Patent Grant
8918644
The present disclosure relates to imparting real-time priority-based network communications in an encrypted communication session.
A computer network is a collection of processing nodes coupled together with wired and/or wireless communication links. A computer network can be a single network or a collection of networks (e.g., an internetwork), and can use multiple networking protocols, including internetworking protocols (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP)). These protocols define the manner in which information is prepared for transmission through the network, and typically involve breaking data into segments generically known as packets (e.g., IP packets, ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) cells) for transmission. These networking protocols are typically organized by a network architecture having multiple layers, where a layer provides communication services to the layer above it. The protocols can include shared-line protocols such as in Ethernet networks, connection-oriented switching protocols such as in ATM networks, and/or connectionless packet-switched protocols such as in IP.
Many computer networks use connectionless packet-switched protocols (e.g., IP). Packets are routed separately and can thus take different paths through the network. Various protocols have been built on top of connectionless packet-switched protocols, such as IP, to provide connection based communications over the underlying connectionless protocol. For example, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), of the TCP/Internet Protocol (IP) protocol stack, sets up a connection at both ends of a communication and attaches a header to the packets that contains the source and destination ports as well as the sequence number of the packet and other administrative information. The destination typically receives a number of TCP packets before sending an acknowledgement to the source. If the acknowledgment fails, the source will generally presume the packets were lost and retransmit those packets. This process ensures reliable delivery.
Another protocol, UDP is connectionless and unreliable, meaning that the protocol does not establish a connection at both ends and does not include a resource for resending lost packets. Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) operates as a thin layer on top of UDP to create a generalized multipurpose real-time transport protocol. RTP provides support for applications with real-time properties including reconstruction, loss detection, security, and content identification without reliability-induced delays associated with TCP. Real-Time Control Protocol (RTCP) works in conjunction with RTP to provide control support to an application for maintaining an RTP session.
The interactions of various aspects of networks can be complex. Many applications use RTP for transporting media streams. RTP is built over UDP, which generally has no fixed ports associated with it. Firewalls can prevent unauthorized and/or hostile access to a computer system or network. As such, firewalls are generally configured with strict rules specifying static ports through which desired and/or authorized data traffic can pass, while blocking undesirable data. There is no guarantee that a port associated with an incoming RTP/UDP stream will be allowed through the firewall. In addition, NAT devices, which can allow a network to support many more clients than it has fixed IP addresses, are used to translate an IP address used within one network to a different IP address known within another network.
This specification describes technologies relating to imparting real-time priority-based network communications in an encrypted communication session. In general, one aspect of the subject matter described in this specification can be embodied in a method that includes establishing, based at least in part on cryptographic information in a pre-defined portion of a handshake network communication, a communication session to communicate a media stream, where the pre-defined portion of the handshake network communication is reserved for random data, receiving through the communication session, as part of the media stream, values of parameters relating to a sub media stream, included in a first header portion of a first real-time, priority-based network communication, storing the values of the parameters, obtaining through the communication session, as part of the media stream, state information included in a control portion of a second real-time, priority-based network communication and a data payload included in the second network communication, identifying, from the state information, a purpose of the second network communication in relation to the media stream, and whether a second header portion of the second network communication includes one or more new values corresponding to one or more of the parameters, updating, when the second header portion includes the one or more new values, one or more of the stored values based at least in part on the one or more new values, and processing the data payload based at least in part on the identified purpose and the stored values of the parameters.
In addition, another aspect of the described subject matter can be embodied in a method, where the sub media stream is a first sub media stream, that includes receiving through the encrypted communication session, as part of the media stream, real-time, priority-based network communications associated with a second sub media stream, where the network communications include state information and data payloads, decrypting the data payloads based at least in part on the cryptographic information, assembling a playable portion of the second sub media stream based at least in part on state information and the decrypted data payloads, and playing the assembled portion of the second sub media stream relative to a media type indicated by at least one of the stored values of the parameters. The first and second sub media streams can be the same sub media stream in some embodiments (e.g., both the video portion of a media stream) while in others the sub media streams are distinct (e.g., video and audio portions, respectively, of a media stream). Another aspect of the described subject matter can be embodied in a method that includes turning on or off a feature of a program operating in relation to the communication session based at least in part on the establishing of the communication session. Other embodiments of these aspects include corresponding systems, apparatuses, and computer program products.
These and other embodiments can optionally include one or more of the following features. Identifying the purpose can include identifying the purpose from a set of possible purposes including beginning a new sub media stream, the second header portion including sub media stream values corresponding to the parameters, indicating a new media type, the second header portion including the one or more values corresponding to fewer than all of the parameters, providing a new time, the second header portion including one new value corresponding to one of the parameters, and continuing the sub media stream, the second header portion not including new parameter values.
Establishing the communication session can include generating, using an incoming data portion from the handshake network communication, a responsive handshake network communication, including an outgoing data portion where the outgoing data portion includes at least one of random data and cryptographic information, and the incoming data portion includes at least one of random data and cryptographic information in the handshake network communication, communicating the generated responsive handshake network communication, receiving a second handshake network communication in response to the communicated responsive handshake network communication, and authenticating the second handshake network communication based on the outgoing data portion in the communicated responsive handshake network communication. In addition, establishing the communication session can include establishing a cryptographic key based at least in part on the cryptographic information, and initiating the communication session as an encrypted communication session based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
The described subject matter can also be embodied in a method that includes establishing, based at least in part on cryptographic information in a pre-defined portion of a handshake network communication, a communication session to communicate a media stream, where the pre-defined portion of the handshake network communication is reserved for random data and the media stream includes sub media streams, associating priority values with the sub media streams, generating a total priority value based on the priority values, calculating desired transmission proportions corresponding to the sub media streams based on the priority values and the total priority value, communicating a first set of real-time priority based network communications over the sub media streams, assessing sub media stream counts corresponding to the sub media streams based on the first set of network communications communicated in the sub media streams, summing a total count based on the sub media stream counts, determining actual transmission proportions corresponding to the sub media streams based on the sub media stream counts and the total count, figuring ratios corresponding to the sub media streams based on the desired transmission proportions and the actual transmission proportions, and storing the figured ratios. In addition, another aspect of the described subject matter can be embodied in a method that includes selecting a low-ratio sub media stream corresponding to a lowest of the ratios, queuing a second set of network communications to be communicated over the sub media streams, picking a low-ratio sub media stream network communication, associated with the low-ratio sub media stream, from the queued second set of network communications, and communicating the low-ratio sub media stream network communication over the low-ratio sub media stream.
