Deployable passive broadband aircraft tracking

Abstract

In a first, preferred embodiment of the present invention, integrated tracking is provided using passive broadband. The invention takes the system for deployable passive broadband detection and extends it by incorporating the capability to decode position for ADS-B, SSR multilateration, and broadband multilateration. In a second embodiment, validation of a self-reported position is provided. The invention takes the system for deployable passive broadband detection and extends it by incorporating the capability to decode self-reported position for ADS-B, and compare it to line of calculated position, or line of precision, derived from multilateration techniques applied to various signals received from the aircraft. In a third embodiment, validation of a self-reported ADS-B position using independent surveillance is provided by the system.

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to the field of aircraft and ground vehicle tracking and surveillance. In particular, the present invention is directed towards techniques for using multilateration and bilateration as a backup and validation for ADS-B aircraft tracking and as a portable or deployable tracking system for military and security purposes.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Despite ongoing concerns about security, demand for air travel is forecast to continue at an extraordinary rate in both mature and developing markets. In the USA, the NGATS program forecasts that passenger numbers will increase by up to 140% over the next 20 years with aircraft movements increasing up to three-fold, depending on the mix of small and larger aircraft. See, e.g., Next Generation Air Transport System Integrated Plan, JPDO, December 2004, incorporated herein by reference. In Europe, the SESAR Consortium predicts similar challenges, with the number of flights predicted to increase by 150% over the same period. See, e.g., SESAR Definition Phase Deliverable for Air Transport Framework—The Current Situation, SESAR Consortium 2006, incorporated herein by reference. In developing markets such as China, Asia-Pacific and South America the growth is expected to be even greater. See, e.g., Boeing Current Market Outlook 2006, incorporated herein by reference.

From an ATM perspective, the result will be around twice as many commercial aircraft travelling a more complex network of point-to-point and hub-and-spoke routes to an increasing number of airports. In turn, this will require reduced separation and flexible route planning, which will place significant pressure on improved performance from ATC systems and surveillance technologies.

There is general agreement that Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS-B) will play a significant role at the core of future civil aviation surveillance infrastructure and, following some years of pilot programs (including CAPSTONE in USA, the Bundaberg Trials in Australia, and CASCADE/CRISTAL in Europe) and discussions about standards and technologies, major ADS-B deployment programs are now in progress, including the Australian Upper Airspace Program and the FAA's NAS-Wide ADS-B Program.

ADS-B uses new on-board avionics subsystems which incorporate GNSS positioning systems (e.g., GPS or alternatives such as Europe's Galileo), an interface to flight management systems, and a transponder to broadcast aircraft position and supplementary information on a regular basis. This approach offers a number of benefits, especially when compared to traditional radar alternatives:

• • The ground infrastructure required to determine aircraft position is relatively cheap, consisting of radio receivers able to detect and decode the messages within line-of-sight of the transmitting aircraft and up to 250 nm distant from the aircraft.
  • The resulting data is generally extremely accurate (potentially within tens of meters), of high integrity, and with an update rate far exceeding that obtained from radar.
  • ADS-B architecture is two-way, which allows aircraft to receive position and other information directly from other aircraft or from ground based (TIS-B and FIS-B) infrastructure, to provide rich cockpit information and enable new cockpit-based applications.

These benefits present an overwhelmingly compelling case for ADS-B deployment, however there are a number of challenges, which must be addressed for ADS-B to be adopted as a primary or sole surveillance solution in order that the benefits can be completely realized.

Firstly, ADS-B requires new equipment on-board each aircraft and, while incremental costs of ADS-B equipage for new aircraft is small, the costs to retrofit existing aircraft, including certification costs and the opportunity costs of the associated operational downtime, are significant. As a result, even with new rules and mandates being introduced, it will be many years until equipage levels are such that ADS-B can be used as a platform for consistent and universal aircraft separation. See, e.g., Paper to RTCA Spring Forum—Mitre Corporation, May 2005, incorporated herein by reference. The FAA ADS-B program assumes that, even with rulemaking support, it will be 2020 until all large commercial aircraft are equipped.

