The present disclosure relates generally to an electronically controllable and testable trip system for use with, for example, a turbine and, more particularly, to an apparatus and method for controlling and testing turbine trip control components while a turbine is operating in a manner that does not prevent the turbine from being tripped during the test.
Hydraulic control systems are commonly used to control power generation machines, such as turbines. Known hydraulic control systems may include a trip control system or other protection system configured to stop the turbine (i.e., trip the turbine) upon the detection of an abnormal operating condition or other system malfunction. Unfortunately, the failure of one or more components associated with the trip control system to operate properly can prevent a turbine trip operation from occurring during emergency situations, which can lead to extensive damage to the turbine as well as other catastrophes, such as harm or injury to plant personnel.
Existing emergency tripping systems such as, for example, the mechanical emergency tripping system manufactured by General Electric Company (GE), include several components (e.g., valves, governors, blocks, ports, etc.) piped together to form a mechanically operated trip system. In a purely mechanical version, block and bleed functions are performed using non-redundant hydraulically actuated valves. However, in some cases, this system has been retrofit to include electronically controlled redundant bleed valves that perform a bleed operation to dump or remove pressure from a steam valve trip circuit that operates the turbine based on a two-out-of-three voting scheme. Once a bleed operation is performed, however, the GE mechanical tripping system requires that the delivery of hydraulic fluid to the control port of the steam valve be blocked. Such a mechanical system results in a large, complex design having separate parts that may be expensive to manufacture. Additionally, the GE mechanical tripping system requires an operator to manually perform tests of the blocking components. Still further, the mechanical nature of the blocking system of the GE mechanical tripping system requires that an operator travel to the site of the turbine, which is undesirable.
While automatic tripping systems have been developed in which the mechanical governor and associated linkages are replaced with a controller that automatically performs a trip operation, such automatic tripping systems typically include single, isolated valves or are limited to the bleed functionality of the tripping system. In particular, as described above with respect to the retrofit GE turbine system, it is known to use a set of three control valves connected to a controller to perform a two out of three voting scheme for performing a bleed function within a turbine trip control system. In this configuration, each of the control valves operates two DIN valves which are connected to one another in a manner that assures that, if two out of the three control valves are energized, a hydraulic path is created through a set of two of the DIN valves to cause pressure to be bled from the trip port of the steam valve that provides steam to the turbine. The loss of pressure at the trip port of the steam valve closes the steam valve and trips or halts the operation of the turbine. With this configuration, the failure of any one of the control valves will not prevent a trip operation from being performed when desired or required and likewise, will not cause a trip to occur when such a trip is not desired. Additionally, because of the two out of three voting scheme, the individual components of this bleed circuit can be tested while the turbine is in operation without causing a trip to occur.
Unfortunately, the block circuit or block portion of the tripping control system is an important part of the control circuit and, currently, there is no manner of being able to provide redundancy in the block circuit to assure proper operation of the block circuit if one of the components thereof fails, and no manner of electronically testing or operating the block circuit. In fact, currently, the block circuit of this known turbine trip control system must be operated manually, which is difficult to do as it requires an operator to go to and actually manually operate components of the block circuit (generally located near the turbine) after the bleed portion of the trip operation has occurred. Likewise, because of the manually operated components, there is no simple remote manner of testing the operation of the block portion of the trip control system.
A tripping control system for use with, for example, turbines, includes a block circuit having two or more redundant blocking valves connected in series within a pressure supply line to block the supply of hydraulic fluid within the pressure supply line and a bleed circuit having two or more bleed valves connected in parallel between the trip line and a return or dump line to bleed to the hydraulic fluid from the trip. The blocking valves and the bleed valves are actuated by one or more control valves under control of a process or safety controller which operates to cause a trip by first performing a bleed function using at least one of the bleed valves and then a block function using at least one of the blocking valves. Additionally, pressure sensors are disposed at various locations within the tripping control system and provide feedback to the controller to enable the controller to test each of the blocking and bleed valves individually, during operation of the turbine, without causing an actual trip of the turbine. In this manner, the tripping control system provides reliable trip operation by providing redundant block and bleed functionality in combination with enabling the individual components of the block and bleed circuits to be tested while the turbine is online and operating but without preventing the turbine from being tripped, if necessary, during the test. Additionally, the tripping control circuit can be integrated into a small, single package that can be easily fit onto existing turbine systems, thereby enabling existing turbine trip control systems to be retrofit or upgraded relatively inexpensively.
