Many physical network servers are designed to act as virtual servers. A virtual server is one that hosts a number of virtual machines. A virtual machine is a separate isolated guest operating system installation that operates within the virtual server operating system. Virtualization of the guest operating system may be done through either hardware virtualization, software emulation, or sometimes a combination of both. Computing entities that interact with a virtual machine do so as if the virtual machine were a physical computing system.
There are many advantages to using virtual machines. Most notably, a server system can run multiple virtual systems, each operating within isolation of each other. The virtual server can also provide different instruction set architectures to different virtual machines. Additionally, a virtual system may be moved to different physical servers, thus allowing greater mobility of a system.
In many cases, an entity that controls a virtual server system may be different than the entity or entities that control the multiple virtual systems that run on the virtual server. For example, the owner of a virtual system may enter into a business arrangement that allows the virtual system to run on the virtual server. This can often result in forced sharing of sensitive information. Specifically, the owner of the virtual system has to have access to the virtual system in order to allow that virtual system to communicate over a network. Moreover, the administrative effort that is needed to configure the virtual systems for operation over the network may be relatively burdensome.
The accompanying drawings illustrate various examples of the principles described herein and are a part of the specification. The drawings are merely examples and do not limit the scope of the claims.
Throughout the drawings, identical reference numbers designate similar, but not necessarily identical, elements.
As mentioned above, an entity that controls a virtual server system may be different than the entity or entities that control the multiple virtual systems that run on the virtual server. For example, the owner of a virtual system may enter into a business arrangement that allows the virtual system to run on the virtual server. This can often result in forced sharing of sensitive information. Specifically, the owner of the virtual system has to have access to the virtual system in order to allow that virtual system to communicate over a network. Moreover, the administrative effort that is needed to configure the virtual systems for operation over the network may be relatively burdensome.
Typically, when a new virtual system is first placed onto a virtual server, the virtual system has to be authenticated on the network in order to be able to send and receive data over the network. This authentication may be done through a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) identifier (VID) that is tagged onto packets transmitted from that virtual system. The VID identifies a specific VLAN on which the virtual system is authorized to operate. If the packet contains the appropriate VID, then the network device connected to the virtual server can forward the traffic accordingly. This, however, relies on a specific configuration of the network device to handle the VLAN to which the virtual system belongs.
In light of this and other issues, the present specification discloses methods and system for dynamic network provisioning that allows for more isolation between the operator of the virtual server and the operator of the virtual systems that run on that server. According to certain illustrative examples, the virtual server is designed to perform network authentication on behalf of the virtual systems that it is hosting.
Network authentication is performed through an authentication server such as a Remote Access Dial-in User Service (RADIUS) server. Using such authentication, a RADIUS networking protocol is used to send data from the virtual system to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server is preconfigured to recognize the virtual system as being authorized to operate on the network. The RADIUS server then sends provisioning information back to the network device connected to the virtual system running the recently authenticated virtual machine. The provisioning information is used to configure the port on the network device that connects to the virtual server. With the port configured, the virtual machine can operate securely on the network according to the access granted by the provisioning information.
The RADIUS server is designed to recognize packets by the source address attached to the data packet containing the request for authorization. This address is a physical address such as a Media Access Control (MAC) address. As virtual machines are designed to present themselves as physical devices, data packets from a specific virtual machine are tagged with the MAC address of that virtual machine.
According to certain illustrative examples, the virtual server is designed to perform network authentication on behalf of a hosted virtual system by impersonating the physical address of that virtual system. Specifically, as the virtual system is aware of the physical address of its hosted virtual systems, it can use that physical address to send a request to the authentication server. This request will indicate as the physical address of the virtual system to be authenticated as the source. The authentication server will then send the provisioning information to the network device connected to the virtual system. With the port properly configured, the virtual system can send and receive data packets on behalf of the authenticated virtual machine by using the physical address of that virtual machine.
Through use of methods and systems embodying principles described herein, less administrative effort may be employed to set up virtual systems on new or different virtual servers. Virtual systems may be transferred between different virtual servers with less effort. Moreover, more isolation between the virtual systems and the virtual server may be achieved.
In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present systems and methods. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the present apparatus, systems and methods may be practiced without these specific details. Reference in the specification to “an example” or similar language means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with that example is included as described, but may not be included in other examples.
Referring now to the figures,
There are many types of memory available. Some types of memory, such as solid state drives, are designed for storage. These types of memory typically have large storage volume but relatively slow performance. Other types of memory, such as those used for Random Access Memory (RAM), are optimized for speed and are often referred to as “working memory.” The various forms of memory may store information in the form of software (104) and data (106). Throughout this specification and the appended claims, the term software refers to any type of machine readable instructions.