Secondly, the transition from radar to ADS-B will need to address issues of data integrity and validation before ANSP's can undertake safety-critical separation services using position information derived no longer from their own radar infrastructure but from information provided directly from the aircraft avionics. It seems likely that, even if the safety case supports ADS-B-only surveillance, issues of governance and responsibility will require ANSP's to establish an independent means of backup and validation for ADS-B and the associated business case will be significantly impacted if this backup system must rely only on ongoing use of radar infrastructure. Encrypting ADS-B has been proposed as a means to validate ADS-B, but this technique does not support backup surveillance. See, e.g., Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)—Sensis, October 2006, incorporated herein by reference.

Thirdly, surveillance based on the broadcast of self-reported aircraft position raises security issues, both in terms of the ease with which aircraft can be tracked from the ground by almost anyone, using low-cost and readily available ADS-B decoding units, and also by the potential for an aircraft to knowingly mislead a surveillance system by spoofing its position information and appearing to be in a position other than the position at which it is actually located. In May 2006, the potential vulnerabilities to spoofing were described in a letter from the Australian Civil Aviation Authority's former Chairman to the Australian Government's Minister for Transport and Regional Services, which highlighted the potential for malicious or capricious actions, stating that “any electronics boffin, using a second-hand or ‘borrowed’ transponder from a small GA aircraft connected to a $5 data lead, a $5 aerial and a laptop computer, can create ten, twenty or even fifty false aircraft on an air traffic controller's screen.” See: Open letter from Mr Dick Smith to Australian Minister for Transport and Regional Services—May 2006 6, incorporated herein by reference

Finally, the introduction of ADS-B surveillance will require the finalization and global adoption of a significant new body of associated standards for both aircraft and ground domains. See, e.g., Reference Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for ADS-B-NRA Application—ED 126 Draft. EUROCAE, August 2006, incorporated herein by reference.

It can be argued that multilateration techniques can be purposefully, economically, and effectively integrated into an ADS-B surveillance infrastructure to mitigate these issues and to enable a faster, more comprehensive, and more cost-effective ADS-B implementation.

In doing so, the term “Extended ADS” (ADS-X) is sometimes used to describe this integrated approach, as it avoids the traditional and, unhelpful tendency to compare ADS-B and multilateration techniques and the implication that we are somehow choosing between the two technologies.

Multilateration systems use triangulation techniques to determine the source of transponder emissions by analyzing the time difference of arrival (TDOA) of those signals at a network of receiving ground stations with three or four stations required to receive each signal in order for the central processor to determine a triangulation outcome.

These systems are well-proven around the world in Advanced Surface Movement and Ground Control Systems (A-SMGCS) applications in airports including Copenhagen, Prague, Madrid, London, Paris, Atlanta and St Louis and they have also been successfully deployed as ground-based height monitoring units to support RVSM implementation by verifying the performance of barometric altimeters in dense airspace.

A recent report for Eurocontrol on Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) concludes that “Where coverage exists a WAM system will generally outperform MSSR for accuracy” and, with respect to costs found that “The hardware costs of a WAM system are (very roughly) around 50% of those of an SSR system” and “The maintenance cost of WAM systems will be much lower than MSSR as there are no rotating mechanical parts. A 6 monthly maintenance check at each site to maintain ancillary equipment such as UPS systems may be required; otherwise there is very little to do.” See, Wide Area Multilateration, Report on EATMP TRS 131/04, Eurocontrol 2005, incorporated herein by reference.

As a result, multilateration is seen as a cost-effective and high performance solution for terminal area and en-route surveillance in countries as diverse as Taiwan, Mongolia, the Czech Republic and Australia.

Furthermore, the ground stations of all commercially proven multilateration systems are also full-featured, standards-compliant ADS-B ground stations, which means that such a system is able to not only receive and decode self-reported position information, but can also triangulate on the source of the message to derive an independent position report for the same aircraft. This presents a number of opportunities in addressing ADS-B implementation challenges.

