Patent Grant
9830593
This disclosure relates generally to data processing devices and, more particularly, to cryptographic currency user directory data and enhanced peer-verification ledger synthesis through multi-modal cryptographic key-address mapping.
A cryptographic currency may be a peer-to-peer digital currency in which a user of the cryptographic currency may transfer a value from a public key-address under a control of the user to a different public key-address under a control of a different user through a transaction that is propagated across a cryptocurrency network. The user may have many unique instances of the public key-address, as the user may be able to generate a new public key-address at will with a key generation software. For example, the user may create the new public key-address for each transaction. To allow the peer-to-peer cryptographic currency to function without a central authority, the set of transactions may be recorded in a peer-verification ledger at a set of cryptographic nodes that comprise the cryptocurrency network. The peer-verification ledger may be a publically available data comprising an entire set of the previous transactions of the cryptographic currency to allow the cryptographic node to verify the transaction is valid (e.g., to verify that a value is currency associated with the public key-address that the transaction is purporting to transfer the value from). The peer-verification ledger, while including within the publically available data a set of transactions and an associated set of public key-addresses that the value has been transferred to and/or from, may not have any information regarding a true identity of who may control a particular public key-address (e.g., who may control the private key that may allow the value transfer from the corresponding public key-address). The cryptographic currency may therefore be “pseudonymous,” that is, anonymous until the user discloses his or her control of the public key-address.
The cryptographic currency may be used by both a legitimate user and an illegitimate user. The illegitimate user may use the cryptographic currency to purchase contraband, support crime, and/or participate in terrorist activity. An analyst, who may be a law enforcement agency and/or an intelligence agency, may therefore be interested in monitoring or thwarting activity of a user of interest who is transacting in the cryptographic currency.
However, due to the pseudonymous nature of the cryptographic currency, the analyst may be unable to tell who sent and/or received the value of the cryptographic currency within a particular transaction. Criminals and/or terrorists, who may be synonymous with or comprise the user of interest, may continue to transact anonymously. Additionally, a thief of the cryptographic currency itself may use a hacking technique to obtain the private key of a legitimate user of the cryptographic currency and steal the value associated with the corresponding public key-address. Further, the user of interest may transact in several instances of the cryptographic currency, further complicating detection and surveillance efforts. The user of interest may therefore operate financially outside the control of a government authority that might otherwise be able to reduce crime and/or prevent terrorism by analyzing a set of global financial transactions.
Disclosed are a method, a device and/or a system of cryptographic currency user directory data and enhanced peer-verification ledger synthesis through multi-modal cryptographic key-address mapping.
In one embodiment, a method for multimodal cryptographic key-address mapping includes using a computer processor and a volatile memory to determine that a propagation packet is a transaction of a cryptographic currency propagating across a network for integration into a peer-verification ledger. The transaction includes a value transfer of the cryptographic currency between an input key-address of an input of the transaction and an output key-address of an output of the transaction. The method also extracts an IP address from a TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet associated with the transaction, and additionally extracts from the transaction a transactional hash associated with the input of the transaction. The transactional hash references a previous output of a previous transaction.
Further, the method analyzes the peer-verification ledger to determine the input key-address associated with the transactional hash referencing the previous output. The input key-address of the input of the transaction of the cryptographic currency propagating across the network for integration into the peer-verification ledger is then extracted. Next, the IP address from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet is linked with the input key-address of the input of the transaction. The method also determines that the input key-address of the input of the transaction is under a suspected control of a user of interest based upon an association between the user of interest and the IP address extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet of the transaction.
The method may further include stratifying, within a user directory data, a designation of the suspected control of the input key-address of the input of the transaction into one or more designations of a provisional control and a designation of a verified control. This designation may be based upon a predetermined certainty of the association between the user of interest and the IP address extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet of the transaction.
The propagation packet may be determined to be the transaction of the cryptographic currency based upon the identification, within an application layer protocol of the propagation packet, of a magic number associated with a specific cryptographic currency and/or the magic number located in a header field of the application layer protocol. A byte size of the propagation packet and a hash format associated with the specific cryptographic currency may also be used to determine the presence of the propagation packet. The method may also determine that a point-to-point packet relayed between the user of interest and a correspondent of the user of interest is a key-bearing communication that includes a relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication. The key-bearing communication may be a chat note, a social media message, a text message, and/or a voice call. The relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication may be extracted from the key-bearing communication, and it may be determined that the user directory data includes the relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication.
