Patent Application
20220014466
Embodiments described herein generally relate to computer networking and more specifically to information centric network (ICN) tunneling.
Information centric networks (ICNs) implement protocols and mechanisms where communications between machines for information or computational services are specified by name. This is in contrast to traditional (legacy) networks and protocols in which communications include addresses (e.g., and ports) of specific end-points (e.g., a host Internet Protocol (IP) address). In ICN operations, an interest packet (e.g., request) arrives at an ICN node. The interest packet includes a name for the requested content. If the content happens to be in content store (CS) (e.g., local cache) of the ICN node, the interest is satisfied with the data from the CS. To satisfy the interest, the ICN node transmits a data packet including the content out of the interface (e.g., face) from which the interest was received. If the content is not in the CS, the incoming interest is recorded in a pending interest table (PIT) along with information about the requestor (e.g., incoming face). The interest, if not already in the PIT (e.g., due to some other requestor), represents a new need to seek the requested data from some other node. Accordingly, the ICN node consults a Forwarding information base (FIB) to route the interest forward neighbor ICN nodes. In this way, interests navigate to the nearest node that has the requested data in its content store, or to an original publisher. When the data packet in response to the interest traverses back to the original requester, the intervening PIT entries are used to find the route, akin to following a trail of breadcrumbs, and the data may be cached at each node the data packet traverses.
Edge computing places computing resources close to consumers of services in order to, for example, meet ultra-low latency requirements of these services. Accordingly, compute servers are often situated in close physical proximity to data sources. For example, servers may be situated in cellular base stations These kinds of operating environments are often unique because they are resource constrained environments. The resource constraints may include processing or storage limitations, as well as power. Often mains power (e.g., power provided by a commercial grid operator) is unavailable, and so battery or ambient power generation (e.g., wind or solar) power may be used. Ambient and battery power may fluctuate in time and the power use of applications running at the edge (e.g., demand for edge services) may also fluctuate in time.
In the drawings, which are not necessarily drawn to scale, like numerals may describe similar components in different views. Like numerals having different letter suffixes may represent different instances of similar components. The drawings illustrate generally, by way of example, but not by way of limitation, various embodiments discussed in the present document.
ICN protocols and mechanisms are often a good match to edge computing architectures because they are naturally decentralized due to a distributed peer-to-peer model of access, they can resiliently access information throughout the network due to the greedy caching of data at ICN nodes, and they auto-adapt to request patterns through intrinsic multicasting and forwarding strategies. Because ICNs thus focus on naming the data, agnostic of a particular host address or location where data may be produced, on the edge entails edge-wide sharing of the data. However. edge-wide data sharing may create security or privacy issues and may interfere with trusted computing base (TCB) requirements of cloud or edge cloud providers.
In legacy networks, secure access (e.g., prevention of man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks) is obtained by creating secure channels (e.g., TLS or SSL) between requestors and addressed hosts (or their proxies). Some techniques may limit the anycasting (e.g., sending the packet to any node connected directly by an interface) of interest or data packets to address the security issues. However, avoiding ICN anycasting or differentiating channel-by-channel transfers—which are generally host or location centric—inhibits the scaling and self-adaptive characteristics of ICNs where the security properties are content centric.
To address the security and privacy issues in the context of ICN deployments, new mechanisms that work with the distributed nature of state in an ICN (e.g., state in the form of PIT entries, FIB entries, content stores, etc.) are described herein. In general, the devices, systems, and techniques ensure that only sensitive content is subject to additional overhead, such as encrypted tunneling or cache restrictions. Non-sensitive content is treated like traditional ICN content, being transmitted and cached without throughout the edge.
ICN tunneling tracks the sensitivity of data in security metadata that is affixed to interest or data packets. When an ICN node encounters sensitive data, the security metadata is used to determine how a given node handles the data. This handling may include data being cached with restrictions, forwarding a handle (e.g., reference) to the data instead of the data itself, or establishing an encrypted session with another ICN node. Sensitivity can range across a set of categories from non-sensitive data at one extreme, and extremely sensitive data at the other with varying levels in between.
As noted above, sensitivity of data may be recorded in metadata associated with data either directly in a portion of a data structure that identifies the data by name (e.g., an interest packet or a data packet handle), or indirectly through attribute metadata that is immutably linked with data name, for example through associative means such as hashing, indexing, or combinations of such linkages. In this last example, the metadata is on a given ICN node and retrieved based on the index or hash derived from the interest, data, or data handle structures.