Triangulation or multilateration systems using time difference of arrival (TDOA) processing are used to track aircraft in local, regional and wide areas. These systems generally need pulse transmissions from the aircraft, which have sufficiently fast rise times in order to make a consistent time reference on the signal.

Pulse transmission systems, having sufficiently fast rise times are generally higher frequency signals, L-band or above (generally higher than 900 MHz), with sufficient bandwidth to provide the fast rise time.

Signals with sufficient frequency and bandwidth include secondary surveillance radar systems (SSR), including Mode A, Mode C, Mode S, and ADS-B.

Companies fielding triangulation systems for SSR include Sensis Corporation and ERA Systems Corporation.

While SSR signals are used for multilateration on the 1090 MHz frequency, there are others that use TDOA processing of other aircraft signals on different frequencies.

One of these is the VERA-E system manufactured by ERA Systems Corporation, assignee of the present application, and illustrated in FIGS. 1 through 4. This system is used to track aircraft over wide areas using broadband methods. Essentially the broadband aspect is achieved by using a series of antennas and receiver systems interconnected as illustrated in FIG. 4. Each sub system handles a subset of frequencies in an overall range of 1 GHz to 20 GHz. The system has the following features and capabilities:

Covertness—electronic and physical

Exploitation of electronic warfare countermeasures

Long range of detection (radio horizon is main limitation)

Tracking and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) providing covert IFF capability

Excellent Tracking Accuracy

Coverage of both land and surface targets

Cost effective systems acquisition and life cycle cost.

FIG. 1 illustrates a deployable Broadband Receiver Unit Manufactured by ERA a.s. FIG. 2 is a close-up view of a VERA E Antenna. FIG. 3 shows a VERA E receiver unit shown on a transport for deployment. FIG. 4 illustrates VERA E architecture. Referring to FIG. 4, signals may be input from a plurality of antennas 405 comprising antennas 410, 415, 420, 430, and 425. Antenna 410 may comprise an FE SIF antenna whose input is fed to a SIF/TACAN (Selective Identification Feature/Tactical Air Navigation) receiver 445. The inputs from antennas 415, 420, 425, 430, and 435 are fed to radar band receivers 450 and 455.

The output of SIF/TACAN receiver 445 and the outputs of radar band receivers 450 and 455 are fed to a video switch and interface 460. The output of video switch and interface 460 and radar band receiver 450 is fed to the CPS system 485. Control and commands from the CPS system 490 are fed to datalink subsystem 465, which in turn comprises a plurality of data links 470, 475, and 480. The output of data link subsystem 465 in turn controls video switch and interface 460. Control and commands from CPS 490 also control radar band receivers 450 and 455 along with video switch interface 460 and SIF/TACAN receiver 445.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In a first, preferred embodiment of the present invention, integrated tracking is provided using passive broadband. The invention takes the system for deployable passive broadband detection and extends it by incorporating the capability to decode position for ADS-B, SSR multilateration, and broadband multilateration.

In this embodiment the aircraft transmits a signal, which is received at a minimum of three stations. The signals include all pulse and high bandwidth signals emanating from the aircraft including but not limited to UAT, DME, TACAN, SSR, Mode S, ADS-B, Pulse Radar, Weather Radar, Communications, and Military Radar.

It is assumed that ADS-B is transmitted by the aircraft and is received by at least one ground station. All ground stations receive all other transmissions be they UAT, DME, TACAN, SSR, Mode S, ADS-B, Pulse Radar, Weather Radar, Communications, or Military Radar.

The comparator compares the ADS-B reported position with a line of precision or a triangulated position from any high frequency signal emanating from the aircraft be it UAT, DME, TACAN, SSR, Mode S, ADS-B, Pulse Radar, Weather Radar, Communications, or Military Radar, and provides the following information to the user:

1) ADS-B self reported position

2) Validated position and identification based on transponder/SSR information

3) Validated position and identification, if available, from all other high frequency signals

4) Information about the validity and integrity of the data, especially the ADS-B self-reported position.

Therefore, the system is capable of tracking aircraft whether or not they have ADS-B, operating transponders, or other high frequency avionics devices.

