This application is based upon and claims the benefit of priority from prior Japanese Patent Application No. 2007-112258, filed Apr. 20, 2007, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to an incident/accident report analysis wherein failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is performed.
2. Description of the Related Art
The incident report is of two types, description type and selection type. In the incident report of description type, a risk manager is required to read and understand the contents thereof and the statistical analysis is difficult. The incident report of selection type, on the other hand, includes the famous format of the Japan Council for Quality Health Care which discloses the analysis result on Web. As FMEA for medical applications, HFMEA (Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) is famous and widely used by US medical organizations (See Takahiro Soma, “Application of FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) to Medical Areas”, and J. Derosier, E. Stalhandske, J. P. Bagian, T. Nudell: “Using Health Care Failure Mode and Analysis”, Journal on Quality Improvement, May, 2002, <URL: www.va.gov/ncps/HFMEA.html>).
In the incident/accident report, the magnitude of the latent problem hidden in a minor incident is difficult to evaluate, and there is a problem that if measures are taken against all incidents, the work process becomes too complex. In order to take an effective measure, a system is required for objectively evaluating a job harboring a large latent problem.
An incident/accident report analysis apparatus according to an aspect of the present invention comprises: an input unit which inputs an incident/accident report containing a crisis rate and an severity of an incident/accident; a data table having recorded therein a crisis probability corresponding to the crisis rate and a loss amount corresponding to the severity; a parameter storage unit having stored therein an N value indicating the number of times a failure occurs and an α value indicating a risk tolerance parameter; and a risk calculation unit which calculates a incident risk that is the loss amount occurring with the probability of α% upon repetition of the same failure N times, using the crisis probability corresponding to the crisis rate and the loss amount corresponding to the severity.
Referring to
As shown in
Also, the incident/accident report analysis apparatus includes a display unit S9 for totalizing the incident reports for each task obtained from the process map information accumulated in a process map database S8 and displaying them in a color corresponding to the magnitude of the loss amount (incident risk) of each incident.
The procedure for carrying out a Risk FMEA (RFMEA) with the incident/accident report analysis apparatus configured as described above will be explained below. Especially, this embodiment deals with the steps of the procedure from the input of the incident report to the calculation and display of the incident risk.
(Step 1): The discoverer of an incident inputs the incident discovery information through the incident/accident report input unit S1. In this case, a discovery information input screen 20 as shown in
(Step 2): The person who has committed an error inputs the incident occurrence information through the incident/accident report input unit S1. The person involved selects, for example, a process 41 on an occurrence information input screen 40 shown in
An example of the contents of the data table S4 for storing the information on the occurrence, detectability and crisis rate is shown in
The contents of the table 44 on the occurrence information input screen 40 are recorded in the FMEA table S3.
(Step 3): The information input from the incident/accident report input unit S1 is accumulated in the report database S2. The information thus accumulated is shown in
(Step 4): Upon complete input to the incident/accident report input unit S1, the registration process is executed after the approval of the risk manager. The latest incident/accident report that has been given is registered on the report database S2. Incidentally, a system configuration may be such that the registration process and the approval process are executed at the same time.
(Step 5): After execution of the registration process, a screening unit S5 extracts the first occurring failure from a plurality of failures. The process map indicating the flowchart of a series of jobs (tasks) as shown in
(Step 6): The risk calculation unit S6 utilizes the occurrence information corresponding to the first occurring failure. Based on the failure mode described in the occurrence information, the detectability and the crisis rate stored in the FMEA table S3 are read. An example of the FMEA table S3 is shown in
In the FMEA table S3 shown in
(Step 7): The risk calculation unit S6 obtains the loss amount corresponding to the severity from the data table S4 based on the severity in the occurrence information. The risk calculation unit S6 also obtains the numerical values corresponding to the detectability and the crisis rate from the data table S4 based on the detectability and the crisis rate, respectively, shown in the FMEA table S3. The correspondence with the numerical values is shown in
(Step 8): Then, the risk calculation unit S6 calculates a probability p as follows, in accordance with whether the incident level of the discovery information is 0a or not lower than 0b. This probability p corresponds to the probability of occurrence of the worst situation on condition that the same incident occurs.
where k is the crisis probability and a is the latent probability.
(Step 9): The following steps (9-1) to (9-4) are repeated.
(Step 9-1): j is set to 0 and x to 1, where j is the number of times the worst situation occurs, and x the probability.
(Step 9-2): Equation 2 below is calculated.
x=x−
N
C
j
p
j(1−p)N−j [Equation 2]
(Step 9-3):
x≦0.01α [Equation 3]
In the case where Equation 3 is satisfied, the process is ended. Otherwise, the process returns to step 9-2 assuming that j=j+1.
(Step 9-4): y (=loss amount×j) is determined.
The value y can be considered the magnitude of the loss accrued with the probability of α% after repetition of the same failure N times, and therefore, constitutes an index to determine the degree of the risk after repetition of the same failure. Thus, y is called the “incident risk” of the failure.
(Step 10): The value of the incident risk y of the failure thus calculated is stored in the report database S2 in correspondence with the incident/accident report.
(Step 11): In the display unit S9, the incidents that have occurred are displayed on the corresponding tasks in the process map by designating the process and the period. Each incident is indicated by a cylinder, for example. Desirably, each cylinder is so colored as to make it possible to identify the magnitude of the incident risk of the failure. An example in which a plurality of incidents/accidents occur for one task and cylinders are displayed in stack is shown in
As explained above, according to the first embodiment, the incident risk can be calculated as the analysis result of the incident/accident report, and can be displayed in a form easy to understand on the process map.
