The present invention relates generally to digital communications, and specifically to methods and systems for secure distribution of digital information.
In secret sharing schemes, a secret (such as a cryptographic key) is shared among a group of participants, each of whom is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can foe reconstructed only when a sufficient. number of secret-shares are combined together, while individual shares are of no use on their own.
A method for secret sharing based on polynomials, for example, was described by Shamir in “How to Share a Secret,” Communications of the ACM 22:11 (1979), pages 612-613. According to this method, a secret S is divided into n parts, which are chosen in such a way that any subset containing k of the parts can be used to reconstruct the secret. Any suitable values of n and k≦n may be chosen, and the secret sharing scheme is designed accordingly.
Specifically, if S is an element of a finite field F, the scheme may foe based on a polynomial, f(x) with random coefficients ; a1, . . . , ak−1, in F, of the form: f(x)=a0+a1x+a2x2+a3x3+. . . +ak-1xk-1, with a0=S.
The n secret-shares in this case have the form (i,f(i)), i.e., values of the polynomial f computed for n different known elements i of F, If k of these secret-shares are known, they can be used to find the coefficients of the polynomial by interpolation, and thus to reconstruct the secret value of a0. This scheme of secret sharing has been shown to be secure, in the sense that reconstructing the secret using less than k shares is, in general, computationally infeasible.
Other methods of secret sharing are also known in the art. For example, U.S. Patent Application Publication 2010/0217978 describes a method and system for distributing a secret to a plurality of computing systems. The method chooses n coprime random bit strings in any one of various general rings as moduli, the general rings including one or more non-integer rings. The secret is then embedded in a bit string that is at least one bit longer than the product of any k−1 moduli and at least one bit shorter than the product of any k moduli. Each share includes one of the moduli and a corresponding remainder.
As another example, U.S. Pat. No. 5,764,767 describes a method for reconstructing a secret, over a public communication channel, using a perfect t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme. The scheme privately delivers n secret shares of the secret along with n keys to n participants that are interlinked by the channel. The scheme has a secret reconstructing procedure, executed by selected recipient participants, for reconstructing the secret by utilizing the secret share of the recipient participant and 1-1 secret shares of the other participants.
The Fiat-Shamir identification scheme is a type of parallel zero-knowledge proof that allows a first party to prove to a second party that the first party possesses secret information without revealing to the second party what that secret information is. It was described by Feige, Fiat and Shamir in “Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Identity,” Journal of Cryptology 1:2 (1988).
Broadcast encryption addresses the problem of encrypting broadcast content in such a way that only qualified users will be able to decrypt it. Some schemes for this purpose use an array of keys that are arranged in a binary tree, as described., for example, in Advance Access Content System (AACS): Introduction and Common Cryptographic Elements Book (Revision 0.951, 2009), as well as in other books in the AACS aeries, which are distributed toy AACS LA LLC and are available at www.aacsia.com.
Embodiments of the present invention that are described hereinbelow provide methods, systems and software for secure distribution of information using secret sharing.
There is therefore provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a method for distributing information, which includes distributing an item of encrypted information to a plurality of clients. Respective key-shares axe distributed to the clients, such that each client will require a key-share that has been distributed to at least one other client in order to reconstruct a key for decrypting the encrypted information. Upon receiving from a first client a report that a second client requested and received a respective one of the key-shares from the first client, a server makes a record, responsively to the report, of a delivery of the item to the second client.
In a disclosed embodiment, distributing the key-shares includes generating and distributing respective secret-shares to the clients, such that a predetermined number of no less than two of the secret-shares are required in order to reconstruct a key to decrypt the encrypted information.
In another embodiment, distributing the key-shares includes generating a binary tree, such that the key-shares are associated with respective ancestor nodes in the tree, and each client has a respective client key associated with a respective leaf of the tree, which is derivable from the ancestor nodes by a predetermined one-way function. The key-share distributed to each client is not associated with an ancestor node of the respective leaf that is associated with the respective client key of the client. The item may he encrypted using a content key, and the method may include, for each client encrypting the content key for the client using the respective client key, and conveying the encrypted content key to the client.
In some embodiments, receiving the report includes receiving a message from the first client over a communication network, indicating that the respective one of the key-shares was requested and transmitted to the second client while the first client was disconnected from the communication network. Distributing the item may include pushing the item to the clients while the clients are connected to the communication network.
Making the record may include verifying that the second client also reported that the item was delivered to the second client, additionally ox alternatively, the method may include providing an incentive to the first client for providing the report.