When the user directory data does not include the relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication, the method may create a new entry for the relayed key-address within the user directory data. Similarly, it may be designated, within the user directory data, that the relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication is under the suspected control of the user of interest.
The method may also stratify, within the user directory data, the designation of the suspected control of the relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication into one or more designations of the provisional control and the designation of the verified control. The stratification may be based upon a predetermined certainty of the association between the user of interest and an IP address of the key-bearing communication extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the peer-to-peer packet and/or an online identity associated with a transmission of the key-bearing communication. The point-to-point packet may be identified as associated with the key-bearing communication based on a length of a character string of the relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication, a leading character of the character string of the relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication, and/or the character string of the relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication being a base-58 alpha-numeric format.
The method may also determine that a web content comprises a key-bearing content having an exhibited key-address of the key-bearing content. The key-bearing content may be a markup language page, a forum post, an online cryptographic key directory entry, and/or a social media data. Additionally, using a web-scraper, the exhibited key-address of the key-bearing content may be extracted from the key-bearing content. Following this process, and within the user directory data, the exhibited key-address of the key-bearing content may be designated as under the suspected control of the user of interest based upon an association between the online identity responsible for creating the key-bearing content and the user of interest.
The method may consolidate a set of key-addresses within a control radius of the verified control of the user of interest into a crypto bank profile corresponding to the user of interest, and additionally verify that the transaction has been incorporated into a forming unit of the peer-verification ledger and/or a confirmed unit of the peer-verification ledger. A majority of a set of prepopulated key-addresses within the user directory data may be derived from a set of previous transactions of the peer-verification ledger.
Also, when a first key-address of a specific stratum of the provisional control of the user of interest and a second key-address of an unknown control are both used as the input of the transaction, the method may designate, within the user directory data, the second key-address of the input of the transaction as under the specific stratum of the provisional control of the user of interest. Similarly, when a third key-address under a first stratum of provisional control of the user of interest and a fourth key-address under a second stratum of provisional control of the user of interest are both used as the input of the transaction, the method may elevate the designation of the third key-address and the designation of the fourth key-address to be under the verified control or a third stratum of provisional control closer in certainty to the verified control as measured by the control radius.
It may also be determined, when the transaction has a first key-address of the output of the transaction and a second key-address of the output of the transaction, that the first key-address of the output of the transaction is a change key-address returning a portion of the value transfer of the transaction back to the user of interest associated with the input key-address of the input of the transaction. The first key-address of the output of the transaction may be identified as the change key-address. This identification may occur by determining that the transfer of the value to the second key-address of the output of the transaction is an approximate integer multiple of a unit of the cryptographic currency. The identification may also occur by determining, when the second key-address of the output of the transaction is used as a next key-address of a new input of a later transaction, that traveling a distance between a geographic origin of the transaction and the later transaction would be physically impracticable for a suspected controller of both the second key-address of the output of the transaction and the next key-address of the new input of the later transaction within an elapse time of the transaction and the later transaction. The method may designate, within the user directory data, the change key-address as under the suspected control of the user of interest.
The method also applies to specific mechanisms of the cryptographic currency. For example, the peer-verification ledger may be a block chain data with the forming unit being a forming block of the block chain data and the confirmed unit being a confirmed block of the block chain data. The method also applies to specific types of the cryptographic currency. For example, the cryptographic currency may be a bitcoin currency, and the hash format may be a string of twenty-seven to thirty-four base-58 alphanumeric characters beginning with a numeral “1” or a numeral “3”.
In another embodiment, a method includes determining that a propagation packet is a transaction of a cryptographic currency propagating across a network for integration into a peer-verification ledger, the transaction including a value transfer of the cryptographic currency between an input key-address of an input of the transaction and an output key-address of an output of the transaction. Next, an IP address from a TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet associated with the transaction is extracted. Similarly extracted from the transaction is a transactional hash associated with the input of the transaction. The transactional hash referencing a previous output of a previous transaction.
The peer-verification ledger is then analyzed to determine the input key-address associated with the transactional hash referencing the previous output. The input key-address of the input of the transaction of the cryptographic currency propagating across the network for integration into the peer-verification ledger is then extracted, allowing for the linking of the IP address from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet with the input key-address of the input of the transaction. Within an enhanced ledger data it is then designated that the input key-address of the input of the transaction is under a suspected control of a user of interest, based upon an association between the user of interest and the IP address extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet of the transaction.
In yet another embodiment, a system includes a collection server associated with an access point and having a computer processor and physical memory. The collection server intercepts an internet protocol packet determined by the collection server to have an association with a transaction of a cryptographic currency propagating across a network for integration into a peer-verification ledger and/or a key-bearing communication between a user of interest and a correspondent of the user of interest.