Referring to
As will be understood from
As illustrated in
It should be understood that the controller 145 may be remote from or local to the block circuit 120 and the bleed circuit 130. Furthermore, the controller 145 may include a single control unit that operates and tests the block circuit 120 and the bleed circuit 130 or multiple control units, such as distributed control units, which are each configured to operate different ones of the block circuit 120 and the bleed circuit 130. Generally speaking, the structure and configuration of the controller 145 are conventional and, therefore, are not discussed further herein.
During normal operation of the turbine 110, which may be configured to drive a generator, for example, hydraulic fluid under pressure (e.g., operating oil) is supplied from a hydraulic fluid source (e.g., a pump) to the block circuit 120 and the bleed circuit 130 via the line 150, and to the steam valve 140 via the hydraulic fluid path made up of the lines 150a and 150b. The hydraulic fluid may include any suitable type of hydraulic material that is capable of flowing along the hydraulic fluid paths 150, 150a and 150b as well as the return path 160 and drain line 170. As noted above, when the pressure in the fluid line 150b at the trip input to the steam valve 140 is at a predetermined system pressure, the steam valve 140 allows or enables the flow of steam to the turbine 110. However, when the pressure in the fluid line 150b at the trip input of the steam valve 140 drops to a predetermined or significant amount below system pressure, the steam valve 140 closes, which causes a shutdown of the turbine 110.
Generally speaking, to cause a trip of the turbine 110, the controller 145 first operates the bleed circuit 130 to bleed fluid from the supply line 150b at the trip input of the steam valve 140 to the return line 160 to thereby remove the system pressure from the trip input of the steam valve 140 and cause a trip of the turbine 110. Once a trip of the turbine 110 has occurred, the block circuit 120 automatically operates due to the loss of trip pressure 150b to block the flow of hydraulic fluid within the supply line 150a to prevent continuous supply of hydraulic fluid from the supply line 150a to 150b while the turbine 110 is in a trip state. Additionally, as will be discussed in more detail, the controller 145 may control various components of the bleed circuit 130 and the block circuit 120 during normal operation of the turbine 110 to test those components without causing a trip of the turbine 110. This testing functionality enables the components of the trip system 100 to be periodically tested, and replaced if necessary, during operation of the turbine 110 without requiring the turbine 110 to be shut down or taken off line. This testing functionality also enables failed components of the block and bleed circuits 120 and 130 to be detected and replaced or repaired prior to the actual operation of a trip, thereby helping to assure reliable trip operation when needed.
In one embodiment, the controller 145 operates the bleed circuit 130 to perform a trip of the turbine 110 in response to the detection of one or more abnormal conditions or malfunctions within the plant in which the turbine 110 is located. To help ensure that a trip operation is performed even if one or more components associated with the bleed circuit 130 fail to operate properly, the bleed circuit 130 preferably includes a plurality of redundant valve systems that create redundant bleed fluid paths connected in parallel between the line 150b and the return line 160, wherein operation of any one of the parallel bleed fluid paths is sufficient to remove trip pressure from the trip input of the steam valve 140 and thereby cause a trip of the turbine 110. In one embodiment, the bleed circuit 130 may include three such valve systems, and each of the valve systems may include an actuator valve that controls two trip valves. In this case, as will be described in more detail with respect to
In one embodiment, each of the first-sixth trip valves 230-280 may be a two-way DIN cartridge valve having a pair of operational ports (A, B) and a control port (X) in which the operational ports (A, B) may be normally biased in an open position by a spring or other mechanical device (not shown). Hydraulic fluid may pass through the operational ports (A, B) of the trip valves 230-280 in response to the loss of control pressure at the control port (X). DIN cartridge valves are well known in the art and are, therefore, not described in further detail herein. In any event, as will be understood, when any of the trip valves 230-280 is in the open position, hydraulic fluid may flow from port A to port B of that valve. To the contrary, when control pressure is applied at the control port (X) of any of the trip valves 230-280, the trip valve 230-280 to which control pressure is provided locks the valve in a closed position to thereby block or prevent the flow of hydraulic fluid between the operational ports (A, B) of that valve.
As shown in
As is evident in
Still further, the third trip branch 220 includes the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 coupled between the hydraulic fluid path 150b and the return path 160. Specifically, port A of the third trip valve (B1) 250 is hydraulically coupled to the hydraulic fluid path 150b via hydraulic conduit 288, port B of the third trip valve (B1) 250 is hydraulically coupled to port A of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 via hydraulic conduit 289, and port B of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 is hydraulically coupled to the return path 160 via hydraulic conduit 290.
