The present invention relates to a system and method to detect failure to de-energize ON/OFF valve actuators, especially around ESD/PSD/BD valve failure to de-energize without interfering/degrading the safety integrity of the Shutdown Valve, (SDV) defined as a Final Control Element in the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) (IEC61508, IEC 6151 or the PSA).
A Shutdown Valve, SDV (also referred to as Process Shutdown Valve (PSDV) or Emergency Shutdown Valve (ESV) or Emergency Shut Down Valve (ESDV)) is an actuated ON/OFF valve designed to stop the flow of a hazardous fluid upon the detection of a dangerous event. SDVs are energized to open in normal operation and de-energized close when required by the process. Blow Down Valves (BDV) are actuated ON/OFF valves designed to depressurize a process system in case of a detected hazardous situation on the plant. BDV's are energized shut in normal operations and de-energize to open when a process blow-down is required.
SDV's and BDV's are examples of general ON/OFF valves used in a variety of industrial application to safeguard process equipment for exposure of internal pressures exceeding the equipment design pressure, among others the oil and gas industry.
To simplify the description of this invention ON/OFF valve, energized in normal operation and de-energized to safeguard the process, are used in the following, but the description is equally valid for SDV's and BDV's.
In the process industry the Process Control System (PCS) will ensure stable production and processing during normal operation. The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) will respond in case of a failure of the PCS such as instrument faults, or in case of a hazardous event not managed by the PCS such as an external equipment faults, gas leaks, fires etc.
The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) normally consist of several independent systems, the Process ShutDown (PSD) system, and the Emergency ShutDown (ESD) system including the Fire &Gas (F&G) system.
For both technical and financial reasons, an SDV can be activated by both ESD and PSD independent of each other, and to allow a graceful start-up of the process and for the purpose of system synchronization, the Process Control System (PCS) is also interfaced to the SIS logic systems and the activation of SDVs.
All of the international safety regulations (PSA regulations, IEC 61508/61511 and ISO 10148) include requirements related to independence between systems comprising the SIS, i.e. ESD, PSD and PCS. Such requirements are introduced as a defence against making several barriers vulnerable to one common event or cause, and to avoid negative effects from one function onto another.
IEC 61508 classifies the frequencies of demands of the SIS into three different demand modes. Low-demand which would occur less than once per year, high-demand occur more than once per year and continuous-mode are always present.
The safety integrity of the SIS is the probability to satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period.
SDV's are Final Control Elements in the SIS to manage functional safety to the process, or the Equipment Under Control (EUC) to protect people, environment, and the economical investments against possible harm, upon the detection of a hazardous event.
However, for some applications, for example when the pneumatic or hydraulic actuated SDV is the Final Control Element in the EUC, a normally used configuration is to operate the SDV actuator from independent solenoid valves controlled by the ESD and the PSD system in the SIS. In some applications a third solenoid valve controlled by the DCS system is connected to the mentioned SDV's.
For the process industry the low-demand mode of the SIS means that a failed state is not hazardous unless a demand occurs. By nature of the faults some may remain hidden until a demand occurs, at which time the SIS will not be able to execute the safeguarding action on the EUC. These faults are defined as Dangerous Undetected (DU) faults. DU faults can be detected by proof tests. A shutdown test will reveal if SDVs are closing or not. However, when both ESD, PSD and DCS are energizing individual solenoid valves to supply fluid (air/hydraulic) to on the SDV actuator, a simple shutdown test of the SDV will not reveal which solenoid valve have failed, since all systems will act on a general shutdown. A Dangerous Undetected fault in any individual solenoid valve connected to the ESD system or the PSD system will jeopardize the safety function of that system, and therefore also the overall safety of the EUC.
To solve the above-mentioned problems and to satisfy the above-mentioned need, in accordance with the present invention it is provided a detector system to detect or determine at least a solenoid valve failure to de-energize the ON/OFF valve actuator, the specialty of the detector system is that it comprises
These objectives are achieved with the method and system of the present invention as set forth in the appended claims.
The invention will now be described in more detail and with reference to the appended drawings, in which:
At least one embodiment of the present invention is described below about operation of ON/OFF valves with pneumatic or hydraulic activation system within an oil and gas production plant. However, it should be apparent to those skilled in the art and guided by the teaching herein that the present invention is likewise applicable to any Emergency ShutDown Valves (ESDV's) with either pneumatic or hydraulic activation system and any, Blow Down Valves (BDV's) in any industrial facility that may employ SDV's, ESDV's or BDV's.
A non-exhaustive listing of possible industrial facilities that employ ON/OFF valves, SDV's, ESDV's or BDV's and have a need to monitor such valves includes power generation plants, chemical facilities and electrical facilities. Those skilled in the art will further recognize that the teachings herein are suited to other applications in addition to industrial settings such as for example military, commercial and residential applications.
Referring to the drawings
Referring to
For the purpose of describing one embodiment of the invention illustrated schematically in
When all solenoid valve SOV1, SOV2 and SOV3 are energized the fluid line 7 pressurizes valve actuator 4 to keep the VI flow controlling element in open position, but if one of the solenoid valve SOV1, SOV2 or SOV3 are de-energized the valve actuator 4 is de-energized and VI flow controlling element goes to closed position, and where an actuator energized/deenergized detector which may be pressure sensor AP8 monitor the said actuator state.
The solenoid valves SOV1, SOV2 and SOV3 are equipped with solenoid energizing detectors which may be current detectors CD1, CD2 and CD3 which will detect when any of the solenoids SO1, SO2 and SO3 are magnetized or not to confirm that the said solenoid valves are energized or not, and solenoid valve deenergizing detectors which may be fluid flow detectors/valve vent detectors VENT1, VENT2 and VENT3, which will detect if any of the solenoid valve SOV1, SOV2 or SOV3 have changed from energized to de-energized state.
Referring to drawing
Where any of CD1, CD2 or CD3 current detector will generate a signal to trigger the microcontroller 51 to wake up from sleep mode when the current in any solenoid is turned on or off.
One function of the microcontroller 51 is to store defined threshold values for the said hardwired sensors, including pressure, current and flow.
Referring to
Similarly, all solenoid valves which are de-energized and vented according to design will be logged together with AP8 low pressure to indicate that the VI have closed will be logged 140 and the microcontroller 51 will go back to sleep 141.
An important element of the present invention is that the microcontroller 51 will store the relationship between system A and SOV1, system B and SOV2 and system C and SOV3 and record and store sequences of low or high pressure of AP8, associated with changes in solenoid valve SOV1, SOV2 and SOV3 open or closed states, deducted from detected above or below set threshold values for solenoid currents CD1, CD2 or CD3 and solenoid valve vent flow VENT1, VENT2 and VENT3 and compare with the correct combination of said pressure and valve states according to table in
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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20210616 | May 2021 | NO | national |
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind |
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PCT/NO2022/050109 | 5/16/2022 | WO |