Patent Grant
8732033
1. Field
The present invention relates to the field of auctions and, in particular, networked systems for conducting specialty auctions using computers.
2. Background
An important goal of anyone attempting to sell the right to attend an event, to own a product, or to perform an activity is to receive in return for that right the true market value of the right. For some rights, the market values of similar rights are all equal. For example, under normal conditions, the fair market value of two identical radios, both of the same brand and model, is the same. Thus, if a consumer were given the opportunity to purchase the right to obtain one of the radios instead of the other, there would typically be no incentive for the consumer to pay for that right. Therefore, the market value of the rights to obtain the radios are equal. However, the relative market values of some rights to similar products, services, or events are not the same, but are dependent upon a difference in some characteristic of the rights. For example, when purchasing tickets to a concert, although each of two tickets may allow the holder to see the same performer, on the same night, in the same venue, the market values of those tickets differ depending upon the location of the ticket within the venue. Therefore, the market value of the right to sit in a particular seat at a concert depends at least in part upon the characteristic of the proximity of the seat to center stage.
The right to perform an activity, or obtain a product, or attend an event wherein the difference between the market value of the right and the market value of another similar right is dependent upon the difference in some characteristic of the rights shall be referred to herein as a “priority right”. A ticket is one example of a priority right used throughout the specification. However, it is to be understood that tickets are not the only priority rights applicable to the present invention.
Too often, the established methods of selling priority rights do not result in prices for these rights that are equal to their true market value. Therefore, these established methods are incapable of maximizing the revenue of those selling priority rights.
For some priority rights, the manner in which differences in the pertinent characteristic affect the market value of the right are apparent. For instance, for most sports or concert performances, the market value of the ticket rights, i.e., the right to sit in a particular seat at a particular event, is greater if the seat is closer to the stage. Thus, it may be relatively easy for a seller to rank the ticket rights prior to any sale of the rights. However, for other priority rights, although the characteristic that affects the market value of the right may itself be obvious, the manner in which variance in the characteristic affects the market value is not apparent. For example, when an individual wishes to purchase the right to play a round of golf at a particular course, the time that the round begins will likely affect the amount that the individual is willing to pay. The golfer may wish to be the first to tee off and would be willing to pay more for such a time than for any other. On the other hand, the golfer may have another commitment in the morning and be interested only in tee times in the afternoon. Therefore, the amount the individual would be willing to pay for a time in the afternoon varies greatly from the amount for a time in the morning. Due to this variability in consumer preference, any ranking of the rights to play a round of golf at particular times on a particular day by the owner of the golf course may not result in sales prices for these rights that are equal to their true market values. Therefore, a system is needed whereby the true market values of all priority rights can be achieved, including both those rights with relative values that can be easily pre-ranked and those rights with relative market values dependent upon consumer preferences that are difficult to discern prior to the commencement of sales.
Types of Priority Rights
As discussed above, the right to sit in a particular seat for a particular event is a priority right wherein the market value of similar rights can be ranked prior to the sale of the rights, by ordering the seats in large part according to their proximity to center stage. The current manner of selling the right to sit in a particular seat for a particular event involves selling tickets to the event. However, the established method of selling tickets to sporting and entertainment events involves pre-setting inflexible prices and then releasing the tickets for sale at a box office or by phone. This method has a number of shortcomings. Typically, each sale involves employees taking time-consuming individual orders and trying to describe the prices and seat locations to customers. Another shortcoming with this method is that it can be highly inconvenient and sometimes impossible for the purchaser to access the sale due to demand. This is especially true for premium or “high demand” events. Moreover, for practical reasons, prices are assigned to tickets in large blocks, while, in reality, purchasers often consider tickets within a block to have a wide ranging continuum of values; and these market values can be very hard to estimate before the tickets are sold. Largely because of these shortcomings, many premium tickets are sold for substantially less than their market value. Generally, these shortcomings exist even with new automated methods involving phone or Internet sales since the number of tickets is limited and the selling system is still fundamentally the same; with “first-come-first-served” orders taken for pre-priced tickets.
Another priority right with a relative market value that can be fairly easily determined prior to sale is the right to obtain a product for which the market demand far exceeds the supply. Occasionally, a manufacturer underestimates the demand for its product and thus creates too few units for the product's initial market release. Examples of this occurrence in the recent past include the Cabbage Patch Kids™ doll, the Tickle-Me Elmo™ doll, and the Sony PlayStation 2™ video game system. When such a situation exists, the manufacturer generally maintains a fixed selling price and offers the products on a “first-come-first-served” basis. The manufacturer not only loses revenue from the sales it could have made if it had produced more units, but it also loses revenue by selling the units it did produce at a price below their true market value. This difference between the original sales price and the market value is typically realized by an entity other than the manufacturer, e.g. one who buys the product and then resells it at a higher price. The pertinent characteristic that determines the market value of such highly desired products is the time of availability of the product to the consumer. In other words, a consumer would pay more to have the first product off the assembly line than to have the five-hundredth. Therefore, a system is needed so that when a manufacturer realizes that it has produced too few of a highly desired product, the manufacturer may maximize its revenue on those products by selling them at their true market value.
Other priority rights with market values that can be ranked prior to their sale are rights to obtain services wherein the value of those rights are dependent upon the order in which the services are received. For example, many consumers hire companies or individuals to remove snow from their property after an accumulation of snow. However, the value of this service is dependent upon the time at which the service is performed and, therefore, is dependent upon the order in which the properties are serviced. For instance, a consumer would likely be willing to pay more to be the first serviced after the accumulation of snow has stopped than to be the twentieth to receive the same service. Therefore, a system is needed wherein this discrepancy in market value may be realized by the provider of the service.