For the sake of illustration, the control valves that control the operation of the trip valves 230-280 are not depicted in
As will be understood, each of the first, second, and third actuators 292-294 is operatively coupled to the controller 145, which is configured to energize and de-energize each of the first, second, and third actuators 292-294, either separately or simultaneously. In one embodiment, each of the first, second, and third actuators 292-294 may include a solenoid valve that, when energized by the controller 145, supplies control pressure from the system pressure line 150 to the control port (X) of the associated trip valves 230-280 to lock the associated trip valves 230-280 in their closed position. Likewise, when de-energized by the controller 145, the first, second and third actuators 292-294 connect the control port (X) of the associated trip valves 230-280 to the drain line 170.
As depicted in
To ensure that all of the components work properly to perform a trip operation when required or desired, the components associated with the bleed circuit 130 may be tested while the turbine 110 is operating online without interrupting operation of the turbine 110. For testing purposes, the bleed circuit 130 includes first, second, and third pressure transmitters (PT1-PT3) 300-320 configured to sense the pressure at the first, second, and third trip branches 200-220, respectively, and, in particular, to sense the fluid pressure in the conduits 283, 286 and 289 respectively. Additionally, the bleed circuit 130 may include first, second, and third pressure sensors (PS1-PS3) 330-350 configured to sense the fluid pressure in hydraulic conduits 295-297, respectively. As shown in
During normal operating conditions (i.e., when the turbine 110 is not tripped), the controller 145 is configured to simultaneously energize each of the first, second, and third actuators 292-294 to activate the first-sixth trip valves (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2) 230-280. When the first, second, and third actuators 292-294 are energized, control pressure is supplied at the control port (X) of each of the first-sixth trip valves (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2) 230-280, thereby causing the first-sixth trip valves (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2) 230-280 to lock the valve in the closed position. When the first-sixth trip valves (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2) 230-280 are in the closed position, hydraulic fluid is blocked or prevented from flowing between the operational ports (A, B) of those valves and, as a result, no direct path exists between the hydraulic fluid path 150b and the return path 160. This configuration maintains sufficient hydraulic pressure within the hydraulic fluid path 150b at the trip input of the steam valve 140 to hold the steam valve 140 in the open position. When the steam valve 140 is held in the open position, steam is delivered to the turbine 110 and the turbine 110 operates normally.
During abnormal conditions or malfunctions, it may be desirable to stop operation of the turbine 110 to prevent damage to the turbine 110 and/or to prevent other catastrophes. To do so, the controller 145 creates a bleed fluid path between the hydraulic fluid path 150b and the return path 160 to thereby remove hydraulic pressure from the hydraulic fluid path 150b. The bleeding of pressure from the fluid path 150b causes the trip input of the steam valve 140 to become depressurized, thereby moving the steam valve 140 to the closed position and preventing the delivery of steam to the turbine 110. This action causes and is referred to as a tripping or halting of the turbine 110.
To determine if a trip is needed, the controller 145 may monitor turbine parameters such as, for example, turbine speed, turbine load, vacuum pressure, bearing oil pressure, thrust oil pressure, and the like using various sensors (not shown). As will be understood, the controller 145 may be configured to receive information from these sensors during operation of the turbine 110 to monitor operating conditions of the turbine 110, to thereby detect abnormal operating conditions and problems associated with the turbine 110 that may require that the turbine 110 be shut down. In response to information received from the operational sensors such as, for example, the detection of an overspeed condition, the controller 145 may cause a trip operation to be performed. To actually effectuate such a trip, the components associated with only two of the redundant valve systems or branches 200-220 of the bleed circuit 130 need to operate properly. However, to cause a trip, the controller 145 will generally operate (actually deactivate) each of the actuators 292, 293 and 294 to thereby attempt to open each of the trip valves (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2) 230-280 and create three parallel bleed fluid paths between the hydraulic fluid line 150b and the return path 160. In this manner, the trip control system helps to assure that a trip will be performed even if one of the components of the bleed circuit 130 fails to operate properly because, in that case, at least one bleed fluid path will still be created or opened between the hydraulic fluid path 150b and the return path 160, thus causing a trip.
More particularly, during a trip operation, the controller 145 may be configured to simultaneously de-energize each of the first, second, and third actuators 292-294 so that hydraulic fluid is permitted to flow through each of the first trip branch 200, the second trip branch 210, and the third trip branch 220, thereby dumping pressure off the trip input of the steam valve 140 to stop operation of the turbine 110. As will be understood from
Similarly, when the controller 145 de-energizes the second actuator 293, the control ports (X) of both the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 are coupled through the actuator 293 to the drain 170. As a result, control or system pressure from the line 150 is released or removed at each of the control ports (X) of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260, and the pressure within the control line for these valves is immediately diverted or bled to the drain 170. When control pressure at the control ports (X) of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 is bled to the drain 170, both of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 move from the closed position to the open position which enables hydraulic fluid to flow through the operational ports (A, B) of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260.