The system also includes an IP extraction module to extract an IP address from a TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet associated with the transaction and/or the key-bearing communication. A key extraction module extracts a transactional hash of an input of the transaction of the cryptographic currency propagating across the network for integration into the peer-verification ledger and/or extracts a relayed key-address of the key-bearing communication between the user of interest and the correspondent of the user of interest. Finally, the system includes a network, a cryptocurrency network, and a directory server that houses a ledger copy data, a user directory data, and/or an enhanced ledger data.
The embodiments of this invention are illustrated by way of example and not limitation in the figures of the accompanying drawings, in which like references indicate similar elements and in which:
Other features of the present embodiments will be apparent from the accompanying drawings and from the detailed description that follows.
Disclosed are a method, a device and a system of cryptographic currency user directory data and enhanced peer-verification ledger synthesis through multi-modal cryptographic key-address mapping. Although the present embodiments have been described with reference to specific example embodiments, it will be evident that various modifications and changes may be made to these embodiments without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the various embodiments.
In
In a first mode of cryptographic key-address mapping, the directory server 100 may probe for and collect the propagation packet (which may be an internet protocol packet, e.g., the propagation packet 301 of
The propagation of the transaction to the cryptocurrency network 110, as initiated by the user of interest 118, is seen in ‘circle 1’ of
A second primary mode of cryptographic key-address mapping may be the addition to the enhanced ledger data 102 and/or the user directory data 104 of information derived from intercepted communications and/or transactions between the user of interest 118 and the correspondent 120 of the user of interest 118. The collection server 106, with its access point 108 located at the communication node 114 of the wide area network 101, may be able to identify a communication having a public key-address and/or a private key (e.g., the key-bearing communication 606 of
Another source of cryptographic key-address mapping used to populate the enhanced ledger data 102 and/or the user directory data 104 may include information that the user of interest 118 may make available on a public forum, a web page, and/or a markup-language page hosted on the web host 116. In
The cryptographic currency may be a medium of exchange designed to securely exchange information through a public, peer-to-peer transaction verification process enabled by certain principles of cryptography. The cryptographic currency may also be a type of digital currency that is based on cryptography to ensure security, making the cryptographic currency difficult to counterfeit. The cryptographic currency may be a medium of exchange using public and private keys to transfer the value of the currency from one person to another. The cryptographic currency may also be referred to as a crypto-currency, a cyber currency, a digital cash, a digital currency, a digital money, an e-currency, an e-money, an electronic cash, an electronic currency, and an electronic money. A specific instance of the cryptographic currency is Bitcoin (which may be denoted BTC), which launched in 2009. Other specific examples of the cryptographic currency include Litecoin (LTC), Namecoin (NMC), Dogecoin (Doge) and Masertercoin (MSC).
The cryptocurrency network 110 may be a network of peer-to-peer nodes (e.g., the cryptographic node 112) that process the transaction of the value transfer of the cryptographic currency from a first public key-address (e.g., the input key-address of the transaction) to a second public key-address (e.g., the output key-address of the transaction). The transaction is broadcast to the cryptocurrency network 110 and included in a peer-verification ledger, a copy of which may be located at or associated with the cryptographic node 112. A person and/or an organization associated with the cryptographic node may participate in the cryptocurrency network 110—specifically, by keeping a public copy of a peer-verification ledger that records the set of transaction—because a software code implementing the cryptocurrency network 110 may reward the person and/or the organization for doing so. This reward may take the form of randomly awarding a predetermined value of the cryptographic currency, a probability of receiving the reward proportionate upon a total computational power contributed to processing the set of transactions of the cryptocurrency network 110. Dedicating or contributing a computing power to the cryptocurrency network 110 in an effort to receive the reward may be referred to as “mining” the cryptographic currency. A distributed nature of the peer-verification ledger may ensure that the value of the cryptographic currency associated with a particular public key-address cannot be spent twice. Each user of the cryptocurrency network may potentially have many instances of the public key-address. Although one form of the cryptographic currency has been described, the user directory data 104 and/or the enhanced ledger data may be comprised of additional instances of the cryptographic currency that use a public key-address with a corresponding private key, even where the additional instance of the cryptographic currency uses a different reward structure and/or a different peer-verification process.
The cryptocurrency network 110 may be comprised of the cryptographic nodes 112 to publically verify a set of transactions of users of the cryptographic currency. The cryptographic node 112 may be a node that participates in the cryptocurrency network 110 by relaying the transaction, maintaining the peer-verification ledger, and/or “mining” for the cryptographic currency (e.g., attempting to receive the reward by participating in the maintenance of the cryptocurrency network 110).
