protocol. In some embodiments, this key exchange takes place over a physical bus between the MPU and the SIM. In some embodiments, this key exchange takes place through a logical bus (e.g., via an untrusted APU). Such key exchanges protocols are well known in the art and are not described here. In some embodiments, after the MPU and SIM have mutually authenticated the keys using certificates, they establish a shared session key. In some embodiments, the MPU and SIM initialize a transmit count value to zero, a receive count value to zero, a maximum transmit count value to an integer N, and a maximum receive count value to an integer M. In some embodiments, the values of M and N are the same. In some embodiments, the values of M and N are implementation-dependent and can be determined based on the MPU's receive and transmit packet processing capabilities. For example, by choosing M to be 3 and N to be 2, the SIM block expects to get an ACK frame from the MPU after no more than three received packets and no later than after two transmitted packets; otherwise the SIM concludes that fraud has occurred and informs a network element.
In some embodiments, the MPU sends only a relevant portion of the transmit frame to the SIM for each outgoing packet in order to reduce SIM processing requirements. In some embodiments, the relevant portion of the transmit frames includes a header, transmit count, and an integrity check. In some embodiments, the header includes information such as one or more of source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, a protocol tag, and a packet length in bytes. In some embodiments, the transmit count counts transmitted frames and increments with each transmit frame. In some embodiments, the integrity check is determined by hashing one or more of the session key, header, and the transmit count.
In some embodiments, the MPU also sends only a relevant portion of the receive frame to the SIM for each incoming packet. In some embodiments, the relevant portion of the receive frames includes a header, receive count, and an integrity check. In some embodiments, the header is the same as the transmit frame header (e.g., one or more of source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, a protocol tag, and a packet length in bytes). In some embodiments, the receive count increments with each received frame. In some embodiments, the integrity check is determined by hashing one or more of the session key, header, and transmit count.
In some embodiments, the frame acknowledgment (e.g., ACK) is the sum of the maximum transmit count, the maximum receive count, and the integrity check. In some embodiments, the maximum transmit count is set to (transmit count+N), where transmit count is the transmit count from the most recent transmit frame. In some embodiments, the maximum receive count is set to (receive count+M), where receive count is the receive count from the most recent received frame. In some embodiments, the integrity check is determined by hashing one or more of the session key, maximum transmit count, and maximum receive count.
In some embodiments, the interface between the MPU and the SIM is a logical channel (e.g., via untrusted APU). In some embodiments, on the transmit side the APU sends the SIM the transmit frame header only (e.g., one or more of source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, a protocol tag, and a packet length in bytes). In some embodiments, the SIM sends back to the APU the transmit count, the maximum receive count (e.g., receive count+M), and an integrity check. In some embodiments, the SIM increments the value of the transmit count for every transmitted frame. In some embodiments, the SIM determines the integrity check by hashing one or more the session key, the header, the transmit frame count and the maximum receive count. In some embodiments, the APU appends the header and the frame body to the SIM-delivered transmit count, max receive count, and the integrity check and sends the result to the MPU. In some embodiments, the MPU transmits only the frames passing the integrity check one at time. In such embodiments, the MPU may not use a maximum transmit count.
In some embodiments, the interface between the MPU and the SIM is a logical channel (e.g., via untrusted APU). In some embodiments, on the receive side the MPU sends the APU the header (e.g., one or more of source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, a protocol tag, and a packet length in bytes), the receive count, an integrity check, and the frame body. In some embodiments, the receive count is incremented for every received packet. In some embodiments, the integrity check is determined by hashing one or more of the session key, the header, and the receive count. In some embodiments, the APU sends only the header (e.g., one or more of source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, a protocol tag, and a packet length in bytes), the receive count, and the integrity check to the SIM. In some embodiments, the MPU can process more than a single receive frame before obtaining the SIM confirmation feedback. In some embodiments, the SIM ACK frame (e.g., the indication of the maximum receive count) is piggybacked onto the frame as described herein.
In some embodiments, the MPU sends the entire data frame to the SIM, and the SIM appends an integrity check to be validated on the transmit side and on the receive side. In some embodiments, the DSPV engine adds the integrity check to the data frames and sends them to the SIM. In such embodiments, the SIM interfaces with the APU, and the SIM (DDR Processor) is in the middle of the data exchange.
In some embodiments, in each transmit frame, the MPU increments the transmit count and compares that value to the value of maximum transmit count as obtained from the most recent frame acknowledgment. In some embodiments, if the transmit count is greater than the maximum transmit count, the MPU determines that the SIM is not receiving valid transmit frame data. In some embodiments, the MPU informs a network element (e.g., a trusted entity such as a service controller) that a fraud has occurred after determining that the SIM is not receiving valid transmit frame data.
In some embodiments, if the MPU detects an invalid integrity check in a frame acknowledgment, or if the SIM detects an invalid integrity check on a transmit frame, the MPU or the SIM determines that malicious behavior is occurring. In some embodiments, when the MPU or the SIM determines that malicious behavior is occurring, the MPU or the SIM informs a network element (e.g., a trusted entity such as a service controller) that a fraud has occurred. In some embodiments, if the MPU or the SIM does not determine that malicious behavior is occurring, the SIM updates the DDR data collection using the header from the transmit frame and reports the results to the network element.
In some embodiments, in each receive frame, the MPU increments the receive count and compares that value to the value of the maximum transmit count as obtained from the most recent frame acknowledgment. In some embodiments, if the receive count is greater than the maximum receive count, the MPU determines that the SIM is not receiving valid receive frame data. In some embodiments, the MPU informs a network element (e.g., a trusted entity such as a service controller) that a fraud has occurred after determining that the SIM is not receiving valid receive frame data.
In some embodiments, if the MPU detects and invalid integrity check in a frame acknowledgment, or if the SIM detects an invalid integrity check on a receive frame, the MPU or the SIM determines that malicious behavior is occurring. In some embodiments, when the MPU or the SIM determines that malicious behavior is occurring, the MPU or the SIM informs a network element (e.g., a trusted entity such as a service controller) that a fraud has occurred. In some embodiments, if the MPU or the SIM does not determine that malicious behavior is occurring, the SIM updates the DDR data collection using the header from the receive frame and reports the results to the network element.
In some embodiments, the SIM DPP generates secure DDRs and communicates the secure DDRs to the Service Controller in a sequenced and secure manner as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, the Service Processor application and/or Service Processor kernel program informs the SIM DPP which sockets/flows belong to which applications so that the SIM DPP knows which application is generating or receiving traffic in order to assist in application classification tag for charging, traffic control, and notification policy.
In some embodiments, the SIM DPP performs a variety of functions, as described herein. For example, the SIM DPP can perform the DDR Processor functions. The SIM DPP can perform any or all of the service monitoring functions of the Charging Agent (CA) and/or Policy Decision Agent (PDA). The SIM DPP counts all traffic with the network, and in some cases, also classifies the traffic by application and/or destination, NBS, time of day (TOD), active network, and/or various other criteria. The SIM DPP can generate charging records. The SIM DPP can communicate charging records to the Service Controller (e.g., or another network charging function) and/or device notification UI.