Likewise, when the controller 145 de-energizes the third actuator 294, the control ports (X) of both the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 are coupled through the actuator 294 to the drain 170. As a result, control or system pressure is released or removed at each of the control ports (X) of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280, and the pressure within the control line for these valves is immediately diverted or bled to the drain 170. When control pressure at the control ports (X) of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 is bled to the drain 170, both of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 move from the closed position to the open position which permits hydraulic fluid to flow through the operational ports (A, B) of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280.
As will be understood, to effectuate a trip operation, hydraulic fluid in the fluid path 150b need only flow to the return path 160 via one of the first, second, or third trip branches 200-220 to, thereby depressurize the trip input of the steam valve 140 and stop operation of the turbine 110. As a result, the components associated with only two of the redundant valve systems A1 and A2, B1 and B2 or C1 and C2 need to operate properly to perform a trip operation. In other words, if all of the components associated with the first valve system (e.g., the first actuator 292, the first trip valve (A1) 230, and the second trip valve (A2) 240) operate properly, and if all of the components associated with the third valve system (e.g., the third actuator 294, the fifth trip valve (C1) 270, and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280) operate properly, then hydraulic fluid may flow from the hydraulic fluid path 150b to the return path 160 via the first trip branch 200, thereby dumping trip pressure off the steam valve 140 and stopping operation of the turbine 110. Similarly, if all of the components associated with the first valve system operate properly, and if all of the components associated with the second valve system (e.g., the second actuator 293, the third trip valve (B1) 250, and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260) operate properly, then hydraulic fluid may flow from the hydraulic fluid path 150b to the return path 160 via the second trip branch 210, thereby dumping trip pressure off the steam valve 140 and stopping operation of the turbine 110. Still further, if all of the components associated with the second and the third valve systems operate properly, then hydraulic fluid may flow from the hydraulic fluid path 150b to the return path 160 via the third trip branch 220, thereby dumping trip pressure off the steam valve 140 and stopping operation of the turbine 110. In this manner, redundancy is achieved by requiring that the components associated with only two of the three valve systems operate properly to perform a trip operation. In other words, the failure of one or more components associated with one of the branches 200-220 will not prevent the controller 145 from performing a trip operation to stop the turbine 110.
Still further, it is desirable, from time to time, to test the components associated with the bleed circuit 130 while the turbine 110 is online and operating to ensure that all of these components work properly. However, it is desirable to test these components without interrupting the operation of the turbine 110, as stopping the turbine 110 for testing or maintenance is costly and undesirable. In the system illustrated in
More specifically, to test the operation of the first actuator 292, the first trip valve (A1) 230, and the second trip valve (A2) 240 associated with the first valve system, the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292 while keeping the second actuator 293 and the third actuator 294 energized. When the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292, the control ports (X) of both the first trip valve (A1) 230 and the second trip valve (A2) 240 should be coupled to the drain 170 and thus control pressure should be released or removed from each of the control ports (X) of the first trip valve (A1) 230 and the second trip valve (A2) 240. Thus, if the first actuator 292 is operating properly, when the first actuator 292 is de-energized, both of the first trip valve (A1) 230 and the second trip valve (A2) 240 should move from the closed position to the open position. By monitoring the pressure sensed by the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300. at the hydraulic conduit 283, the pressure sensed by the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 at the hydraulic conduit 286, and the pressure sensed by the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 at the hydraulic conduit 289, the controller 145 can determine whether one or more of the first actuator 292, the first trip valve (A1) 230, and the second trip valve (A2) 240 are operating properly.
In particular, if each of the first actuator 292, the first trip valve (A1) 230, and the second trip valve (A2) 240 is operating properly when the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292, the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 should sense a small or negligible pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 289 that couples the third trip valve (B1) 250 to the fifth trip valve (C1) 270. Additionally, the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 should sense system pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 when the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292 due to the first trip valve (A1) 230 being in the open position and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 being in the closed position. Still further, the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 should sense system pressure at the hydraulic conduit 286 when the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292 due to the second trip valve (A2) 240 being in the open position and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 being in the closed position.
If the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 senses a pressure other than a small or negligible pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 289 after the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292, the controller 145, to the extent it receives a measurement from the pressure transmitter 320, may determine that the first actuator 292 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal or take any other desired action to notify a user of the problem. Additionally, if the pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 senses a small or negligible pressure change but the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 senses a pressure other than system pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 after the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292, the controller 145 may determine that the first trip valve (A1) 230 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal, if desired. In particular, if the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 senses a reduced pressure level that is less than system pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 due to the orifice 299a, the controller 145 may determine that both the first trip valve (A1) 230 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 are in the closed position indicating that the first trip valve (A1) 230 has failed to operate properly. Still further, if the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 senses a small or negligible pressure change but the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 senses a pressure other than system pressure at the hydraulic conduit 286 after the controller 145 de-energizes the first actuator 292, the controller 145 may determine that the second trip valve (A2) 240 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal, if desired.