Although the risk calculation unit S6 has been described above as means for reading the detectability and the crisis rate from the FMEA table S3 as required for calculation of the incident risk, the detectability and the crisis rate may alternatively be input to the incident/accident report input unit S1 together with the incident/accident level (severity). Then, the incident risk can be calculated without referring to the FMEA table S3. As another alternative, the incident risk may be calculated from the crisis rate (crisis probability) and the severity (loss amount) without using the detectability.
A method of analyzing a process by FMEA, though effective for detecting the latent problem point, poses the problem that it is unknown whether the FMEA evaluation results are correct or not. According to the second embodiment, therefore, a hypothesis is set up about the probability with which the effect of the failure reaches the patient for each failure mode from the FMEA evaluation result. Also, the number of times the effect reaches the patient is counted for each failure mode from the report, and whether the hypothesis can be rejected or not is confirmed. In the case where the hypothesis is rejected, one can use an edit function to change the FMEA sheet.
As shown in
A hypothesis verification unit T13 of a report analysis unit T6 calculates, from the probability designated in the FMEA table T3, the probability that failures not less than and not more than the number of times the failure occurs obtained from the screening unit T5 for each failure mode. In the case where the aforementioned numerical value is not more than a significant level β, the massages “reports are significantly small/large” are displayed in the evaluation result display unit T9. And there is an editing unit T10 which edits the occurrence or the detectability corresponding to the failure mode. Also, in the editing process, the candidates for the occurrence and the detectability are displayed by a candidate calculation unit T11.
With regard to the hypothesis verification unit T13, assume that the number of times the failure occurs as obtained from the screening unit T5 (the number of times the failure not less than 0b in level actually occurs) is given as M, for example. The probability that M or more failures occur during the measurement period is calculated using the probability (hypothesis) designated in the FMEA table T3. In the case where this probability is small (not higher than the significant level of 5%, for example), the hypothesis is rejected. In the process, a doubt arises that the numerical value of the hypothesis is too small. In other words, failures measured are considered too many. In similar fashion, the probability that M or less failures occur during the measurement period is calculated. In the case where this probability is small (not higher than the significant level of, say, 5%), the hypothesis is rejected. In this case, an excessively large numerical value of the hypothesis is doubted, and the number of failures measured is considered too small.
The steps of operation of the incident/accident report analysis apparatus according to the second embodiment having the aforementioned configuration will be explained below.
(Step 1): The discoverer who has discovered an incident or an accident inputs the discovery information into the incident/accident report input unit T1 (see
(Step 2): The person who has committed an error notes the occurrence information by way of the incident/accident report input unit T1 (see
(Step 3): The information input from the incident/accident report input unit T1 is accumulated in the report database T2. The information accumulated in the report database T2 is also the same as that shown in
(Step 4): The incident/accident report input unit T1, upon complete input, executes the registration process after the approval process by the risk manager. The latest incident/accident report given is registered on the report database T2.
(Step 5): The report analysis unit T6 receives the information indicating the report collection period from a report collection period input unit T14, and searches the report database T2 for the data in this period.
(Step 6): The screening unit T5 extracts only the reports having the incident level of 0b or more from among the data searched, and sets up a flag for the occurrence information first occurred in each report in accordance with the information in the process map database T8. The process of setting up the flag may be executed in each time the report is registered.
(Step 7): The report analysis unit T6 executes the following steps (7-1) and (7-2) for all the failure modes of the designated process.
(Step 7-1): While checking whether the failure mode described in the occurrence information with the flag set up in the incident/accident report coincides with the failure mode in the evaluation, the number of coincident reports is counted.
(Step 7-2): The number of coincident reports nf is stored for each failure mode.
(Step 8): In the hypothesis verification unit T13 in the report analysis unit T6, N and β are read from the parameter storage unit T7, and the following steps (8-1) to (8-4) are executed for all the failure modes.
(Step 8-1): The occurrence and the detectability corresponding to the failure mode are acquired from the FMEA table T3. Also, the corresponding numerical values are acquired from the data table T4 (
(Step 8-2): q (=occurrence probability×detectability probability) is calculated. F is set to be zero (F=0) and T is set to be 365(T=365).
(Step 8-3):
In the case where this equation is satisfied, F is set to 1 (reports too few) for the failure mode.
(Step 8-4):
In the case where this equation is satisfied, F is set to 2 (reports too many) for the failure mode.
(Step 9): A risk calculation unit T12 of the report analysis unit T6 calculates an expected loss and a latent loss in accordance with the number of reports for each failure mode.
(Step 10): An evaluation result display unit T9 displays the result of calculation in the report analysis unit T6. An example of the display is shown in
(Step 11): The editing unit T10 can change the occurrence or the detectability corresponding to the failure mode. Upon selection of the occurrence or the detectability, as the case may be, the number of points can be selected. The number of points with alarm and the number of points without alarm are displayed in different colors. For example, if an attempt is made to change a occurrence 116 for a failure mode 115 “no injection prescription has reached” with the alarm in
According to the embodiments of the invention described above, an incident that has actually resulted in a small loss but that has a large latent problem can be evaluated. Also, by totalizing the incidents for each task, a particular task which harbors many problems can be identified at a glance. Further, according to the second embodiment, the contents of FMEA can be verified, and therefore, the legitimacy of the FMEA evaluation can be checked. Also, even in the case where the risk is judged to be high according to FMEA, no report may occur. When the FMEA evaluation result (hypothesis) is not disregarded according to the statistical test, a request can be reasonably made to take a measure even in the absence of a report.
Additional advantages and modifications will readily occur to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the invention in its broader aspects is not limited to the specific details and representative embodiments shown and described herein. Accordingly, various modifications may be made without departing from the spirit or scope of the general inventive concept as defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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2007-112258 | Apr 2007 | JP | national |