According to another aspect, the described subject matter can also be embodied in a system including a server, programmed to establish encrypted sessions over a network with a client using a session startup handshake including a handshake network communication including a pre-defined portion reserved for random data, and the client, programmed to establish encrypted sessions with the server using the session startup handshake including cryptographic information in the pre-defined portion of the handshake network communication, where the server and the client are programmed to perform operations including establishing, based at least in part on the cryptographic information, an encrypted communication session to communicate a media stream, receiving through the communication session, as part of the media stream, values of parameters relating to a sub media stream, included in a first header portion of a first real-time, priority-based network communication, storing the values of the parameters, obtaining through the communication session, as part of the media stream, state information included in a control portion of a second real-time, priority-based network communication and a data payload included in the second network communication, identifying, from the state information, a purpose of the second network communication in relation to the media stream, and whether a second header portion of the second network communication includes one or more new values corresponding to one or more of the parameters, updating, when the second header portion includes the one or more new values, one or more of the stored values based at least in part on the one or more new values, and processing the data payload based at least in part on the identified purpose and the stored values of the parameters. The client can be a mobile device (such as a mobile phone, game machine, personal digital assistant, and laptop computer) and a stationary device (such as a workstation, desktop computer, and super computer). The operations can include the various operations of the method(s) described.
In another aspect, the described subject matter can also be embodied in a method including dividing sub media streams, making up media streams, into network communications, assigning states to the network communications representative of information regarding the associated sub media streams and the associated media streams, writing the states into headers of the network communications, queuing the network communications for transmission, and transmitting some of the network communications according to a scheduling process. Another aspect of the described subject matter can be embodied in a method that includes receiving the transmitted network communications, translating the states associated with the network communications into information regarding the associated sub media streams and the associated media streams, and reassembling the network communications into the associated sub media streams for replay of the media streams. In addition, an aspect can be embodied in a method that includes assigning a priority to each sub media stream, totaling a priority for each media stream, calculating a desired transmission proportion for each sub media stream using the assigned priority and the totaled priority, counting a sub-total of network communications transmitted per the sub media stream during a preset period, counting a total number of network communications transmitted during the preset period, calculating an actual transmission proportion for each sub media stream using the sub-total and the total, calculating a ratio between the desired transmission proportion and the actual transmission proportion, determining a sub media stream having a lowest ratio, checking a queue of the network communications for a network communication associated with the determined sub media stream, and transmitting the network communication associated with the determined sub media stream when found in the queue.
These and other embodiments can optionally include one or more of the following features. The states can indicate possible purposes of a corresponding network communication, and the possible purposes can include a new stream network communication associated with a new media message sub media stream where the new stream network communication includes new parameters in a corresponding header and has no parameters from a previous header, a new media network communication associated with a new media message sub media stream where the new media network communication has new parameters in a corresponding header and has at least one other parameter from a previous header, a new time network communication associated with the new media message sub media streams where the new time network communication has at least one new parameter in a corresponding header and uses other parameters from a previous header, and a continuation network communication having no new parameters in a corresponding header and has parameters from a previous header. Dividing can include maintaining a user-definable maximum payload size for the network communications. Assigning can include assigning a unique network communication identification parameter for associating the network communication with its sub media stream, and the unique network communication identification parameter can be smaller than a label associated with the sub media stream. Parameters can include one or more of a stream ID parameter, a length parameter, a media type parameter, and a time delta parameter. Queuing the network communications can include according to a media type of the network communication, where the media type includes is one of an audio format network communication, a video format network communication, and a data format network communication. The scheduling process can interleave the audio format network communications, the video format network communications, and the data format network communications according to an interleaving process. The scheduling process can include determining a sub media stream having a lowest ratio, checking the queue of the network communications for a network communication associated with the determined sub media stream, and transmitting the network communication associated with the determined sub media stream when found in the queue.
Another aspect of the subject matter described in this specification can be embodied in a method that includes identifying a location in a pre-defined portion of a network communication to be sent in a client-server environment, wherein the pre-defined portion of the network communication is reserved for random data, inserting cryptographic information into the pre-defined portion of the network communication at the location, and sending the network communication in the client-server environment to facilitate modifying interactions in the client-server environment based at least in part on a result of processing of the cryptographic information. In addition, another aspect of the described subject matter can be embodied in a method that includes receiving cryptographic information inserted into a pre-defined portion of a network communication in a client-server environment, wherein the pre-defined portion of the network communication is reserved for random data, identifying a location of the cryptographic information in the pre-defined portion of the network communication, processing the cryptographic information, and modifying interactions in the client-server environment based at least in part on a result of the processing of the cryptographic information. Other embodiments of these aspects include corresponding systems, apparatus, and computer program products.
These and other embodiments can optionally include one or more of the following features. Identifying the location can include using at least part of the network communication to determine the location. The pre-defined portion can include the random data, and using at least part of the network communication to determine the location can include retrieving a portion of the random data, and determining an index into the pre-defined portion of the network communication based on the retrieved portion of the random data. Moreover, using at least part of the network communication to determine the location can include retrieving multiple different portions of the random data and determining multiple different indices into the pre-defined portion of the network communication based on the different portions of the random data.
