This application claims the benefit and priority of Great Britain Patent Application No. 1421503.2 filed Dec. 3, 2014. The entire disclosure of the above application is incorporated herein by reference.
This disclosure relates to a fail-safe interface. It is particularly suitable for an inverter enable input, and especially suited to an inverter enable input for a motor drive.
This section provides background information related to the present disclosure which is not necessarily prior art.
Machinery often comprises parts, which, during normal operation, would be hazardous to an operator should the operator come into contact with those parts when they are moving.
Such machinery is often driven by an electric motor. For safety reasons, it is often a requirement that a control system be employed for allowing and preventing operation of the electric motor (and hence machine operation) with a high level of integrity. For example, when a safety guard or gate is opened to allow access to a part of a machine that would be hazardous when moving, the motor must be prevented from driving the machine. A typical level of integrity for such a function would be a probability of dangerous failure of the order of 10−8 per hour. To achieve this, circuit design is employed that ensures that most component failures and combinations of failures result in the motor being prevented from driving the machine and, in turn, the machine not operating.
Traditionally, the ability to enable or disable the operation of the electric motor is achieved with electromechanical contactors, at least two of which would be arranged in series with the motor. The contactors are typically provided with auxiliary monitoring contacts so that an incorrect position of the main contacts of one contactor could be detected, and completion of the circuit prevented by disconnecting both coils of the electromagnets of the contactors.
Recently, solid-state controllers that drive an inverter to convert the d.c. supply into a phased set of a.c. supplies to produce a rotating magnetic field in the motor have been equipped with safety-related inputs. The inputs allow the operation of the motor to be prevented by electronic means.
In order to maintain torque in the motor, continual active and co-ordinated switching in the required sequence of the corresponding power semiconductors is needed. Should erroneous conduction of one or more of the power semiconductor devices of the inverter occur, this does not result in sustained torque in the motor. For a motor with a smooth (non salient) rotor, no torque is produced by any failure of a power semiconductor device of the inverter. For a motor with permanent magnets and/or saliency, a pair of short circuit power semiconductor devices in the inverter could cause a brief alignment torque whereby the motor partially rotates, however, the current would increase rapidly until interrupted by a protection device (for example a fuse) or destructive failure of at least one of the power semiconductor devices.
As a further example, in power grid-connected power generating inverter applications, the same principles apply when the inverter drives a transformer rather than a motor. Erroneous conduction of power semiconductor devices of the inverter cannot produce an alternating flux in the transformer, and therefore cannot produce a sustained output from the transformer secondary coil. In other words, a fault in the inverter power device results in direct current, which cannot be transferred through the transformer because the transformer relies upon alternating current for its operation.
In order for safe and reliable control of such an inverter, an interface is required between the inverter control input terminals which typically use logic signals such as 24V d.c. and the power semiconductors of the inverter that maintains the required low probability of dangerous failure of the inverter.
Electromechanical relays have been used to provide the necessary electrical isolation and electrical level conversion for such an interface. However, relays possess relatively high probabilities of failure in the dangerous direction and have a relatively short time before mechanical wearout. This results in pairs of relays being used accompanied by monitoring to detect fault conditions.
Recently, generation of the power semiconductor control signals for operating the inverter is typically carried out by complex digital electronic circuits and programmable digital processors. Such an arrangement does not provide the required low probability of dangerous failure as most digital circuits can fail with equal probability into either of the available logic states. Further, the complexity of the digital circuits and functions is such that it is difficult to reliably and confidently demonstrate a sufficiently low probability of dangerous failure under all combinations of conditions and sequences of conditions that the circuit may be subjected to during operation. For example, it may be difficult to predict how the circuit reacts under changeable temperature conditions together with each and every possible sequence of combinations of logic levels on each and every pin of the various devices of the circuit.
If complex digital electronic circuits and programmable circuits are to be employed in safety critical functions, typically, at least two independent channels together with diagnostic and cross-checking functions to detect faults or errors are used. These systems allow the disabling of an inverter by way of a channel that is not affected by a particular fault that has been detected. As can be seen, even in such systems, means for disabling the inverter which do not rely on the complex circuits needs to be provided in order to achieve the required low probability of dangerous failure.
It is therefore desirable to have a fail-safe interface, in particular, to an inverter, which employs simple electronic components with well-defined failure modes. In such an interface, it is desired that a very high fraction of component faults, and combinations of component faults, result in a safe failure. In other words, a failure where the inverter is not provided with the required waveform, and hence a motor connected to the inverter is not driven.
The same approach applies to power generators using inverters, in cases where under certain conditions, it is necessary to prevent the operation of the inverter with a high level of integrity. This could be, for example, when the part of a public power distribution network fed by an inverter has become separated from the main body of the power network and must be disabled.