As another example, the SIM DPP can perform various access controller functions. The SIM DPP can instruct the Service Processor application and/or kernel program to either allow, block/kill, or background an application or destination. The Service Processor application and/or kernel program can allow, block/kill, or background an application by manipulating the application access to the network or by intercepting the application program boot/start sequence, or from suspending/resuming the application. The Service Processor application and/or kernel program can perform the intercept functions by reprogramming or intercepting application management functions in the OS (e.g., such as the Android activity manager and/or the service manager functions). As an example, the SIM DPP can either instruct the Service Processor application and/or kernel program to control the application and/or traffic, or controls traffic directly in the DPP. The SIM DPP can also perform policy enforcement functions as described herein.
As yet another example, the SIM DPP can perform NBS monitoring and/or reporting functions. The SIM DPP can detect NBS, modem performance parameters, network assets involved in link, and geo-location.
As yet a further example, SIM DPP can obtain a network time from network with “secure” ping-loop system to verify that network time stamp is not intercepted and delayed. For example, the SIM DPP can either have local reliable clock or can perform ping-loop each time a report is started and/or stopped.
In some embodiments, a hardware or firmware secure data path between the DDR Processor and the modem DPSV is not required, such as shown in
Referring to
In some embodiments, a first logical communication channel is created over the SIM bus 1016 between the Service Processor DDR mailbox 910 on the APU and the DDR mailbox 1034 on the SIM, and this supports the communication between the Service Processor (e.g., Service Processor application program 112 and/or Service Processor kernel program 113) and the DDR Processor 114 using DDR processor mailbox interface 1044 to DDR mailbox data 1034 to SIM bus driver 1032 as shown. A second logical data channel is created over the SIM bus 1016 between the OS networking stack and the DDR Processor 114, and this is the logical channel intended for all OS networking stack communications with the 3G or 4G network using OS stack data path interface 1046 to SIM bus driver 1032 as also shown. A third logical communication channel is created between the SIM DDR Processor 114 and the modem DPSV 1026. This third logical communication channel is formed by forwarding data between the SIM bus interface (e.g., modem data path interface 1048 to SIM bus driver 1032) located on the SIM, the SIM bus driver 1010 located on the APU, the SIM to modem bus forwarding function 1012 located on the APU, the modem bus driver 1014 located on the APU, and the modem bus interface 1022 located on the modem as also shown.
In some embodiments, the communication between the DPSV 1026 and DDR Processor 114 is secured using various secure communication techniques, such as those described herein. In some embodiments, the DPSV has a unique private/public key pair and a digital certificate (cert) that attests to the authenticity of its public key. The DDR Processor has a unique private/public key pair and a digital certificate (cert) that attests to the authenticity of its public key. The DPSV and the DDR Processor exchange public keys and certs, then execute a key exchange process that authenticates each other and results in a secret, shared session key. The DDR Processor receives upstream network data flows from the device OS networking stack and, using the session key, it appends an integrity check to each upstream data message that it sends to the DPSV. The DPSV blocks any upstream data path information that does not have a valid integrity check from the DDR Processor and informs the DDR Processor that it is receiving invalid upstream data so that the DDR Processor may inform the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DPSV receives downstream network data flows and, using the session key, it appends an integrity check to each downstream data message that it sends to the DDR Processor. Each downstream data message is, for example, sequenced so that data messages cannot be blocked or replayed without being detected by the DDR Processor. If the DDR Processor receives a downstream data message with an invalid integrity check, the DDR Processor rejects the message and informs the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DDR Processor acknowledges each non-rejected downstream data message in the next upstream data message it sends to the DPSV. If the DPSV stops receiving downstream data message acknowledgements, it blocks downstream network data flows and informs the DDR Processor so that the DDR Processor may inform the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DDR Processor securely sends DDR reports to the Service Controller by way of the Service Processor as described herein with respect to various embodiments.
In some embodiments, the DDRs transmitted from the DDR Processor to the Service Controller are integrity checked and sequenced in a manner that cannot be tampered with or replayed. An authentication process between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller combined with a set of unique DDR report sequence identifiers and authentication session keep-alive timers are used to maintain and confirm the secure connection between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller. If the secure session or the flow of DDR records between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller are interrupted, then the access control function in the DDR Processor restricts access of the 3G or 4G modem data path to the network destinations necessary to reestablish a securely authenticated session with between the DDR and the Service Controller.
In some embodiments, various other architectures including various other locations of the DDR Processor can be provided using these or similar techniques as will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the embodiments described herein.
In some embodiments, various other architectures including various other locations of the DDR Processor and/or DPSV can be provided using these or similar techniques as will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the embodiments described herein.
For example, the DDR Processor (e.g., and/or various secured elements of the Service Processor) can be located in various other locations (e.g., in various secure operating environments) that involve network access policy enforcement at higher levels in the network stack. In particular, certain functions performed by the Service Processor without hardware security can be located in hardware secured execution memory. Such functions can include 3G and 4G network data path processing and usage report functions, 3G and 4G network application access management and usage reporting functions, and 3G and 4G service user notification and customer activity status functions.
In some embodiments, using secure execution environment partitioning technology, large portions or the entire service processor functionality are implemented in hardware secured execution environments in the APU or MPU. In some embodiments, using secure CPU partitioning technology, large portions or the entire Service Processor functionality are implemented in hardware secured execution environments in the APU or MPU. As an example embodiment, service processor functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment include policy enforcement actions in accordance with a set of policy instructions stored in the secure execution environment such as: managing policy for one or more of 2G, 3G or 4G network (and/or other I/O ports such as Ethernet, WiFi, USB, Firewire, Bluetooth, or NFC), wherein the policy management can include application access management, application traffic processing, application access monitoring and reporting, or application access service accounting and reporting. As another example embodiment, secure service processor element functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment include managing policy for one or more applications wherein the policy specifies whether to block, allow, or throttle the applications in accordance with a set of policy instructions stored in the secure execution environment. As another example embodiment, secure service processor element functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment include managing policy for one or more applications wherein the policy includes application activity monitoring and reporting or operating environment monitoring and reporting (e.g., monitoring the security status or presence of malware in the device operating environment). As another example embodiment, secure service processor element functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment include managing policy for one or more network destinations or resources that can include websites, domains, URLs, IP and/or TCP addresses, server names, other devices, or content sources, wherein the policy includes access management, traffic control, access monitoring or access service accounting. As another example embodiment, secure service processor element functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment include managing policy for one or more roaming access networks. As another example embodiment, secure service processor element functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment include monitoring and reporting communication activity on one or more device I/O connections including one or more of a 2G, 3G, 4G and/or other I/O port. In some embodiments, secure service processor element functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment include monitoring, classifying (e.g., identifying application and/or network destination associated with the I/O port activity) and reporting communication activity on one or more device I/O connections, including one or more of a 2G, 3G, 4G and/or other I/O port. In some embodiments, a service controller located in the network provides the set of policy instructions stored in the secure execution environment by communicating them to the secure service processor element via a secure communication link as described herein. In some embodiments, these policy enforcement actions involving reporting can include sending the reports to a service controller located in the network via a secure communication link into the secure execution environment as described herein for further processing of the reports. In some embodiments, sending the reports to a service controller located in the network via a secure communication link into the secure execution environment can include the authenticated secure sequencing and receipt protocols described herein.