Processing the cryptographic information can include establishing a cryptographic key, and modifying interactions in the client-server environment can include initiating an encrypted session using the cryptographic key. In addition, processing the cryptographic information can include authenticating the network communication, and modifying interactions in the client-server environment can include turning on or off a feature of a program operating in the client-server environment.
Particular embodiments of the subject matter described in this specification can be implemented to realize one or more of the following advantages. Communication sessions can be established in which information providers (e.g., media stream distributors) are better able to ensure that consumers of the information comply with the terms of the information transfer. For example, advertising-based providers can advantageously assure that client applications used to access communication sessions include required advertising.
In addition, network communications corresponding to a communication session can be resistant to snooping by those not directly involved in the session. For example, a client can be a software application running in a browser while a remote server can communicate with the client over a network. Embodiments can avoid a user of the client or anyone intercepting the session traffic on the network from being able to interpret or use the communications without using the specific client to which the communication is directed.
In addition, embodiments can advantageously authenticate communication session participants. For example, so that both the client and server know the identity of the other. Knowing the identity can include assurance that a particular person is using the client or that a specific client or client type is being used. Also, the method can allow a server to detect that a given client is legitimate. Being legitimate can include adhering to communication session protocols or being an authorized client implementation.
In addition, embodiments can ensure that when network communications are altered during transmission, the alteration is detected. For example, a server can send a network communication to a client. An intercepting party can alter the network communication (e.g., inserting spam) and then pass the communication to the client. Upon receipt, the client can detect the alteration, thus avoiding undesirable exposure to spam, phishing attacks, viruses, or other malicious or benign alterations.
In addition, embodiments can overcome the often considerable complexities of balancing the demanding nature of streaming media with security, system administration and computer performance issues. Embodiments can allow each area to work together to permit a feasible, scalable and practical implementation. Embodiments can also advantageously provide backwards compatibility with existing non-encrypted, non-authenticated session establishment protocols.
Encrypted sessions can be established using a method that reduces the risk of reverse engineering. Credentials can be established using the method, which credentials can be used to start an encrypted session, or to verify various other pieces of information. The method can resist reverse engineering since the credentials can be, in essence, hidden in plain sight within data that has been used for bandwidth detection. Moreover, the data (with cryptographic information hidden therein) can still be used for other purposes, such as for bandwidth detection or for holding other information.
Other embodiments can be implemented to realize advantages from breaking media streams into smaller network communications such as smooth delivery of each of the sub media streams and smooth playback of the entire stream (e.g., allowing small but more time-sensitive audio messages to be interleaved with much larger but less time-sensitive video messages so that the overall stream can be played back in a pleasing manner).
The details of one or more embodiments of the invention are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the description below. Other features, aspects, and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the description, the drawings, and the claims.
Like reference numbers and designations in the various drawings indicate like elements.
The network environment 100 can support both encrypted and non-encrypted sessions, both of which can include the use of a handshake 150, which can include authentication and other communication protocols. Cryptographic information can be included in a previously existing section of the handshake 150 known to contain random bytes, allowing the cryptographic information to remain hidden in plain sight since the cryptographic information appears random itself (due to the nature of the cryptographic information). Re-using the random byte section in this way can handicap reverse engineering attempts and provide interoperability with previously written software.
The network environment 100 includes a server computer 110. For example, the server computer 110 can be the FLASH® Media Server provided by Adobe Systems Incorporated of San Jose, Calif. The server computer 110 can use a network 120 (e.g., the Internet) to communicate with one or more first client computers 130 and one or more second client computers 140. The handshakes 150a and 150b precede the sessions 135 and 145 and can include cryptographic information from the server 110 that the client(s) 130 might not know is there.
The session startup handshakes 150a and 150b can include one or more bytes that denote the version of the protocol (e.g., the RTMP protocol) and other information used to open a socket and establish a session. The handshakes 150a and 150b can also include other information, such as the current time as reported by the operating system (e.g., the number of milliseconds since the system was launched). The handshakes 150a and 150b include a block of bytes that contain random data, and the block of bytes can also include information useable for authenticating the network communications between server and client, and information for establishing an encrypted session. Such cryptographic information can be sent by the server computer 110 and the client computer(s) 140, but the client computer(s) 130 need not know that such information is present or be able to send such information.
The first client computer 130 can be a computer programmed to establish non-encrypted sessions with the server computer 110 using the session startup handshake 150a. For example, the first client computer 130 can include an older version of the FLASH® Player program, which starts a session with the server computer (e.g., the FLASH® Media Server). The server 110 can include cryptographic information in the block of random data in a network communication forming part of the handshake 150a. However, if the first client computer 130 fails to recognize this cryptographic information, and thus doesn't send appropriate return cryptographic information, the session 135 that is established with the server 110 is a non-encrypted session. Note that other aspects of the interactions between the server 110 and the client 130 can also be affected by this failure on the part of the computer 130, since the server 110 knows after the handshake 150a that the computer 130 is running a legacy program that is not aware of the new cryptographic information portion of the communication protocol.
In contrast, the second client computer 140 can be a computer programmed to establish encrypted sessions with the server computer 110 using the session startup handshake 150b. For example, the second client computer 140 can include a newer version of the FLASH® Player program, which starts an encrypted session with the server computer (e.g., the FLASH® Media Server). The server 110 can include cryptographic information in the block of random data in a network communication forming part of the handshake 150b. The second client computer 140 can recognize this cryptographic information and send appropriate return cryptographic information. This then allows the session 145 that is established with the server 110 to be an encrypted session. Note that other aspects of the interactions between the server 110 and the client 140 can also be affected by the handshake 150b, since the server 110 knows after the handshake 150b that the computer 140 is running a newer program that is aware of the new cryptographic information portion of the communication protocol. Thus, the cryptographic information used to establish encrypted sessions with new client programs can be added to an existing communication protocol used to establish non-encrypted sessions with old client programs, without the old client programs being aware of the newly added cryptographic information.
