Authentication has become a complex problem for modern day networks. For example, a request from an unknown computing device often cannot be properly handled until the unknown computing device is identified. In some cases, a trusted authority, such as a certificate authority, is leveraged to verify a computing device's identity. The trusted authority may issue a credential, such as a digital certificate, to a computing device and the credential may be used by the computing device for authentication purposes. Technologies, such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor, Transport Layer Security (TLS), leverage digital certificates and are available to increase the authentication capabilities of a system. However, implementing a full SSL/TLS system, or other complex authentication systems, can be cumbersome and costly.
The following summary is for illustrative purposes only, and is not intended to limit or constrain the detailed description.
In some embodiments, a credential may be retrieved from a trusted authority, for example a certificate authority. The credential may be used to generate first authentication information and second authentication information, for example a user name and a password. The user name may comprise the credential retrieved from the trusted authority, where the credential includes a public key. The password may comprise a digitally signed version of the user name, where the digital signature is based on a private key. The user name and password may be transmitted to an authentication computing device.
In some embodiments, first authentication information and second authentication information may be received from a computing device requesting authentication, where the first authentication information and second authentication information comprise a user name and password. The user name may be converted and a credential that includes a public key may be extracted from the user name. The password may be decoded and may be decrypted based on the public key extracted from the user name. The user name and password may be authenticated by comparing the decrypted password to the extracted credential. If the comparison results in a match, the computing device may be authenticated.
In some embodiments, the user name comprises supplemental information concatenated to the retrieved credential. The supplemental information may comprise a time stamp generated at the time the user name is generated. The time stamp may be extracted from the user name. After the user name and password are compared, the time stamp may be verified in order to complete authentication. The time stamp may be verified by comparing the extracted time stamp to previously received time stamps for that computing device. If the extracted time stamp is different from the previously received time stamps for the computing device, the extracted time stamp may be confirmed.
As noted above, this Summary is merely a summary of some of the features described herein. It is not exhaustive, and it is not to be a limitation on the claims. Further embodiments are described below.
Aspects of the present disclosure are described by way of example with respect to the accompanying figures in which like numerals indicate similar elements.
In the following description, reference is made to the accompanying figures, in which are shown various illustrative embodiments. It is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized and structural and functional modifications may be made, without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.
There may be one link 101 originating from the local office 103, and it may be split a number of times to distribute the signal to various premises 102 in the vicinity (which may be many miles) of the local office 103. The links 101 may include components (not illustrated) such as splitters, filters, amplifiers, etc. to help convey the signal clearly, but in general each split introduces a bit of signal degradation. Portions of the links 101 may also be implemented with fiber-optic cable, while other portions may be implemented with coaxial cable, other lines, or wireless communication paths. By running fiber optic cable along some portions, for example, signal degradation may be significantly minimized, allowing a single local office 103 to reach even farther with its network of links 101 than before.
The local office 103 may include an interface, such as a termination system (TS) 104. More specifically, the interface 104 may be a cable modem termination system (CMTS), which may be a computing device configured to manage communications between devices on the network of links 101 and backend devices such as servers 105-107 (to be discussed further below). The interface 104 may be as specified in a standard, such as the Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) standard, published by Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. (a.k.a. CableLabs), or it may be a similar or modified device instead. The interface 104 may be configured to place data on one or more downstream frequencies to be received by modems at the various premises 102, and to receive upstream communications from those modems on one or more upstream frequencies.
The local office 103 may also include one or more network interfaces 108, which can permit the local office 103 to communicate with various other external networks 109. These external networks 109 may include, for example, networks of Internet devices, telephone networks, cellular telephone networks, fiber optic networks, local wireless networks (e.g., WiMAX), satellite networks, and any other desired network. The network interface 108 may include the corresponding circuitry needed to communicate on the external networks 109, and to other devices on the network such as a cellular telephone network and its corresponding cell phones.
As noted above, the local office 103 may include a variety of servers 105-107 that may be configured to perform various functions. For example, the local office 103 may include a push notification server 105. The push notification server 105 may generate push notifications to deliver data and/or commands to the various premises 102 in the network (or more specifically, to the devices in the premises 102 that are configured to detect such notifications). The local office 103 may also include a content server 106. The content server 106 may be one or more computing devices that are configured to provide content to users at their premises. This content may be, for example, video on demand movies, television programs, songs, text listings, etc. The content server 106 may include software to validate user identities and entitlements, to locate and retrieve requested content, to encrypt the content, and to initiate delivery (e.g., streaming) of the content to the requesting user(s) and/or device(s).