The access point 108 may be a location at which the collection server 106A may be communicatively coupled to a backbone transport of the wide area network 101 to replicate and analyze information and/or traffic over the backbone transport. The access point 108 may also be any other location that may allow for an interception of information and/or an interception of data across the wide area network 101. One or more of the set of collection servers 106 through 106N may be associated with the access point and communicatively coupled with the directory server 100. The set of collection servers 106A through 106N may be responsible for identifying which of a set of information moving past the access point 108 associated with a particular collection server 106 should be analyzed and/or conveyed to the directory server 100.
The ISP 109 may be an organization that provides services for accessing, using, or participating in the Internet and/or other communications and transactions over the wide area network 101. The ISP 109 may be an organization that is commercial, community-owned, non-profit, or otherwise privately owned. The user of interest 118 may refer to a specific person and/or a group of people such as an organization. For example, a non-profit organization may be a user of interest, as might be a government, a business, or a terrorist organization. In some cases, the user of interest 118 may only refer to an online identity, as a controller of the online identity (e.g., the natural person and/or organization that controls the use of the online identity) may be unknown. In one or more embodiments, each and every user of the cryptographic currency may be the user of interest 118. The correspondent 120 of the user of interest 118 may also be a specific person and/or a group of people such as an organization, or may be an online identity when no additional information of the correspondent is known. Similarly, the analyst 122 may represent a natural person and/or an organization. For example, analyst 122 may be a government law enforcement agency, a security agency, a non-profit corporation or educational institution, and/or an agent or employee of any of these organizations. The analyst 122 may use the enhanced ledger data 102 and/or the user directory data 104 to improve an integrity of the cryptocurrency network 110 (e.g., by catching a cryptocurrency thief), study a behavioral pattern of a use of the cryptographic currency (e.g., economics), or to gather an information related to criminal activity and/or collect intelligence (for example, to thwart a terrorist activity).
The auxiliary memory 107 may include the peer-verification ledger 200 that may be referenced in forming the enhanced ledger data 102 and/or the user directory data 104 as described in conjunction with
The enhanced ledger data 102 may include an enhanced transaction entry 202 that may be a form of the transaction as incorporated into the peer-verification ledger but with added information such as a name of the user of interest 118 (and/or their IP address) associated with the input key-address and/or the output key-address of the transaction. The user directory data 104 may include a crypto bank profile 240 of the user of interest that organizes the set of public key-addresses of one or more cryptographic currencies believed to be under the suspected control of the user of interest.
The transaction identification module 210 may identify the propagation packet as being a transaction of the cryptographic currency as described in conjunction with
In
The transaction 304 is comprised of an input 306 of one or more instances of a public key-addresses 300. In
The one or more instances of the input key-addresses referenced by the transactional hash 302 may be under the control of the user of interest 118 when the directory server 100 includes a known association between the IP address 303 and the user of interest 118. For example, the directory server 100 may have a recorded information that the user of interest 118 may subscribe to a particular instance of the ISP 109 with a limited number of dynamically assigned instances of the IP address 303. A propagation packet 301 that has the IP address 303 within the limited number of dynamically assigned instances of the IP address 303 may therefore be indicative of having been propagated by the user of interest 118.
The transaction 304 may also include a public key-address 300 of the output 308 that is under the control of the user of interest 118. For example, due to the design of the cryptographic currency that utilizes the peer-verification ledger, the change key-address 312 may be required to return a portion of the input 306 of the transaction 304 back to the user of interest 118 to avoid overpayment. It is sometimes impossible to recognize the change key-address within the output 308. However, as people often think in integers, it may be possible to determine the change key-address 312 as a public key-address 300 of the output 308 that did not receive an integer value portion of the value transfer 314.
The transaction identification module 210 may also identify the propagation packet based upon a magic number value within a field header of the application layer of the propagation packet. The magic number value may indicate an origin of a message on a network. For example the magic number value may be the first four bytes of the protocol specification 400. In one or more alternate embodiments, the magic number value may be a version field (e.g., having the raw transaction data 404 of ‘01 00 00 00’ in
Operation 508 may extract the input key-address of the input of the transaction, for example by extracting the input key-address from the peer-verification ledger. In some instances of the cryptographic currency, however, the input key-address may be extracted directly from propagation packet 301. Operation 510 may link the internet protocol address (e.g., IP address 303) from the TCP/IP layer of the internet protocol packet with the input key-address of the input of the transaction. Operation 512 may determine that the input key-address of the input of the transaction 304 is under a suspected control of a user of interest based upon an association between the user of interest and the IP address. Operation 512, for example, may be conducted by the control verification module 212.