The network communication 300 can also include a cryptographic information offset 312. The offset 312 can be used in whole or part to locate cryptographic information 314 in a pre-defined portion 310 that includes cryptographically pseudo-random data. The cryptographic information 314 can appear random and can be indistinguishable from the other random data. In this way, the cryptographic information can be hidden in plain sight. Using this technique can reduce the likelihood that reverse engineering is able to discover the details of the communication protocol.
The location of cryptographic information 314 within the pre-defined portion 310 can vary with implementation or within a given implementation. For example, the cryptographic information can be located at a pre-determined byte location, or a pre-determined byte location (e.g., offset 312) can contain a value from which the location of cryptographic information 314 can be determined. In some implementations, using cryptographic information can include the use of an encryption key establishment protocol, such as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or other suitable technique for establishing one or more symmetric or asymmetric encryption keys.
In some implementations, using cryptographic information can include the use of authentication information 324. Authentication information 324 can be a type of message authentication code (MAC) and can be used to simultaneously verify both the data integrity (e.g., the data was not altered in transit) and the authenticity (e.g., the originator of the information is who it claims to be) of a network communication received over a communication session. Authentication information 324 can be calculated using a specific algorithm involving a cryptographic hash function in combination with a secret key, such as a hash message authentication code (HMAC). Any iterative cryptographic hash function, such as MD5, SHA-1, or SHA-256 can be used in the calculation of an HMAC. The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends upon the cryptographic strength of the underlying hash function, on the size and quality of the key and the size of the hash output length in bits.
The location of authentication information 324 can be found similarly to the cryptographic information 314. For example, authentication information offset 322 can be used in whole or part to locate authentication information 324 within a pre-defined region 320 containing cryptographically pseudo-random data. The authentication information 324 can also be located at a pre-determined byte location, or a pre-determined byte location can contain a value (e.g., offset 322) from which the location of authentication information 324 can be determined.
In addition, although the locations of cryptographic information 320 and authentication information 324 are shown in
In some embodiments, version byte 380 can be used to provide information on the particular version of the transport protocol being used. Version byte 380 can be used in conjunction with a handshake (e.g., handshakes 150a and 150b) and a network communication 300, including cryptographic information, or a network communication 350, including data relating to media stream content. The inclusion of this information can allow easier maintenance of future protocol versions and backwards compatibility. In operation, only a single version byte would likely be necessary per session. Therefore, version byte 380 would likely not add any overhead on a per network communication basis.
In attempting to reduce the overhead of stream messages, certain assumptions can be leveraged into bandwidth savings. One such assumption involves the necessity of a 32-bit message stream ID. Statistically, there are usually less than sixty-one (61) message streams (having unique message stream IDs) in a server at any given time for any given client. Sixty-one (61) message streams can be uniquely represented in only 6 bits. Thus, having a 32-bit message stream ID is typically a waste of space.
The configuration of the real-time priority-based protocol represented by
The configuration of sub media stream ID 410 in some embodiments, as provided in Table 1, demonstrates implementation of a state machine having different state associations using its first 2 bits to address many different levels of streams. In furtherance of the state machine concept implementing the embodiments, network communication type 420 provides four states/types for classifying each network communication message. Network communication type 420 identifies the type or purpose of the network communication.
As provided in Table 2, bits 6 and 7 of network communication control byte 400 includes network communication type 420. When the value of network communication type 420 is 0 in some embodiments, the network communication state or type indicator is a new/reset message type (Type 0) or indicates a new stream. This signifies the first message sent on the network communication stream in some embodiments. As is described in Table 2, a Type 0 message can include additional bytes of information that include the typical header information of the current stream methods, such as message length, message type ID, and message stream ID. Instead of using a timestamp, however, the embodiments represented by
When the value of network communication type 420 is 1 in some embodiments, the network communication state or type is a new media indicator of a specified new time change/time delta, length, and any new message type ID (Type 1). This state can signify a new network communication that is measured using the new specified time delta (i.e., the time stamp change from the last message) and the specific length. Thus, a subsequent message in a network communication stream that belongs to the same sub media stream ID, but that is a different type/format and a different time delta than the previous network communication only has to include header information on the message type ID, time delta, and the length. A Type 1 network communication can, therefore, have fewer bytes of header information than the Type 0 network communication, because the state machine implementing the represented embodiments has been set with certain information by the Type 0 network communication that remains unchanged for the Type 1 network communication.
A value for network communication type 420 of 2 in some embodiments represents the network communication state or type for a new message defined only by a single piece of header information, such as the time delta (Type 2) in a new time indicator. A Type 2 network communication can have all of the same information from the previous network communication except possibly for a change in the time delta. Therefore, the state machine might only need to use the new time delta to change to the proper new state.
The least amount of overhead or header information in the embodiments represented by
The 0-length header of the Type 3 network communications is especially interesting when the Type 3 network communication represents the beginning of a new message. This scenario can occur when two consecutive network communications use the same message stream ID, the same message type ID, the same time change/time delta, and the same length as the previous network communication. In this case, a new message is enabled without any required header information, a 0-length header.
Values of parameters relating to a sub media stream, included in a header of a first network communication, are received 220. For example, the parameters (e.g., a stream ID, media stream length, media type and time delta) can be included in header 390 of network communication 350. The value of the parameters are stored 230. For example, software on computer 140 can store, in physical memory or on a hard drive, the values of parameters across multiple network communications.
State information in a control portion and a data payload included in a second network communication is obtained 240. For example, the state information can be included in control byte 360 and the data payload can be payload 370. The state information can include network communication type 420 and sub media stream ID 410, allowing, in some embodiments, the purpose and sub media stream association of the second network communication to be obtained in 1 byte of information (e.g., control byte 360).