Another example of a service with a market value dependent upon the order of its performance is admittance through a toll booth. Currently, the administrator of a toll booth receives a set price for each vehicle that passes through the toll booth. That price is often dependent upon the type of vehicle, but the price does not reflect the true market value of the right to pass through the booth. The true market value depends upon how quickly the consumer is able to pass through the booth, i.e., the consumer's order in the line at the toll booth. Therefore, a system is required whereby the price of the right to pass through a toll booth is dependent upon the order in which the consumer is allowed to pass through the toll area.
Another right for which the current sales system does not return the true market value of the right is the right to obtain a certain numbered product of a limited edition series of products. For example, a popular artist may sell only 100 prints of one of her paintings. The current established method for such sales is offering all of the prints for sale at a set, inflexible price on a “first-come-first-served” basis. However, this sales approach may not achieve the full market value for all of the prints. Many consumers may be willing to pay more for the first numbered print than for the fiftieth. Therefore, because only one price is set for all of the prints, many of the prints are likely being sold at a price below their true market value. Also, by basing the availability of the prints upon “first-come-first-served,” the additional profit that could be gained by selling a print to one who comes later but is willing to pay more is lost. Because the lower the number on the limited edition item, the higher its value, the relative market values of the rights to obtain items with different numbers can be determined prior to any sales activity. A system is needed whereby the true market value of limited edition items may be realized by the seller of the items.
Other markets in which the priority rights that are sold are often purchased for less than their market value are those markets containing products whose true market value depends on the product's location. For example, the rights to stay in cabins on cruise ships or hotel rooms or bungalows in vacation resorts are often assigned a sales price based on the amenities available in the room. However, among rooms containing the same amenities, the true market value of the right to stay in each room may differ depending upon the distance from the room to some desired location, such as a pool, beach, or lounge. The established method for determining the price of the right to stay in such rooms is to simply set a fixed price and make the rooms available on a “first-come-first-served” basis. A system is needed whereby the market values of these priority rights, which can be ranked according to the distance from some desired attraction or attractions, can be fully realized.
Another characteristic which determines the value of some priority rights is the time of entry into some venue. The established methods for selling these priority rights are not capable of garnering the full market value of the rights. For example, theme parks, such as Disneyland™ and Busch Gardens™, sell tickets at an inflexible price for a day's admission to the park. However, the actual time of admission to the park on any particular day is generally determined by how early the patron is willing to arrive at the park to stand in line. An earlier time of admission is desired by many patrons because the most popular attractions at theme parks often fill up quickly and maintain long lines for the entire day. The desirability of early admission is evidenced by the current practice of some theme parks, such as Walt Disney World™ in Orlando, Fla., which allow customers who stay at resorts affiliated with the theme park to enter the park earlier than customers who do not. However, this practice consists of allowing all patrons of the affiliated resort to enter the park at a set time, such as one hour prior to the admittance of the general public. This practice does not maximize the profit that may be obtained by the selling of these rights. Some of those customers who stay at the affiliated resorts may be willing to pay more to enter the park before other affiliated resort patrons. Further, this system does not account for the profit that could be gained by allowing members of the general public to purchase the right to enter the park at a time prior to other members of the general public. The relative value of these rights can be easily ranked, with earlier times of admittance having higher market values.
Another priority right with a market value dependent upon location, but for which pre-ranking of the relative market values may not gamer the true market value of the rights, is the right to sit at a particular table in a restaurant. A patron is likely to pay more to obtain a table closer to a window, for example, and is likely to pay less for a table close to the kitchen. However, individual patrons may prefer one window view to another or may desire to sit at a table in a corner for more privacy. Therefore, a complete, objective ranking of such rights to sit at a particular table may not be entirely accurate. There is a need for a system which would enable the seller of these rights to obtain their full market value.
As discussed above, the right to begin a round of golf at a particular time is a priority right for which the relative market values of related rights are difficult to determine prior to the sale of the rights. The tee time itself is the pertinent characteristic that determines the relative values of the rights to begin rounds of golf throughout a particular day. However, it is unclear prior to the sale of the rights which times are most desired by individuals wishing to play golf that day. The established method for determining tee times at a golf course is to set an inflexible price for playing a certain number of holes and then offering tee times on a “first come first served” basis. At premier golf courses, the system may be slightly different, requiring consumers to stay at a particular resort or be a member of an association in order to purchase a round of golf, However, even within these premier systems, the tee times are generally offered on a “first-come-first-serve-d” basis. These systems fail to garner the most profit for the golf course owners because individuals who attempt to reserve tee times after all the times have been reserved may be willing to pay more than the owner has currently received for a particular time. Also, some individuals may prefer to tee off at certain times of the day and, therefore, would be willing to pay more for the right to tee off at those times. For example, a golfer may wish to be the first person to tee off on a particular day, or a golfer may wish to tee off later in the afternoon to avoid the heat of the day and to view the sunset on the golf course. Therefore, the current system for selling golf tee times is sub-optimal because it does not account for individuals who would pay more to play at a particular time or for individuals who attempt to make reservations after all tee times have been reserved.
Another priority right with a relative value dependent upon individual consumer preference and, therefore, difficult to rank prior to a sale is the right to sit in a particular seat to view a movie in a theater. When viewing a movie, many individuals prefer to sit in the exact middle of the theater. However, others, such as those with small children, may wish to sit on an aisle, and others may prefer seats in the back of the theater. Therefore, the market value of the right to sit in a particular seat is not determined by some easy calculation, such as the distance from the center of the screen, but is dependent upon each potential movie-goer's personal preferences. The current system of selling tickets to the movie and then allowing admission on a “first-come-first-served” basis does not garner the full market value of the right to view the movie in a particular seat. Therefore, a system is needed whereby the full market value of the right to sit in a particular seat to see a particular movie at a particular time can be recognized by the theater owner.