The local office 103 may also include one or more application servers 107. An application server 107 may be a computing device configured to offer any desired service, and may run various languages and operating systems (e.g., servlets and JSP pages running on Tomcat/MySQL, OSX, BSD, Ubuntu, Red Hat, HTML5, JavaScript, AJAX and COMET). For example, an application server may be responsible for collecting television program listings information and generating a data download for electronic program guide listings. Another application server may be responsible for monitoring user viewing habits and collecting that information for use in selecting advertisements. Yet another application server may be responsible for formatting and inserting advertisements in a video stream being transmitted to the premises 102. Although shown separately, one of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the push notification server 105, content server 106, and application server 107 may be combined. Further, here the push notification server 105, content server 106, and application server 107 are shown generally, and it will be understood that they may each contain memory storing computer executable instructions to cause a processor to perform steps described herein and/or memory for storing data.
An example premises 102a, such as a home, may include an interface 118. The interface 118 can include any communication circuitry needed to allow a device to communicate on one or more links 101 with other devices in the network. For example, the interface 118 may include a modem 110, which may include transmitters and receivers used to communicate on the links 101 and with the local office 103. The modem 110 may be, for example, a coaxial cable modem (for coaxial cable lines 101), a fiber interface node (for fiber optic lines 101), twisted-pair telephone modem, cellular telephone transceiver, satellite transceiver, local Wi-Fi router or access point, or any other desired modem device. Also, although only one modem is shown in
The
One or more aspects of the disclosure may be embodied in computer-usable data and/or computer-executable instructions, such as in one or more program modules, executed by one or more computers or other devices. Program modules may include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc. that perform particular tasks or implement particular data types when executed by a processor in a computer or other data processing device. The computer executable instructions may be stored on one or more computer readable media such as a hard disk, optical disk, removable storage media, solid state memory, RAM, etc. In various embodiments, the functionality of the program modules may be combined or distributed across multiple computing devices. In addition, the functionality over the various embodiments described herein may be embodied in whole or in part in firmware or hardware equivalents such as integrated circuits, field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), and the like.
An example system of authenticating a computing device is described further below with reference to
In an example, computing device 301 may comprise customer premises equipment 102a from
In some embodiments, computing device 301 and authenticating computing device 306 implement a public key cryptography system. For example, public key 304 and private key 305 may comprise a set of asymmetric keys. When data is encrypted using private key 305, public key 304 may be used to decrypt the data. For example, a digital signature for computing device 301 may comprise hashing data prior to transmission, e.g., based on a 256-bit secure hash algorithm (SHA), and then encrypting the digest of the hash with private key 305. The digital signature may be decrypted using public key 304. Any other suitable hashing algorithm (e.g., SHA-224, any hash algorithm published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, etc.) may be used.
An example process of authenticating a computing device is described further below in
In some embodiments, trusted authority 303 comprises a certificate authority (e.g., Symantec®, VeriSign®, Entrust®, DigiCert®, etc.) that issues digital certificates to entities (e.g., a computing device). The digital certificate may comprise an X.509 v3 digital certificate that includes a public key and metadata about the entity issued the certificate. The digital certificate may be used to bind the public key included in the digital certificate with the entity described by the metadata in the digital certificate. For example, credential 302 may comprise a digital certificate that binds public key 304 with computing device 301.
A digital certificate may also be used to authenticate a digital signature from an unknown sender based on public key verification. A digital signature may comprise a hash digest that is encrypted using a private key. Data digitally signed by computing device 301 using private key 305 may be authenticated based on credential 302. For example, a digital certificate for computing device 301 (e.g., credential 302) may include public key 304, which may be used to decrypt a digital signature for computing device 301.
In some embodiments, at step 401, computing device 301 is issued a credential 302 (e.g., digital certificate) from trusted authority 303 (e.g., certificate authority). For example, a pair of asymmetric keys (e.g., public key 304 and private key 305) may be generated for computing device 301. During this generation, a certificate signing request (CSR) may also be generated. The CSR may comprise the generated public key 304 and additional identification information (e.g., a business/organization name, a department name, a location (town/city), etc.). For instance, the CSR may be formatted according to one or more syntaxes commonly known in the art (e.g., PKCS #10 Specification, SPKAC, etc.). After generation, the CSR may be forwarded to trusted authority 303.