As another example embodiment, secure service processor element functions that can be executed within a secure execution environment can include one or more of: (i) a secure application manager that identifies traffic associated with a specific application or group of applications to differentially manage one or more of 2G, 3G and 4G application access policies (e.g., allow, block, throttle, defer for later transmission, apply a given QoS level) or service usage accounting (and/or accounting for application access by one or more other I/O ports, such as Ethernet, WiFi, USB, Firewire, Bluetooth, or NFC), (ii) a secure application manager that identifies when an application is attempting to run and determines whether to permit the application to run or to not allow the application to run based on a set of application policies, (iii) a secure application manager that differentially manages 3G and 4G application access (and/or application access or service usage accounting for one or more other I/O ports) according to network access policy set by the service controller and network busy state determined on the device, and (iv) 3G and 4G network traffic that is classified and processed according to application identifier, layer 7 destination as well as layer 3/4 destination and network busy state. In some embodiments, securing such service processor functions can be augmented by: (i) configuring the secure execution environment with the various operating environment techniques disclosed herein so that the service processor achieves a similar degree of protection from hacking and malware described for lower levels of stack processing (e.g., the DDR processor SEE embodiments described herein), (ii) protecting or securing the data path between the DDR Processor (e.g., and/or elements of the service processor) and the modem antenna connection from circumvention or tampering by device malware, and (iii) providing sufficient secure or protected memory and sufficient secure execution environment CPU cycles to execute the more sophisticated data path processing functions.
In some embodiments, a secure communication between a network-based service controller and a device-based secure service processor element operating in a secure execution environment on a device connected to a wide area access network is used for secure (or trusted) delivery of secure service processor element I/O activity monitor records for one or more I/O ports (e.g., an I/O port including but not limited to 2G, 3G, 4G, Ethernet, WiFi, USB, Firewire, Bluetooth, or NFC), wherein the secure communication includes a secure message receipt feedback loop. In some embodiments, if the secure message feedback loop is interrupted, a secure service processor element secure communication channel error condition is detected and acted on. In some embodiments, an ordered sequence of secure service processor element I/O activity reports is communicated to a service controller using a signed or encrypted communication channel, and if the ordered sequence is interrupted or tampered with, a device secure service processor element secure communication channel error condition is detected and acted on. In some embodiments, the service controller observes the integrity of the ordered sequence of secure service processor element I/O activity reports to determine if device data records have been tampered with or omitted. In some embodiments, if the secure service processor element determines that the I/O activity monitor records have not been tampered with or omitted, the service controller sends back a signed or encrypted I/O activity monitor record receipt message. In some embodiments, if the secure service processor element determines that an I/O activity monitor record has been tampered with or omitted, the service controller sends back an error message or does not send back a signed or encrypted I/O activity monitor record receipt message. In some embodiments, if the secure service processor element receives an error message from the service controller, or does not receive a signed or encrypted I/O activity monitor record receipt message within a certain period of time or within a certain number of transmitted I/O activity monitor records or within a certain amount of communication information processed, then (i) a device configuration error message is generated for delivery to a security administrator or server, and/or (ii) one or more of the wireless network connections or other I/O connections or ports of the wireless communication device are either blocked or restricted to a pre-determined set of safe destinations. In this manner, if a device secure service processor element, the device operating environment, device operating system, or device software is tampered with in a manner that produces wireless network or other I/O port access service usage characteristics that are not compliant with expected policy or allowed policy, a device configuration error message can be generated, or device wireless network access or other I/O connection accesses can be restricted or blocked. Such embodiments can be helpful in securing device-based network access (or I/O control) policies and can also be helpful in identifying device software that has been tampered with or any malware that is present on the device. In some embodiments, the restriction on wireless network accesses or other I/O accesses results in access to a limited number of network destinations or resources sufficient to allow further analysis or troubleshooting of the device configuration error condition.
In some embodiments, the secure service processor element executing within a secure execution environment and communicating with a service controller via a secure communication link that includes a secure message receipt feedback loop observes device application and/or I/O port activity and generates one or more of the following device activity reports: service usage reports, service usage reports including service usage classification, application service usage reports, network destination service usage reports, service usage reports including network type identifiers, service usage reports including location identifiers, application access monitoring reports, application access service accounting reports, application activity monitoring reports, device operating environment monitoring reports.
In some embodiments, the secure service processor element executing within a secure execution environment and communicating with a service controller via a secure communication link that includes a secure message receipt feedback loop observes device application and/or I/O port activity and generates a roaming network service usage report.
In some embodiments, the service controller observes the secure service processor element I/O activity records to determine if the device is in compliance with a service controller policy condition. In some embodiments, determining whether the device is in compliance with the service controller policy condition comprises verifying that the device secure service processor element is properly implementing a device policy. In some embodiments, the device policy being verified is a network access service policy enforcement set. In some embodiments, the device policy that is verified is a network access service policy enforcement set comprising a network access service plan policy enforcement set, including a set of policies for one or more of network access control or traffic control, network application control, network destination control, network charging or accounting, and network service usage notification. In some embodiments, the device policy that is verified is whether or not the device application activity is in accordance with a set of pre-determined policies (e.g., determining if the applications that are accessing the network or other I/O ports are all allowed applications, or determining if the applications accessing the network or other I/O ports are behaving according to expected policy behavior). In some embodiments, the device policy verification includes whether the device is accessing approved or unapproved networks. In some embodiments, the device policy verification includes whether the device is communicating specified content via one or more allowed wireless connections or other I/O ports, or is communicating specified content over one or more wireless networks or I/O ports that are not allowed. In some embodiments, the device policy verification includes whether the device is communicating specified content via an allowed secure link over one or more wireless connections or other I/O ports, or is communicating specified content over an insecure link. In some embodiments, the device policy verification includes whether the device is communicating from an allowed location or from a location that is not allowed. In some embodiments, the device policy verification includes whether or not the device operating environment monitoring reports indicate that the device operating environment is free of any malicious software or erroneous operating conditions.
In some embodiments, secure service processor elements 1604 are implemented within a secure execution environment (zone of data path security 140) that is located on a SIM card. The various embodiments described in relation to
Additional embodiments are now provided for various aspects of DDR Processor functional operations.