Some priority rights are unique in that it may be relatively easy in one situation to determine the relative market value of related rights prior to their sale while in another situation it is very difficult. One example of such a priority right is the right to view an art exhibit. For highly anticipated art exhibits, many individuals would be willing to pay a premium for the right to be one of the first to view the exhibit. Therefore, the true market value of the right to enter the art exhibit is not being achieved by the current system of either issuing select invitations to a premiere night or simply allowing admission to ticket holders on a “first-come-first-served” basis. In this situation, the priority rights could easily be pre-ranked with the earliest time of admittance being the most valuable. Thus, a system is needed whereby the exhibit organizer may realize the full market value of the right to view such an exhibit.
However, on any day after the opening day of an art exhibit, the relative values of different times of admittance may vary more widely due to the schedules of potential viewers. For example, one individual may be willing to view the exhibit late in the afternoon because work precludes any other time of attendance. Therefore, to that individual, the right to view the exhibit in the late afternoon is more valuable than the right to view it in the morning. The current system of selling tickets for an art exhibit does not account for this variance in market value due to individual viewers' preferences. Therefore, there is a need for a system that does yield the full market value of the rights sold.
Priority Right Auctioning System Options
In selling priority rights where the relative market values of the priority rights can be easily pre-ranked, there also exists a need for a system that can allow the purchaser to override the pre-ranking to denote the purchaser's own personal preference. For example, although seats in the front row at a concert are widely regarded as the best seats and would be pre-ranked as the seats with the highest relative market value, an individual may wish to sit on the side of the stage to be near a particular member of the performing group. If that individual was willing to pay handsomely for the right to sit in a seat on the side, but not one in front of the stage, then the full market value of the right to sit in a seat on the side of the stage would only be captured by a system which allowed the individual to denote his own ranking of desired seats. Also, a bidder may be willing to pay a premium for the right to sit in the first few rows but not for the right to sit in all the seats in a section specified by the seller of the rights. Therefore, a system is needed whereby a bidder may personally designate one or more priority rights and then offer to pay up to a certain amount for those rights.
Additionally, when purchasing priority rights consumers often wish to designate alternative bids. For example, an individual who wished to purchase the right to sit in a seat at an event may only be interested in sitting in the first few rows if it would cost below a particular price. If that person's bid was unsuccessful for that section of priority rights, however, he may be willing to sit in one of a group of seats in another location for some lesser amount of money. The current method of selling priority rights does not accommodate this desire by the consuming public to designate individually-tailored alternative priority right bids. Therefore, there is a need for a system that satisfies this desire.
Shortcomings of Current Auctioning Systems
Logistically, auctioning of priority rights has not always been feasible due to the large quantity of unique rights and even larger quantity of buyers wishing to purchase them. A few auction systems have been developed that operate using the Internet as the communications mode. These systems have been used to auction items such as computer equipment, artwork, and special items for charity. However, these systems are not suitable for use in connection with a real-time mass auction of priority rights. With the currently operating systems, generally the items being sold are of a small quantity or individually unique. In most of the currently operating systems, the items for sale are individually listed and individually bid upon using e-mail over a period of days or weeks. While, the currently operating systems are useful for such limited purposes, they have several shortcomings.
One such shortcoming arises from the use of e-mail to place bids and to update participants of their bid status. While in theory e-mail is instantaneous, there are occasional routing delays of which the sender is often not immediately aware. In an auction of a slow, deliberate nature such as those presently operating, this is not a great concern. However, in a fast pace auction with numerous participants some bids could be lost as delayed e-mail, unbeknownst to the participant.
An additional problem with the e-mail approach is that time may elapse before the bid information is read and applied. Therefore, the participant may not get instantaneous feedback on other bids which may be taking place simultaneously. The participant often must wait for some period of time to learn if the bid is successful. If the participant has a strategy for bidding on a very desirable item, the participant must return to the auction numerous times to follow its progression.
Most currently operating systems provide some general bid status data, usually a minimal amount of information such as “current” high bid. This “current” high bid is updated by periodically reviewing the bids received, and entering the highest bid to date. Therefore, these “current” bids are not current up to the second. Moreover, if there are many of a particular item, such as event tickets or golf tee times having a continuum of values, participants need to know considerably more than the high bid information in order to make an informed bidding decision.
Currently operating systems do not provide bid status information updates independent of solicitation of the information from participants. Once the Internet auction site is accessed, the information conveyed may become outdated as it is being viewed. Again this would be quite unfavorable for fast-paced auctions. Therefore, even with auction sites which were actually being updated real-time, a participant would need to continually re-access the site in order to keep information truly updated.
One Internet auction system, “onsale” at http://www.onsale.com/ attempts to overcome the e-mail auction problems by automatically updating its Internet site. However, like the other Internet auction sites, “onsale” conducts relatively slow, deliberate sales, and still relies on e-mail to transmit some of the bid information. In addition, although the “onsale” auction site is automatically updated, it does not automatically present this information to participants. As explained above, participants need to continually re-access the site in order to keep information truly updated.