The second actuator 293, the third trip valve (B1) 250, and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 associated with the second valve system may be tested in a manner similar to the manner described above with respect to the first valve system. Specifically, when the controller 145 de-energizes the second actuator 293 while keeping the first actuator 292 and the third actuator 294 energized, the control ports (X) of both the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 should be coupled through the actuator 293 to the drain 170 and thus control or system pressure should be released or removed from each of the control ports (X) of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260. Thus, if the second valve system is operating properly when the actuator 293 is de-energized, both of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 should move from the closed position to the open position. By monitoring the pressure sensed by the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 at the hydraulic conduit 283, the pressure sensed by the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 at the hydraulic conduit 286, and the pressure sensed by the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 at the hydraulic conduit 289, the controller 145 may determine whether one or more of the second actuator 293, the third trip valve (B1) 250, and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 are operating properly.
In particular, if the second actuator 293, the third trip valve (B1) 250, and the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 are operating properly when the controller 145 de-energizes the second actuator 293, the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 should sense a small or negligible pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 283 that couples the first trip valve (A1) 230 to the sixth trip valve (C2) 280. Additionally, the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 should sense a small or negligible pressure in the hydraulic conduit 286 as operation of the fourth trip valve (B2) 210 should allow the reduced system pressure present in the hydraulic conduit 286 as a result of the operation of the orifices 299b and 301b to be dissipated via the now open trip valve (B2) 260 to the return path 160. Still further, the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 should sense system pressure in the hydraulic conduit 289 due to the third trip valve (B1) 250 being in the open position and the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 being in the closed position.
If the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 senses a pressure other than a small or negligible pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 283 after the controller 145 de-energizes the second actuator 293, the controller 145 may determine that the second actuator 293 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal, or take any other desired action. Additionally, if the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 senses a small or negligible pressure change, but the second transmitter (PT2) 310 senses a pressure other than a small or negligible pressure at the hydraulic conduit 286, the controller 145 may determine that the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal. In particular, in this case, if the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 senses a reduced system pressure that is greater than a small or negligible pressure in the hydraulic conduit 286, the controller 145 may determine that the fourth trip valve (B2) 260 remained in the closed position instead of opening and allowing the reduced system pressure present in the hydraulic conduit 286 as a result of the operation of the orifices 299b and 301b to be dissipated via the return path 160. Still further, if the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 senses a small or negligible pressure change, but the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 senses a pressure other than system pressure at the hydraulic conduit 289, the controller 145 may determine that the third trip valve (B1) 250 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal.
The third actuator 294, the fifth trip valve (C1) 270, and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 of the third valve system may be tested in a similar manner as the first valve system and the second valve system. Specifically, when the controller 145 de-energizes the third actuator 294 while keeping the first actuator 292 and the second actuator 293 energized, the control ports (X) of both the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 should be coupled to the drain 170 and control pressure should be released or removed from each of the control ports (X) of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280. Moreover, if the third actuator 294 is operating properly when de-energized by the controller 145, both of the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 should move from the closed position to the open position. By monitoring one or more of the pressures sensed by the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 at the hydraulic conduit 286, the pressure sensed by the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 at the hydraulic conduit 283, and the pressure sensed by the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 at the hydraulic conduit 289, the controller 145 may determine whether one or more of the third actuator 294, the fifth trip valve (C1) 270, and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 are operating properly.
In particular, if each of the third actuator 294, the fifth trip valve (C1) 270, and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 is operating properly when the controller 145 de-energizes the third actuator 294 while keeping the first actuator 292 and the second actuator 293 energized, the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 should sense a small or negligible pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 286 that couples the second trip valve (A2) 240 to the fourth trip valve (B2) 260. Additionally, the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 should sense a small or negligible pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 due to the first trip valve (A1) 230 being in the closed position and the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 being in the open position, allowing the reduced system pressure developed in the conduit 283 by the orifices 299a and 301a to be dissipated to the return path 160 through the sixth trip valve (C2) 280. Still further, the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 should sense a small or negligible pressure at the hydraulic conduit 289 due to the third trip valve (B1) 250 being in the closed position and the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 being in the open position, allowing the reduced system pressure developed in the conduit 289 by the orifices 299c and 301c to be dissipated to the return path 160 through the fifth trip valve (C1) 270.