DDR Firmware Installation, Security Credential Configuration, and Update
Mailbox Communication Channel Between the Service Processor and DDR Processor
In some embodiments, in which the DDR Processor is located in the APU, then the shared memory can be accessed via both Service Processor and DDR Processor using the APU's direct memory access (DMA) engines.
In some embodiments, in which the DDR Processor is located in the MPU, then a modem interface is provided to support an additional logical channel (e.g., USB endpoint for 2G/3G/4G) to satisfy this requirement. In some embodiments, the logical channel is piggybacked on top of an existing configuration and status channel that provides the control channel between the APU and the MPU.
DDR Processor Record Generator
In some embodiments, a DDR report spans a measurement period. Measurement periods are generally contiguous, meaning the next period begins immediately after the current period ends, with no traffic falling between periods. At the start of a period, all prior DDRs are deleted. During the period, the table of DDRs grows, since each observed IP flow creates an entry in the table. The period ends when either DDR storage exceeds a predefined threshold, or when a DDR report is requested by the Service Processor. DDR data not yet sent to the Service Processor application remains in memory across power cycles and battery pulls.
In some embodiments, at the end of the measurement period, the DDR report is prepared by the DDR Processor and sent to the Service Processor. For example, various secure communication and/or crypto techniques can be used to ensure that the contents of the report are kept private, and to ensure that any tampering with the DDR report will be detected by the Service Controller.
In some embodiments, the report also includes time stamps that identify the start and end of the measurement period. Timestamps are calibrated and confirmed via a periodic handshake with the Service Controller to ensure that the DDR Processor time base has not been altered. Data compression is used to minimize the size of the report.
In some embodiments, each DDR report message includes a unique sequence identifier that allows the Service Controller to determine if any DDRs have been blocked from the sequence. The report is stored by the Service Processor for subsequent forwarding to the Service Controller. Data stored by the Service Processor remains in memory across power cycles and battery pulls.
In some embodiments, the DDR processor resides in the modem where the secure DDR usage report is then sent to the Service Processor (e.g., communication agent within the Service Processor) to be sent to the Service Controller.
DDR Processor Access Controller
In some embodiments, the Access Controller ensures that the Service Processor correctly delivers DDRs to the Service Controller. If the DDR flow is blocked or tampered with, then the Access Controller blocks cellular (e.g., or managed WiFi) wireless network access until the proper flow of DDRs is restored. In some embodiments, the network access restriction is only applied to networks that have network access services maintained and managed by the network operator. For example, this function can disabled for WiFi access that is not managed by the network operator.
In some embodiments, once a modem is authenticated (e.g., via a PPP session) via AAA, either after initial power up and/or after restoring from power save, the Access Controller restricts limited network access (e.g., based on set of IP addresses/host names and/or other criteria) until it gets feedback from the Service Controller to allow open access. Also, while traffic is running and the DDR Processor sending DDR records/reports, it continually expects to receive secure DDR ACK frames to allow open access, otherwise it enters a restrict access state again.
Referring now to
DDR Processor Network Busy State (NBS) Monitor
In some embodiments, the Network Busy State (NBS) Monitor is a secure firmware program element in the DDR Processor that monitors, records, and/or securely reports information on network busy state (e.g., or network congestion state) to the Service Controller for storage, network congestion analysis, and/or service charging and control policy security purposes. For example, the NBS Monitor can perform one or more of the following functions within the SEE: log active network information (e.g., active network type, home/roaming, current carrier, base station, and/or base station sector); monitor network access attempts and successes; monitor network speed; monitors round trip delay; monitor packet error rate; monitor modem performance parameters (e.g., RF channel, RF signal strength and variability, SNR, raw modem bit rate, raw modem bit error rate, and/or channel bandwidth); implements algorithm to classify busy state of network; and report network busy state history within DDRs.
Binding and Securing the Secure Communication Channel Between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller
In some embodiments, binding and securing the secure communication channel between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller is provided as described below. The DDR Processor has a unique private/public key pair and a digital certificate (cert) that attests to the authenticity of its public key. The Service Controller has a unique private/public key pair. Its public key is well known and included in the DDR Processor code image. The DDR Processor sends its public key and cert to the Service Controller, and the two execute a key exchange process that authenticates each other and results in a secret, shared session key. The DDR Processor uses the session key to encrypt DDR reports it sends to the Service Controller and to append an integrity check to messages it sends to the Service Controller. The Service Controller uses the session key to append an integrity check to messages it sends to the DDR Processor.
As will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the various embodiments described herein, various other secure communication and crypto techniques can be used to provide for binding and securing the secure communication between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller.
Binding and Securing the Secure Communication Channel Between the DDR Processor and the DPSV in an APU/MPU Implementation
In some embodiments, binding and securing the secure communication channel between the DDR Processor and the DPSV in an APU/MPU implementation is provided as described below. The DPSV has a unique private/public key pair and a digital certificate (cert) that attests to the authenticity of its public key. The DDR processor has a unique private/public key pair and a digital certificate (cert) that attests to the authenticity of its public key. The DPSV and the DDR Processor exchange public keys and certs, then execute a key exchange process that authenticates each other and results in a secret, shared session key. The DDR Processor receives upstream network data flows from the device OS networking stack and, using the session key, it appends an integrity check to each upstream data message that it sends to the DPSV. The DPSV blocks any upstream data path information that does not have a valid integrity check from the DDR Processor and informs the DDR Processor that it is receiving invalid upstream data so that the DDR Processor may inform the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DPSV receives downstream network data flows and, using the session key, it appends an integrity check to each downstream data message that it sends to the DDR Processor. Each downstream data message is sequenced so that data messages cannot be blocked or replayed without being detected by the DDR Processor. If the DDR Processor receives a downstream data message with an invalid integrity check, the DDR Processor rejects the message and informs the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DDR Processor acknowledges each non-rejected downstream data message in the next upstream data message it sends to the DPSV. If the DPSV stops receiving downstream data message acknowledgements, it blocks downstream network data flows and informs the DDR Processor so that the DDR Processor may inform the Service Controller of a possible fraud event. The DDR Processor securely sends DDR reports to the Service Controller by way of the Service Processor as described herein. The DDRs transmitted from the DDR Processor to the Service Controller are integrity checked and sequenced in a manner that cannot be tampered with or replayed. An authentication process between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller combined with a set of unique DDR report sequence identifiers and authentication session keep alive timers are used to maintain and confirm the secure connection between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller. If the secure session or the flow of DDR records between the DDR Processor and the Service Controller are interrupted, then the Access Controller function in the DDR Processor restricts access of the 2G, 3G, or 4G modem data path to the network destinations necessary to reestablish a securely authenticated session with between the DDR and the Service Controller.
As will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the various embodiments described herein, various other secure communication and crypto techniques can be used to provide for binding and securing the secure communication channel between the DDR Processor and the DPSV in an APU/MPU implementation.