Again, the data sensitivity determines how ICN nodes handle encryption, caching, use of secure storage, anycasting, or other ICN routing functions. Thus, the introduction of data handles (e.g., forward handles) to the ICN protocol enables communication of a returning data packet without exposing the sensitive data itself. The data handle includes the meta data of the data packet without the data itself. A subsequent ICN node may determine, from the security metadata for example, that the ICN node is authorized to handle the data, and establish a forwarding protocol (e.g., encryption technique) to tunnel the data to the ICN node.
In an example, the security metadata defines the options available at any ICN node for receiving, storing, or processing data that may be sensitive. The security metadata may indicate whether a node is attested to be non-vulnerable to physical or logical invasion. This enables emulation of the ICN peer-to-peer communication model while bypassing intermediary nodes that cannot be guaranteed (e.g., pass the attestation) to be sufficiently invulnerable relative to the sensitivity of data they cache or route.
In an example, a non-volatile memory, together with automatic hardware encryption of data in non-volatile memory, may be used for storing content or for storing programs that transform the content or implement capabilities for protecting sensitive data. The incorporation of such hardware encrypted memory (e.g., working memory used to store the state of an operating machine) in the ICN node to selectively cache and or transform data reduces the exposure to input-output (I/O) software or hardware vulnerabilities. Additional examples and details are provided below.
The links represent the traversal of a data packet from the source node 105 to the sink nodes in response to an interest packet originating from the sink nodes. The dashed connections illustrate links in which the data packet traverses the system without differentiation between the sink node A 135 and the sink node B. This is due to the ICN routers along the dashed links meeting the security requirements set for the data as communicated by the security metadata of the data packet. Again, the security metadata may be absent or empty, in which case the data packet is treated as a traditional data packet in ICNs.
In the case where the security metadata specifies some heightened level of sensitivity over the baseline ICN data handling, the ICN router 120 implements selective anycasting. Thus, the path 125 indicates a point in which the forwarding of the data packet diverges from the ICN router 120 towards sink A 135 from other transmissions of the data packet. In effect, due to the differing security capabilities or level of trust of sink A 135 and sink B, interests from sink A 135 and sink B may be treated as non-fungible requests for the same data.
The following examples operate from the perspective of ICN router 120. ICN router 120, like the other illustrated nodes, includes processing circuitry and a medium for storing instructions that, when the ICN router 120 is operating, configure the processing circuitry.
The processing circuitry is configured to receive a data handle for data that is received at the ICN router 120. As noted above, the data handle is not a data packet, but rather a placeholder carrying the metadata for the data packet. Here, the data handle includes an indication of security metadata. In an example, the indication if the security metadata is the security metadata itself, completely included in the data handle. In an example, the indication of the security metadata is used to lookup some or all of the security metadata in a local store of the ICN router.
In an example, the security metadata includes a policy for data security or integrity with respect to one or more target hardware or software platforms. This example notes that hardware platforms alone may signify differentiating behavior of the ICN router 120. Accordingly, the processing circuitry is configured to treat the data traversing or stored on the ICN router 120 in accordance with the policy matching the hardware platform of the ICN router 120.
The processing circuitry is configured to obtain the security metadata based on the data handle. In an example, obtaining the security metadata includes extracting the security metadata from the data handle. In this example, the security metadata is simply read from the data handle and used below.
In an example, obtaining the security metadata includes processing a portion of the data handle using a local function (e.g., a hash) to generate the security metadata. In an example, obtaining the security metadata includes extracting an index (e.g., key) from the data handle and retrieving the security metadata from a local repository based on the index. In an example, the ICN router includes hardware assisted lookup circuitry (HALO) to perform hash based lookups. Here, retrieving the security metadata includes using a HALO to lookup the security metadata in the local repository. In an example, the ICN router uses the HALO, or a second HALO, to perform lookups in a content store, pending interest table, or forwarding interest base of the ICN router. Additional details about HALO lookups are provided with respect to
The processing circuitry is configured to cache the data based on the security metadata. When the data handle is sent alone, there is no data to cache when the data handle arrives. However, if the data handle is part of a complete data packet, then the security metadata may govern how the data will be cached at the ICN router 120. For example, when the security metadata includes a policy, the data caching may be based a policy directive retrieved from the policy. Here, the ICN router 120 platform information is used to select the policy directive from multiple in the policy. Once the policy directive is retrieved, the processing circuitry applies the policy directive with respect to the data in the local cache. In an example, the policy directive is at least one of no-cache, encrypt, or compress. The no-cache policy directive entails that the ICN router 120 not store the data locally in a content store. The compression policy directive is generally permissive, enabling the ICN router 120 to perform compression when storing the data. Such a policy protects the integrity of data that may suffer due to lossy compression, for example. The encryption policy defines whether encryption is necessary to cache the data. In an example, a second policy directive establishes one of several different levels of encryption based on the ICN router platform information. Thus, for example, if the ICN platform is vulnerable (e.g., to a physical attack), a higher level of encryption may be defined in the policy directive than if the ICN router 120 were implemented on a more secure platform.