The purpose of the second network communication is identified 250 from the state information. For example, network communication type 420 can indicate that the network communication is starting a new sub media stream or that a new media type is being transmitted over the sub media stream (see Table 1). Process 200 determines 260 whether the header of the second network communication includes new parameter values. For example, some network communications (e.g., Type 3) can include no new parameter values (or a header) while others (e.g., Type 1) can include multiple new parameter values. When the header of the second network communication includes new parameter values, the state information can indicate that the stored values are to be updated 280 with the new values. Process 200 can look for new parameter values in response to the purpose of the network communication. For example, there can be times when network communication will include extraneous header information, such as values for parameters that should not be used to update the stored values. The purpose can enable process 200 to avoid incorrectly updating stored parameter values.
The data payload is processed 270 using the stored parameter values and the identified purpose. For example, payload 370 can be correctly assembled and played based on the stored values of time deltas and media type indications. The data payload can also be process as the beginning network communication in a new sub media stream based on that being identified as the purpose.
Referring back to Table 1, when the value of sub media stream ID 40 is 2, in some embodiments, the state is designed to change for the system to expect a low-level protocol message. Table 3 describes two low-level protocol messages that can be implemented in various embodiments. In such embodiments, a message ID of 1 represents a change to the maximum network communication size. The parameter passed with such a message ID can be an integer representing the size for all future network communications. Another message ID, shown as message ID 2 in Table 3, can allow for an abort signal to be sent to the network corresponding to a particular sub media stream ID. For example, if a communication session is in mid-stream when the transmitting end shuts-down, or other such event, the abort message would generally inform the network that it should not expect any further network communications, thus, aborting the stream. Many other optional low-level protocol messages can also be provided for in various embodiments. The two messages provided for in Table 3 are merely examples.
Some embodiments obtain benefits from breaking the individual messages further down into network communications. While it might appear simpler to send one message and then the next, a linear process, such as this, can be much less efficient. A stream representing some media presentation can include several different sub media streams. One sub media stream can be for the audio, one for the video, and another for data. The combination of each of these sub media streams makes up the entire streaming presentation. Therefore, it becomes important to coordinate smooth delivery of each of the sub media streams to facilitate the smooth playback of the entire stream. For example, a video key frame can have a large amount of data in contrast to audio messages that are generally very small. However, the audio messages are much more time sensitive than the video messages due to the nature of human hearing. Therefore, if an audio message is sent from the audio sub media stream, followed by a very large video message from the video sub media stream, followed by the next audio message, the audio stream can typically stall because the next audio message simply might not arrive in time.
In operation, the larger video messages are typically much less frequent, even though they can be much larger. Therefore, interleaving other messages in between the video messages is acceptable as long as the video message eventually arrives in time for the smooth playback of the video sub media stream. Considering this balancing process, breaking the messages into network communications that can be more easily balanced and interleaved increases the efficiency of the streaming. While no one maximum network communication size is best for all situations, a given maximum can be beneficially set in which the video and data messages arrive without too much effect on the timely arrival of the audio network communications.
In some embodiments, the maximum network communication size is set to correspond to the complete length of a standard audio message in the audio sub media streams in order to ensure timely delivery of the complete audio message. For example, the sampling rate for the audio compression algorithm, Nellymoser, can be 8 kHz. The 8 kHz sampling typically generates messages that are 128 bytes long. Therefore, in some embodiments that can use the Nellymoser compression algorithm, the maximum network communication size can be set to 128 bytes. Other audio compression formats can produce messages that are either greater than or less than 128 bytes. In such cases, a low-level protocol message can be used to change the maximum network communication size of the applicable embodiments to achieve optimal performance.
The priority of each sub media stream (PrioritySB) is summed 602 into a total stream priority (StreamPriority). A desired proportion for sending each sub media stream within the stream is calculated 604 according to formula:
Desired Proportion=PrioritySB/StreamPriority
The total number of network communications sent (Count) are counted 606 per sub media stream over a group of preceding network communications (N). N represents a scheduling sampling window that can be pre-set by a user or developer. The sampling window can be based, on a period of time or a count of network communications. For example, process 600 can count network communications sent (Count) over a period of one second or 5 seconds. The network communications for each sub media stream can be counted 606 concurrently or sequentially. Process 600 can also send a pre-set number of network communications and count 606 the number of network communications sent in each sub media stream out of the pre-set number. The actual proportion of network communications sent per sub media stream in the preceding N network communications is developed 608 according to formula:
Actual Proportion=Count/N
A ratio of desired proportion to actual proportion is determined 610 for each sub media stream. The sub media stream with lowest ratio is selected 612. The process 600 determines 614 whether the selected sub media stream has a network communication queued. If a network communication is queued for the selected sub media stream, the sub media stream network communication is sent 616. If no data is queued for the selected sub media stream, the determination 618 is made whether there are any other waiting sub media streams left. If there are no remaining sub media streams, then no network communications are sent in the cycle 620. However, if there are remaining sub media streams, a new sub media stream is selected 622 that has the next lowest ratio of desired to actual proportions. The process 600 can repeat the operations 614-622, depending on the case, until all network communications in each sub media stream are sent.
Scheduling process 600 can result in a favorable balance of streams. If all sub media streams always have data to send, not only does scheduling process 600 provide for those streams to obtain the proper proportion of network communications sent, but also provides a good interleaving mix over the scheduling window. When some sub media streams do not have data or, at least, do not have data queued, scheduling process 600 allows the lower priority sub media streams to use a greater bandwidth. Thus, bandwidth use is routinely optimized. One embodiment can achieve desired results with audio having a priority of 100, data priority of 10, and video priority of 1. However, other various priority assignments can prove better for different situations and known or expected data types or data loads.