Security Requirements for OEM Programming of DDR Processor
In some embodiments, code signing for the DDR Processor is provided. In particular, the DDR Processor code image is digitally signed by the device OEM. The signature is verified by the Secure Boot Loader using a fixed public key embedded within the Secure Boot Loader code image. This imposes the security requirement that the OEM operate a secure code-signing facility that preserves the secrecy of the fixed signing key. The OEM ensures that only authorized personnel are able to access the code-signing facility and that they do so only for legitimate DDR Processor images.
In some embodiments, a random seed for the DDR device private key is provided. In particular, at the time of device manufacture, a private/public key pair called the DDR Device Key is assigned. The DDR Device Key is unique to each device and is used to establish a secure communications link to the Service Controller. For example, the DDR Device Key can be a Diffie-Hellman key pair with a 1024-bit modulus, 1024-bit base, and a 128-bit private exponent. The private exponent of the DDR Device Key (DDR Device Private Key) is unique to each device and stored in, for example, 128 bits of on-chip nonvolatile memory (e.g., OTP memory) in the SEE. The modulus and base are common to all devices and are embedded within the DDR Processor image. The public portion of the DDR Device Key (e.g., DDR Device Public Key) is not permanently stored; instead, it is calculated by the DDR Processor using the modulus, base, and private exponent. The DDR Processor includes a factory initialization routine that is executed while the device is being initialized and tested at the factory. The factory initialization routine generates the DDR Device Private Key and programs it into the nonvolatile memory of the SEE. The DDR Device Private Key never leaves the device and is accessible only to the DDR Processor. The factory initialization routine computes the DDR Device Public Key and exports it to the factory tester. For example, the factory tester can provide a 128-bit random string to be used by the factory initialization routine as a seed to generate the DDR Device Private Key. This requires that the factory tester include or have access to a high-quality random bit source. Various suitable methods can be used, such as FIPS 140-2 (“deterministic random number generators”) seeded with the output of a hardware random source.
In some embodiments, at the time of device manufacture, a digital certificate called the DDR Device Cert is assigned to the device. The DDR Device Cert is unique to each device and is used to establish a secure communications link to the Service Controller. The contents of the DDR Device Cert include the DDR Device Public Key. The DDR Device Cert is signed by the issuing certificate authority, and the signature is verified by the Service Controller when establishing a secure link. The DDR Device Cert is not sensitive information and, for example, can be stored in either on-chip or off-chip nonvolatile memory. The OEM issues a DDR Device Cert for the DDR Device Public Key exported by the factory initialization routine, which imposes the security requirement that the OEM operates, or has access to, a certificate authority (CA). If the OEM chooses to access an outsourced CA, then the OEM's primary obligation is to ensure that only authorized personnel are able to request certificates, and that they do so only for devices that have DDR Device Public Keys legitimately exported by the FI routine. If the OEM chooses to operate a CA, the OEM has the additional obligation of maintaining the security of the CA, specifically, preserving the secrecy of the CA's fixed key that signs certificates.
As will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the various embodiments described herein, various other security techniques can be used or required for OEM programming for the DDR Processor.
Exemplary Service Policy Verification Combinations
In some embodiments, a communications device comprises: one or more communication I/O ports, at least one of which is a wide area network connection port; storage for storing a device communication activity policy; a secure execution environment that is not accessible by user application software; a one or more secure data path processing agents configured to: execute in the secure environment, monitor device data communications activity on one or more device I/O ports, generate a device data record that summarizes an aspect of the device communications activity that provides information suitable for verifying that a device policy enforcement client is properly implementing the device communication activity policy, and communicate the device data record via a trusted communication link over the wide area network connection port to a network element; and a trusted data path between the one or more secure data path processing agents and the one or more I/O ports that cannot be accessed by device user application software. In some embodiments, the data path is trusted because tampering with or alterations to data on the data path are detectable. In some embodiments, intermediate elements on the data path cannot alter or tamper with the data without detection. In some embodiments, the data path is trusted because data sent over it is signed. In some embodiments, the trusted data path between the one or more secure data path processing agents and the one or more I/O ports is further configured to secure communications by encryption.
In some such embodiments, the trusted communication link includes a secure message receipt feedback loop.
In some embodiments, the one or more secure data path processing agents are further configured to restrict the access of one or more device I/O ports, and if the secure message receipt feedback loop indicates an error, then the one or more secure data path processing agents restricts access of one or more device I/O ports. In some embodiments, the restriction of access for one or more device I/O ports allows communication to a network element configured to provide the device with error handling service when a secure message receipt feedback loop error condition exists.
In some embodiments, the communications device receives the device communication activity policy from a network element. In some embodiments, the device communication activity policy comprises an application activity monitoring policy. In some embodiments, the device communication activity policy comprises a network destination, address or resource monitoring policy.
In some embodiments, the information suitable for verifying that the device policy enforcement client is properly implementing the device communication activity policy comprises communication activity records for one or more device I/O ports.
In some embodiments, the secure execution environment and the one or more secure data path processing agents are located in a secure execution partition controlled by an application processor. In some embodiments, the secure execution environment and the one or more secure data path processing agents are located in a secure execution partition controlled by an operating system or secure partitioning software. In some embodiments, the secure execution environment and the one or more secure data path processing agents are located in a secure execution partition controlled by a modem processor. In some embodiments, the secure execution environment and the one or more secure data path processing agents are located on a SIM card.
In some embodiments, the wide area network is a wireless network, and the information suitable for verifying that the device policy enforcement client is properly implementing the device communication activity policy comprises device wireless network service usage records.
In some embodiments, the wide area network is a wireless network, and the device communication activity policy comprises a network access control policy for the wireless network. In some such embodiments, the wireless network access control policy is a set of one or more control policies for one or more applications operating on the device. In some embodiments, the wireless network access control policy is set of one or more specific access control policies for one or more network destinations, addresses or resources accessible over the wireless network. In some embodiments, the wireless network is a roaming network, and the network access control policy defines policies that are specific to a device roaming network connection condition and different than a home network connection condition.
In some embodiments, the wide area network is a wireless network and the device communication activity policy comprises a network access service usage accounting policy for the wireless network. In some such embodiments, the network access service usage accounting policy is a set of one or more service usage accounting policies for one or more applications operating on the device. In some embodiments, the network access service usage accounting policy is a set of one or more service usage accounting policies for one or more network destinations, addresses or resources accessible over the wireless network. In some embodiments, the wireless network is a roaming network, and the network access service usage accounting policy defines service usage accounting policies that are specific to a device roaming network connection condition and different than a home network connection condition. In some such embodiments, the device communication activity policy further comprises requesting an access network service cost acknowledgement or payment indication from a device user and restricting device roaming network access privileges if the user does not provide an service cost acknowledgement or payment indication.