This section provides a general summary of the disclosure, and is not a comprehensive disclosure of its full scope or all of its features.
According to a first aspect of the present disclosure there is provided a fail-safe interface circuit as defined in claim 1 of the appended claims. Thus there is provided a fail-safe interface circuit arranged to provide an inverter enable input to drive an inverter, the circuit being supplied by a first voltage and comprising: a charge pump comprising a charge pump input and a charge pump output, the charge pump output being coupled to a circuit output; and a pulsed input arranged to supply pulsed power to the charge pump input; wherein the charge pump output is arranged to produce a second voltage distinct from the first voltage only when the pulsed input is supplying pulsed power to the charge pump input, and wherein the circuit output is arranged to provide the inverter enable input when the second voltage is produced at the charge pump output.
Optionally, the pulsed input is supplied by the first voltage.
Optionally, the polarity of the second voltage is opposite to the polarity of the pulsed input.
Optionally, the magnitude of the second voltage is greater than a peak magnitude of the pulsed input.
Optionally, the circuit is further arranged to provide a second inverter enable input to drive the inverter, the circuit being further supplied by a third voltage, the circuit further comprising: a second charge pump comprising a second charge pump input and a second charge pump output, the second charge pump output being coupled to a second circuit output; and a second pulsed input arranged to supply pulsed power to the second charge pump input; wherein the second charge pump output is arranged to produce a fourth voltage distinct from the third voltage only when the second pulsed input is supplying pulsed power to the second charge pump input, and wherein the circuit output and the second circuit output are arranged to provide the first and second inverter enable inputs respectively when the second and fourth voltages are produced at the respective first and second charge pump outputs. Optionally, the second pulsed input is supplied by the third voltage.
Optionally, the polarity of the third voltage is opposite to the polarity of the second pulsed input.
Optionally, the magnitude of the third voltage is greater than a peak magnitude of the second pulsed input.
Optionally, at least one isolator device is arranged to produce the inverter enable input when coupled between the circuit output and the inverter input.
Optionally, at least one isolator device is arranged to produce the second inverter enable input when coupled between the second circuit output and the second inverter enable input.
Optionally, the isolator devices comprise electromagnetic devices, for example opto-isolators.
Optionally, the inverter comprises a polyphase inverter.
Optionally, the inverter is arranged to drive a motor.
Optionally, the first and second voltages are of opposite polarity and/or of different magnitude.
Optionally, the third and fourth voltages are of opposite polarity and/or of different magnitude.
Optionally, the second and fourth voltages are of different magnitude and/or of different polarity.
Optionally, the first, second, third and fourth voltages are each of different magnitude.
Optionally, the fail-safe interface is a fail-safe interface of the inverter.
According to a second aspect of the present disclosure there is provided a method of providing a fail-safe interface as defined in claim 21 of the appended claims. Thus there is provided a method of providing a fail-safe interface, the method providing an inverter input to drive an inverter, the method comprising: providing a first voltage to a charge pump, the charge pump comprising a charge pump input and a charge pump output; coupling the charge pump output to a circuit output; supplying the charge pump input with pulsed power from a pulsed input and thereby producing a second voltage at the charge pump output, the second voltage being distinct from the first voltage; and providing the inverter input via the circuit output when the second voltage is produced at the charge pump output.
Further aspects and areas of applicability will become apparent from the description provided herein. It should be understood that various aspects of this disclosure may be implemented individually or in combination with one or more other aspects. It should also be understood that the description and specific examples herein are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure.
The drawings described herein are for illustrative purposes only of selected embodiments and not all possible implementations, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure.
Corresponding reference numerals indicate corresponding parts throughout the several views of the drawings.
In overview, a fail-safe interface 1a, denoted by the left hand side of the dotted line of
The circuit is arranged so that when the enable input 17 is in the disable state, no failure can result in the charge pump 15 producing the terminal outputs 10. With no terminal output, even if an attempt is made to switch an isolator 12 in the required sequence for the inverter 13, for example by a PWM 19, the isolator cannot produce an output due to the arrangement of the isolator 12 and the terminal output 10.
Accordingly, a single channel fail-safe interface is provided where the channel 2 can be enabled and disabled. The channel 2 comprises the safety-related parts for the fail-safe interface as will be discussed further herein.
In
It is clear therefore that either one channel (
A solid-state drive which operates an AC motor or a brushless DC motor (a type of AC motor) is particularly suited to the fail-safe interface where the drive uses an inverter 13 to convert the DC supply into a phased set of AC supplies to produce a rotating magnetic field in the motor 14.