U.S. Pat. No. 4,689,928 details an auction system for used cars that is capable of interactive, essentially real-time auctioning. Instead of being Internet based, this used car auctioning system is constructed with a 4-level hierarchy of computers networked to a plurality of auto dealers terminals. At each level, the bids received by the computer are processed and only select bids are transmitted to the next level. The bids are raised in increments of 3000 yen and the participants may bid via a single signal indicating a “yes” in response to the bid being raised. This system is based on the traditional auction format, and is used to sell one item or lot at a time. When a car has been auctioned, a disc is loaded by each dealer into his terminal which shows the photograph of the next car to be auctioned. Bidding is limited to a predetermined group of auto dealers. Because the structure of this system is hierarchical, i.e. not on the Internet, it is not practical for use in wide-spread auctions available to consumers. Because of the methodical nature of this system, selling a progression of single items with incremented bids, it is geared for low volume sales of items with relatively high values.
Recently tickets have been made available for purchase on the Internet, for example at http://www.ticketmaster.com and http://www.tickets.com. However, at these Internet sites, sales are of the traditional pre-set pricing, “first-come-first-served” format. Some Internet sites do offer tickets in an auction format, but only a few tickets to select events sold by individuals who have purchased the tickets and are attempting to resell them. Examples of such sites are http://www.ebay.com, http://auctions.yahoo.com, http://www.allsoldout.com, and http://www.busyrhino.com.
Considering the selling of a large number of priority rights, there are unique circumstances which present challenges not manifested in selling other types of rights. Since the values of priority rights vary widely depending upon the difference in a pertinent characteristic, it is not practical to mass the priority rights into simple generic blocks to be auctioned. Nor is it practical to list and auction each priority right individually, since this could present auction participants with a prohibitively large number of individual auctions, and no practical way to obtain contiguous priority rights. In other words, if a bidder wished to purchase the right to sit in four adjacent seats at a show or movie, and the right to sit in each seat was sold in a separate auction, it would be virtually impossible for the bidder to monitor every combination of four adjacent seats and make appropriate bids. Accordingly, there exists a need for a system which can, within a single, clear format, auction a large number of rights with a continuum of values, each at its market price. Furthermore, this system needs to apply logic in sorting bids based not only on price, but on clustering requirements to ensure that within a multiple priority right bid, the priority rights are contiguous. This would require a database configuration unlike that employed by the prior art.
Moreover, given the furious pace of sales for many premium priority rights, there exists the unique and as yet, unmet challenge of providing instant, automatic, comprehensive feedback for the status of a relatively complex arrangement of standing bids. Frequently the more popular sporting and entertainment events sell all available tickets in a matter of a few minutes. The number of tickets to these events may reach into the hundreds of thousands. A practicable auction of priority rights for such an event would require a system uniquely designed to process this large volume while presenting an updated, clear and informative view of the proceedings to all participants. It would be logical to presume that efficient conveyance of bid information for a large, complex pattern of bids would require a graphical representation of the bid standings. Although some Internet auctions employ graphical representation of objects for sale, none employ graphical representation of bid status.
Another need for on-line auction systems is a method of convincing bidders to place their bids early instead of waiting to bid at the last minute before the auction closes. As mentioned previously, on-line auctions are typically conducted over a set period of time. With these systems, bidders often wait until the last possible second before auction closing to place their bids in an attempt to block subsequent bidders from making higher bids. Such actions by bidders not only keeps the price of the auctioned item undesirably low, but sometimes results in a large quantity of bids just before auction closing which the on-line system is not capable of handling. Thus, it would be advantageous for an on-line auction system that provides incentives for bidders to place their bids early in the auction rather than waiting until the last minute.
In addition, ticket auction participants occasionally need to have two or more mutually exclusive ticket purchase options available to them. Ticket purchase decisions are often made based on price and availability of seats having acceptable locations. Even the number of tickets a consumer wishes to order may be dependent on price. For example, a consumer may desire two front row tickets if they are within his budget, otherwise he desires four tickets in a different location within budget, otherwise he desires ten tickets anywhere available within budget. But with auctions of pre-ranked seats, some such information cannot be known until the auction has ended, unless the auction close is phased-out from the best to the worst seats. There exists a need to make solutions available in the form of mutually exclusive, prioritized bids simultaneously entered by a consumer in a ticket auction.
In addition, not all ticket auction customers will agree with the exact seat pre-ranking assigned for an auction. For example, a race fan may prefer seats behind his favorite driver's pit stop. An older fan at an arena concert may wish to be as close as possible without being on the floor, where he assumes fans will stand during much of the show. Again, there exists a need for mutually exclusive, simultaneous prioritized bidding in order to provide this flexibility to fans.
Another shortcoming of currently established methods for selling tickets and other priority rights is their inability to reap for the priority right seller the dramatic increases in market value of priority rights immediately prior to their usage. For example, in the days immediately preceding a popular concert or movie premiere, the market value of tickets to those events typically increase dramatically as publicity increases and the public focuses on the event. However, because a large percentage of the public must plan their schedules far in advance, it is not feasible to only sell tickets to these events in the few days before the event occurs. Therefore, tickets are sold months in advance and popular events sell out before the true market value of the rights to attend the event can be determined. A system is needed that permits individuals to reserve priority rights a sufficient amount of time in advance but that also garners for the priority right seller the full market value of those rights.
A potential negative effect of a system that places primary emphasis upon the maximum amount of money an individual is willing to pay for a particular right is that less affluent members of the consuming public will be unable to procure desired priority rights. Under current established methods for selling priority rights which offer rights on a “first-come-first-served” basis, individuals of limited means may still purchase rights if they are willing to stand in line for an extended period of time. Also, a system that only seeks the highest profit margin in priority rights sales would not permit special treatment of certain bidders, such as alumni group members, company employees, or frequent purchasers. Such special treatment may be important to the public image of a priority right seller, and, thus, its long-term economic success. Therefore, there is a need for a priority right sales system that may be modified to favor members of a selected group, such as those of limited means or company employees.