In
The key-bearing communication 606, in addition to the email, may be a text message, an SMS message, an internet chat message, and/or a social media message. The key-bearing communication 606 may also be any other form of an electronic communication that comprises a set of characters and is sent from one point to another over the wide area network 101. The key-bearing communication 606 may additionally be a voice call, which the collection server 106 may translate into text (e.g., VoIP). Although
In
After the user 118 posts to and/or creates the web content 801, the exhibition scanning module 214 may scrape the web content 801 using a “web scraper” may determine that the web content 801 is the key-bearing content 806. The web scraper, for example, may operate by a grep command and/or a regular expression matching function. The web scraper may recognize the public key-address of the cryptographic currency by a hash format of the cryptographic currency. For example, the exhibited key-address 800 may be identified by the exhibition scanning module 214 by being a string of twenty-seven to thirty-four base-58 alphanumeric characters. The particular instance of the cryptographic currency to which the exhibited key-address 800 may belong may occur by analyzing the beginning character of the string. For example, either a numeral “1” and or numeral “3” may stand for the public key-address of the Bitcoin cryptographic currency. The Exhibition scanning module 214 may also reference the peer-verification ledger of one or more instances of the cryptographic currency to verify that a string of characters is the exhibited key-address 800. In addition to character recognition, the web scraper may have a semantic notation recognition that recognizes a semantics within the web content 801, the semantics commonly associated with and/or placed in conjunction with display of the public key-address (that may be the exhibited key-address 800).
In
The block number 1000 may be a sequential order of the blocks of the block chain going back to a first transaction of the cryptographic currency. A block having the highest number may be a forming unit of the peer-verification ledger, specifically, a forming block. A block having any other number may be a confirmed unit of the peer-verification ledger, specifically, a confirmed block. A common property of one or more instances of the cryptographic currency may be that a new block forms at approximately equal intervals of time (e.g., about 10 minutes). The block hash 1002 may be a unique identifier of each block that prevents a data comprising the block from being altered without drastically changing the identifier. The time 1004 may be a time in which the cryptographic node 112 received the block in a complete (e.g., solidified) form. The number of transactions 1006 may show the total instances of the transaction 304 that occur within the block, and the total BTC 1008 may show the total number of Bitcoins transferred from a set of input key-addresses to a set of output key-addresses within the block (e.g., a sum total of the value transfer 314 of each instance of the transaction within the block). The size 1010 may be the size of the block in kilobytes.
The user activity 1012 may show one or more instances of the user of interest 118 that may have transacted within the block. For example, as shown in
The analyst 122 may examine the enhanced ledger data in real-time to determine useful information about, execute surveillance on and/or gather intelligence about one or more instances of the user of interest 118. The analyst 122 may also set a condition for the alerts 1014, such as requesting the alert 1014 when a public key-address under the suspected control of a specific user of interest 118 transfers and/or receives over a certain value of the cryptographic currency. When one of the alerts 1014 set by the user is displayed, the analyst 122 may choose to inspect the block giving rise to the user activity 1012. For example, in the embodiment of
In
The from (name) field 1106 and the from to (name) field 1110 may contain the name of the user of interest believed to have the suspected control of one or more instances of the public key-address 300 that comprise one or more instances of the input key-address and one or more instances of the output key-address.
Each user of interest 118 placed on the enhanced ledger data 102 may have a suspected control over one or more of the public key-addresses 300 that comprise the peer-verification ledger and/or the enhanced ledger data 102. The suspected control designation may be assigned and/or managed by the control verification module 212 of
In another example, an internal analysis of the peer-verification ledger may determine that an output key-address is a change key-address returning a portion of the transfer of value of the transaction 304 to the controller the input key-address of the transaction 304. This determination may occur, for example, when within the transaction 304 an integer value of the cryptographic currency is transferred to a first output key-address and a decimal value of the cryptographic currency is transferred to a second key-address. Because the user of interest 118 may tend to think and/or transact with integers (and/or common fractions, such as 5.25, 3.125, 0.3333), the second key-address may tend to be an excess of the transfer of value 314 transferred back to the public key-address 300 controlled by the user of interest 118. Therefore, the suspected control may attach to the change key-address 312. For example, in
A specific public key-address 300 may be designated as under the suspected control of more than one instance of the user of interest 118 at a given time. However, due to the ease of generating a new public key-address, it may be unlikely that the specific public key-address 300 would be under the actual control of more than one instance of the user of interest 118. The actual control of the public key-address 300 may never be able to be fully determined. Rather, the suspected control may be stratified by the level of certainty into a set of provisional control levels and/or a verified control that may represent the highest level of certainty of the association between the user of interest 118 and the public key-address 300. In one embodiment, the enhanced ledger data 102, the user directory data 104 and/or the crypto bank profile 240 may only display to the analyst 122 a sub-set of public key-addresses under the suspected control of the user of interest 118 within a certain radius of the verified control. For example, the analyst may specify to apply a filter that only allows the from (name) field 1106 and/or the to (name) 1110 to display users of interest 118 with a suspected control of a verified state or a provisional certainty up to two levels below the verified state.