The processing circuitry is configured to test an ICN node (e.g., ICN node 130) at an interface of the ICN router 120 for compatibility with the security metadata. In an example, testing the ICN node 130 includes transmitting the data handle to the ICN node 130 and receiving a response from the ICN node 130. Here, the ICN node 130 tests whether the security metadata is in one or more sets installed at the ICN node. The ICN node 130 performs many of the same operations as the ICN router 120 to determine whether the ICN node 130 is authorized to receive the data to which the data handle refers. At this transmission, the data has not yet been sent to the ICN node 130.
One technique for testing whether a given ICN node is authorized to receive the data involves using a set-membership. Here, the security metadata includes a label indicating a security regime to which the data belongs. Each node, including the ICN router 120, includes one or more sets of labels. If the ICN node has a set that has the security label of the data in the data handle as a member, then the ICN node is authorized to handle the data, possibly in accordance with policy directives attached to the set. Thus, in an example, the processing circuitry is configured to receiving a set definition at the ICN router 120 and use the set definition to respond to tests from other ICN nodes about compatibility with other security metadata.
In an example, the set corresponds to a virtual private network. Here, each ICN node with the set definition is a participant in the virtual private network. The set-membership technique provides a convenient way to organize ICN nodes into VPNs as nodes within a given VPN are given the same set definitions. An example is illustrated in
The processing circuitry is configured to transmit a version of the data to the ICN node 130 based on the compatibility of the ICN node 130 with the security metadata. In an example, when the ICN node is not compatible with the security metadata, the version of the data is the data handle. Transmitting just the data handle may be part-and-parcel to testing the ICN node 130. However, because the data will eventually traverse to the sink A 135, some form of the data will be sent to the ICN node 130 beyond the data handle. In an example, when the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata indicates that the data must be encrypted, the version of the data is an encrypted form of the data.
In an example, the processing circuitry is configured to receive an interest packet from a second ICN node (e.g., the sink A 135) connectable to the ICN router 120 through the ICN node 130. Here the interest packet indicates compatibility with the security metadata and an encryption protocol to use. Then, the data is encrypted in accordance with the encryption protocol to create encrypted data. The encrypted data may then be transmitted in a data packet to the ICN node 130 for delivery to the second ICN node (e.g., sink A 135). This communication between sink A 135 and the ICN router 120 establishes the tunnel between the ICN router 120 and the sink A 135 through the ICN node 130. That is, the ICN node 130 cannot access or otherwise expose the data because of the encryption agreed upon by the ICN router 120 and sink A 135.
The nature of the security metadata and the actions applied at ICN nodes because of the security metadata may be varied. For example, the same data may not be sensitive with respect to one ICN node and sensitive with respect to another. This may arise due to platform differences, physical location, or an operator of a given ICN node. When differences occur, potentially the data may be transmitted as different responses to an interest, using different keys for encrypting the data, different data transformations, etc. Thus, the requests may be treated as two distinct requests that are not merged for anycasting. Security metadata (e.g., content labels) is for such discrimination. However, the security metadata may also specify the type of merging that is permitted for each type of content. For example, data may not be so sensitive that it needs to be encrypted but may be sensitive enough that an attestation may be requested by a given ICN node before receiving the data.
In an example, the security metadata 210 is bound to the data-chunk name 205 such that the data-chunk name 205 is self-confirming. This may be accomplished by signing all or part of the security metadata 210 with a private key that is a property of the name of the data, the data creator, owner, or some attribute of the creator, owner, etc. The signature may be verified by decryption with a public key and verifying that the signature contains a hash of the name.
In practice, the association 220 may be maintained in different ways. In the example 225, the security metadata 210 (e.g., signature, label, etc.) is included as part of the data-chunk name 205, or part of the data handle, which also includes the data-chunk name 205.
Another technique is illustrated in example 230. Here, an agreed-upon one-way function (e.g., secure hash) is used to obtain an ID that is used to retrieve the security metadata 210 with which the signature can be retrieved from a distributed key-value-store (KVS), distributed ledger, or other storage structure.