The virtual server system (100) also includes a processor (108) for executing the software (104) and using or updating the data (106) stored in memory (102). The software (104) may include an operating system. An operating system allows other applications to interact properly with the hardware of the physical computing system. Such other applications may include virtual system management software (112). Virtual system management software is used to manage and run multiple virtual systems on the server system (100). Such virtual system management software is sometimes referred to as a hypervisor.
A network interface (110) is used to connect the virtual server system (100) to a network. This connection may be done through a physical connection such as an ethernet cable, coaxial cable, or fiber optic cable. Alternatively, the network interface (110) may communicate with the network wirelessly. The virtual system management software (112) allows each of the virtual systems running on the server system (100) to use the network interface (110) to access the network.
As mentioned above, a hypervisor (204) is used to manage multiple virtual systems (206) running on the same physical computing system (202). The hypervisor (204) presents the virtual systems (206) with a virtual operating platform and manages execution of the virtual operating systems of the virtual systems (206) on the physical computing system (202).
The hypervisor (204) is designed to treat each of the different operating systems of the virtual systems separately. Thus, different virtual systems can run completely independent of the other virtual systems. This isolation is useful, especially in cases where the different virtual systems are operated by different entities. For example, it may be the case that virtual system 1 (206-1) and virtual system 2 (206-2) are operated by a first entity. Virtual system 3 (206-3) may be operated by a second entity. Those entities may be running secure programs and do not want their programs mixed with other entities.
The 802.1X protocol is set up so that when a device first connects to a particular physical port of a network device (306), standard traffic is not allowed for that device. Rather, a special type of traffic used for authentication is used. The recently connected device sends a request for authentication to an authentication server (310) such as a RADIUS server. After being authenticated and authorized, the authentication server (310) sends provisioning information to the network device (306) to which the device was recently connected. The network device then configures the port that is physically connected to the authenticated device so that that port will route network traffic from that device as normal.
According to certain illustrative examples, the virtual server system (302) is configured to perform this authentication process on behalf of the virtual system (304). Presumably, the virtual server system itself has already been authenticated and thus allowed access to the network (308). Thus, when the virtual server system (302) sends network traffic to the network, the packets associated with that traffic will be tagged with the physical address of the virtual server system. To authenticate one of the virtual systems, the virtual server system sends a request to the authentication server using the 802.1X protocol. However, instead of using its own physical address to tag the data packets associated with the request, the virtual server system tags the appropriate packets with the physical address of the virtual system to be authenticated. This process is sometimes referred to as “spoofing”. The virtual server system effectively impersonates the physical address of the virtual system which is being authorized.
Using such a technique, the authentication server (310) receives the authentication request from the virtual server system (302). However, because the packets associated with the request have been tagged with the physical address of one of the virtual systems (304), the authentication believes it is receiving the request from the virtual system (304) itself. The authentication server then checks to see if that device is authorized to operate on the network. If so, then the authentication server sends the appropriate provisioning information to the network device (306) connected to the virtual server system. This network device (306) is often referred to as the neighbor network device (306).
The provisioning information sent by the authentication server (310) informs the neighbor network device (306) how to configure the port connected to the virtual server system (302). The provisioning information may include policy information such as VIDs that should be assigned to traffic from that port with a specific physical address. The provisioning information may also include other information such as rate limiting information or Class of Server (CoS) information.
After the network device has been properly configured, any traffic with the physical address of an authenticated system that is received on the configured port will be allowed to be routed as normal. Thus, even though the virtual server system (302) performed the authentication, the virtual system (304) itself is subsequently allowed to operate as normal over the network. The virtual server system (302) can perform this authentication on behalf of each virtual system (304) it is hosting.
According to certain illustrative examples, a virtual system (404) is transferred from a first virtual server system (402-1) to a second virtual server system (402-2). The first virtual server system (402-1) first logs the virtual system (404) off. Thus, the neighbor network device (406-1) connected to the first virtual server system (406-1) will no longer route traffic with the physical address of the virtual system (404).
When the virtual system (404) is loaded to the second virtual server system (402-2), that virtual server system (402-2) will perform authentication on behalf of the virtual system (404) as described above. Because the provisioning for the virtual system is done dynamically by the switch, the virtual server system administrator has a reduced administrative load.
In sum, through use of methods and systems embodying principles described herein, less administrative effort may be employed to set up virtual systems on new or different virtual servers. Virtual systems may be transferred between different virtual servers with less effort. Moreover, more isolation between the virtual systems and the virtual server may be achieved.
The preceding description has been presented only to illustrate and describe examples of the principles described. This description is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit these principles to any precise form disclosed. Many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teaching.
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