In some embodiments, trusted authority 303 replies to the CSR by sending a digital certificate (e.g., credential 302) corresponding to the CSR. The digital certificate may comprise information included in the CSR (e.g., public key 304 and additional identification information) that has been digitally signed by the trusted authority. The digital certificate (e.g., credential 302) and the generated private key (e.g., private key 305) may then be stored in a storage device at computing device 301. In some embodiments, credential 302 may comprise any type of credential that includes a public key (e.g., a public key with accompanying metadata, a digital certificate, etc.)
In some embodiments, trusted authority 303 (e.g., certificate authority) may generate credential 302 (e.g., digital certificate) and send the generated certificate to computing device 301. For example, trusted authority 303 may generate public key 304, private key 305, and credential 302 and subsequently send the generated keys and credential to computing device 301. In this embodiment, the generated certificate may be sent to the computing device as part of a PKCS #12 bundle.
An example digital certificate in human readable format is illustrated below:
After step 401, the process may proceed to step 402, where a user name is generated based on retrieved credential 302. In an example, the user name may comprise retrieved credential 302 (e.g., digital certificate). In some embodiments, step 402 of
In some embodiments, supplemental information is used to verify an authentication request. For example, the supplemental information may comprise a time stamp that indicates a timing for the authentication request. In another example, the supplemental information may comprise a random number.
The process of
In an example, a user name generated by the process of
The process of
The process of
The process of
In an example, a password generated by the process of
The process of
The process of
From step 702A the process of
The process of
In some embodiments, the password may be received encoded in a Base64 scheme. In an example, the password may be decoded from the radix-64 representation to a binary representation. In some embodiments, the password may be received in various forms and any suitable means may be implemented to convert the received password to binary form. The process may move from step 702B to step 703B, where the received password is decrypted based on the extracted key (e.g., public key).
In an example, a computing device (e.g., computing device 301) may have encrypted the received password with a private key for the computing device (e.g., private key 305). In addition, the extracted credential (e.g., credential 302) may comprise a digital certificate that has been issued to the computing device (e.g., computing device 301) that transmitted the user name and password. In some embodiments, the public key for the computing device (e.g., public key 304) extracted from the credential (e.g., credential 302) may be used to decrypt the password that has been previously encrypted with the private key for the computing device (e.g., private key 305). The conversion illustrated in
The process of
The digital signature may be authenticated by comparing the decrypted password with a hashed version of the user name. For instance, the user name may be hashed according to SHA-256 and the digest of the hash may be compared to the decrypted password. If the comparison indicates a match, the result may indicate a positive authentication. If the comparison does not indicate a match, the result may indicate a failed authentication.
In some embodiments, a positive authentication is not indicated until the extracted credential (e.g., digital certificate) is validated. In an example, authentication computing device 306 may communicate with trusted authority 303 (e.g., certificate authority) to verify the validity of the extracted credential. The verification may include determining if the credential has been revoked. In an example, authentication computing device 306 may verify a path for the credential. For instance, it may be verified that the credential was issued by a trusted authority (e.g., trusted authority 303, certificate authority, etc.). In an example, authentication computing device 306 may consult with one or more outside sources to determine the validity of the credential. For instance, the other sources consulted may comprise directory 307, database 308, and any other suitable computing device (e.g., computing device 309). In an example, authentication computing device 306 may inspect fields and data in the credential to determine the validity of the credential. In some embodiments, if the credential is not properly validated, the authentication computing device 306 may indicate a failed authentication.
In some embodiments, a positive authentication is not indicated until supplemental information received from the computing device requesting authentication (e.g., computing device 301) is confirmed. In an example, the supplemental information may comprise a time stamp and the time stamp may be included in the user name. At authentication computing device 306, the time stamp may be extracted from the user name, for instance, at step 703A of
The process may proceed from step 604 to step 605, where supplemental information received from the computing device requesting authentication (e.g., computing device 301) is confirmed. In some embodiments, the supplemental information may comprise a time stamp. At step 703A of
In some embodiments, the time stamp is validated based on accessing a database that stores authentication data about computing device authentications. In an example, a database may store data about the authentications performed by authentication computing device 306. The database may be stored at authentication computing device 306 or may be operatively connected to authentication computing device 306. For example, for a positive authentication, the database may store a time stamp provided from the positively authenticated computing device in association with the credential used during authentication. In some embodiments, the database stores a portion of the credential and/or a portion of the time stamp. In some embodiments, the database stores a MAC address for the positively authenticated computing device in association with the time stamp. While a credential and a MAC address are described, the database may store any suitable identifying information for the positively authenticated computing device in association with the time stamp.