The security metadata 210 may also take sever forms, such as a label, a signature, a set of policy directives, even an executable, or combination thereof. In an example, a label may directly or indirectly describe one of a small number of categories of sensitivity as illustrated in
An ICN node may be annotated with a collection of sets. The first ICN node may be annotated to cache data that maps into set 1 305 and set 3 (not pictured) and the second ICN nodes may similarly be annotated to cache data mapping into set 2 310 and set 4 (not pictured). Data that is labeled with label A 315 may be cached in either the first ICN node or the second ICN node. However, if the data is labeled with label C 325, the data may only be cached at the second ICN node. Other logical conditions for caching may be specified. For example, instead of allowing data to be cached at any node that has one or more of the sets to which the data belongs, a node may only be allowed to cache data if it is annotated with all of the same sets to which the data belongs
As illustrated, the ICN node recognizes that it has not received the data but rather a data handle (operation 505). The data handle is forwarded through an in-face (e.g., an interface from which the original interest was received). The in-face determines whether it was the original requestor (decision 515). If no, then the in-face transmits the data handle instead of the data (operation 520). Otherwise, the in-face transmits a request to the node holding the data to retrieve the data.
In an example, ICN node sets may be known to each forwarder through a distributed ledger, or other configuration data source. This type of out-of-band update to the set may reduce the need to trust individual ICN nodes with content caching or forwarding decisions.
To address these issues, a data object A 605 may be split into parts (e.g., A1, A2, A3, A4) with metadata for the data object specifying how those subparts are to be treated differently. Object 610 illustrates this split from data object A 605. Thus parts A1 and A3 in object 610 may be free to propagate anywhere, while A2 and A4 have to be handled differently. Object 615 illustrates that even the sensitive parts, A2 and A4, may not be equally sensitive. Here, the metadata may indicate that they are to be differently encrypted for example. As illustrated, A2 is heavily encrypted and therefore may be shared more broadly, while A4 is lightly encrypted and sharing is more restricted.
In an example, the data object A 605 may be compressed, and then its compression dictionary may be encrypted and stored in a small segment such as A2 or A4. In this case, the data dictionary itself acts like an extended encryption key but does not create decryption overhead (aside from decrypting the dictionary) in addition to decompression overhead. If the content is not particularly compressible, then, in lieu of compressing the content, a compressible mask may be used to exclusive OR (XOR) the content. Here, the mask may be compressed and encrypted as the data object A2 or A4.
The lightly encrypted data A4 may be subject to an offline attack, possibly resulting in the data being disclosed in clear text and widely circulated. The decision to use light encryption may thus be taken in the context of other factors such as physical security or the relative value of the data. For example, data may have temporal value such as stock ticker, temperature sensor readings, instant messages, etc., that will mean little in a short period of time. In an example, key management may play a role in how widely circulated data may be. If the key management system circulates a key to a narrow set of nodes, the ICN routing may take the key management behavior into consideration.
Some nodes (e.g., routers, boundary nodes, gateways, etc.) in the multiplexed physical network, may belong to more than one VPN (e.g., routers, boundary nodes, gateways, etc.). Such nodes may implement bridging to forward data between VPNs according to the ICN protocol. Others which are only in one VPN at any time, may implement normal ICN forwarding and caching protocols for the data that is set-label associated with that VPN.
Each node that receives a chunk of the data being streamed (operation 805) checks if the data is encrypted (decision 810). If the data is encrypted, the node caches the chunk (operation 815) and forwards the chunk to an in-face (e.g., in accordance with a PIT entry for the data) (operation 820). If the data chunk is not encrypted, the node determines whether or not its policy permits data to be stored locally and shared downstream or whether the node can only forward a data handle to the last retainer (decision 825). If local storing is not permitted, the chunk is forwarded to the in-face (operation 820). If local storing is permitted, the chunk is cached (operation 830) and a data handle is sent to the in-faces (operation 835). In an example, the in-faces later reactively pull the data or only pull the data lazily, according to various local configurations at the in-faces.
The differences between the stream and non-stream approaches acknowledge that the decisions are being made according to the local policy for handling streaming data chunks—which may only be cached for very short durations in time but are cached with high priority—sufficient to cover the buffering time for the stream. Thus, if data is not encrypted, and the policy requires non-storing of data, then a target receiver or content replica cache downstream may set up a traditional end-to-end secure sockets layer (SSL) or transport layer security (TLS) channel (e.g., using a legacy addressed based technique) with the last-retainer for the entire data stream. A stream may be un-encrypted in some parts and encrypted in others.
The difference between node vulnerability and other aspects of node trust discussed above (e.g., in the context of a VPN) involve the ability of a node to be not “currently” trusted according to the physical attributes configured for that node. For example, the node may be a virtual machine that is at one moment hosted in a secure host, and may readily cache, and at another instant may be located (for load-balancing, recovery, or other reasons) in a less secure host. Or the node itself is a physical machine that is by itself highly intrusion resistant, but is located in a physically less secure infrastructure or in an infrastructure that is subject to logical intrusion (such as placement of wireless sensors by an unscrupulous third party).