In a second embodiment, validation of a self-reported position is provided. The invention takes the system for deployable passive broadband detection and extends it by incorporating the capability to decode self-reported position for ADS-B, and compare it to line of calculated position, or line of precision, derived from multilateration techniques applied to various signals received from the aircraft.

In this embodiment the aircraft 100 emits an ADS-B position report along with associated quality and integrity information (NIC/NAC/SIL) 110, 120 and this signal is received at one or more of the stations and is decoded and made available for onward processing to the ATC system 140.

Simultaneously, the same signal and/or other signals emitted by the aircraft are received at a number of stations and a position, or line of precision, is calculated using multilateration techniques. Equivalent measures of data quality and integrity are derived for this information based on the known geometry of the stations and the number of receiving stations, amongst other factors.

Data from the two sources is compared and the “Figure Of Merit” (FOM) for the ADS-B self-reported position is adjusted to reflect the additional information now available to assess the report validity. Optionally an alert may also be raised.

In a third embodiment, independent surveillance position determination and validation of a self-reported ADS-B position are provided for a target under surveillance. The invention uses passive range and passive bearing or Angle of Arrival measurement techniques to determine an independent surveillance position for targets under surveillance and compares the self-reported ADS-B position to the independent surveillance position.

In this third embodiment the aircraft emits an ADS-B position report along with associated quality and integrity information (NIC/NAC/SIL) and this signal is received at one or more of the receivers and is decoded and made available for onward processing to the ATC system.

Simultaneously, the same signal, and/or other signals emitted by the aircraft, are received at a one or more receivers and a independent surveillance position is calculated using passive range and Angle of Arrival measurement techniques. Equivalent measures of surveillance data quality and integrity are derived for independent surveillance position information based on the known geometry of the stations and the number of receiving stations, range error, and angle error, amongst other factors.

The self-reported ADS-B position and independent surveillance position are compared and the “Figure Of Merit” (FOM) for the self-reported ADS-B position is adjusted to reflect the additional information now available to assess the report validity. Optionally an alert may also be raised.

In this third embodiment, the system is implemented as a ground fixed system with one or more receivers or a mobile system with one receiver that is installed on an aircraft or ground vehicle. Vehicles are provided a means to independently determine position and validate ADS-B position reports transmitted by other vehicles.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows a deployable broadband receiver unit manufactured by ERA Systems Corporation.

FIG. 2 is a close-up of a VERA E antenna.

FIG. 3 shows a VERA E receiver unit on transport for deployment.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating VERA E architecture.

FIG. 5 is a graph indicating coverage of “SSR-visible” aircraft (i.e., Aircraft with operational transponders) in an ADS-X network, and how the network provides SSR-equivalent coverage independent of the speed of the ADS-B transition.

FIG. 6 is a map indicating en route coverage that might be expected from single ADS-B sensors located at four mid-west USA airports (Cincinnati, Louisville, Indianapolis and Columbus).

FIG. 7 is a map indicating ADS-X coverage for the same four sensors, with the wider ADS-B coverage area enhanced with a core area where an independent multilateration position could be derived from the same four sensors, in this case with no additional cost or infrastructure.

FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating an example of an ADS-B message received at two separate ADS-X ground stations and, while this is not sufficient to determine a 3-d position in space, it is, when combined with barometric altitude information, sufficient to determine a line of precision on which the aircraft must be located.

FIG. 9 is a block diagram of a first embodiment of the present invention, where the system for deployable passive broadband detection is extended by incorporating the capability to decode position for ADS-B, SSR multilateration, and broadband multilateration.