Additionally, to achieve the full market value of a group of priority rights, the administrator of a priority right sales system must be equipped with certain statistical information regarding the progress of the sale. Therefore, a system for selling priority rights should be capable of real-time statistical analysis to aid the system administrator in regulating the system to achieve optimal results.
In spite of their shortcomings, the above mentioned prior art systems are useful for their respective intended purposes. However, given their limitations, and the above noted unique circumstances for mass priority right sales, it is simply not practical or feasible to apply any of the prior art to the particular task of auctioning a large volume of priority rights.
Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to provide a computer controlled auctioning system, in which an large number of participants may have simultaneous access to bid on to the desired priority rights. The above stated needs as well as others are fulfilled by the present invention through a system constructed to sell a large number of priority rights in a very short time, each said priority right being sold for a value set by existing market forces. The system provides participants with simple, yet informative graphical standing bid information on the entire stock of priority rights available, and allows them real-time bidding interaction. This system can achieve such sales even for priority rights garnering extremely high public interest, without excluding any potential purchasers.
The present invention achieves said objectives by employing a computer controlled priority right auctioning system which receives and evaluates bid information records received from a plurality of remote terminals, said bid information records corresponding to bids for one or more priority rights.
The automated priority right auctioning system is comprised of a memory storing a plurality of previously accepted bid information records, said records each including identification information, section information, quantity information, and bid price information. The automated priority right auctioning system is further comprised of a central controlling computer operably connected to the memory and operable to receive a message including a received bid information record from one of a plurality of remote terminals through a communication system, determine a lowest minimum acceptable bid value corresponding to the received section information using the previously accepted bid information records stored in the memory, and store the received bid information record if a value represented by the received bid price information exceeds the lowest minimum acceptable bid value.
The central controlling computer is further operable to, in a like manner, receive, evaluate and store, if acceptable, subsequent bids received and to stop receiving subsequent messages after a predetermined time period.
Within the automated priority right auctioning system, each previously accepted bid information record includes rank information based on the section information and the bid price information, and the central controlling computer is further operable to assign a rank to each received bid information record based on its section information, its bid price information, and the previously accepted bid information records.
After stopping receiving subsequent messages, the central controlling computer is further operable to associate one or more particular priority rights with a previously accepted bid information record based on the rank information and the section information of each of a plurality of previously accepted bid information records.
The automated priority right auctioning system further includes a programmed graphical representation method designed to efficiently convey to auction participants useful standing bid information across a spectrum of priority rights to be auctioned, allowing current priority right bid prices to be quantified in an effective manner.
The system further includes programmed methods for ensuring contiguous grouping of priority rights within each multiple priority right bid, and for ensuring that the standing bid information is automatically updated on a real-time basis and presented as such to all auction participants; said programmed method employing HTML programming features such as the recently available META refresh (a client pull type browser directive) or the multipart/mixed MIME format (a server push type browser directive).
Participants may access this system from remote sites using terminals, such as personal computers, via telephone lines or other means of communication. The status of bids and their corresponding priority rights are conveyed on graphic displays which are updated on a real-time basis for all participants to view. Participants may place bids of any amount, subject to predetermined limits, and cancel, raise, or lower bids at will. In addition, participants may view their personal bid standings and the updated overall bid standings without having to continually re-access the auction site. Through the participants' remote terminals, the personal bid requests are sent to the host computer which immediately processes, and sorts the bids according to section and price. The central computer immediately updates and displays the new bid standing order. When the auction is closed, the bids become fixed and the physical transaction can occur.
The system further includes the ability for participants to limit their bids to particular types of priority rights. Additionally, the system will allow participants to lock-in their priority rights before auction closing upon the payment of a premium. Also, the system provides for proxy bidding which allows participants to automatically increase bid amounts to match subsequent higher bids. The system further includes the ability for participants to define their own personal bidding sections and to make alternative bids. Also, the system provides incentives for compelling bidders to place bids well in advance of auction closing.
In addition, it would be advantageous for the system to further include the ability for each participant to place two or more prioritized simultaneous but mutually exclusive bids in a single ticket auction.
A computer controlled priority right auctioning system is now described with reference to
Accordingly, consumers wishing to become participants (also referred to herein as “bidders”) in an upcoming auction may access the central computer 12 of
Registration Procedure of Auctioning System
Referring again to
Referring again to
Step 24 in
The central computer 12 of
At step 22 of
Auction Procedure of Auctioning System
Referring again to
If the query finds the participant is registered, then in step 44 of
Referring again to
As shown in step 51 and step 52, if the standing bid price of a pre-selected key ticket in the graphical representation has changed as a result of the latest bid, this change is reflected immediately by automatically updating the display of the current bid standings. These prices are displayed within the graphical view of the priority right and sale information, just as the initial minimum bids were displayed in
Referring again to
Referring again to
a and
The databases shown in
Accordingly, a ticket seller could promote numerous ticket sales simultaneously at one network site, with the added step for the registrant/participant of choosing the desired sale from those presented.