There is also provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a method for processing information, which, includes receiving at a first client an item of encrypted information distributed to a plurality of clients. The first client receives a given key-share from, among multiple, respective key shares distributed to the clients, such that each client requires a key-share that has been distributed to at least one other client in order to reconstruct a key for decrypting the encrypted information. Upon receiving at the first client a request from a second client to convey the first key-share from the first client to the second client, the first client conveys the given key-share, responsively to the request, to the second client and reports to a server that the given key-share has been conveyed to the second client.
In some embodiments, reporting to the server includes transmitting a message from the first client to the server over a wide-area communication network, and conveying the first key-share includes transmitting the given key-share from the first client to the second client over a local communication link, independent of she wide-area communication network, between the first and second clients. In one embodiment, transmitting the given key-share includes communicating over the local communication link while at least the first client is disconnected from the wide-area communication network, and transmitting the message includes establishing communications between the first client and the server after the given key-share has been transmitted to the second client. Typically, the item is received at the clients over the wide-area communication network while the clients are connected to the wide-area network, prior to transmitting the first key share to the second client.
In a disclosed embodiment, receiving the request includes receiving at the first client an authenticated identification of the second, client, which is used by the first client in reporting to the server. Additionally or alternatively, conveying the given key-share may include exchanging the given key-share for another key-share conveyed from the second client to the first client.
There is additionally provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, apparatus for distributing information, including a communication interface, which is configured to be coupled to a communication network so as to distribute, over the network, an item of encrypted information to a plurality of clients and to distribute over the network respective key-shares to the clients, such that each client will require a key-share that has been distributed to at least one other client in order to reconstruct a key for decrypting the encrypted information. A processor is configured to receive over the communication network from a first client a report that a second client requested and received a respective one of the key-shares from the first client, and to snaking a record of a delivery of the item to the second client responsively to the report.
There is farther provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, apparatus configured to operate as a first client. The apparatus includes a communication interface, which is configured to receive an item of encrypted information distributed over a network to a plurality of clients and to receive a given key-share from among multiple, respective key shares distributed to the clients, such that each client requires a key-share that has been distributed to at least one other client in order to reconstruct a key for decrypting the encrypted information, A processor is configured to receive a request from a second client to convey the given key-share to the second client and responsively to the request, to convey the given key-share to the second client and to report to a server that the given key-share has been conveyed to the second client.
There is moreover provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a system for distributing information, including a plurality of clients, configured to communication over a communication network, including at least first end second clients. A server is configured to distribute an item of encrypted information over the communication network to the clients and to distribute respective key-shares to the clients, including at least first and second key-shares distributed to the first and second clients, such that each client will require a key-share that has been distributed to at least one other client in order no reconstruct a key for decrypting the encrypted information. At least the first client is configured, upon receiving a request from a second client to convey the given key-share from the first client to the second client, to convey the given key-share to the second client and report to the server that the given key-share has been conveyed to the second client.
There is furthermore provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a computer software product, including a computer-readable medium in which program instructions are stored, which instructions, when read fey a computer, cause the computer to distribute an item of encrypted information to a plurality of clients, to distribute respective key-shares to the clients, such that each client will require a key-share that has been distributed to at least one ether client in order to reconstruct a key for decrypting the encrypted information, to receive from a first client a report that a second client requested and received a respective one of the key-shares from the first client, and responsively to the report, to make a record of a delivery of the item to the second client.
There is also provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a computer software product, including a computer-readable medium in which program instructions are stored, which instructions, when read by a computer, cause the computer to serve as a first client, so as to receive an item of encrypted information distributed to a plurality of clients and to receive a given key-share from among multiple, respective key shares distributed to the clients, such that each client requires a key-share that has been distributed to at least one other client in order to reconstruct a key for decrypting the encrypted information, and in response to receiving a request to the first client from a second client to convey the given key-share to the second client, to convey the given key chare to the second client and to report to a server that the given key-share has been conveyed to the second client.
The present invention will be more fully understood from the following detailed description of the embodiments thereof, taken together with the drawings in which:
Content distributors, who sell information content such as books, newspaper articles, video, and music to users of client devices (referred to hereinbelow simply as “clients”), often wish to push content to clients in advance of purchase. After an item of content has been received in the client, the user is then offered the opportunity to purchase the item at some subsequent time. In many cases, the purchase can be resolved on-line by communication between the client and a server over a wide-area network. In other cases, however, it may be desirable to allow content acquisition even when the client, is not connected to the server. This sort of off-line purchase could be reported by the purchasing client subsequently, after the connection to the server has been reestablished, but such a scheme requires strong security, which, typically depends on trusted security hardware in each client device and is vulnerable to hacking.