FIG. 10 is a block diagram of a second embodiment of the present invention, which takes the system for deployable passive broadband detection and extends it by incorporating the capability to decode self-reported position for ADS-B, and compare it to line of calculated position, or line of precision, derived from multilateration techniques applied to various signals received from the aircraft.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram of the third embodiment of the present invention, which shows a passive ranging and passive Angle of Arrival ground-based surveillance system and vehicle-based surveillance system that provides the capabilities to decode self-reported ADS-B position, determine independent surveillance position of an ADS-B target using passive ranging and passive Angle of Arrival measurement techniques, and validate self-reported ADS-B position using the independent surveillance position.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

As multilateration techniques can be applied to existing (Mode A, Mode C, Mode S) transponder signals, the network of ground stations is able to determine the position of aircraft without the need for new avionics. This allows ANSPs to deploy the next generation, low cost technologies without the need for a contentious early mandate for equipment retrofit while still potentially avoiding the need to replace SSR systems.

FIG. 5 is a graph indicating coverage of “SSR-visible” aircraft (i.e., aircraft with operational transponders) in an ADS-X network, and how the network provides SSR-equivalent coverage independent of the speed of the ADS-B transition. As illustrated in this graph, at the present time, aircraft with ADS-B equipment comprise a minority of aircraft in service, perhaps around 20%. Over the next 15 years, more and more aircraft will be provided with ADS-B equipment as illustrated in this projection. However, even 15 years from implementation, a significant minority (around 20%) are projected to not have ADS-B equipment installed, unless such equipment is mandated by the FAA or other government agency. Thus, relying upon ADS-B alone for aircraft tracking may not be safe, practical, or feasible. Multilateration provides a means of filling in these gaps by tracking non-ADS-B equipped aircraft.

The second ADS-B implementation challenge, i.e., the need for independent backup and validation of ADS-B self-reported position, is also addressed by the inclusion of multilateration capability in the ADS-B network, as each ADS-B position report is validated in real-time by TDOA triangulation. As an analogy, this is similar to independently comparing the return address shown at the top of a letter with the postmark on the envelope containing the message to assess the validity of that message.

The FAA, in an industry briefing, has both confirmed the need for a backup and validation system for ADS-B and has identified and short listed three candidate strategies to address this requirement. See, e.g., FAA Surveillance and Broadcast Services Industry Day 2—August 2006, incorporated herein by reference. The first candidate strategy relies on the continued use of a (reduced) SSR (Secondary Surveillance Radar) network, which is likely to have a significant impact on the economics of the overall program. The intent of ADS-B was to supplant or replace the aging SSR system presently in use. Maintaining the existing SSR system in tandem with ADS-B does not achieve any cost savings, and in fact, merely adds additional costs and complexity to the system.

The second and third strategies enumerated by the FAA are both based on the use of multilateration as the backup technique, with the two strategies differentiated by the inclusion of active interrogation for terminal areas in strategy three.

It is clear that the backup and validation system will not only mitigate the risk of accidentally erroneous self-reported position, but will also address the potential for deliberate spoofing of aircraft position, as the independently-derived multilateration solution will be extremely difficult to spoof without actually emitting a signal from the location in question. ADS-B relies upon position self-reporting, whereas multilateration indicates the actual position of a transmitter.

While there are obvious benefits for the inclusion of multilateration techniques in a next generation ADS-X surveillance solution, there are some challenges and implications to this approach.

This first such implication is that the need for several sensors to receive a signal implies that multilateration functionality requires more ground stations than ADS-B alone. In a simplistic example, a single ADS-B station could be conceived to cover a surveillance area at least equivalent to one secondary radar. A multilateration solution would require four or more stations to achieve the same outcome. This issue can become a significant economic driver if the availability and costs of suitable ground station sites is high and a very conservative approach is taken with the number of sensors. See, e.g., Wide area multilateration replacing en route radars: not for Australia—Greg Dunstone, Airservices Australia to ICAO ADS-B Task Force, New Delhi 2006, incorporated herein by reference.

While the need for additional ground stations is real, the costs may generally be only incremental to most ADS-B solutions and remain significantly below the equivalent costs for an SSR, and can be readily justified by the advantages described above.

The cost of ADS-X ground stations is low, even compared to ADS-B stations, as much of the processing is offloaded to central servers. In many applications suitable developed locations for ground stations can be found from existing aviation facilities (airports, navigation aid sites, communication sites, and the like) and from other suitable existing infrastructure such as mobile phone towers and other infrastructure. The low cost of ground stations allows significant levels of redundancy to be built into a network, which can increase the available selection of suitable sites as each site does not require extremely high levels of power and communications resilience.