A first portion of the random data can be retrieved 702. For example, in the network communication 300 sent by client computer, the server can look in a pre-determined byte position within the pre-defined portion 310. A first index into the pre-defined portion can be determined 704 based on the retrieved first portion. For example, one or more bytes of the random data can be used as the dividend in a modulo operation, where the divisor is the length of the region of the pre-defined portion 310 set aside for a message authentication code (e.g., an HMAC), minus the length of the message authentication code. The first index can then be set equal to the remainder of this modulo operation plus a pre-defined offset (which can be zero).
Note that various combinations of the random data can be used to generate the dividend. For example, x bytes of the random data can be treated as a single binary number forming the dividend falling in the range of zero to 2(8x)−1, or the same x bytes of the random data can be treated as x binary numbers that are added together to form the dividend falling in the range of zero to x(28−1). Various other combinations of the random data are also possible. In addition, the first index can be determined from the first portion of the random data alone, or from the first portion in combination with other information retrieved from the network communication. For example, such other information can come from the header 330 or the payload 340.
In any event, once the index is determined, this index corresponds to the starting position of the cryptographic information used for message authentication (e.g., the starting point of the HMAC) in the block of otherwise random data. The network communication is authenticated 706 using this cryptographic information. For example, the authentication can involve using the first index to access an HMAC in the network communication 300. If the message authentication code is not confirmed 708, then the process 700 can check 710 whether a fallback first portion is available. This occurs when the first index determined 704 fails to locate a message authentication code usable to authenticate 706 the network communication.
In this case, one or more fallback processes can be provided for retrieving 702 the first portion and determining 704 the first index. The fallback processes can use a different technique for retrieving 702 the first portion and/or determining 704 the first index. determining 704 the first index. These fallback processes can provide additional security for the authentication process, allowing a server system to change the indexing technique when a currently used technique has been discovered, and the client computers can then automatically fall back to the new indexing technique. Once all available fallback processes have been tried, the process 700 ends without the network communication having been authenticated.
If the message authentication code is confirmed 708, then a second portion of the random data is retrieved 712. For example, in the network communication 300 sent by client computer, the server can look in another pre-determined byte position within the pre-defined portion 310. A second index into the pre-defined portion can be determined 714 based on the retrieved second portion. For example, one or more bytes of the random data can be used as the dividend in another modulo operation, where the divisor is the length of the region of the pre-defined portion 310 set aside for encryption parameters (e.g., Diffie Hellman information), minus the length of the encryption parameters. The second index can then be set equal to the remainder of this modulo operation plus a pre-defined offset (which can be zero).
As with the message authentication code, various combinations of the random data can be used to generate the dividend. For example, x bytes of the random data can be treated as a single binary number forming the dividend falling in the range of zero to 2(8x)−1, or the same x bytes of the random data can be treated as x binary numbers that are added together to form the dividend falling in the range of zero to x(28−1). Various other combinations of the random data are also possible. In addition, the second index can be determined from the second portion of the random data alone, or from the second portion in combination with other information retrieved from the network communication. For example, such other information can come from the header 330 or the payload 340. Moreover, it will be appreciated that the random data section needs to be larger than the total length of the message authentication code and the encryption parameters, e.g., larger than one hundred and sixty bytes when using a thirty two byte HMAC and one hundred and twenty eight bytes of Diffie Hellman information.
In any event, once the index is determined, this index corresponds to the starting position of the encryption parameters used for establishing a cryptographic key (e.g., the starting point of the Diffie Hellman information) in the block of otherwise random data. This cryptographic information in the network communication is confirmed 716. This confirmation can involve using the second index to access and confirm encryption parameters in the network communication 300. If the encryption parameters are not confirmed 718, then the process 700 can check 720 whether a fallback second portion is available. This occurs when the second index determined 714 fails to locate encryption parameters usable to initiate encrypted communications in the network environment.
In this case, one or more fallback processes can be provided for retrieving 712 the second portion and determining 714 the second index. The fallback processes can use a different technique for retrieving 712 the first portion and/or determining 714 the second index. Note that these processes can also be different than those used for the first index. These fallback processes can provide additional security for the encrypted session establishment process, allowing a server system to change the indexing technique when a currently used technique has been discovered, and the client computers can then automatically fall back to the new indexing technique. Once all available fallback processes have been tried, the process 700 ends without the encryption parameters having been confirmed.
If the encryption parameters are confirmed 718, then a determination 722 can be made if an encrypted session is desired. For example, the encryption parameters can contain information that the session (e.g., session 145) is to be an encrypted session. If so, then the encrypted session is initiated 724. Otherwise, an un-encrypted session can be initiated. Either session (e.g., encrypted or un-encrypted) can be between the client computer 802 (e.g., executing FLASH® Player program) and the media server 804 (e.g., FLASH® Media Server), in
If it is determined 726 that one or more features are to be enabled or disabled, then one or more features of the media player, the media server or both, are turned on or off 728. For example, a set of features can be turned on or off according to the version number of the client media player. This version number can be provided by the client media player (e.g., in non-encrypted and non-disguised form in the handshake 150), and the server can decide to trust the version number provided based on the fact that the client properly incorporated cryptographic information within the random byte section of a network communication (e.g., the client media player is not a legacy player that has been modified to improperly identify itself as a newer version).
The client computer 802 can include software, firmware and hardware. The hardware can include a computer readable medium 812, a processor 814, and one or more interface devices 816. The computer readable medium 812 can include one or more hard drives, external drives, magnetic disks, optical disks, tape drives, memories devices, etc. The processor 814 can include one or more central processing units capable of interpreting computer program instructions and processing data, and the processing units can include one or more processor cores. The interface devices 816 can include one or more display and audio devices (e.g., computer screens, computer monitors, digital displays, liquid crystal displays (LCDs), light emitting diodes (LEDs), etc.) and audio-capable components (e.g., microphones, speakers, etc.). The interface devices 816 can support a graphical user interface (GUI) by which the user sees, hears and experiences the output of a media player application 808.
