The invention relates to encryption techniques for data transmission. It departs from a method of encrypting data on the physical layer of a data transmission system as described in the preamble of claim 1.
Signals from wireless data transmission in general as well as signals from powerline communication are easily intercepted by appropriate receivers, necessitating encryption techniques in order to provide for some level of confidentiality. Digital encryption is usually applied to the transmitted bits at the link layer or at higher protocol layers of the communication protocol stack. Block encryption techniques permute blocks of bits in a key-dependent way, while stream ciphers first generate a key-dependent pseudo-random binary key stream, which is then XOR-ed with the plaintext bit sequence to produce the cipher text. A separate key management procedure ensures that sender and legitimate receiver both know the secret key and can thus establish a confidential data transmission path. An eavesdropper without access to the key cannot easily recover the plaintext from an intercepted cipher text.
Performing encryption on a certain higher protocol layer makes it application- or service-specific. Other services running on top of unencrypted lower protocol layers remain unprotected or must implement their own encryption. Further, some data bits e.g. for synchronization, addressing, and other control functions may remain unencrypted. Eavesdroppers using so-called “sniffers” are thus able to synchronize to intercepted data packets, read control information, and obtain the binary cipher text, which can then be crypto-analyzed separately.
Performing encryption on the lowest protocol layer of the information transfer process, i.e. the physical communication layer or modem layer where the digital modulation occurs, overcomes the disadvantages mentioned above. The U.S. Pat. No. 6,157,679 describes a method to encrypt radio frequency (RF) single carrier 24-QAM signals by transmitting altered QAM constellation symbols directly and sequentially. The alteration is based on a binary key stream and involves a complex conjugation of QAM symbols, i.e. flipping the sign of their components. This sign change is easy to implement as it involves no computation. However, as with all time-domain QAM, intersymbol interference of the QAM symbols introduces complications for synchronization and channel equalization for the intended receiver, even without encryption of the QAM symbols.
It is therefore an objective of the invention to provide for a data encryption technique which prevents eavesdroppers from synchronizing to intercepted data packets and at the same time facilitates channel equalization by the intended receiver. These objectives are achieved by a method of encrypting and decrypting data according to the claims 1 and 8, and by a modem for encrypting and decrypting data according to claims 9 and 10. Further preferred embodiments are evident from the dependent patent claims.
In the inventive encryption technique, an encryption on the physical communication layer is combined with Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplex (OFDM) transmission schemes. OFDM is a digital modulation technique particularly adapted to transmission channels or bands with frequency-dependent characteristics (e.g. signal-to-noise) such as wireless or powerline transmission. In contrast to single carrier QAM, OFDM modulation involves a superposition of several sub-channels or sub-carriers, wherein inter-sub-carrier interference is avoided and sub-carrier-equalization is facilitated by a cyclic prefix.
In other words, the invention introduces encryption on the physical protocol layer, i.e. directly on the digital modulation level of the OFDM modulation scheme. OFDM symbols to be transmitted comprise several underlying Quadrature Amplitude Modulated (QAM) symbols which are altered in a manner determined by an encryption key. Specifically, the concept of stream ciphers is modified in that a generalized key stream sequence is concatenated with the sequences of said underlying QAM symbols. The generation of the key stream sequence takes advantage of known methods to generate cryptographically secure binary key streams. The actual encryption is easy to implement.
In a preferred variant of the invention, said key stream sequence consists of elements chosen at random from a set of K>2 distinct values. This allows more varied alterations of the underlying QAM symbols that just a change in sign or a complex conjugation, further obstructing signal acquisition attempts by an eavesdropper.
In a further preferred embodiment of the invention, the encryption operation consists of a simple complex multiplication with the elements of the key stream sequence, which can be efficiently performed by the digital signal processors typically used for the implementation of OFDM modems. (Traditional binary encryption schemes require bit-wise manipulations which cannot be performed efficiently on such processors). If the elements of the key stream sequence are of equal amplitude, the amplitude of the QAM symbols and therefore the transmitted power of the corresponding sub-channels are left unchanged.
In the case of an underlying 2m QAM modulation involving 2m constellation points (or potential QAM symbols), the latter are symmetrically distributed in the four quadrants of the complex plane. If the operation then equals a congruent rotation, every altered symbol again is a regular constellation point. The number K of distinct complex elements of the key stream sequence is therefore preferably set to 4 and the elements themselves are multiples of π/2. Another possible QAM constellation consists of 16 equally spaced points on a circle, i.e. a pure phase modulation. Here K=16 (roots of unity) also preserves the original constellation points.