In some embodiments, validating a time stamp comprises accessing the database that stores authentication data and comparing information stored in the database with the time stamp. In an example, the computing device requesting authentication is looked up in the database, for instance, based on the credential received from the computing device, a MAC address for the computing device, or any other suitable identifying information. If a database entry is not found for the computing device, the timestamp is confirmed.
If a database entry is found for the computing device, the extracted time stamp is compared to the time stamp stored in the database for the computing device. If the extracted time stamp is chronologically before the stored time stamp, the time stamp is not confirmed and the computing device fails authentication. In some embodiments, if the extracted time stamp is identical to the stored time stamp, the time stamp is not confirmed and the computing device fails authentication. If the extracted time stamp is chronologically after the stored time stamp, the time stamp is confirmed. In some embodiments, the time stamp is confirmed when a duration between the extracted time stamp and the stored time stamp is greater than a predetermined threshold.
After the time stamp is confirmed, the database may store an entry for the positively authenticated computing device comprising identifying information for the positively authenticated computing device (e.g., a credential, a MAC address, etc.) in association with the confirmed time stamp. The database may store a predetermined number of confirmed time stamps (e.g., the last five previously confirmed time stamps). In some embodiments, authentication computing device 306 is configured to ignore time stamps and the authentication process does not include verifying the time stamp.
In some embodiments, the supplemental information comprises a randomly generated number and the randomly generated number is confirmed. In an example, the user name received from the computing device requesting authentication (e.g., computing device 301) comprises a credential and a randomly generated number. At step 703A of
In an example, a computing device requesting authentication is looked up in the database, for instance, based on the credential received from the computing device, a MAC address for the computing device, or any other suitable identifying information. If a database entry is not found for the computing device, the randomly generated number is confirmed.
If a database entry is found for the computing device, the extracted randomly generated number is compared to the randomly generated number stored in the database for the computing device. If the extracted randomly generated number is equal to the randomly generated number stored in the database, the randomly generated number is not confirmed and the computing device is not authenticated. If the extracted randomly generated number is not equal to the randomly generated number stored in the database, the randomly generated number is confirmed and the computing device is authenticated.
In some embodiments, a user name may comprise any credential that includes a public key and a password may comprise any information that is known to an authenticating entity (e.g., authenticating computing device 306) and that is encrypted by a private key corresponding to the public key from the user name. In such an embodiment, the authenticating entity (e.g. authenticating computing device 306) may authenticate the username and password by decrypting the password based on the public key included in the user name. This decrypted password may then be verified against the information known to the authenticating entity.
In some embodiments, a user name may comprise any credential that includes a public key and any additional information and a password may comprise any portion of the user name encrypted with a private key corresponding to the public key from the user name. In such an embodiment, the authenticating entity (e.g. authenticating computing device 306) may authenticate the username and password by decrypting the password based on the public key included in the user name. This decrypted password may then be verified against the corresponding portion of the received user name. In embodiments described above, the password comprises an encrypted user name but the password may comprise any portion of the user name that is encrypted.
Although example embodiments are described above, the various features and steps may be combined, divided, omitted, and/or augmented in any desired manner, depending on the specific outcome and/or application. Various alterations, modifications, and improvements will readily occur to those skilled in art. Such alterations, modifications, and improvements as are made obvious by this disclosure are intended to be part of this description though not expressly stated herein, and are intended to be within the spirit and scope of the disclosure. Accordingly, the foregoing description is by way of example only, and not limiting. This disclosure is limited only as defined in the following claims and equivalents thereto.
This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 16/562,066, filed Sep. 5, 2019, which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/693,549, filed Sep. 1, 2017, now U.S. Pat. No. 10,484,364, which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 13/826,777, filed Mar. 14, 2013, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,787,669, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.
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Child | 15693549 | US |