Example embodiments will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Enable/Disable Function of Terminal Outputs 10, 11
The pulse train input provided at T2 is connected to an input of an amplifier A1. The amplifier A1 is such that it provides sufficient current to supply the output load, and may comprise an integrated amplifier, the output stage of an opto-coupler, or an amplifier comprised of discrete components of a conventional design. For example, the amplifier may be a push-pull complimentary emitter follower using bipolar transistors. In the present arrangement, the amplifier A1 is configured to be powered by a negative DC power supply voltage −V which is connected across terminals T3 (ground) and T4 of
The output of amplifier A1 is connected to a charge pump comprising capacitors C1, C2 and diodes D1, D2. A first plate of the capacitor C1 is coupled to the output of the amplifier A1. A second plate of the capacitor C1 is coupled to both a cathode of diode D1 and an anode of diode D2. An anode of diode D1 is coupled to the ground line T1/T3, and a cathode of diode D2 is coupled to output terminal T5. The capacitor C2 is coupled between the terminal T5 and the ground line T1/T3. When the T2 pulse train is generating its peak output, i.e. a negative voltage, the amplifier A1 outputs a negative voltage −V to the first plate of the capacitor C1. As the diode D1 is coupled between the ground line T1/T3 and the second plate of the capacitor C1, the negative voltage −V provided by the amplifier A1 to the capacitor C1 therefore generates a potential V across the capacitor C1 due to the potential difference between the ground line T1/T3 and the output of the amplifier A1. The capacitor C1 is therefore charged as would be understood.
After the charging of C1, when the T2 pulse train is providing its zero output, the potential difference V across the capacitor C1 “pumps” a positive voltage output +V to a forward-biased diode D2 that connects to output terminal T5. The terminal T5 is the terminal output 10 of
In the arrangement of
After the charging of C1, when the T2 pulse train is providing its zero output, the potential difference V across C1 “pumps” a positive voltage output +V to the forward-biased diode D1 that connects to the ground line T1/T3. This results in a potential between output terminals T3 and T5 of V. However, since the ground line T1/T3 is held at ground level, T5 is therefore at a potential of −V relative to T3 in order to maintain the potential V across the terminals T3 and T5. In the arrangement of
In the arrangements of
In this arrangement, the pulse train provided by T2 is of positive pulses such that its peak voltage output is a positive voltage. Due to this, when the pulse train is generating its peak output, the amplifier A1 also outputs a positive voltage +V. The output of the amplifier A1 is connected to a charge pump of the same configuration as the charge pump of
In the arrangement of
When the T2 pulse train is providing its zero output, a potential V is generated across the capacitor C1 due to the potential difference between the T4 supply line (+V) and the output of the amplifier A1 (zero, or ground potential). The capacitor C1 is charged as would be understood. It is important to note that, even though the diodes D1 and D2 in the arrangement of
When the T2 pulse train is providing its positive peak output, the output of the amplifier A1 provides a voltage +V to the capacitor C1. The combination of the T4 supply line and the potential difference V across the capacitor C1 is such that a voltage of 2*V (minus any inherent losses in the system) is output at terminal T5, as would be understood. The arrangement of
Since the driven circuit requires a potential greater than that provided by the input power supply across the terminals T4 and T3, and since the power supplied by T3 is the highest power supply of the system, there are no failure modes that can occur in the event of a component fault. Any fault in the components would result in the charge pump failing, and therefore the boost potential required to operate the driven circuits would not be provided by T5.
As for the arrangement of
In the arrangement of
When the T2 pulse train is providing its positive peak output, the output of the amplifier A1 provides a voltage +V to the capacitor C1. Since the capacitor C1 is coupled to the negative supply rail T6, which provides a negative potential −V, the potential across the capacitor is −2*V. The capacitor C1 is charged as would be understood.
When the T2 pulse train is providing its zero output, the potential difference between the output of the amplifier A1 (0) and T5 is −2*V as this is the potential across the capacitor C1. Therefore, a voltage of −2*V (minus any inherent losses in the system) is output at terminal T5, as would be understood. The arrangement of
As in
Any of the individual arrangements of
In all of the above arrangements, the frequency and duty cycle of the pulse train T2 can be adjusted such that the successive charging and discharging of the capacitor C1 produces a continuous positive (
In the above charge pumps, a resistor in series with C1 may be present, as would be understood, to limit the peak current flowing into the capacitor C1.
An optional capacitor C2 is provided across the terminals T3 and T5 (
If the pulse train signal T2 fails in any of the above arrangements, then the input T2 is either in a stuck high state, a stuck low state or a tri-state and no terminal output 10, 11 can be produced by charging and discharging the capacitor C1. Further, in the event of any static fault in the amplifier A1 or any circuits driving it which also results in a stuck high or stuck low state, the terminal outputs 10, 11 also cannot be produced by charging and discharging the capacitor C1. In each failure mode, the required charge/discharge cycle is broken and hence the T5 supply would fail.