The determination of node vulnerability (e.g., to physical intrusion or other attack) may be assessed dynamically by an ICN router or gateway node that interfaces to a network of lower security nodes or a mixed network of lower and higher security nodes but where intermediate layers and protocols do not reliably preserve the vulnerability context. An edge ICN node may prevent access to a more secure side of the network, holding the ICN packet in quarantine, then perform an attestation protocol via a side channel to the node originating the data, until an attestation result authorizes a level of trust commensurate with the destination network security level.
As illustrated, the node's vulnerability to physical intrusion is assessed (decision 905). If the node is not vulnerable, data flow may progress as normal (operation 910). Otherwise, a data signature (e.g., security metadata) is extracted from the data (operation 915), the signature is verified (operation 920), and a sensitivity level of the data to the vulnerability is obtained from the signature (operation 930).
The sensitivity level given the vulnerability may determine whether or not the data is cacheable (decision 930). If no, the node does not keep cache the data (operation 945). If yes, the node encrypts, or otherwise transforms the data in accordance with the signature (operation 935) and caches the result (operation 940).
As illustrated, a determination of whether a data is compressed or encrypted is made (decision 1005). If yes, the data is stored in the content store as is (operation 1010). If no, a determination as to whether the data is high-volume is made (1015). High-volume may be determined by statistical analysis of packet flows through the node, or simply represent a count above a threshold. If the data is high volume, a determination is made as to whether the data is compressible (decision 1020). If no, the data is placed in default (e.g., unencrypted) storage 1025 for large data—which may be separate from the standard content store of the node. If yes, the data is compressed. If the data is not high-volume (decision 1015) or has been compressed (operation 1030), the node determines whether the data is sensitive (decision 1035) (e.g., from the security metadata or node vulnerability). If no, the data is placed in the content store (operation 1010). If yes, the determination is made as to whether the data is encrypted (decision 1040). If yes, the data is placed into the content store (operation 1010). If no, the data is encrypted (operation 1045) and then placed in the content store (operation 1010).
In an example, HALO is implemented by a programmable hardware acceleration mechanism that supports create/retrieve/update/delete (CRUD) operations over a range of memory described to it by a configuration, and which continues into a software-backed associative lookup when it cannot resolve in hardware, a key to yield a value. HALO facilitates ICN operations because ICN operations are generally very intensive in the use of associative lookups to map arbitrary bit-strings (e.g., names 1105, embedded metadata 1130, or local metadata 1120) to addresses of various objects in content stores (e.g., control meta data 1135, local metadata 115, or a content store 1125). However, in addition to mapping names 1105 to data structures, ICN implementations also generally map names 1105 to various control structures such as PIT entries, FIB entries, and more generally, to map between names and various information control metadata 1135 such as hash digests, encryption keys to be used, signatures to be verified, etc. Each time an Interest packet arrives, the PIT, content store 1125 and potentially the FIB must be looked up. Depending on the length of these tables, such operations may consume a lot of time. While such lookups may be implemented in software, it may be prohibitively expensive to perform so many associative searches. This may be an underlying reason why ICNs compare poorly in relation to legacy CDNs where content caches are intentionally organized for different purposes and located at strategic places for efficient aggregation and dissemination of content.
HALO 1110 addresses these issues by supporting the multiple lookups into the content store 1125, PIT, FIB, and other structures to remove a significant performance penalty that repeats over and over at each ICN node.
In an example, HALO may be implemented as a confidential computing element in the platform. Because HALO is implemented in hardware, HALO may be associated with a device root of trust. In this way, the T-CAM capability is not just accelerating performance but also enhancing content security by removing the need to trust software infrastructure to provide the necessary protection from malicious or accidental side channels.
In an example, the illustrated metadata content store 1115 is new to ICN. Here, the meta data associated with the content or compute function is stored. This enables a client or user to request a class of data rather than one particular type of data or compute function.
In an example, HALO 1210 may be configured to perform metadata optimized FIB operation. Data definition schemas are a form of metadata that ‘accepts’ a data set if the data fits within the parameters defined by the schema. The schema may identity a range of values the data may hold, the structure of data in terms of maps, groups, arrays, enumerations and so forth. The data definition schema may be realized in a machine-readable form such as JSON, CBOR, XML.
In general, for every data set there are zero or more metadata schemas that ‘accepts’ the data set. Also, for a given metadata schema, there are zero or more data sets that are accepted by the schema. Accordingly, for a given data set, there is intrinsic interest in the metadata schemas that accept it. Likewise, for a given metadata schema there is intrinsic interest in the data set that is accepted by the schema.
ICN routing nodes may leverage intrinsic interest to optimize efficiency by scanning the content store containing both data and metadata to find data that is accepted by the metadata schemas. If the FIB contains a route for a data set in the content store and the node finds a metadata schema that accepts that data, then the node may automatically add a FIB entry for the matching metadata schemas. Similarly, if there are PIT entries for a data set and the result of a scan finds interested metadata, the PIT entry may be updated to include interest packets for the metadata.