If the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 senses a pressure other than a small or negligible pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 286 after the controller 145 de-energizes the third actuator 294 while keeping the first actuator 292 and the second actuator 293 energized, the controller 145 may determine that the third actuator 294 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal. Additionally, if the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 senses a small or negligible pressure change, but the first transmitter (PT1) 300 senses a pressure other than a small or negligible pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 after the controller 145 de-energizes the third actuator 294, the controller 145 may determine that the sixth trip valve (C2) 280 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal. Still further, if the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 senses a small or negligible pressure change, but the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 senses a pressure other than a small or negligible pressure at the hydraulic conduit 289 after the controller 145 de-energizes the third actuator 294, the controller 145 may determine that the fifth trip valve (C1) 270 is not operating properly, and generate a fault or alarm signal. Of course, if desired, the controller 145 may not receive signals from the pressure sensors PS1, PS2 and PS3 and may still diagnose a fault within or associated with the trip valves using the signals from the pressure transmitters PT1, PT2 and PT3 in the manner discussed above, with it being understood that if the controller detects that both valves associated with a particular actuator, such as valves A1 and A2, appear to be failing, the problem may be with the actuator which drives or controls those valves.
As can be seen, the operation of a trip of the turbine 110 is not prevented during the testing of any one of the valve systems associated with the actuators 292, 293 and 294 because, during a test, the controller 145 is essentially controlling one of the three valve systems to simulate a trip for that valve system. Thus, to actuate an actual trip during a test, the controller 145 need only send a trip signal to one or both of the other valve systems (not undergoing the test) by de-energizing one or both of the actuators 292, 293 or 294 associated with the other valve systems.
As will be understood, the bleed circuit 130 described above is configured to electronically perform a trip operation from a remote location in response to abnormal conditions or malfunctions by bleeding the hydraulic fluid in the hydraulic fluid path 150b to the return path 160 using a two out of three voting scheme, thereby removing pressure from the trip input of the steam valve 140. In addition, because of the two out of three redundancy, the components of this bleed circuit 130 can be tested individually during operation of the turbine 110, but without preventing the controller 145 from effectuating an actual trip during the test. As a result, a human operator is not required to manually operate or test the components associated with the bleed circuit 130. Furthermore, the plurality of redundant valve systems associated with the bleed circuit 130 described above helps to ensure that a trip operation can be performed even if one of the components associated with the bleed circuit fails to operate. As a result, the bleed circuit 130 described herein provides greater reliability that a trip operation will be performed when desired or required.
While not shown in
Once the bleed circuit 130 of
Preferably, the block circuit 120 includes redundancy to enable the block circuit 120 to work correctly in the presence of a failed component within the block circuit 120. Furthermore, the block circuit 120 is preferably remotely testable during operation of the turbine 110 in a manner that does not trip the turbine 110 but that enables the turbine 110 to be tripped, if necessary, during the testing of the block circuit 120. In one embodiment, the block circuit 120 may include a plurality of redundant blocking components connected in series within the hydraulic fluid line 150 and configured to block system pressure to the turbine trip header in a redundant manner after a trip has occurred.
Referring to
As illustrated in the functional diagram of
The first logic valve 440 is normally biased in an open position by a spring (not shown) or other mechanical device to allow the flow of hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic fluid source to the turbine trip header. Thus the logic valve 440 normally allows free flow from ports (A) to (B) or (B) to (A). Since the port (X) on the logic valve 440 connects directly to the line 150a through the first block valve 430, the logic valve 440 will not allow fluid flow from port (A) to port (B) (i.e., from the line 150a to the second logic valve 470), unless the pressure at the port (X) of the logic valve 440 is vented. When the first block valve 430 receives pressure from the line 150b through the first block actuator 420, then the logic valve 440 allows, because its (X) port is vented to the drain 170, fluid flow from port (A) to port (B) and on to the second logic valve 470. If the turbine trip header pressure in the line 150b is bled through the bleed circuit 130 (i.e., during an initiated trip), then the pressure at the port (X) of the first block valve 430 is also vented through the bleed circuit 130 thus causing the first block valve 430 to move to its spring biased position, which connects the port (X) of the logic valve 440 to the pressure line 150a thereby causing the logic valve 440 to close.