In some embodiments, a network system comprises: memory configured to store a device communication activity policy; a trusted communication link over a wide area network to a one or more secure data path processing agents; a communication link over the wide area network to a device policy enforcement client; and a policy verification processor configured to (i) store the device data records, (ii) receive device data records from a communications device over the trusted communication link, the device data records containing information that summarizes an aspect of the device communications activity that provides information suitable for verifying that the device policy enforcement client is properly implementing the device communication activity policy, (iii) analyze the information contained in the device data record to determine if the device policy enforcement client is properly implementing the device communication activity policy, and (iv) take an error handling action if the analysis indicates that the device policy enforcement client is not properly implementing the device communication activity policy.
In some such embodiments, the trusted communication link includes a secure message receipt feedback loop. In some embodiments, the network system further comprises an error handling processor that detects when an error condition exists with the secure message receipt feedback loop, flags the error condition to an administrator or error tracking system, and communicates with the device to analyze the error or provide error messages to a device user.
In some embodiments, the network system communicates the device communication activity policy to the device. In some embodiments, the device communication activity policy comprises an application activity monitoring policy. In some embodiments, the device communication activity policy comprises a network destination, address or resource monitoring policy.
In some embodiments, the information suitable for verifying that the device policy enforcement client is properly implementing the device communication activity policy comprises communication activity records for one or more device I/O ports.
In some embodiments, the wide area network is a wireless network, and the information suitable for verifying that the device policy enforcement client is properly implementing the device communication activity policy comprises device wireless network service usage records.
In some embodiments, the wide area network is a wireless network, and the device communication activity policy comprises a network access control policy for the wireless network. In some such embodiments, the wireless network access control policy is a set of one or more control policies for one or more applications operating on the device. In some embodiments, the wireless network access control policy is a set of one or more specific access control policies for one or more network destinations, addresses or resources accessible over the wireless network. In some embodiments, the wireless network is a roaming network and the network access control policy defines policies that are specific to a device roaming network connection condition and different than a home network connection condition.
In some embodiments, the wide area network is a wireless network, and the device communication activity policy comprises a network access service usage accounting policy for the wireless network. In some such embodiments, the network access service usage accounting policy is a set of one or more service usage accounting policies for one or more applications operating on the device. In some embodiments, the network access service usage accounting policy is a set of one or more service usage accounting policies for one or more network destinations, addresses or resources accessible over the wireless network. In some embodiments, the wireless network is a roaming network and the network access service usage accounting policy defines service usage accounting policies that are specific to a device roaming network connection condition and different than a home network connection condition.
Exemplary Combinations Using a Receipt Feedback Loop
In some embodiments, a communications device comprises: one or more I/O ports, at least one of which is a wide area network connection port; a secure execution environment that cannot be accessed by user application software; a one or more secure data path processing agents configured to: (i) execute in the secure environment, (ii) monitor communication activity for one or more of the I/O ports, (iii) generate a device data record that summarizes an aspect of the device I/O port communication activity, (iv) communicate the device data record via a trusted communication link over the wide area network connection port to a network element, the trusted communication link comprising a secure message receipt feedback loop wherein the one or more secure data path processing agents receives a successful transmission receipt from the network element for data records that are successfully transmitted to and verified by the network element, (v) track transmitted device data records and successful transmission receipts received from the network element, and (vi) if one or more successful transmission receipts are not received for corresponding transmitted device data records within a specified event interval after sending the device data record to the network element over the trusted communication link, then restrict access of one or more device I/O ports; and a secure data path between the one or more secure data path processing agents and the one or more I/O ports that cannot be accessed by device user application software. In some such embodiments, the restriction of access for one or more device I/O ports still allows the communications device to communicate with a network element configured to provide the device with error handling service when a secure message receipt feedback loop error condition exists. In some such embodiments, the specified event interval comprises a period of time, a number of records transmitted, or a number of communications with the network element.
In some embodiments, the secure execution environment and one or more secure data path processing agents are located in a secure execution partition controlled by an application processor. In some embodiments, the secure execution environment and one or more secure data path processing agents are located in a secure execution partition controlled by a modem processor. In some embodiments, the secure execution environment and one or more secure data path processing agents are located on a SIM card.
In some embodiments, the aspect of the device I/O port communication activity that is summarized in the device data record comprises a summary of device application access activity. In some embodiments, the aspect of the device I/O port communication activity that is summarized in the device data record comprises a summary of device network access activity. In some embodiments, the aspect of the device I/O port communication activity that is summarized in the device data record comprises a summary of device content communication activity.
In some embodiments, a network system comprises: a trusted communication link over a wide area network to a one or more secure data path processing agents for the purpose of receiving device data records, the device data records comprising a summary of an aspect of the device I/O port communication activity, the trusted communication link comprising a secure message receipt feedback loop wherein the network based system transmits a successful transmission receipt to the one or more secure data path processing agents for data records that are successfully received by and verified by the network based system; and a storage system to store the device data records. In some embodiments, the network system further comprises an error handling processor that detects when an error condition exists with the secure message receipt feedback loop, and, after detecting an error, flags the error condition to an administrator or error tracking system. In some embodiments, the network system further comprises a system to communicate with the device during an error condition to analyze the error condition or provide error messages to a device user.
In some embodiments, the network system further comprises a device data record analyzer configured to: (i) store a device I/O port communication activity policy comprising allowable device I/O port communication behavior, (ii) compare device data records to the I/O port communication activity policy, and (iii) declare an I/O port activity error condition when the device data records indicate I/O port communication activity that is outside of the behavioral limits specified in the I/O port communication activity policy.
In some embodiments, the aspect of the device I/O port communication activity that is summarized in the device data record comprises a summary of device application access activity. In some embodiments, the aspect of the device I/O port communication activity that is summarized in the device data record comprises a summary of device network access activity. In some embodiments, the aspect of the device I/O port communication activity that is summarized in the device data record comprises a summary of device content communication activity.
Exemplary Combinations Using a SIM Card
In some embodiments, a communications device comprises: one or more communication I/O ports comprising at least a wide area network connection port; storage for storing a device communication activity policy; and a SIM card configured with: (i) a secure execution environment that is not accessible by user application software, (ii) one or more secure data path processing agents configured to execute in the secure execution environment and act on device data path communication to one or more of the I/O ports to enforce the device communication activity policy, and (iii) a trusted data path link for data path communication from the one or more secure data path processing agents to one or more I/O port modems, the one or more I/O port modems comprising a secure modem processor execution environment that is not accessible by user application software. In some embodiments, the one or more secure data path processing agents are further configured with a trusted communication link over the wide area network connection port to a network element.