Furthermore, any operational ADS-B solution would require redundant receiver configuration, which decreases the differential between the ADS-B and ADS-X sensor requirements. It may be possible, for certain applications, to design solutions where large ADS-B surveillance zones are enhanced by a core area, which incorporates multilateration backup and validation.

For example, FIG. 6 is a map illustrating the indicative en route coverage that might be expected from single ADS-B sensors located at four mid-west USA airports (Cincinnati 602, Louisville 605, Indianapolis 601, and Columbus 603). The circles shown in the map illustrate the potential coverage range of each ADS-B sensor. Circle 611 illustrates the potential coverage area for Indianapolis sensor 601. Circle 612 illustrates the potential coverage area for Cincinnati sensor 601. Circle 613 illustrates the potential coverage area for Columbus sensor 603. Circle 614 illustrates the potential coverage area for Louisville sensor 604. The solution is designed to have significant overlapping coverage to provide for a failure in one of the sensors or its associated infrastructure.

FIG. 7 is a map illustrating shows the ADS-X coverage area for the same four sensors 601, 602, 603, and 604. Where at least two circles overlap, it may be possible to track a line of precision for an aircraft. Where at least three circles overlap, it may be possible to determine aircraft position in three dimensions. The wider ADS-B coverage area enhanced with a core area 710 where an independent multilateration position could be derived from the same four sensors, in this case with no additional cost or infrastructure.

If ADS-X techniques are being used to assist in the transition to ADS-B by providing position information for aircraft without ADS-B avionics, a complete three or four sensor solution may be required for each point in the required surveillance area. However; when ADS-B equipage is high, the use of multilateration techniques may be restricted to validation of ADS-B self-reports and, in this case, it will be possible to use bi-lateration techniques to further reduce or eliminate the differential cost between ADS-B and ADS-X designs.

For example, in FIG. 8, the ADS-B message from aircraft 840 may be received at two separate ADS-X ground stations 810 and 830. While this may not be sufficient to determine a 3-D position in space, it is, when combined with barometric altitude information, sufficient to determine a line of precision 840 on which the aircraft must be located. In a dynamic situation, it is almost impossible for an inaccurate or spoofed ADS-B report to simultaneously maintain a valid position on the changing line of precision, therefore this technique can be used for ADS-B validation and aircraft tracking. Hybrid surveillance solutions can be designed which combine ADS-B, multilateration, bi-lateration and other techniques to provide a pragmatic and cost-effective approach to addressing ADS-B implementation issues.

Another challenge for multilateration as a backup for ADS-B is that wide area multilateration systems require extremely accurate synchronization of clock signals between the ground stations. This synchronization has generally been achieved using GPS satellite signals as time references. However, using GPS satellite signals creates a potential dependency and hence an unacceptable common mode of failure between the ADS-B and multilateration components of the ADS-X solution. Alternate methods of clock synchronization for the remote stations have been identified and can be used to offset this impact. See, e.g., Smith, A., et al, System Wide ADS-B Back-Up and Validation, 6th ICNS Conference and Workshop, Baltimore, May 2006, incorporated herein by reference.

Before multilateration can be used as a backup for ADS-B for advanced ATC functions such as separation, the required standards and safety cases must be developed for multilateration. Perhaps ironically, although multilateration is the less revolutionary of the two technologies (the timing of signal receipt from aircraft transponders is a similar technique, using the same avionics, as for today's SSRs), standards development for ADS-B is currently more advanced than it is for multilateration with proposed changes for ICAO Air Traffic Management procedures being circulated and performance and interoperability specifications for ADS-B infrastructure also in draft version. See, e.g., “Air Traffic Management”, ICAO, Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Document 4444, Fourteenth edition—proposal to update Amendment 4 to include ADS-B procedures in Chapter 8, incorporated herein by reference.