In one embodiment, a template may be loaded into participants' terminals prior to their accessing the auction site, said template providing text or graphic information that does not change during an auction or between auctions, such as background art, forms or instructions. Said template may be downloaded from the Internet, or installed from a disc or by some other means. Use of a template allows the bid status updates to be made with transmission of only the numerical data, which in combination with the template, presents the comprehensive auction status update to participants. In another embodiment, the bid status changes are automatically presented to the participants by means of the multipart/mixed MIME format, a recently available server-push type programming feature which takes advantage of a connection that is held open over multiple responses, allowing the server to send more data at will. This method can be more efficient, since new HTTP connections do not have to be reopened.
Participant Preference Options of Auctioning System
Various other alternative embodiments of the invention are also possible. For example, as shown in
Another participant preference option presented to the bidder under the ticket options block 202 is the option for a premium subsection ticket, such as the right to sit in a front row seat at an event. Certain bidders may be exclusively interested in a premium subsection ticket. Under this option, the participant may instruct the system to cancel the bid if the bid is bumped from the premium subsection. Thus, if a participant makes a bid and specifies that he must be in the premium subsection, the system will cancel the bid if the bid is bumped from the premium subsection. Alternatively, the participant may state that he simply prefers the premium subsection, but will take other tickets. Thus, under this option, the system will leave the participant with a premium subsection ticket so long as his bid is consistent with the other premium subsection bids. If the participant is bumped from the premium subsection, the participant's bid will not be canceled, but he will simply be moved back. This will generally be the system default. Finally, the participant may state that he absolutely does not want a premium subsection ticket, and he should be moved back if his bid lands him in the premium subsection. Thus, under this option, the system will place the participant in another subsection even if his bid qualifies him for the premium subsection.
Another example of a premium subsection ticket is the right to sit in an aisle seat at an event. The ticket options block 202 would allow the participant to specify aisle seat preference as a participant preference option. The system may present the participant with a number of choices concerning the aisle, including the following options: (i) must have an aisle seat and will move back to get on the aisle, (ii) will not accept an aisle seat, (iii) prefer the aisle, but will accept other seats, (iv) do not prefer the aisle, and (v) don't care. The “don't care” option is generally the system default. Based upon the participant's input, the system will attempt to place the participant in the desired location either on an, aisle or away from an aisle.
A number of other participant preference options other than those described above may also be specified in the ticket options block 202. For example, if the priority right is the right to sit in a particular seat at an event, the system may give participants options for being placed near concession stands, restrooms, exits, or the rear of a section. Other preference options are also possible and may be easily incorporated by those of ordinary skill in the art.
The participant's preference screen 200 also includes an option 204 that allows the system to receive lock-in ticket information. This option 204 allows the participant to secure a ticket, upon payment of a premium, regardless of any subsequent bids for the ticket during the auction. This premium may be expressed in any number of ways such as a flat dollar amount (e.g., $25) or a percent of the bid value (e.g., 50%). The premium is expressed on the preferences screen 200 by lock-in premium line 208. Thus, if the participant makes a bid of $80 per ticket for five seats, and this bid currently places the bidder in a particular subsection of seats, the participant may lock-in these five tickets upon payment of the premium. If the premium is 50% of the bid value, the participant would be required to pay $120 per ticket, or $600 total dollars to secure these five seats until the close of the auction. If the participant does choose to lock-in his bid by paying the premium, the participant will retain all five tickets throughout the auction even if a subsequent bidder offers $120 or more for the same tickets.
The participant's preference screen 200 may also include an option that allows the system to receive proxy bid information. The proxy bid options are shown under proxy block 206. According to the proxy bid options, the participant may enter a maximum proxy bid amount in addition to the current bid amount. The maximum proxy bid amount is the amount that the bidder authorizes the system to bid in his absence in order to keep the bidder in the preferred seat or location. Under this block 206, the bidder has the following three options: (i) keep the bidder in the bidding for the same tickets for up to the maximum bid amount, (ii) keep the bidder in the same section of seats for up to the maximum bid amount, and (iii) keep the bidder in the bidding for any ticket in the auction for up to the maximum bid amount. Thus, if the participant bids $80 for a ticket in a certain section, but authorizes proxy bidding up to $130, the participant may leave the auction, knowing that proxy bids will be made for him up to $130 should a subsequent bid exceed his bid. If the participant chooses the option to stay in the bidding for the same ticket for up to the maximum bid, the system will keep the participant in the bidding for that ticket until subsequent bids for that ticket are received exceeding $130. At that time, the participant's bid will be bumped. If the participant chooses the option to stay in bidding for the same section of seats for up to the maximum bid, the participant will be bumped to the rear of the section as subsequent bids are received for greater than $80. Once bids for the rear of the section reach $80, the participant's bid will automatically increase to keep him in the section up to a value of $130. Once all bids in the section exceed $130, the participant's bid will be bumped. Finally, if the bidder chooses to simply stay in the overall bidding for up to $130, the participant's $80 bid will be continually bumped to less preferential tickets, as bid values exceed $80. Once the least preferential ticket reaches $80, the participant's bid will automatically increase to keep him in the bidding for up to a bid of $130. If bids for the least preferential ticket exceed $120, the participant will be completely removed from the bidding.
The participant's preference screen 200 may also include an option that allows the auction participant to individually designate those seats upon which the participant wishes to bid. Instead of selecting to bid within the sections or subsections defined by the auction organizer, each participant may define his own personal bidding section. One embodiment of this invention is to allow the auction participant to define the bounds of his personal bidding section by using a mouse to “click and drag” a cursor over a portion of the graphical representation of the available seats. Another embodiment involves permitting the auction participant to define his personal bidding section by entering the first and last seat identification numbers in the desired personal bidding section.