In some such embodiments, the device communication activity policy is a device I/O port communication reporting policy, and the one or more secure data path processing agents are further configured to: (i) monitor and/or report communication activity conducted on the one or more I/O ports, (ii) create device data records that summarize the communication activity, and (iii) transmit the device data records to the network element over the trusted communication link. In some embodiments, the monitoring and/or reporting of communication activity comprises monitoring data usage. In some embodiments, the monitoring and/or reporting of data usage comprises a classification of the network destinations accessed in association with the data usage. In some embodiments, the monitoring and/or reporting of data usage comprises a classification of the device applications generating the data usage. In some embodiments, monitoring communication activity comprises monitoring roaming service usage. In some embodiments, monitoring communication activity comprises monitoring service usage for one or more QoS classes. In some embodiments, monitoring communication activity comprises monitoring voice usage.
In some embodiments, the service processor is further configured to gather application information from device agents.
In some embodiments, the device communication activity policy is device I/O port communication control policy and the service processor is further configured to: (i) monitor communication activity conducted on the one or more I/O ports, and (ii) enforce I/O port communication policy on the one or more I/O ports.
In some embodiments, the communication control policy specifies a control policy for one or more network destinations. In some embodiments, the communication control policy specifies a control policy for one or more device applications. In some embodiments, the communication control policy specifies a control policy for a roaming network. In some embodiments, the communication control policy specifies a control policy for a QoS service class.
In some embodiments, the trusted data path communication between the one or more secure data path processing agents and the one or more I/O port modems is secured by signing or encrypting with a shared key. In some embodiments, the one or more secure data path processing agents are further configured with a trusted communication link over the wide area network connection port to a network element, and the shared key is acquired from the network element.
Although the foregoing embodiments have been described in some detail for purposes of clarity of understanding, the invention is not limited to the details provided. There are many alternative ways of implementing the invention. The disclosed embodiments are illustrative and not restrictive.
This application is a continuation-in-part of and incorporates by reference the following U.S. pending non-provisional patent applications: U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,759 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Policy Implementation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,779 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality, and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,758 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Monitoring with Reporting, Synchronization, and Notification,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,778 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Billing with Integrated Accounting, Mediation Accounting, and Multi-Account,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,768 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Policy Implementation with Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,767 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,780 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Automated Device Provisioning and Activation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,755 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,756 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,770 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Tools for Analysis, Design, Testing, and Production of Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,771 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Billing for Intermediate Networking Devices” (issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,023,425 on Sep. 20, 2011), U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,772 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Roaming Services Network and Overlay Networks,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,782 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Development System for Access Service Providers,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,783 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Virtual Service Provider Systems,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,757 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Service Activation Tracking System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,781 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Transaction Central Billing System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,774 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable and Accurate Service Usage Monitoring for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,773 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Policy Implementation for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,769 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality and User Privacy for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,777 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Simplified Service Network Architecture,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,019 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation, and Billing,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,020 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,445 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,451 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,455 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,021 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Quality of Service for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,980 filed Jan. 28, 2010, entitled “Enhanced Roaming Services and Converged Carrier Networks with Device Assisted Services and a Proxy,” U.S. Ser. No. 13/134,028 filed May 25, 2011, entitled “Device-Assisted Services for Protecting Network Capacity,” U.S. Ser. No. 13/134,005 filed May 25, 2011, entitled “System and Method for Wireless Network Offloading,” U.S. Ser. No. 13/229,580 filed Sep. 9, 2011, entitled “Wireless Network Service Interfaces,” U.S. Ser. No. 13/237,827 filed Sep. 20, 2011, entitled “Adapting Network Policies Based on Device Service Processor Configuration,” U.S. Ser. No. 13/239,321 filed Sep. 21, 2011, entitled “Service Offer Set Publishing to Device Agent with On-Device Service Selection,” U.S. Ser. No. 13/248,028 filed Sep. 28, 2011, entitled “Enterprise Access Control and Accounting Allocation for Access Networks” and U.S. Ser. No. 13/248,025 filed Sep. 28, 2011 entitled “Service Design Center for Device Assisted Services.” This application claims priority to and incorporates by reference the following U.S. pending provisional patent applications: U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/387,243 filed Sep. 28, 2010, entitled “Enterprise and Consumer Billing Allocation for Wireless Communication Device Service Usage Activities,” and U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/387,247 filed Sep. 28, 2010, entitled “Secured Device Data Records,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/389,547 filed Oct. 4, 2010, entitled “User Notifications for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/407,358 filed Oct. 27, 2010, entitled “Service Controller and Service Processor Architecture,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/418,507 filed Dec. 1, 2010, entitled “Application Service Provider Interface System,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/418,509 filed Dec. 1, 2010, entitled “Service Usage Reporting Reconciliation and Fraud Detection for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/420,727 filed Dec. 7, 2010, entitled “Secure Device Data Records,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/422,565 filed Dec. 13, 2010, entitled “Service Design Center for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/422,572 filed Dec. 13, 2010, entitled “System Interfaces and Workflows for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/422,574 filed Dec. 13, 2010, entitled “Security and Fraud Detection for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/435,564 filed Jan. 24, 2011, entitled “Framework for Device Assisted Services,” and U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/472,606 filed Apr. 6, 2011, entitled “Managing Service User Discovery and Service Launch Object Placement on a Device.” Further, this application incorporates by reference the following U.S. provisional patent applications: U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/206,354 filed Jan. 28, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/206,944 filed Feb. 4, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/207,393 filed Feb. 10, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/207,739 filed Feb. 13, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/270,353 filed Jul. 6, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation and Billing,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/275,208 filed Aug. 25, 2009, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/237,753 filed Aug. 28, 2009, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/252,151 filed Oct. 15, 2009, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/252,153 filed Oct. 15, 2009, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/264,120 filed Nov. 24, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/264,126 filed Nov. 24, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Services Activity Map,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/348,022 filed May 25, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services for Protecting Network Capacity,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/381,159 filed Sep. 9, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services for Protecting Network Capacity,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/381,162 filed Sep. 9, 2010, entitled “Service Controller Interfaces and Workflows,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/384,456 filed Sep. 20, 2010, entitled “Securing Service Processor with Sponsored SIMs,” U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/385,020 filed Sep. 21, 2010, entitled “Service Usage Reconciliation System Overview.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,759 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Policy Implementation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,779 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality, and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,758 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Monitoring with Reporting, Synchronization, and Notification,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,778 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Billing with Integrated Accounting, Mediation Accounting, and Multi-Account,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,768 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Policy Implementation with Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,767 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,780 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Automated Device Provisioning and Activation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,755 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,756 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,770 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Tools for Analysis, Design, Testing, and Production of Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,772 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Roaming Services Network and Overlay Networks,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,782 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Development System for Access Service Providers,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,783 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Virtual Service Provider Systems,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,757 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Service Activation Tracking System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,781 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Transaction Central Billing System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,774 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable and Accurate Service Usage Monitoring for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,771 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Billing for Intermediate Networking Devices” (issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,023,425 on Sep. 20, 2011), U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,773 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Policy Implementation for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,777 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Simplified Service Network Architecture,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,019 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation, and Billing,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,020 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,445 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,451 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,455 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,021 filed Jan. 27, 2010 entitled “Quality of Service for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,980 filed Jan. 28, 2010, entitled “Enhanced Roaming Services and Converged Carrier Networks with Device Assisted Services and a Proxy” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/206,354 filed Jan. 28, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,759 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Policy Implementation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,779 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality, and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,758 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Monitoring with Reporting, Synchronization, and