As a part of the FAA's ADS-B program, the FAA plans, through a series of simulations and flight test validations to analyze separation errors for ADS-B, and to seek separation standards approval for terminal and en route phases by 2009. This ongoing process has not prevented some authorities from implementing ADS-B based separation standards ahead of the formal standards process. For example, in Australia, ADS-B is already being used for 5 nm separation in the Bundaberg area as a result of a safety case based on Comparison to Monopulse SSR using ICAO Doc 9689 methodology. See, ADS-B Regulation—CASA Australia presentation to ICAO ADS-B Task Force, New Delhi, 2006, incorporated herein by reference.

The current interest in multilateration deployment, the absence of requirement for avionics changes, and the “radar-like” standards being established for ADS-B are all expected to result in an accelerated progress for multilateration standards in the short term. It is likely that some countries will, as with ADS-B, implement multilateration for separation in advance of these standards based on suitable safety case development.

FIG. 9 is block diagram illustrating a first embodiment of the present invention, providing integrated tracking using passive broadband. As illustrated in the embodiment of FIG. 9, the invention takes the system for deployable passive broadband detection and extends it by incorporating the capability to decode position for ADS-B, SSR multilateration, and broadband multilateration. In this embodiment, aircraft 100 transmits a signal, which is received at a minimum of three stations 140, 140, and 150. Antenna 150 may receive ADS-B signals and generate an ADS-B position signal as generated by aircraft 100. Antennas 140 may receive other signals but may not necessarily generate ADS-B position data. Signals 110, 120 may include all pulse and high bandwidth signals emanating from aircraft 100 including, but not limited to, UAT, DME, TACAN, SSR, Mode S, ADS-B, Pulse Radar, Weather Radar, Communications, and Military Radar.

In the embodiment of FIG. 9, it is assumed that ADS-B is transmitted by the aircraft 120 and is received by at least one ground station 150. All ground stations 140, 150 receive all other transmissions be they UAT, DME, TACAN, SSR, Mode S, ADS-B, Pulse Radar, Weather Radar, Communications, or Military Radar. Comparator 180 compares the ADS-B reported position from antenna 150 with a line of precision or a triangulated position determined from all antennas 140, 140, and 150 based on any high frequency signal emanating from the aircraft be it UAT, DME, TACAN, SSR, Mode S, ADS-B, Pulse Radar, Weather Radar, Communications, or Military Radar, and provides the following information to the user 200:

1) ADS-B self reported position

2) Validated position and identification based on transponder/SSR information

3) Validated position and identification, if available, from all other high frequency signals

4) Information about the validity and integrity of the data, especially the ADS-B self-reported position.

The embodiment of FIG. 9 is thus capable of tracking aircraft whether or not they have ADS-B, operating transponders, or other high frequency avionics devices.

FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating a second embodiment of the present invention, providing validation of a self-reported position. In this embodiment of the present invention takes the system for deployable passive broadband detection and extends it by incorporating the capability to decode self-reported position for ADS-B, and compare it to line of calculated position, or line of precision, derived from multilateration techniques applied to various signals received from the aircraft.

Referring to FIG. 10, aircraft 1000 emits an ADS-B position report 1010 along with associated quality and integrity information (NIC/NAC/SIL) 1020, as well transponder and other aircraft signals 1030. These signals 1010, 1020, and 1030 are received at one or more of the stations 1035 and is decoded and made available for onward processing to the ATC system 1090.

Simultaneously, the same signal, and/or other signals emitted by the aircraft 1010, 1020, and 1030, are received at a number of stations and a position, or line of precision, is calculated using multilateration techniques by TDOA processor 1070, as previously outlined. Equivalent measures of data quality and integrity are derived for this information based on the known geometry of the stations and the number of receiving stations, amongst other factors.

Data from the two sources is compared in comparator 1080 in ADS-X server 1040 and the “Figure Of Merit” (FOM) for the ADS-B self-reported position is adjusted to reflect the additional information now available to assess the report validity 1050, 1055. Optionally an alert 1060 may also be raised. The FOM may comprise a numerical value indicating the relative accuracy of the self-reported aircraft position versus the determined position from multilateration. This FOM may be adjusted based upon the accuracy of the multilateration equipment and other values. A high FOM indicates a high level of confidence in the self-reported position value. A low FOM indicates a low level of confidence in the self-reported position value.