Similarly, the second blocking system 410 includes a second block actuator 450, a second block valve 460 hydraulically coupled to the second block actuator 450, and a second logic valve 470 hydraulically coupled to the second block valve 460 and disposed between the first logic valve 440 and the hydraulic fluid path 150. As illustrated in
The second logic valve 470 is normally biased in the open position by a spring (not shown) or other mechanical device to allow the flow of hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic fluid source to the turbine trip Thus, the logic valve 470 normally allows free flow from the ports (A) to (B) or (B) to (A). Because the port (X) on the logic valve 470 connects directly to the line 150a through the second block valve 460, the logic valve 470 will not allow fluid flow from port (A) to port (B) (i.e., from the first logic valve 440 to the check valve 484), unless the pressure at the port (X) of the logic valve 470 is vented. When the second block valve 460 receives pressure from the line 150b through the second block actuator 450, then the logic valve 470 allows, because its (X) port is vented to the drain 170, fluid flow from port (A) to port (B) and on to the check valve 484. If the turbine trip header pressure 150b is bled through the bleed circuit 130 (i.e., during an initiated trip), then the pressure at the port (X) of the second block valve 460 is also vented through the bleed circuit 130 thus causing the second block valve 460 to move to its spring biased position, which connects port (X) of the logic valve 470 to the pressure line 150a, thereby causing the logic valve 470 to close.
During a trip operation, the controller 145 may energize the solenoid of both of the first block actuator 420 and the second block actuator 450 to thereby cause the logic valves 440 and 470 to close and block the fluid line 150a from the fluid line 150b. More particularly, when the first block actuator 420 is energized, system pressure is released or removed from the control input of the first block valve 430, which causes control pressure to be applied to the control input of the first logic valve 440, causing the logic valve 440 to move to the closed position to prevent or block the flow of hydraulic fluid between the line 150a and the line 150b. Similarly, when the second block actuator 450 is energized, system pressure is released or removed from the control input of the second block valve 460, which causes control pressure to be applied to the control input of the second logic valve 470, causing the logic valve 470 to move to the closed position to prevent or block the flow of hydraulic fluid from the line 150a to the line 150b.
Because the logic valves 440 and 470 of the first blocking system 400 and the second blocking system 410, respectively, are connected in series between the lines 150a and 150b, the block circuit 120 performs redundant blocking functions, thereby assuring high reliability. For example, if the first blocking system 400 fails to properly perform a blocking function due to, for example, the failure of one or more components associated with the first blocking system 400, the series-connected second blocking system 410 is configured to ensure that the blocking function is still performed to prevent or block the flow of hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic fluid source to the turbine trip header. Similarly, if the second blocking system 410 fails to properly perform a blocking function due to, for example, the failure of one or more components associated with the second blocking system 410, the series-connected first blocking system 400 is configured to ensure that the blocking function is still performed to prevent or block the flow of hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic fluid source to the turbine trip header. Accordingly, the block circuit 120 is configured such that only one of the first blocking system 400 and the second blocking system 410 is required to perform a blocking operation to block or prevent the flow of hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic fluid source to the turbine trip header.
Using the system depicted in
Referring to
If the pressure transmitter 480 senses a decrease in fluid pressure in the hydraulic fluid line 150b upstream of the check valve 484 after the first block actuator 420 is energized while keeping the second block actuator 450 de-energized, the controller 145 may determine that all of the components in the first blocking system 400 are operating properly. However, before the fluid pressure in the line 150b downstream of the check valve 484 decreases to a pressure that is sufficiently below the system pressure to trigger a trip operation (i.e., to close the steam valve 140 of
Similarly, to test the operation of the second blocking system 410 while the turbine 110 is operating, the controller 145 energizes the second block actuator 450 while keeping the first block actuator 420 de-energized. When the second block actuator 450 is energized and the first block actuator 420 is de-energized, system pressure is released or removed from the control input of the second block valve 460 and the pressure at the control input of the second block valve 460 is diverted to the drain 170. As a result of the loss of control pressure, the second block valve 460 actuates to apply the control pressure in the line 150a to the control port (X) of the second logic valve 470. This action, in turn, causes the second logic valve 470 to immediately move to the closed position. When the second logic valve 470 is in the closed position, the pressure in the line 150b upstream of the check valve 484 starts to decrease. Again, if the pressure transmitter 480 senses a proper or expected decrease in pressure in the line 150b upstream of the check valve 484, the controller 145 determines that all of the components in the second blocking branch 410 are operating properly. On the other hand, if the controller 145 does not detect a pressure decrease, one or more of the components of the valve system 410 may be faulty and in need of repair. However, before the pressure in the line 150b decreases to a pressure that is sufficiently below system pressure to trigger a trip of the steam valve 140 of
The block circuit 120 described above performs reliable electronically controlled redundant blocking functionality by providing redundant blocking systems 400, 410, the operation of only one of which is needed to perform a block function. Of course, it will be understood that the testing of the block functionality will typically be performed when no testing of the bleed functionality of the bleed circuit 130 is being performed, although it may be possible to test both of these system simultaneously. In any event, the controller 145 may still implement a trip of the turbine 110 while one of the blocking systems 400 or 410 is being tested, as the controller 145 needs to merely control two out of three of the bleed actuators 292, 293, and 294 to bleed the pressure from the line 150b to thereby cause an immediate trip of the turbine 110 in the manner discussed above, and this bleed function can take place while one of logic valves 440 or 470 is closed for testing purposes. In fact, such a bleed function can occur when one or both of the logic valves 440 and 470 are closed and blocking the line 150a from the line 150b. Thus, the testing of the block circuit 120 does not effect the ability of the controller 145 to engage a trip of the turbine 110.