Embodiments of the present invention that are described hereinbelow provide an alternative scheme, which is based on collaboration between clients over a local communication link and can support off-line purchase of pre-delivered content items with a high level of security. Content is distributed in encrypted form, and access to the content is controlled by requiring clients to collaborate in order to enable one other to decrypt the content off-line. Whenever connectivity is available, “honest” clients will report back to the server on the off-line transactions in which they were involved—whether as the purchaser or as a collaborator.
Thus, even a hacked device cannot access the encrypted content on its own, and as long as one honest client is involved in collaboration with the hacked device, the server will receive a report ox the transaction. The number of collaborating clients necessary, as well as other collaboration parameters, can be adjusted to make it difficult for even a pair of hacked devices to succeed in a collaborative attack on system security. In other words, although it may remain possible for a sufficiently large cohort of hacked devices to access certain content without reporting, the system parameters may be chosen so as to achieve a desired level of security without making content access excessively difficult or burdensome for honest clients. By the same token, the keys required to access different content items are chosen uniformly, randomly and independently within a key space that is large enough to avoid the possibility that a key that is designated for accessing one item might also be usable to access another, different item. Thus, the reliability of reporting is enhanced, and potential revenue loss due to unreported off-line purchases is reduced.
In the disclosed embodiments, an item of encrypted information is distributed over a wide-area network to multiple clients, who also receive respective key-shares. The key-shares are generated in such a way that each client will require at least one key-share that has been distributed to at least one other client (and possibly multiple respective key-shares from multiple clients) in order to reconstruct the key that is needed to decrypt the encrypted information. The term “key-share” is used in the context of the present description and in the claims to refer to a piece of secret data that may be used to reconstruct a decryption key, in some of the embodiments described below, the key-shares are secret-shares, which may be computed using the methods described above in the Background section, for example, or by any other suitable method of secret sharing that is known in the art. Alternatively, they key-shares say be generated using a binary described below, or by any other method that is compatible with the collaboration model explained herein.
When such a key-sharing method is used, a client wishing to access an information item will attempt to communicate with one or more other clients over a local communication link (typically a wireless link, such as a Bluetooth® connection). This local link may be
independent of she wide-area network chat is used to distribute the information and report transactions. Once a local communication link has been established, the client identifies itself and requests the other clients' key-shares. Upon receiving such a request, an “honest” client will convey its key-share to the requesting client and will save the transaction information in its memory, including the information item in question and the identity of the requesting client. This interaction between clients may take place while one or more of the clients are disconnected from the wide-area network and are thus unable to communicate with a server that is responsible for recording such transactions. The interaction may involve an exchange of key-shares among two or more clients, whereby each client receives the other clients' key-shares—for the same information item or different information items—and is thus able to decrypt a desired information item.
After connecting (or re-connecting) to the wide-area network and thus to the server, honest clients will report the transaction, indicating to the server that a certain client requested and received a key-share in order to decrypt a certain item, of information. Based on this report, the server makes a record of the delivery of the item to the receiving client, and may attempt to verify that the client who received the item also reported the transaction. Thus, the record made by the server may, for example, serve as the basis for hilling the client and/or for enforcement activity against dishonest clients who do not report (and pay for) transactions. Additionally or alternatively, the server may provide an incentive to the honest reporting client for providing the report, such as reducing the complication and/or cost of subsequent information access for the honest client. For example, the server may grant the honest client more key-shares in the future, thus making the client less reliant on other devices and possibly even totally self-sufficient for some pieces of content.
Processor 22 is programmed in software to carry out the functions that are described herein. This software may be downloaded to the processor in electronic form, over a network, for example. Additionally or alternatively, the software may be stored on tangible, non-transitory computer-readable media, such as magnetic, optical or electronic memory. Further additionally or alternatively, at least some of the functions of the processor may .be implemented in programmable or hard-wired logic circuits.
In the pictured embodiment, passengers 26, 28, 30, riding in a subway train 32, are using respective portable client devices 34, 36, 38, . . . (also referred to simply as “clients,” as noted above). These client devices may comprise, for example, smart phones, personal digital assistants, media players, tablet computers, or any other suitable sort of personal communication and computing device. While devices 34, 36, 38 are inside the subway, they are disconnected from network 24 and are thus unable to communicate with server 21. Typically, however, devices 34, 36, 38 are capable of establishing short-range, local communication links with one another, via built-in Bluetooth or other, similar sorts of interfaces.