Notification,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,778 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Billing with Integrated Accounting, Mediation Accounting, and Multi-Account,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,768 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Policy Implementation with Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,767 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,780 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Automated Device Provisioning and Activation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,755 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,756 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,770 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Tools for Analysis, Design, Testing, and Production of Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,772 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Roaming Services Network and Overlay Networks,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,782 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Development System for Access Service Providers,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,783 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Virtual Service Provider Systems,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,757 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Service Activation Tracking System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,781 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Transaction Central Billing System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,774 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable and Accurate Service Usage Monitoring for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,771 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Billing for Intermediate Networking Devices” (issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,023,425 on Sep. 20, 2011), U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,773 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Policy Implementation for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,777 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Simplified Service Network Architecture,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,019 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation, and Billing,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,020 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,445 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,451 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,455 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,021 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Quality of Service for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,980 filed Jan. 28, 2010, entitled “Enhanced Roaming Services and Converged Carrier Networks with Device Assisted Services and a Proxy” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/206,944 filed Feb. 4, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,759 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Policy Implementation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,779 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality, and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,758 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Monitoring with Reporting, Synchronization, and Notification,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,778 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Billing with Integrated Accounting, Mediation Accounting, and Multi-Account,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,768 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Policy Implementation with Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,767 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,780 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Automated Device Provisioning and Activation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,755 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,756 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,770 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Tools for Analysis, Design, Testing, and Production of Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,772 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Roaming Services Network and Overlay Networks,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,782 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Development System for Access Service Providers,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,783 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Virtual Service Provider Systems,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,757 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Service Activation Tracking System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,781 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Transaction Central Billing System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,774 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable and Accurate Service Usage Monitoring for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,771 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Billing for Intermediate Networking Devices” (issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,023,425 on Sep. 20, 2011), U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,773 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Policy Implementation for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,777 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Simplified Service Network Architecture,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,019 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation, and Billing,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,020 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,445 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,451 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,455 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,021 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Quality of Service for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,980 filed Jan. 28, 2010, entitled “Enhanced Roaming Services and Converged Carrier Networks with Device Assisted Services and a Proxy,” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/207,393 filed Feb. 10, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,759 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Policy Implementation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,779 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality, and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,758 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Monitoring with Reporting, Synchronization, and Notification,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,778 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Device Assisted Service Usage Billing with Integrated Accounting, Mediation Accounting, and Multi-Account,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,768 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Policy Implementation with Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,767 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Service Profile Management with User Preference, Adaptive Policy, Network Neutrality and User Privacy,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,780 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Automated Device Provisioning and Activation,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,755 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,756 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Based Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,770 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Network Tools for Analysis, Design, Testing, and Production of Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,772 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Roaming Services Network and Overlay Networks,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,782 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Development System for Access Service Providers,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,783 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Virtual Service Provider Systems,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,757 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Service Activation Tracking System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,781 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Open Transaction Central Billing System,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,774 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable and Accurate Service Usage Monitoring for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,771 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Billing for Intermediate Networking Devices” (issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,023,425 on Sep. 20, 2011), U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,773 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Verifiable Service Policy Implementation for Intermediate Networking Devices,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/380,777 filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled “Simplified Service Network Architecture,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,019 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation, and Billing,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,020 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,445 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,451 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,455 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,021 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Quality of Service for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,980 filed Jan. 28, 2010, entitled “Enhanced Roaming Services and Converged Carrier Networks with Device Assisted Services and a Proxy,” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/207,739 filed Feb. 13, 2009, entitled “Services Policy Communication System and Method.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,019 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation, and Billing,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,451 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,980 filed Jan. 28, 2010, entitled “Enhanced Roaming Services and Converged Carrier Networks with Device Assisted Services and a Proxy,” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/270,353 filed Jul. 6, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation and Billing.” The following application, U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,020 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/275,208 filed Aug. 25, 2009, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services.” The following application, U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,020 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services,” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/237,753 filed Aug. 28, 2009, entitled “Adaptive Ambient Services.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,445 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,021 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Quality of Service for Device Assisted Services” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/252,151 filed Oct. 15, 2009, entitled “Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,451 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform,” U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,021 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Quality of Service for Device Assisted Services” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/252,153 filed Oct. 15, 2009, entitled “Device Group Partitions and Settlement Platform.” The following application, U.S. Ser. No. 12/694,455 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/264,120 filed Nov. 24, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Services Install.” The following application, U.S. Ser. No. 12/695,019 filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted CDR Creation, Aggregation, Mediation, and Billing” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/264,126 filed Nov. 24, 2009, entitled “Device Assisted Services Activity Map.” The following applications, U.S. Ser. No. 13/134,028 filed May 25, 2011, entitled “Device-Assisted Services for Protecting Network Capacity” and U.S. Ser. No. 13/134,005 filed May 25, 2011, entitled “System and Method for Wireless Network Offloading” claim priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/348,022 filed May 25, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services for Protecting Network Capacity.” The following application, U.S. serial No. 13,229,580 filed Sep. 9, 2011, entitled “Wireless Network Service Interfaces” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/381,159 filed Sep. 9, 2010, entitled “Device Assisted Services for Protecting Network Capacity.” The following application, U.S. Ser. No. 13,229,580 filed Sep. 9, 2011, entitled “Wireless Network Service Interfaces” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/381,162 filed Sep. 9, 2010, entitled “Service Controller Interfaces and Workflows.” The following application, U.S. Ser. No. 13/237,827 filed Sep. 20, 2011, entitled “Adapting Network Policies Based on Device Service Processor Configuration” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/384,456 filed Sep. 20, 2010, entitled “Securing Service Processor with Sponsored SIMs.” The following application, U.S. Ser. No. 13/239,321 filed Sep. 21, 2011, entitled “Service Office Set Publishing to Device Agent with On-Device Service Selection” claims priority to U.S. provisional Ser. No. 61/385,020 filed Sep. 21, 2010, entitled “Service Usage Reconciliation System Overview.” All of the above patents and applications are hereby incorporated by reference. This application incorporates by reference the following U.S. nonprovisional patent applications, being filed concurrently herewith: U.S. application Ser. No. 13/248,028, filed Sep. 28, 2011, by inventors Gregory G. Raleigh, Alireza Raissinia, and Jeffrey Green, and entitled “Enterprise Access Control and Accounting Allocation for Access Networks”; and U.S. application Ser. No. 13/248,025, filed Sep. 28, 2011, by inventors Gregory G. Raleigh, Alireza Raissinia, James Lavine, Justin James, and Jeffrey Green, and entitled “Service Design Center for Device Assisted Services”.
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