The software/firmware can include the media player application 808 and an application execution environment 810. For example, the media player application 808 can be a FLASH® Player program installed on a home computer or other electronic device. The media player application 808 can run in the application execution environment 810, which can be an operating system (OS) for the computer 802, or a cross-OS runtime environment installed on the computer 802, such as the Adobe® AIR™ runtime environment available from Adobe System Incorporated of San Jose, Calif.
The random byte section that embeds the cryptographic information can be included in the network communications between the client computer 802 and the media server 804. For example, the random byte section can be generated by a user's FLASH® Player program and by the FLASH® Media Server program. As noted above, cryptographic information (e.g., including Diffie Hellman key exchange and HMAC information) can be injected into the random byte section at pre-determined or program-determined locations. In some implementations, the locations can be determined by various processes, which can use pieces of the random data to index the locations of the cryptographic information. The receiving end of the communication, knowing the new protocol, can locate and remove the cryptographic information from the random byte section. If the cryptographic information can be verified, then the receiving side knows that the new protocol is being used. If the cryptographic information cannot be verified, one or more fallback positions can be checked before determining that the new protocol is not being used (because the expected cryptographic information cannot be found in the random byte section), and thus the communication is of a legacy type. Note that from the perspective of an external eavesdropper, the cryptographic information is seen as nothing more than the previously included random data, which can be used for bandwidth detection.
The scheduler at transmitting entity 920 controls when network communications are sent to network interface 932 from either video or audio queue 924 and 926. Network communications 901, 903, 905, 907, 909, 911, 913, and 915 are represented on network path(s) 950 along with corresponding header parameters 902, 904, 906, 908, 910, 912, 914, and 916 configured according to the example. Because audio network communications are more sensitive than video network communications, the scheduler sends audio network communication 901 over network path(s) 950 first. Audio network communication 901 includes header 902. Header 902 describes audio network communication as a Type 0 network communication and gives the necessary information that accompanies a Type 0 new message network communication, including the network communication ID, message stream ID, length, message type, and time delta. The state machine at receiving player 922 sets the state for the audio sub media stream beginning with audio network communication 901. Audio network communication 903 is the next network communication sent by the scheduler at transmitting entity 920 and includes header 904. Header 904 identifies network communication 903 as a Type 3 continuation header belonging to network communication ID 1, the network communication ID assigned to the first audio sub media stream. Because audio network communication 903 is a continuation network communication, only the network communication type and network communication ID are required in the header information. The state machine at receiving entity 922 reads that network communication 903 is a Type 3 continuation network communication and keeps all states fixed for the audio sub media stream of network communication ID 1.
The scheduler at transmitting entity 920 sends video network communication 905 next along with header 906. Because video network communication 905 is the first of the video sub media stream, it is designated a Type 0 network communication and includes all of the necessary header information to go along with the first network communication of the video sub media stream. Thus, video network communication 905 can include a different network communication ID, message stream ID, length, message type, and time delta. The state machine at the receiving entity sets the necessary states for the video sub media stream of network communication ID 2. The next network communication sent by the scheduler is audio network communication 907 and header 908. Header 908 identifies network communication 907 as a Type 3 continuation network communication of network communication ID 1. The state machine refers to the states set for the audio sub media stream of network communication ID 1 and maintains those settings for the first audio sub media stream.
The scheduler then sends audio network communication 909 and header 910 across network path(s) 950. Header 910 identifies audio network communication 909 as a Type 0 new message network communication. The state machine at receiving entity 922 resets all information in the states of the audio sub media streams and sets the new states according to header 910. The next network communication in the interleaved sequence is video network communication 911 along with header 912. Header 912 identifies video network communication 911 as a Type 3 continuation network communication of video sub media stream network communication ID 2. The state machine at receiving entity 922 accesses the states set for network communication ID 2 and keeps all of the state information in tact for video network communication 911. The next network communication sent on network path(s) 950 is audio network communication 913 and header 914. Header 914 identifies network communication 913 as a Type 3 continuation network communication of network communication ID 3. The state machine accesses the states saved for the audio sub media stream of network communication ID 3 and maintains each state intact. The final network communication shown in
Header 916 identifies network communication 915 as a Type 2 network communication representing a new message having a new time delta. The state machine reads that network communication 915 is a Type 2 network communication and expects the beginning of a new audio sub media stream with only a change to one of the states for a new network communication ID 4.
As each of network communications 901, 903, 905, 907, 909, 911, 913, and 915 are received at receiving entity 922 through network interface 934, the audio network communications are reassembled in audio assembly 930, while the video network communications are reassembled in video assembly 928 before being played back at receiving entity 922. The state machine at receiving entity 922 can read the parameters in each of headers 902, 904, 906, 908, 910, 912, 914, and 916, and controls the reassembly of the network communications in audio assembly 930 and video assembly 928. In additional embodiments, other interleaving scheduling processes and/or efficiency processes can be implemented. The goal is to achieve an efficient mix of audio, video, and data network communications that results in a good playback that minimizes the audio or video jitter in the playback.
The responsive handshake network communication is communicated 1020. For example, after a handshake network communication, such as network communication 300, is received, a responsive handshake network communication, similar to network communication 300, is communicated 1020 to the originator of the handshake network communication as a part of completing the encrypted communication session handshake.
A second network handshake is received 1030 in response to communicating the responsive handshake network communication. For example, the second network handshake can include a personalized response based on the outgoing random portion communicated 1020 with the generated 1010 responsive handshake network.
The second handshake network communication is authenticated 1040 based on the outgoing random portion. For example, the other party to the handshake can verify that indeed the handshake communications are associated with the present handshake attempt rather than being intercepted and subsequently retransmitted handshake communications (e.g., in a replay attack). The authentication is possible because the random data in the handshake network communications changes with each handshake communication sent or received and allows unique, one-time use.