In a typical scenario, server 21, which is operated by a content aggregator, pushes items of information to clients 34, 36, 38 while the clients are connected to network 24 (before entering the subway is the present example). These items of information typically comprise content, such as video entertainment programs, music, books and/or articles. The content is encrypted, so that the clients cannot access it without first obtaining a suitable key. The available content may be listed on a menu that, appears on the screen of the client device. In order to access a particular item of information, the respective passenger 26, 28, 30 is required to purchase the key. Server 21 records the purchase transaction and charges the passenger' s account accordingly,
While clients 34, 36, 38 are connected to network 24, it may be possible for them to carry out the purchase transaction on-line, by direct interaction with server 21. In subway 32, however, such on-line purchase may not be possible, and similar situations may arise in other environments, such as in an airplane or other public locations without access to a cellular or other wide-area network. Furthermore, in such environments, a user of a client device may see an item or content playing on another user's device and may be particularly tempted to purchase and view the item himself. (Although the present embodiment relates to accessing content items while clients are off-line, such access methods may also be used while clients are connected to network 24.)
In an example scenario, user 26 chooses an item of information from a menu of pre-loaded content that is stored on client 34. Client 34 attempts to establish local wireless links, such as Bluetooth connections, with clients 36 and 38. Client 34 then queries clients 36 and 38 as to whether they have key-shares tor the item that user 26 has selected. Alternatively or additionally, clients 36 and 38 may provide lists of the key-shares that they hold. This process of query and response between client 34 and clients 36 and 38 typically involves the authenticated exchange of unique, secure identifiers between the clients. The key-shares may be signed by server 21, using a secure digital signature, in order to enable client 34 to verily that they are trustworthy (i.e., they are authentic key-shares and do not contain malicious code).
Upon discovering that one or both of clients 36 and 38 have key-abates for the requested item, client 34 requests these key-shares, and the responding clients send their key-shares to client 34 and make a record of the key-share transfer. Optionally, client 34 may send its key-share for the requested item to clients 36 and 36 at the same time, or for other items requested by clients 36 and/or 38, client 34 attempts to reconstruct the key for the requested item and, if successful, decrypts and plays the item. At some time after clients 34, 36, 38 reconnect to network 24 (upon exiting subway 32, fox example), they report the transaction to server 21, which charges client 34 for purchase of the selected item. Even if client 34 fails to report the purchase (by running software that has been hacked, for example, to avoid reporting off-line purchases), client 36 and/or 38 will still submit a report, leading server 21 to make a record of the purchase.
Processor 40 drives a display 42 (which may include both visual and audio components) to present information to user 26, under control of a user interface 44, For this purpose, processor 40 writes and reads data to and from a memory 48, including both key-shares 50 and content 52, as well as software code. Content 52 may be downloaded to client 34 and stored in memory 48 in encrypted form, and may then be decrypted by processor 40 after client 34 has obtained the necessary key-shares. In addition, a unique, secure identifier 41, such as a particular alphanumeric code, is stored in a secure memory register. Client 34 is designed, using techniques that are known in the art, so as to inhibit tampering with identifier 46 and to ensure that if client 34 is hacked in an attempt to change this identifier, other clients will recognize the messages that they receive from client 34 as invalid and will refuse to provide key-shares requested by client 34. Protection of identifier 46 can be achieved, for example, by using anti-tampering circuitry, such as secure, one-time programmable or other read-only memory, which may be protected by special hardware, and obfuscated hardware layout; as well as software-based measures, such as strongly obfuscating software, self-integrity checks and self-timing measurements; and possibly by coupling identifier 46 wish other identifiers that already exist on the client and are also hard to spoof. Additionally or alternatively, cloned identifiers may be identified on the server side by analyzing the logs of clients connecting to the server.
Processor 40 operates communication interfaces 54 to receive information, exchange key-shares, and report transactions. A long-range communication interface 56, such as a cellular or satellite network interface, communicates with network 24. A lternatively or additionally, network 24 may surprise a terrestrial network, such as the public Internet, and interfaces 54 may communicate with network 24 through a wireless local area network (WLAN) access point not shown). Processor 40 operates a short-range communication interface 58, such as a Bluetooth interface, to communicate with other clients.
Server 21 generates multiple secret-shares for key Si, at a share generation step 64. Any suitable method of secret-sharing that is known in the art may be used at this step, such the methods that were described above in the Background section. For this purpose, the operator of server 21 sets parameters K (the number of secret-shares needed to reconstruct Si, K≧2) and M (the total number of secret-shares to be distributed, N>K), and chooses a parameter H, which is the number of secret-shares to be distributed to each client (H<K), The server generates and distributes the respective secret-shares to the clients in accordance with these parameters. H is chosen so that given a target number B of clients collaborating (as described above) to reconstruct the key Si, there is a reasonable probability, typically no less than 50%, that they will succeed. It can be shown, for example, that setting N=9, K=6 and H=4, then for B=3, the probability that collaborative reconstruction of the key will fail can be no greater than about 59%.