In any event, after a trip operation has been performed to stop the operation of the turbine 110, and it is necessary to reset or start the turbine 110, it is first necessary to remove the blocking functionality provided by the block circuit 120 to thereby allow system pressure to be built up or re-established in the hydraulic fluid line 150b. However, using the blocking system illustrated in
In one embodiment, the reset logic valve 490 is normally biased in a closed position by a spring (not shown) or other mechanical device to prevent or block the flow of hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic fluid source connected to the line 150a to the turbine trip header connected to the line 150b. The logic valve 490 normally allows free flow from ports (A) to (B) or (B) to (A). Because the port (X) on the logic valve 490 connects directly to the line 150a through the reset actuator 485, the logic valve 490 will not allow flow from port (A) to port (B) (i.e., from pressure line 150a to line 150b), unless the pressure at port (X) of the logic valve 490 is vented. When the reset actuator 485 receives a signal from the controller 145, it moves to its actuated position and connects its (B) port to the drain 170 which in turn connects port (X) of the logic valve 490 to the drain 170, thus allowing fluid flow from port (A) to port (B) on the logic valve 490, and on to the turbine trip header 150b. Thus, to reset the block circuit 120, the controller 145 is configured to energize the reset actuator 485 for enough time to re-establish system pressure in the line 150b, to open the first and second logic valves 440 and 470 via pressure flow through the first and second block actuators 420 and 450, and to then de-energize the reset actuator 485, which applies control pressure to the control port (X) of the reset logic valve 490, and connects the fluid in the line connected to the control port (X) of the reset logic valve 490 to the upstream pressure 150a. As a result, the reset logic valve 490 is moved to the closed position.
In any event, the schematic diagram of
Now, with respect to
As an example,
It should be understood that the tripping control system 100, as described above, may be retrofitted with existing mechanical hydraulic control (MHC) turbines by, for example, removing the emergency trip valve, associated linkages and other components, and inserting the tripping control system 100 in the hydraulic fluid path 150. Still further, it will be understood that, while the valves, actuators and other components have been variously described as being electronically or hydraulically controlled components biased to particular normally open or closed positions, individual ones of these actuators and valves could be electronically or hydraulically controlled in a manner other than described herein and may be biased in other manners then those described herein. Still further, in some cases, various ones of the valves or actuator may be eliminated or the functionality may be combined into a single valve device. Thus, for example, it may be possible to eliminate the first and second block valves 430 and 460 and connect the actuators 420 and 450 directly to the valves 440 and 470. Likewise, it may be possible to integrate the actuators 420 and 450 onto or with the block valves 430 and 460 or even with the valves 440 and 470 so that a single valve is used in each of the block valve systems 400 and 410. Still further, it will be understood that the controller 145 described herein includes one or more processors and a computer readable memory which stores one or more programs for performing the tripping, testing and monitoring functions described herein. When implemented, the programs may be stored in any computer readable memory such as on a magnetic disk, a laser disk, or other storage medium, in a RAM or ROM of a computer or processor, as part of an application specific integrated circuit, etc. Likewise, this software may be delivered to a user, a process plant, a controller, etc. using any known or desired delivery method including, for example, on a computer readable disk or other transportable computer storage mechanism or over a communication channel such as a telephone line, the Internet, the World Wide Web, any other local area network or wide area network, etc. (which delivery is viewed as being the same as or interchangeable with providing such software via a transportable storage medium). Furthermore, this software may be provided directly without modulation or encryption or may be modulated and/or encrypted using any suitable modulation carrier wave and/or encryption technique before being transmitted over a communication channel.
While the present disclosure has been described with reference to specific examples, which are intended to be illustrative only and not to be limiting of the disclosure, it will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that changes, additions, or deletions may be made to the disclosed embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure.
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0641919 | Mar 1995 | EP |
Number | Date | Country | |
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20060230755 A1 | Oct 2006 | US |