Embodiments of the subject matter and the functional operations described in this specification can be implemented in digital electronic circuitry, or in computer software, firmware, or hardware, including the structures disclosed in this specification and their structural equivalents, or in combinations of one or more of them. Embodiments of the subject matter described in this specification can be implemented as one or more computer program products, i.e., one or more modules of computer program instructions encoded on a computer-readable medium for execution by, or to control the operation of, data processing apparatus. The computer-readable medium can be a machine-readable storage device, a machine-readable storage substrate, a memory device, or a combination of one or more of them. The term “data processing apparatus” encompasses all apparatus, devices, and machines for processing data, including by way of example a programmable processor, a computer, or multiple processors or computers. The apparatus can include, in addition to hardware, code that creates an execution environment for the computer program in question, e.g., code that constitutes processor firmware, a protocol stack, a database management system, an operating system, or a combination of one or more of them.
Storing can include any maintenance in volatile or non-volatile memory or storage. For example, in a file system, hard drive, database, buffer, cache, random access memory (RAM), Compact Flash or Secure Digital card, or network repository.
A computer program (also known as a program, software, software application, script, or code) can be written in any form of programming language, including compiled or interpreted languages, and it can be deployed in any form, including as a stand-alone program or as a module, component, subroutine, or other unit suitable for use in a computing environment. A computer program does not necessarily correspond to a file in a file system. A program can be stored in a portion of a file that holds other programs or data (e.g., one or more scripts stored in a markup language document), in a single file dedicated to the program in question, or in multiple coordinated files (e.g., files that store one or more modules, sub-programs, or portions of code). A computer program can be deployed to be executed on one computer or on multiple computers that are located at one site or distributed across multiple sites and interconnected by a communication network.
The processes and logic flows described in this specification can be performed by one or more programmable processors executing one or more computer programs to perform functions by operating on input data and generating output. The processes and logic flows can also be performed by, and apparatus can also be implemented as, special purpose logic circuitry, e.g., an FPGA (field programmable gate array) or an ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit).
Processors suitable for the execution of a computer program include, by way of example, both general and special purpose microprocessors, and any one or more processors of any kind of digital computer. Generally, a processor will receive instructions and data from a read-only memory or a random access memory or both. The essential elements of a computer are a processor for performing instructions and one or more memory devices for storing instructions and data. Generally, a computer will also include, or be operatively coupled to receive data from or transfer data to, or both, one or more mass storage devices for storing data, e.g., magnetic, magneto-optical disks, or optical disks. However, a computer need not have such devices. Moreover, a computer can be embedded in another device, e.g., a mobile telephone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile audio player, a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, to name just a few. Computer-readable media suitable for storing computer program instructions and data include all forms of non-volatile memory, media and memory devices, including by way of example semiconductor memory devices, e.g., EPROM, EEPROM, and flash memory devices; magnetic disks, e.g., internal hard disks or removable disks; magneto-optical disks; and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM disks. The processor and the memory can be supplemented by, or incorporated in, special purpose logic circuitry.
To provide for interaction with a user, embodiments of the subject matter described in this specification can be implemented on a computer having a display device, e.g., a CRT (cathode ray tube) or LCD (liquid crystal display) monitor, for displaying information to the user and a keyboard and a pointing device, e.g., a mouse or a trackball, by which the user can provide input to the computer. Other kinds of devices can be used to provide for interaction with a user as well; for example, feedback provided to the user can be any form of sensory feedback, e.g., visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback; and input from the user can be received in any form, including acoustic, speech, or tactile input.
Embodiments of the subject matter described in this specification can be implemented in a computing system that includes a back-end component, e.g., as a data server, or that includes a middleware component, e.g., an application server, or that includes a front-end component, e.g., a client computer having a graphical user interface or a Web browser through which a user can interact with an implementation of the subject matter described in this specification, or any combination of one or more such back-end, middleware, or front-end components. The components of the system can be interconnected by any form or medium of digital data communication, e.g., a communication network. Examples of communication networks include a local area network (“LAN”) and a wide area network (“WAN”), e.g., the Internet.
The computing system can include clients and servers. A client and server are generally remote from each other and typically interact through a communication network. The relationship of client and server arises by virtue of computer programs running on the respective computers and having a client-server relationship to each other.
While this specification contains many specifics, these should not be construed as limitations on the scope of the invention or of what might be claimed, but rather as descriptions of features specific to particular embodiments of the invention. Certain features that are described in this specification in the context of separate embodiments can also be implemented in combination in a single embodiment. Conversely, various features that are described in the context of a single embodiment can also be implemented in multiple embodiments separately or in any suitable subcombination. Moreover, although features might be described above as acting in certain combinations and even initially claimed as such, one or more features from a claimed combination can in some cases be excised from the combination, and the claimed combination might be directed to a subcombination or variation of a subcombination.
Similarly, while operations are depicted in the drawings in a particular order, this should not be understood as requiring that such operations be performed in the particular order shown or in sequential order, or that all illustrated operations be performed, to achieve desirable results. In certain circumstances, multitasking and parallel processing might be advantageous. Moreover, the separation of various system components in the embodiments described above should not be understood as requiring such separation in all embodiments, and it should be understood that the described program components and systems can generally be integrated together in a single software product or packaged into multiple software products.
Thus, particular embodiments of the invention have been described. Other embodiments are within the scope of the following claims. For example, the actions recited in the claims can be performed in a different order and still achieve desirable results. The random data need not be truly random data, but rather can be pseudo random data. Moreover, the pre-defined portion of the network communication need only be reserved for random data, but need not actually include random data in all implementations.
This patent document is a continuation, and claims the benefits of priority under 35 USC 120, of U.S. application Ser. No. 13/281,317, filed Oct. 25, 2011, which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 12/252,357, filed Oct. 15, 2008, incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.
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| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20120317416 A1 | Dec 2012 | US |
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent | 13281317 | Oct 2011 | US |
| Child | 13584484 | US | |
| Parent | 12252357 | Oct 2008 | US |
| Child | 13281317 | US |