The participant's preference screen 200 may also include an option that allows the auction participant to place alternative bids. For example, in an auction for the right to sit in a particular seat at an event, an auction participant could designate that she wished to stay in the bidding for the right to sit in a seat in Section A for up to $50, but if that bid was bumped then she wished to stay in the bidding for the right to sit in a seat in Section D for up to $25.
This option to place alternative bids may be used with the seat sections designated by the auction organizer, as in the previous example, or with the participant's personal bidding sections. Therefore, the auction participant could designate that she wished to stay in the bidding for a right in her first personal bidding section for up to $45, and if that bid was bumped then she wished to stay in the bidding for a right within her second personal bidding section for up to $25. Additionally, more than two alternative bids may be placed.
Referring to
Then, in step 414 the central computer 12 determines whether the activated bid exceeds the standing minimum acceptable bid for the tickets identified in the activated bid. This is accomplished by conducting a query on the main auction database 16 of
Referring again to
Alternative Embodiments of Auctioning System
In another alternative embodiment of the invention, a bidding activity meter 302 is used as shown in
Because the auction may be conducted over an adjustable time period using the bidding activity meter, the bidding activity meter encourages bidders to place their bids early and not wait until the very last minute before auction closing to place their bids. When a large number of bidders wait to bid at the very last minute before auction closing, the system may be unable to handle the large number of bids and all bidders may not be allowed to place their bids. If all bids are not placed, the market price per ticket is not realized. However, the bidding activity meter prevents this problem by encouraging bidders to place their bids early. With the bidding activity meter 302, bidders will monitor the bidding activity meter and place their bids immediately when they realize that bidding is reaching the low threshold level. Because bidders will likely have a continuum of different interpretations as to when the bidding activity meter is reaching the low threshold level, bids will be more evenly distributed over time and the intensity of the final bidding will be decreased.
In a further embodiment of the invention, bidding may be split into a first session and a second session. In this first session, bids are taken to determine which bidders will receive the tickets. In this session, a market price is determined for the least preferential ticket in the auction. Alternatively, bidders may bid on the least preferential ticket in each section. Bidders making bids in excess of the market price are guaranteed a ticket and allowed to bid in the second session. In the second session of bidding, bidders place bids on particular tickets in the auction. The most preferential tickets in the auction are awarded to the highest bidders, consistent with the method of conducting an auction described herein. The bid activity meter 302 may be used in both the first and second session of bidding to define the time limits that bidders have to place bids during the first or second sessions.
In yet another embodiment of the invention, priority bidding may be offered. In the ticket auction context, priority bidding allows the bid participant to place a prioritized bid that acts as a packet of bids and includes a first bid as well as at least one back up bid in the event that the first bid or other higher priority bid in the prioritized bid is rejected during the auction. By way of example,
After submission of the first priority bit, a terminal screen such as screen 406 in
After submission of the second priority bid, the participant may choose to enter a third priority bid or any number of priority bids. Entering third or additional priority bids is performed in generally the same manner as described above for the first and second priority bids. Right clicking with the mouse selects an entire section for the area of a bid, as shown in
When the first priority bid of a prioritized bid has been entered by the bid participant, it becomes active immediately, and is either accepted or rejected by the system. When the lower priority bids are entered, they remain inactive unless other bidders bump the first priority bid out such that the bid is no longer acceptable within its defined area. If the first priority bid is bumped or otherwise rejected during the auction, the second priority bid is then activated. If the second priority bid is bumped, the third is activated and so on. If all priority bids are bumped, the participant must raise one or more bids or enter a new bid in order to purchase tickets.
As mentioned above, the auction procedure illustrated by the flowchart in
Therefore, instead of classifying such priority rights into sections and subsections and determining the amount of an acceptable minimum bid by viewing the lowest bid in a particular section, the minimum acceptable bid for each priority right must be evaluated individually as a bid is placed upon the priority right. The auction procedure illustrated by the flowchart in
In an auction for priority rights that are not easily pre-ranked, the sorting algorithm of step 50 in
Referring again to
First, the central computer 12, in step 428, determined that priority right bid 442 for $300 was the highest of all the bids received. Therefore, that bid was assigned the priority right to tee off at 8:00 a.m., and the bid record corresponding to bid 442 in the main auction database of
The central computer 12 then determined that there were more available priority rights, step 430, and that there remained bids that had not yet been processed, step 436. Therefore, the central computer 12 queried the main auction database of
Returning to step 430 in
The central computer 12 continued processing this algorithm until all priority rights were assigned to received bids. The final result of all priority right assignments can be seen in frame 444. During the process of assigning priority rights, if a desired priority right was already assigned the central computer 12 then selected the closest available priority right to the desired priority right. Other embodiments of this invention may vary this selection, opting to only choose priority rights in one direction, e.g. later tee times. Additionally, the priority rights auctioning system could be modified to permit, as discussed above, alternative priority right bids, personal priority right bidding sections, and participant preference options, such as the option to designate which direction the bid is bumped. The priority rights auctioning system of the present invention, utilizing a sorting algorithm such as that illustrated in
Statistical Analysis of Auctioning System
The automated priority right auctioning system of the present invention may be used in connection with other computer programs to create graphs and tables to enable real-time statistical analysis of the auction.