In an alternative preferred embodiment of the invention, the encryption operation consist in a pseudo-random permutation of the constellation points, i.e. the QAM symbols are exchanged by other QAM symbols. In order not to upset power allocation to the sub-channels, the permutation preferably takes place among subsets of constellation points with equal amplitude.
In another preferred variant, training OFDM symbols are periodically inserted, encrypted and transmitted just as ordinary data OFDM symbols. At the receiver, the received training OFDM symbols are evaluated in order to facilitate synchronization and channel estimation.
The subject matter of the invention will be explained in more detail in the following text with reference to preferred exemplary embodiments which are illustrated in the attached drawings, in which:
The reference symbols used in the drawings, and their meanings, are listed in summary form in the list of reference symbols. In principle, identical parts are provided with the same reference symbols in the figures.
In the following encryption step, the sequence of complex numbers zn is operated on in an encryptor 13 by multiplying with a generalized complex-valued key stream sequence {kn} and a cipher text sequence vn is obtained, i.e.
vn=kn·zn
The generation of {kn}, a K-ary Pseudo-Random Sequence PRS with e.g. K=4 or 8, in the key stream generator 18 is described below. For the present case of OFDM, the preferred choice of {kn} has the form
kn=ejφn ,
where {φn} is a K-ary pseudo-random sequence with 0≦φn≦2π. The OFDM time-discrete signal is then generated as a superposition of the N modulated sub-carriers, i.e.
which is most efficiently calculated by an Inverse Fast Fourier Transform in IFFT 14. Adding a so-called cyclic prefix in a prefix adder 15 reduces inter-subcarrier interference at the receiver. Finally, a digital-to-analogue conversion and possibly a mixing or frequency-translation to the actual carrier frequency takes place in a mixer and digital to analog (D/A) converter 16, resulting in the transmitted signal x(t).
As mentioned above, encryption is provided by the K-ary key stream sequence {kn} or {φn}. Key streams are pseudo-random sequences which are uniquely determined by an encryption key, they must be of large length (period) and unpredictable (given an extract of the sequence) for anyone not knowing the encryption key. Generation of binary key streams for binary stream ciphers is a well-known subject.
For the present application, a K-ary key stream sequence {φn} can simply be obtained by using log2K successive output bits of a binary key stream generator. These bits address a table with K entries containing the mapping to values of φn, or to Re(kn)=cos(φn) and Im(kn)=sin(φn). With reasonable choices of the table entries, cryptographically good binary sequences then yield cryptographically good K-ary {φn}. Obviously, the size of the encryption key determining the key stream {φn} must be large to prevent brute force attacks and preferably comprise 128 bits or more. Also, the period of the key stream must cover a large number of OFDM symbols, wherein for each OFDM symbol with N sub-carriers or N QAM symbols zn, N-log2(K) bits of the binary key stream are consumed. The index n in {kn} must therefore count over many such OFDM symbols.
The optimum choice of the K levels of φn (assigned equidistantly between 0 and 2π), depends on mn, or more precisely on the constellation points of the 2m-QAM symbols zn. For example, the regular 22=4 point constellation would be congruently rotated with K=22=4 levels of φn, (namely 0, π/2, π, 3π/2) hence K=4 should be sufficient to encrypt these QAM symbols zn. On the other hand, a higher value of K may be preferable in order to obstruct any open loop carrier synchronization attempted by an eavesdropper.
A channel transfer function hn represents a possible distortion of the received signal ynat the n-th sub-carrier frequency by the propagation characteristics of the channel. Thus a receiver estimate {circumflex over (v)}n of the cipher text sequence is approximated by
yn=hn·{circumflex over (v)}n,
and the distortion is corrected for in equalizer 30, i.e. the combined operation
equalizes and decrypts the QAM symbol {circumflex over (z)}n which can then be fed to the QAM de-mapper 22 to finally recover the transmitted data bits. This requires that the receiver knows the encryption/decryption key and also the precise clocking information.
Synchronization to obtain this clock information and estimation of the channel transfer function hn are the two crucial ancillary tasks of the receiver. As depicted in
In summary, the present invention is concerned with a method to encrypt OFDM modulation, by multiplying its underlying QAM symbols by a complex-valued generalized key stream sequence. Performing encryption on the physical layer ensures that all services and applications running over the OFDM modem will be protected against eavesdropping. It is also proposed to include in the encryption any training symbols used for synchronization and channel estimation. Only the legitimate receiver knowing the encryption key is hence able to synchronize and correctly demodulate the received signal, whereas attackers will not even be able to acquire the encrypted signal.
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