The control verification module 212 may also apply an algorithm that may adjust the designation of the suspected control of the public key-address 300 based upon its relationship to one or more additional instances of the public key-address 300. For example, where three instances of the public key-address 300 with a low certainty of association to the user of interest are used together as the input of the transaction, the control verification module may elevate the low certainty to a high certainty, which may be reflected as raising the provisional control designation from a ‘2’ to a to and/or the verified control. As will be explained in conjunction with
In
Within the name field 1200 may be placed the true name of the user of interest 118 (e.g., “William Smith,” “Organization X”) and/or an online identity (e.g., a handle such as “User_259” or an email address such as “xyz@gmail.com”). The currency field 1202 may display the particular instance of the currency associated with the public key-address 300 of the public key-address field 1204. The suspected control value field 1206 may contain the suspected control of the user of interest 118 over the public key-address 300, and the balance field 1208 may contain a remaining balance of the cryptographic currency remaining on the public key-address 300 shown in public key-address field 1204. The remaining balance may ordinarily be able to be determined from examination of the peer-verification ledger.
The last block field 1210 may show the last block that the public key-address 300 uses used in (e.g., used as an input key-address and/or an output key-address) and may allow the analyst to click on a link within the GUI displaying the user directory data to allow the user to view the block (e.g., the block 1100 of
Finally, the private key field 1214 may contain the private key corresponding to the public key-address 300. In many instances, the private key will not be known. However, in some cases, the private key may form part of a communication between the user of interest 118 and the correspondent 120, for example when the user of interest 118 relays the private key through the point-to-point packet 601 so that both the user of interest 118 and the correspondent 120 may have a joint control over the corresponding instance of the public key-address 300. Configuring the set of collection servers 106A through 106N to find and extract the private key may have an additional utility. In some cases, the public key-address 300 may be stored in a “wallet” file on the device 113 of the user of interest 118 to manage a corresponding private key. A hacker may attempt to export files associated with the wallet quickly and in an unencrypted format to effectuate a value transfer from a set of public key-addresses 300 within the wallet and thus steal the cryptographic currency. In such case, the transaction identification module 210 may be able to spot the private key within a wallet .DAT file format (and/or an additional format suitable to export the private key), along with the IP address 303 of the TCP/IP layer of the internet protocol packet carrying the wallet .DAT file format, to help catch the thief. Identification of the private key for a user of interest 118 may also allow the analyst 122 to “seize” the value associated with the corresponding public key-address 300 by effectuating the value transfer 314 from the corresponding public key-address 300 to a different public key-address 300 under the actual control of the analyst 122.
A penultimate entry of
In
At a second time ‘t=2’, the unknown user 1318, who may be located in Cape Town, South Africa, may propagate a later transaction using the second output key-address as the next key-address of a new input of the later transaction. When the average travel distance between Vancouver, B.C., and Cape Town, South Africa may take approximately 23 hours by a commercial airliner, and an elapse time between the first time and the second time is less than 12 hours, the directory server 100 may determine that the first output key-address is the change key-address of the transaction 304 and place the first output key-address under the suspected control of the user of interest 118.
In one embodiment, a method for multimodal cryptographic key-address mapping includes using a computer processor 103 and a volatile memory 105 to determine that a propagation packet 301 is a transaction 304 of a cryptographic currency propagating across a network 101 for integration into a peer-verification ledger 200. The transaction 304 includes a value transfer 314 of the cryptographic currency between an input key-address of an input 306 of the transaction 304 and an output key-address of an output 308 of the transaction 304. The method also extracts an IP address 303 from a TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 associated with the transaction 304, and additionally extracts from the transaction 304 a transactional hash 302 associated with the input 306 of the transaction 304. The transactional hash 302 references a previous output 308 of a previous transaction 304.
