This award will fund a series of conferences whose objective is to bring together experts from the respective fields of economic theory and experimental economics. Economic theory and experiments have had a fruitful relationship for the last four decades. Over the course of this period, economic experiments have allowed to uncover many “behavioral anomalies”, that is to say, behaviors which were consistently observed in the lab and did not seem to conform to the prevalent economic models at the time. These seemingly anomalous observations have eventually resulted in the refinement of numerous economic models. Through this series of conferences, the investigators seek to continue and amplify this important collaboration (between economic theorists and experimentalists) by creating many opportunities for scholars in these respective groups of researchers to have live exchanges, which will include state-of-the art presentations from the two fields. This continued collaboration is crucial to ensure the updating of the theories and models seeking to explain the behavior of economic agents. The participation of experts from psychology, political science, and computer science gives an interdisciplinary dimension to these conferences.<br/><br/>Specifically, the first conference in the series focuses on the topic of “learning with incorrect models”. Behavioral economics has accumulated ample evidence documenting systematic mistakes and biases in many economic environments. The question of determining how agents correct these mistakes over time (with experience and sequential acquisition of new information) is of central importance. The investigators have identified a burgeoning literature on this topic from the economic theory side; but there is almost no experimental and behavioral scrutiny on this important question. The organization of this event is thus likely to spur the development of the experimental literature on this topic. The list of conference participants includes world-renowned experts and students from various universities across the United States. In the second conference, the organizers plan to explore the topic of “information design and persuasion”, which essentially refers to one’s ability to influence, through the choice of the information provided, the actions chosen by another agent. In the last decade, many theoretical works have used models of persuasion in various contexts: voter mobilization, traffic routing, rating systems, transparency in financial markets, etc. However, to date, the related works from experimental economics have focused on rather simplistic and unrealistic examples. The second conference will thus give researchers in both field the opportunity to eliminate this disconnect between the two fields. The series includes additional events, which focus on other topics.<br/><br/>This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.