This FOM may be compared to a threshold value, which may be adjusted depending upon a number of circumstances, to prevent false alarms from being generated, and also to prevent false negatives. If the FOM is below a predetermined threshold value, an alarm may be sounded to indicate to an operator that the authenticity of the aircraft in question should be investigated. The threshold may be set higher, for example, near sensitive areas (major cities, military bases) or may be lowered depending upon the accuracy of the self-reported position equipment on the aircraft.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram of the third embodiment of the present invention, which shows a passive ranging and passive Angle of Arrival ground-based surveillance system and vehicle-based surveillance system that provides the capabilities to decode self-reported ADS-B position, determine independent surveillance position of an ADS-B target using passive ranging and passive Angle of Arrival measurement techniques, and validate self-reported ADS-B position using the independent surveillance position.

As shown in the third embodiment illustrated in FIG. 11, the aircraft [340] broadcasts an ADS-B report signal [350] that is received by another airborne aircraft [330] and ground based direction finding antennas [360]. The receivers [365] decode and measure the Angle of Arrival and Time of Arrival of the ADS-B report signal [350]. The Angle of Arrival, Time of Arrival, decoded data, including altitude and identification, are sent by the receiver [365] to the surveillance processor [300]. The surveillance processor [300] decodes the ADS-B position signal to determine self-reported ADS-B position.

Surveillance processor 300 performs independent surveillance target position determination:

• • 1. Determines the time slot of ADS-B signal transmission and computes corresponding Time of ADS-B Transmission based on Minimum Operation Performance Standards
  • 2. Computes the range corresponding to the time difference between the Time of ADS-B Transmission and Time of Arrival.
  • 3. Computes an independent surveillance target position with respect to each receiver 365 using the passive range and passive Angle of Arrival data.
  • 4. Performs surveillance data fusion of independent surveillance target position data for all receivers 365 when more than one receiver 365 is used to compute independent surveillance target position.

Surveillance processor 300 performs self-reported ADS-B position validation by comparing the independent surveillance target position to the decoded self-reported ADS-B position for aircraft 340 and the “Figure Of Merit” (FOM) for the self-reported ADS-B position is adjusted to reflect the additional independent surveillance information now available to assess the report validity. Other aircraft 330 receiving the ADS-B report signal 350 and that are equipped with passive ranging and Angle of Arrival measurement perform the same position determination and validation that is performed by the ground elements 360, 365, 300.

While the preferred embodiment and various alternative embodiments of the invention have been disclosed and described in detail herein, it may be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes in form and detail may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope thereof.

Claims

1. A system for validating aircraft self-reported position, comprising: a plurality of antennas for receiving radio signals from an aircraft, including an aircraft self-reported position;a processor, coupled to the plurality of antennas, for determining aircraft position through time difference of arrival processing of the signals from the aircraft to produce a determined aircraft position; anda comparator, coupled to the processor, for comparing the determined aircraft position with the aircraft self-reported position and determining whether the self-reported position is within a predetermined range of the determined position.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the radio signals from the aircraft comprise high frequency radio signals emanating from the aircraft.

3. The system of claim 2, wherein the high frequency radio signals comprise one or more of UAT, DME, TACAN, SSR, Mode S, ADS-B, Pulse Radar, Weather Radar, Communications, Military Radar or a pulse emitter.

4. The system of claim 1, wherein the comparator generates a (FOM) indicating a level of confidence in the aircraft self-reported position.

5. The system of claim 1, further comprising: an alarm, coupled to the comparator, for generating an alarm signal if the FOM is below a predetermined threshold value.

6. The system of claim 1 wherein the processor determines at least one line of precision based upon signals received from at least two of the plurality of antennas.

7. The system of claim 6, wherein the comparator compares the line of precision to the aircraft self-reported position and generates an alert if the aircraft self-reported position is not within a predetermined range of the line of precision.