The inverse case is also considered where a FIB or PIT 1215 may contain metadata and a scan of the SC reveals data that is accepted by the metadata. This may result in the data being listed in FIB and PIT 1215 according to the routing context already in place for the metadata.
Furthermore, the ICN may accommodate discovery of the discovered intrinsic connection between data and metadata by updating discovery tables to reflect the existence associated metadata. Additionally, a response to a PIT request, may include an unsolicited or suggested interest in the metadata that accepts the interested data (or the inverse where interest in a metadata schema my produce a response that includes references to data sets that are accepted by the metadata).
The drawback to a microservice or serverless function decomposition, however, is that software has to be carefully optimized in order to reduce the number of cross-address space calls among the microservices or serverless functions instances. To address this issue, hardware facilitated inter-service procedure calls may be used. This uses a combination of an enhanced relay capability for channeling function calls from one microservice or a serverless function to another serverless function or RPC handler in another microservice directly through hardware, eliminating the need for costly marshalling and security enforcement in software. A hardware assisted dispatch of a call-frame into the target execution environment—e.g., a programmable hardware interrupt handler which does not interrupt software but uses an anonymous thread for injecting the call—may also be employed. This results in hardware-assisted fire-and-forget operations (HAFAF).
Many of the ICN processing flows do not use return values. For example, when a request for a data chunk arrives, and it is determined that it is already available in the local content store, the remainder of the operation involves retrieving the data chunk from the CS and sending the data back. Similarly, when a response packet arrives from an out-face, three operations need to be performed and they can each be run to completion in parallel: a) entering the received data into the CS, and extracting and entering any metadata about the data chunk into a metadata store, b) looking up the PIT and responding to each in-face that has the interest entry in it for the received data chunk—followed by clearing those PIT entries—and c) computing various latency statistics and updating the FIB. Such fire-and-forget operations have the quality that they can be handed off to specialized hardware or to anonymous handler threads to perform the fire-and-forget actions without adding latencies to one another if any processing resource is available (e.g., there are not various threads waiting in request or response event loops). In general, it is not desirable to tie up processors in various wait states while hardware assists like HALO or remote function calls are working. ICN protocol interactions—like handling a request thread, publishing a response, looking up the content store, or marshaling data into it or out of it—are generally highly mechanical and hardware accelerable specialized actions that only consume intermittent attention from software that implements the ICN protocol engine in each node.
The illustrated HAFAF technique is started when a source executor (e.g., parent process or microservice) makes a HAFAF remote call with a no-return indicator (operation 1305). Because the return value is not needed, the context is simplified, enabling the hardware to format the call for injection into the target hardware (operation), select a resource like an anonymous thread in the target hardware and place the formatted call into the execution stack of the thread (operation 1315), and switch an execution context to the thread to process the instruction (operation 1320). The parent thread may continue processing other instructions without waiting for the remote call to complete.
As illustrated, a HAFAF call is made that specifies auto-retry (operation 1405). The retry parameters, as well as the optional notification channel parameter, are extracted from the call (operation 1410). A timer is started (1415) and the operation is performed (operation 1420). At this point a loop is entered waiting for a success or failure to the operation. If the operation is immediately successful, the success is acknowledged on the notification channel (operation 1430). Otherwise, the timer is consulted (decision 1435). If the timer has not expired, the loop continues. If the timer has expired, a check is made as to whether the maximum number of retries has been reached (decision 1440). If yes, the call failed, and a notification may be made on an error channel, if available (operation 1445). Otherwise, the number of retries is decremented (operation 1450), the timer is started again (operation 1415), and the call is once again attempted (operation 1420.
The concept to forward handles to data (e.g., data handles) when it is not possible to move sensitive data without risking exposure is described above along with the introduction of metadata that describes the options available at any ICN node for receiving, storing, and processing data that may be sensitive, including metadata that indicates whether a node is attested to be non-vulnerable to physical or logical invasion.
In an example, the interfaces and ICN protocols circuitry 1505 is configured to receive updates from peers on the ICN network. For example, if data needs to be updated with a new security metadata, the interfaces and ICN protocols circuitry 1505 is configured to update a data certain object metadata associated to its security characteristics (e.g. security requirements). Note that this may imply that if the new security policy (e.g. platform configuration, node domain etc.) is not satisfied anymore it will be flushed from the cache.
In an example, the interfaces and ICN protocols circuitry 1505 is configured to retrieve a last-known catcher for a particular object ID. The ICN cached data includes both objects stored locally but as well peers that may own a copy of an object of a particular ID that may not be cached local due to security concerns.