Further, the method analyzes the peer-verification ledger 200 to determine the input key-address associated with the transactional hash 302 referencing the previous output. The input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304 of the cryptographic currency propagating across the network 101 for integration into the peer-verification ledger 200 is then extracted. Next, the IP address 303 from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 is linked with the input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304. The method also determines that the input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304 is under a suspected control of a user of interest 118 based upon an association between the user of interest 118 and the IP address 303 extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 of the transaction 304.
The method may further include stratifying, within a user directory data 104, a designation of the suspected control of the input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304 into one or more designations of a provisional control and a designation of a verified control. This designation may be based upon a predetermined certainty of the association between the user of interest 118 and the IP address 303 extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 of the transaction 304.
The propagation packet 301 may be determined to be the transaction 304 of the cryptographic currency based upon the identification, within an application layer protocol 305 of the propagation packet 301, of a magic number associated with a specific cryptographic currency and/or the magic number located in a header field of the application layer protocol 305. A byte size of the propagation packet 301 and a hash format associated with the specific cryptographic currency may also be used to determine the presence of the propagation packet 301. The method may also determine that a point-to-point packet 601 relayed between the user of interest 118 and a correspondent 120 of the user of interest 118 is a key-bearing communication 606 that includes a relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606. The key-bearing communication 606 may be a chat note, a social media message, a text message, and/or a voice call. The relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606 may be extracted from the key-bearing communication 606, and it may be determined that the user directory data 104 includes the relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606.
When the user directory data 104 does not include the relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606, the method may create a new entry for the relayed key-address 606 within the user directory data 104. Similarly, it may be designated, within the user directory data 104, that the relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606 as under the suspected control of the user of interest 118.
The method may also stratify, within the user directory data 104, the designation of the suspected control of the relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606 into one or more designations of the provisional control and the designation of the verified control. The stratification may be based upon a predetermined certainty of the association between the user of interest 118 and an IP address 303 of the key-bearing communication 606 extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the peer-to-peer packet and/or an online identity associated with a transmission of the key-bearing communication 606. The point-to-point packet 601 may be identified as associated with the key-bearing communication 606 based on a length of a character string of the relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606, a leading character of the character string of the relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606, and/or the character string of the relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606 being a base-58 alpha-numeric format.
The method may also determine that a web content 801 comprises a key-bearing content 806 having an exhibited key-address 800 of the key-bearing content 806. The key-bearing content 806 may be a markup language page, a forum post, an online cryptographic key directory entry, and/or a social media data. Additionally, using a web-scraper, the exhibited key-address 800 of the key-bearing content 806 may be extracted from the key-bearing content 806. Following this process, and within the user directory data 104, the exhibited key-address 800 of the key-bearing content 806 may be designated as under the suspected control of the user of interest 118 based upon an association between the online identity responsible for creating the key-bearing content 806 and the user of interest 118.
The method may consolidate a set of key-addresses within a control radius of the verified control of the user of interest 118 into a crypto bank profile 240 corresponding to the user of interest 118, and additionally verify that the transaction 304 has been incorporated into a forming unit of the peer-verification ledger 200 and/or a confirmed unit of the peer-verification ledger 200. A majority of a set of prepopulated key-addresses within the user directory data 104 may be derived from a set of previous transactions of the peer-verification ledger 200.
Also, when a first key-address of a specific stratum of the provisional control of the user of interest 118 and a second key-address of an unknown control are both used as the input 306 of the transaction 304, the method may designate, within the user directory data 104, the second key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304 as under the specific stratum of the provisional control of the user of interest 118. Similarly, when a third key-address under a first stratum of provisional control of the user of interest 118 and a fourth key-address under a second stratum of provisional control of the user of interest 118 are both used as the input 306 of the transaction 304, the method may elevate the designation of the third key-address and the designation of the fourth key-address to be under the verified control or a third stratum of provisional control closer in certainty to the verified control as measured by the control radius.
It may also be determined, when the transaction 304 has a first key-address of the output 308 of the transaction 304 and a second key-address of the output 308 of the transaction 304, that the first key-address of the output 308 of the transaction 304 is a change key-address 312 returning a portion of the value transfer 314 of the transaction 304 back to the user of interest 118 associated with the input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304. The first key-address of the output 308 of the transaction 304 may be identified as the change key-address 312. This identification may occur by determining that the transfer of the value to the second key-address of the output 308 of the transaction 304 is an approximate integer multiple of a unit of the cryptographic currency. The identification may also occur by determining, when the second key-address of the output 308 of the transaction 304 is used as a next key-address of a new input 306 of a later transaction, that traveling a distance between a geographic origin of the transaction 304 and the later transaction 304 would be physically impracticable for a suspected controller of both the second key-address of the output 308 of the transaction 304 and the next key-address of the new input 306 of the later transaction 304 within an elapse time of the transaction 304 and the later transaction 304. The method may designate, within the user directory data 104, the change key-address 312 as under the suspected control of the user of interest 118.