Server 21 distributes the encrypted item Esi(Ci) to clients 34, 36, 38, . . . , at a content distribution step 66. Together with this item, the server distributes to each client a subset of H secret-shares out of the N available secret-shares for Si. Typically, the secret-shares in each subset are chosen at random, and the N secret-shares are uniformly distributed over the subsets.
Client 34 selects an item Ci to decrypt and play, at an item selection step 70, This client establishes local communications with peer clients 36 and/or 33 and requests that these clients provide their respective sets of secret-shares for the selected item, at a collaboration request step 72. Client 34 furnishes its identifier 46 with the request or in a subsequent communication, and clients 36, 38 may similarly identify themselves. The participating clients may use zero-knowledge proof methods, such as the above-mentioned Fiat-Shamir proof, to prove to one another that they hold certain secret-shares, or they may present certificates to this effect that are signed by server 21. Once clients 36, 38 have validated the identifier and secret-shares provided by client 34, they may transmit their own secret-shares to client 34.
Client 34 evaluates the secret-shares that it has received to determine whether they are sufficient to reconstruct the key at a share evaluation step 74. If the number of different shares is insufficient, client 34 may continue to seek other clients to supply the missing secret-shares, at a peer seeking step 76. Once client 34 has assembled a sufficient number of secret-shares, it reconstructs Si, using the appropriate method of reconstruction (such as the interpolation-based method described above in the Background section), and then decrypts the encrypted, item Esi(Ci) using Si, at a decryption step 78,
Client 34 and collaborating clients 36, 38 report the collaborative transaction to server 21, at a reporting step 80, The report may include, for each transaction, the identities of the other clients involved, the information item in question, the numbers of secret-shares exchanged, and the time of the transaction. The clients nay also provide the server with a list of the secret-shares that they current hold for each item. Ci. In this manner, assuming ail of the clients are operating properly and have not. been hacked, server 21 will receive several reports of the transaction and may cross-check them for verification and record the transaction accordingly. Furthermore, even if one of the clients fails to report the transaction, the server will still receive at least one report and will be able to make the appropriate record.
In the present embodiment, the key-share that is distributed to each client is associated with an ancestor node that is not one of the ancestor nodes of the leaf that is associated with the respective client key of the client. Therefore, any given client must find at least one collaborating client in order to receive an ancestor-node key that will enable the given client to derive its own client key.
To apply the method of
Server 21 distributes encrypted item Esi(Ci) and key-shares to clients 34, 36, 38, . . . , at a distribution step 96. For each client j, the server encrypts the content key Si using the respective client key TKij in a symmetric encryption algorithm, (such as AES), thus computing the encrypted content key value Ei,TKij(Si), and transmits this valise to the client. The server also distributes to each client one or more key-shares, corresponding to the values at certain nodes in the binary tree, but not from any of the ancestor nodes of the client's own client key TKij.
Clients 34, 36, . . . , interact and exchange key-shares in this embodiment in a manner similar to that described above with reference to
To encourage clients to correctly and honestly report the transactions in which they took part, server 21 may reward honest clients by providing them with more key-shares for new items of content, ox with additional key-shares for items of content that they have not yet consumed. This approach will make if easier for such clients to consume content off-line, as well as involving them in more transactions with other devices. An especially honest client may even receive enough secrets to enable it to consume some off-line content without the need to cooperate with other devices.
Furthermore, when the overall level of reporting in a given client group or in system 20 as a whole is high, server 21 can provide ail clients with a higher average number of key-shares, thus increasing the level of cooperation and availability of the off-line purchase option. When the overall level of reporting is low, on the other hand, server 21 may decrease the number of key-shares it provides to clients, thus curtailing the off-line purchase option.
It will be appreciated that the embodiments described above are cited by way of example, and that the present invention is not limited to what has been particularly shown and described hereinabove. Rather, the scope of the present invention includes both combinations and subcombinations of the various features described hereinabove, as well as variations and modifications thereof which would occur to persons skilled in the art upon reading the foregoing description and which are not disclosed in the prior art.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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216162 | Nov 2011 | IL | national |
1215327.6 | Aug 2012 | GB | national |
Number | Date | Country | |
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Parent | 14238255 | Feb 2014 | US |
Child | 15238742 | US |