In an example, the interfaces and ICN protocols circuitry 1505 is configured to cache object ID with a given name, set of metadata (e.g. size, organization etc.) and security policy (e.g. characteristics of the nodes that can cache the object, location of the node, tenant or owner of the node etc.
In an example, the interfaces and ICN protocols circuitry 1505 is configured to flush objects of a given type of with certain security metadata.
In an example, the interfaces and ICN protocols circuitry 1505 is configured to communicate with the ICN peers or peers within overlay updates on: (1) objects cached in the node that may mutate and may change their characteristics; (2) new objects generated with certain security policies; (3) changes on the platform configuration.
In an example, the overlay circuitry 1510 is configured to use the overlay rules 1515 to manage characteristics of the overlay where the node belongs to and perform communication between the node and the other peers. For example, the overlay circuitry includes a list of different overlays where the node belongs to. The overlay rules 1515 include are mapped in to overlay securities ID. Each of the overlays may have an overlay security ID that may be mapped into the cached objects. The security ID will include a rule defining the level of security required (e.g. characteristics of the node, domain, location etc.). These overlay security ID will be shared across all the different nodes participating into the overlay. Objects mapped into the overlay may only be visible to the participants of the overlay.
In an example, the overlay circuitry 1510 is configured to consistency of updates of objects cached in the ICN cached data with respect to the peers as well as update to the peers on: (1) changed on cached objects; (2) changes on the node configuration or characteristics.
In an example, the overlay circuitry 1510 is configured to use the abstractions provided by the ICN data management and caching circuitry 1530, and data consistency circuitry 1520 to perform the same functionalities within a given overlay. The overlay enables a set of security rules that are common and consistent across peers within the same overlay and use the security ID abstraction to keep them coherent across all the nodes.
The ICN data management and caching circuitry 1530 and the object cache 1535 are configured to manage all the various objects that are being cached inside the node as well as their security metadata. Every object hosted in the object cache 1535 may include:
The ICN data management and caching circuitry 1530 is configured to manage the objects cached in the object cache 1535 as well as to expose interfaces to be used by the other blocks in order to: (1) update or remove objects; or (2) flush objects with certain characteristics (e.g., belonging to a particular overlay security domain or that are of a given type).
The data integrity circuitry 1520 builds on top of the ICN data management and caching circuitry 1530 to keep the security metadata or properties associated to a given object consistent. For example, any software entity that has the rights to update specific security constraints or metadata associated to an object (e.g. type of platform, location etc.) may configure the data integrity circuitry 1520—e.g., via the security rules 1525—to update the information associated to the object, or to identify whether the object, if being cached locally needs to be flushed (e.g., in coordination with the object cache 1535) and broadcast to the known peers in the ICN the new update on the object. In an example, this involves only updating the peers within an overlay.
The data flushing circuitry 1540 is configured to perform updates and modifications across all the various objects. This block may be invoked by the other blocks when flushing actions are identified (e.g. because of new security constraints).
The transformation management circuitry 1545 is configured to track how objects are being modified by the compute elements within the platform and identify potential transformations to new types (e.g. by accessing header information or performing more advanced processing on the object). In an example, a transformation rule (e.g., stored inside the ICN security rules 1525) defines what type of transformations are monitored and security constraints applied to an object when that transformation is identified. In an example, the transformation management circuitry 1545 is configured to operations to comply with potential policy updates. For example. If object with type A is transformed to into an object of type B, the new object type B may indicate a change from security policy X (e.g. platform needs to have software guard extensions (SGX)) to security policy X1 (e.g. platform needs to have SGX and TPM and multi-key total memory encryption (MKTME) and the object has to be stored in the secure device). In this case, the object B maybe flushed in case the new policy requirements are not satisfied locally. Here, the data integrity circuitry 1520 may be configured to update peers with the new object and the corresponding policy update.
The platform security monitoring circuitry 1550 is configured to implement the platform management policy 1555, the platform configuration rules 1560, and the platform configuration monitoring policy 1565. platform security monitoring circuitry 1550 is configured to monitor changes into the current platform or edge appliance that may imply security violations into the objects currently cached in the node. When a change is identified the ICN data management and caching circuitry is configured to go over all the various objects in the appliance and decide which will be flushed. In an example, different types of platform changes may be monitored, such as changes into the platform configuration—e.g. new devices update, changes on the bios or any other platform—as defined by the platform configuration rules 1560, changes into the platform utilization that may end up with potential degradation into the security—e.g. the cores or resources responsible to analyze security threads are not validating the level of required performance—as defined by the platform management policy, or changes into the software stacks that are running in the systems and that may have an interplay into the security of the system, as defined by the platform configuration monitoring policy. For instance, a check that all the required software stacks are up and running may be performed.