The method also applies to specific mechanisms of the cryptographic currency. For example, the peer-verification ledger 200 may be a block chain data with the forming unit being a forming block of the block chain data and the confirmed unit being a confirmed block of the block chain data. The method also applies to specific types of the cryptographic currency. For example, the cryptographic currency may be a bitcoin currency, and the hash format may be a string of twenty-seven to thirty-four base-58 alphanumeric characters beginning with a numeral “1” or a numeral “3”.
In another embodiment, a method includes determining that a propagation packet 301 is a transaction 304 of a cryptographic currency propagating across a network 101 for integration into a peer-verification ledger 200, the transaction 304 including a value transfer 314 of the cryptographic currency between an input key-address of an input 306 of the transaction 304 and an output key-address of an output 308 of the transaction 304. Next, an IP address 303 from a TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 associated with the transaction 304 is extracted. Similarly extracted from the transaction 304 is a transactional hash 302 associated with the input 306 of the transaction 304. The transactional hash 302 referencing a previous output 308 of a previous transaction 304.
The peer-verification ledger 200 is then analyzed to determine the input key-address associated with the transactional hash 302 referencing the previous output. The input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304 of the cryptographic currency propagating across the network 101 for integration into the peer-verification ledger 200 is then extracted, allowing for the linking of the IP address 303 from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 with the input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304. Within an enhanced ledger data 102 it is then designated that the input key-address of the input 306 of the transaction 304 as under a suspected control of a user of interest 118 based upon an association between the user of interest 118 and the IP address 303 extracted from the TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 of the transaction 304.
In yet another embodiment, a system includes a collection server 106 associated with an access point 108 and having a computer processor 103 and physical memory. The collection server 106 intercepts an internet protocol packet determined by the collection server 106 to have an association with a transaction 304 of a cryptographic currency propagating across a network 101 for integration into a peer-verification ledger 200 and/or a key-bearing communication 606 between a user of interest 118 and a correspondent 120 of the user of interest 118.
The system also includes an IP extraction module 208 to extract an IP address 303 from a TCP/IP layer of the propagation packet 301 associated with the transaction 304 and/or the key-bearing communication 606. A key extraction module 206 extracts a transactional hash 302 of an input 306 of the transaction 304 of the cryptographic currency propagating across the network 101 for integration into the peer-verification ledger 200 and/or extracts a relayed key-address 606 of the key-bearing communication 606 between the user of interest 118 and the correspondent 120 of the user of interest 118. Finally, the system includes a network 101, a cryptocurrency network 110, and a directory server 100 that houses a ledger copy data, a user directory data 104, and/or an enhanced ledger data.
Although the present embodiments have been described with reference to specific example embodiments, it will be evident that various modifications and changes may be made to these embodiments without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the various embodiments. For example, the various devices and modules described herein may be enabled and operated using hardware circuitry (e.g., CMOS based logic circuitry), firmware, software or any combination of hardware, firmware, and software (e.g., embodied in a non-transitory machine-readable medium). For example, the various electrical structure and methods may be embodied using transistors, logic gates, and electrical circuits (e.g., application specific integrated (ASIC) circuitry and/or Digital Signal Processor (DSP) circuitry).
In addition, it will be appreciated that the various operations, processes and methods disclosed herein may be embodied in a non-transitory machine-readable medium and/or a machine-accessible medium compatible with a data processing system (e.g., the set of collection servers 106A through 106N, the directory server 100). Accordingly, the specification and drawings are to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.
The structures and modules in the figures may be shown as distinct and communicating with only a few specific structures and not others. The structures may be merged with each other, may perform overlapping functions, and may communicate with other structures not shown to be connected in the figures. Accordingly, the specification and/or drawings may be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.
In addition, the logic flows depicted in the figures do not require the particular order shown, or sequential order, to achieve desirable results. In addition, other steps may be provided, or steps may be eliminated, from the described flows, and other components may be added to, or removed from, the described systems. Accordingly, other embodiments are within the scope of the preceding disclosure.
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| Number | Date | Country | |
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| 20150310424 A1 | Oct 2015 | US |