In can be seen that the above arrangements provide a safe (inhibited) condition of an inverter in the event of a large number of component faults, thereby eliminating all plausible unsafe failure modes. This is due to the charge pumps of
Fail-Safe Inverter Disable Input
As can be seen, the LED of the opto-isolator can be illuminated only when the terminal output 10 is appropriately enabled by the corresponding enable input 17. Even if the PWM 19 attempts to couple the LED to terminal output 10, the isolator 12 cannot provide an output without terminal output 10 providing the appropriate output.
Should the isolator 12 be coupled to a power semiconductor of an inverter 13, then it is clear that, without the terminal output 10 of appropriate polarity and/or magnitude, the power semiconductor cannot be driven, and hence the inverter cannot provide the required waveform to a connected motor 14. In
Any isolator 12 or other device connected in a manner corresponding to
With a three-phase inverter bridge 13, as shown in
An example of such a two channel fail-safe control is shown in
As shown, the two independent channels 2, 3 each control the terminal output for three of the six power semiconductor devices of inverter 13. Independence of the two channels is obtained by segregating the components of
The top three power semiconductors of the inverter may be controlled by three isolators 12 coupled to terminal output 10 by three corresponding switching devices 60 (only one such isolator is shown for clarity), and the bottom three power semiconductors of the inverter may be controlled by three isolators 12 coupled to terminal output 11 by three corresponding switching devices (only one such isolator is shown for clarity).
With such a two-channel arrangement, both enable inputs 17, 18 must be in the enabled state for the appropriate corresponding terminal output 10, 11 to be produced which, in turn, allows the isolator to produce an output to drive the corresponding power semiconductor of the inverter. A cross-check can be performed between the separate enable outputs 17, 18 for indication of a malfunction. Any mismatch between the two channels and the fail-safe interface could be shutdown.
The isolators 12 are illustrated as opto-isolators. However, alternative isolators comprising transformers or capacitance coupling arrangements could also be employed in the fail-safe interface.
Failure Modes
Various potential failure modes will now be described where a dangerous fault could affect the integrity of the fail-safe interface. It will be shown that no fault can reduce the integrity of the enable/disable function, thereby providing the ability to disable an inverter drive with high integrity.
All components in the charge pumps 15, 16 shown in
The charge pumps are arranged so that there are no component faults within the charge pumps or amplifier A1 that could cause inadvertent output to the terminal output 10, 11 (T5) which is sufficient to operate the driven circuit. Transfer of power to each terminal output 10, 11 relies upon the operation of the charge pump, since either the terminal outputs 10, 11 require a voltage of an opposite polarity to the input power supply (
As has been disclosed herein, there is provided a fail-safe interface which allows low-level control signals 17 and/or 18 to reliably enable and disable the power semiconductor devices 13 of an inverter drive. The following advantages are realised:
In the single channel embodiment of
In the two channel embodiment of
In the embodiment where the two channels produce terminal outputs of opposite polarity, no other circuit can exhibit a fault that is able to cause one terminal output to be energised because the other is energised. In this embodiment, if an energised terminal output were to leak onto an unenergised terminal output, the isolators 12 on the unenergised terminal output would require a terminal output of opposing polarity to that provided by the leaking terminal output in order to be biased correctly for operation. When opposing terminal output polarities are used, the PCB layout discipline when both channels are positioned on the same circuit board may therefore be relaxed as even if one terminal output leaks onto the other, erroneous isolator 12 output cannot occur.
The single or two channel fail-safe interface can be used with many inverter designs, and further, the portions of the overall circuit arranged to control the inverter drive need not be assessed in detail for their failure effects as they will have no effect on the integrity of the fail-safe function of the channels 2 and/or the channel 3.
All of the safety-related parts of the channels 2 and/or the channel 3 may be common electronic components for which mature failure rate data exists, and for which the failure modes are well-defined.
When coupled to an inverter bridge 13 via an isolator 12, no single component failure and no combination of two independent component failures can result in unintended production of appropriate polarity voltage at the terminal output 10 and/or the terminal output 11, or in unintended production of voltage of sufficient magnitude at these terminal outputs, and hence unintended production of torque in the motor 14.
Described herein is a fail-safe interface comprising a safe and reliable enable function provided by way of discrete components with well-defined failure modes. The interface does not require complex circuits or architecture, nor electro-mechanical devices that are inherently unreliable, have a short life expectancy, and are expensive.
The foregoing description of the embodiments has been provided for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the disclosure. Individual elements or features of a particular embodiment are generally not limited to that particular embodiment, but, where applicable, are interchangeable and can be used in a selected embodiment, even if not specifically shown or described. The same may also be varied in many ways. For example, more than two channels could be combined to provide a higher degree of cross-checking. Such variations are not to be regarded as a departure from the disclosure, and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scope of the disclosure.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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1421503.2 | Dec 2014 | GB | national |