It is to be understood that the above-described embodiments of the invention are merely illustrative. Other implementations may readily be devised by those of ordinary skill in the art which will embody the principles of the invention and fall within the spirit and scope thereof. For example, the exemplary contiguous ticket algorithm of
This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/059,990, filed Feb. 17, 2005, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,747,507 which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 09/778,606, filed Feb. 7, 2001, (now U.S. Pat. No. 6,907,405), which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 09/586,927 filed Jun. 5, 2000 (now U.S. Pat. No. 6,704,713), which is a continuation of PCT application Ser. No. PCT/US00/03136 filed Feb. 7, 2000, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 08/862,547, filed May 23, 1997 (now U.S. Pat. No. 6,023,685), which claims the benefit of provisional patent application No. 60/018,211, filed May 23, 1996. The entire disclosure of each one of these priority applications is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
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| 20060195356 | Nerenhausen et al. | Aug 2006 | A1 |
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| 20070012765 | Trinquet et al. | Jan 2007 | A1 |
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| 20070124232 | Brett | May 2007 | A1 |
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| Number | Date | Country |
|---|---|---|
| 2000229843 | Aug 2006 | AU |
| 2006203419 | Jan 2008 | AU |
| 2007214305 | Sep 2009 | AU |
| 2399155 | Feb 2000 | CA |
| 0828223 | Mar 1998 | EP |
| 1069539 | Jan 2001 | EP |
| 1257941 | Aug 2001 | EP |
| 1868153 | Dec 2007 | EP |
| 5204952 | Aug 1993 | JP |
| 5266049 | Oct 1993 | JP |
| 10-289281 | Oct 1998 | JP |
| 11-031186 | Feb 1999 | JP |
| 11031204 | Feb 1999 | JP |
| 3061933 | Jun 1999 | JP |
| 11-353361 | Dec 1999 | JP |
| 4394858 | Oct 2009 | JP |
| WO 8803295 | May 1988 | WO |
| WO 9906928 | Feb 1999 | WO |
| WO 9927476 | Jun 1999 | WO |
| WO 9960489 | Nov 1999 | WO |
| WO 0062260 | Oct 2000 | WO |
| WO 0074300 | Dec 2000 | WO |
| WO 0075838 | Dec 2000 | WO |
| WO 0108065 | Feb 2001 | WO |
| WO 0141021 | Jun 2001 | WO |
| WO 0141085 | Jun 2001 | WO |
| WO 0144892 | Jun 2001 | WO |
| WO 0152139 | Jul 2001 | WO |
| WO 0159649 | Aug 2001 | WO |
| WO 0159658 | Aug 2001 | WO |
| WO 0171669 | Sep 2001 | WO |
| WO 0184473 | Nov 2001 | WO |
| WO 0203174 | Jan 2002 | WO |
| WO 0235322 | May 2002 | WO |
| WO 03027808 | Apr 2003 | WO |
| Entry |
|---|
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| Harlan, “At Least it isn't the Team's Ball that's in Somebody Else's Court”, Wall Street Journal (Jun. 4, 1991). |
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| Jackson, “Media Futures: This Bazaar Could Put Retailers Under the Hammer”, Financial Times (May 25, 1995). |
| Jenkins, “Giants Draw Fans into Web Team Helps Season-Ticket Holders Get Mileage Out of Plans”; USA Today, p. 3C (Jun. 27, 2000). |
| Kasper; “Purchase Griz Playoff Tickets Now”, Missoulian Online (May 3, 2001). |
| Koenig, “Texas Firm Links Sports Teams, Fans”, Amarillo Globe-News, Feb. 20, 2000). |
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| Nestor at al, “Transforming Tickets from a Commodity into a Valuable Strategic Asset”, Global eTicket Exchange whitepaper, Oct. 13, 2000. |
| O'Neil, “Q and A”, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. 4D (Jan. 19, 1995). |
| Riley et al, “Optimal Auctions”, The American Economic Review, vol. 71, No. 3. pp. 381-392 (Jun. 1981). |
| Rosen et al, “Ticket Pricing”, University of Chicago Center for the Study of the Economy and the State (Sep. 1995). |
| Rubel, “ETM to Ticketmaster: Let's Rock”, Marketing News (Jun. 19, 1995). |
| Stevenson, “Frosh Get at Least Fifth Choice Dorm: Women Find Shortage of Single-Sex Rooms”, The Tech, vol. 115, No. 37(Aug. 31, 1995). |
| Thomas, “Deadline Looms for Playoff Tickets; PSL Owners Have Until Dec. 8 to Make Purchase”, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. D8 (Dec. 3, 1999). |
| Vanderporten, “Strategic Behavior in Pooled Condominium Auctions”, Journal of Urban Economics 31, pp. 123-137 (1992). |
| Waddell, “Advantix, Tickets.com Hope Merger Brings Best of Both Ticketing Worlds”, Amusement Business (Feb. 8, 1999). |
| Wagner; “How Retailers are Using Web Auctions to Let Customers Help Them Set Prices”, http://www.internetretailer.com/printArticle.asp?id=3164 (Mar. 2001). |
| www.TicketOptions.com Web Pages, as retreived from archive.org (2001). |
| wwwSeasonTicket.com Web Pages, as retreived from archive.org (2001). |
| Zoltak, “Adventix Acquisitions Continue with Protix Deal”, Amusement Business (Nov. 2, 1998). |
| Office Action dated Mar. 9, 2009 (Japanese Patent Application No. 2001-558899) (English Translation). |
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| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20070027798 A1 | Feb 2007 | US |
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 60018211 | May 1996 | US |
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent | 11059990 | Feb 2005 | US |
| Child | 11502344 | US | |
| Parent | PCT/US00/03136 | Feb 2000 | US |
| Child | 09586927 | US |
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent | 09778606 | Feb 2001 | US |
| Child | 11059990 | US | |
| Parent | 09586927 | Jun 2000 | US |
| Child | 09778606 | US | |
| Parent | 08862547 | May 1997 | US |
| Child | PCT/US00/03136 | US |