Compute, memory, and storage are scarce resources, and generally decrease depending on the edge location (e.g., fewer processing resources being available at consumer endpoint devices, than at a base station, than at a central office). However, the closer that the edge location is to the endpoint (e.g., user equipment (UE)), the more that space and power is often constrained. Thus, edge computing attempts to reduce the amount of resources needed for network services, through the distribution of more resources which are located closer both geographically and in network access time. In this manner, edge computing attempts to bring the compute resources to the workload data where appropriate, or, bring the workload data to the compute resources.
The following describes aspects of an edge cloud architecture that covers multiple potential deployments and addresses restrictions that some network operators or service providers may have in their own infrastructures. These include, variation of configurations based on the edge location (because edges at a base station level, for instance, may have more constrained performance and capabilities in a multi-tenant scenario); configurations based on the type of compute, memory, storage, fabric, acceleration, or like resources available to edge locations, tiers of locations, or groups of locations; the service, security, and management and orchestration capabilities; and related objectives to achieve usability and performance of end services. These deployments may accomplish processing in network layers that may be considered as “near edge”, “close edge”, “local edge”, “middle edge”, or “far edge” layers, depending on latency, distance, and timing characteristics.
Edge computing is a developing paradigm where computing is performed at or closer to the “edge” of a network, typically through the use of a compute platform (e.g., x86 or ARM compute hardware architecture) implemented at base stations, gateways, network routers, or other devices which are much closer to endpoint devices producing and consuming the data. For example, edge gateway servers may be equipped with pools of memory and storage resources to perform computation in real-time for low latency use-cases (e.g., autonomous driving or video surveillance) for connected client devices. Or as an example, base stations may be augmented with compute and acceleration resources to directly process service workloads for connected user equipment, without further communicating data via backhaul networks. Or as another example, central office network management hardware may be replaced with standardized compute hardware that performs virtualized network functions and offers compute resources for the execution of services and consumer functions for connected devices. Within edge computing networks, there may be scenarios in services which the compute resource will be “moved” to the data, as well as scenarios in which the data will be “moved” to the compute resource. Or as an example, base station compute, acceleration and network resources can provide services in order to scale to workload demands on an as needed basis by activating dormant capacity (subscription, capacity on demand) in order to manage corner cases, emergencies or to provide longevity for deployed resources over a significantly longer implemented lifecycle.
Examples of latency, resulting from network communication distance and processing time constraints, may range from less than a millisecond (ms) when among the endpoint layer 1700, under 5 ms at the edge devices layer 1710, to even between 10 to 40 ms when communicating with nodes at the network access layer 1720. Beyond the edge cloud 1610 are core network 1730 and cloud data center 1740 layers, each with increasing latency (e.g., between 50-60 ms at the core network layer 1730, to 100 or more ms at the cloud data center layer). As a result, operations at a core network data center 1735 or a cloud data center 1745, with latencies of at least 50 to 100 ms or more, will not be able to accomplish many time-critical functions of the use cases 1705. Each of these latency values are provided for purposes of illustration and contrast; it will be understood that the use of other access network mediums and technologies may further reduce the latencies. In some examples, respective portions of the network may be categorized as “close edge”, “local edge”, “near edge”, “middle edge”, or “far edge” layers, relative to a network source and destination. For instance, from the perspective of the core network data center 1735 or a cloud data center 1745, a central office or content data network may be considered as being located within a “near edge” layer (“near” to the cloud, having high latency values when communicating with the devices and endpoints of the use cases 1705), whereas an access point, base station, on-premise server, or network gateway may be considered as located within a “far edge” layer (“far” from the cloud, having low latency values when communicating with the devices and endpoints of the use cases 1705). It will be understood that other categorizations of a particular network layer as constituting a “close”, “local”, “near”, “middle”, or “far” edge may be based on latency, distance, number of network hops, or other measurable characteristics, as measured from a source in any of the network layers 1700-1740.
The various use cases 1705 may access resources under usage pressure from incoming streams, due to multiple services utilizing the edge cloud. To achieve results with low latency, the services executed within the edge cloud 1610 balance varying requirements in terms of: (a) Priority (throughput or latency) and Quality of Service (QoS) (e.g., traffic for an autonomous car may have higher priority than a temperature sensor in terms of response time requirement; or, a performance sensitivity/bottleneck may exist at a compute/accelerator, memory, storage, or network resource, depending on the application); (b) Reliability and Resiliency (e.g., some input streams need to be acted upon and the traffic routed with mission-critical reliability, where as some other input streams may be tolerate an occasional failure, depending on the application); and (c) Physical constraints (e.g., power, cooling and form-factor).
The end-to-end service view for these use cases involves the concept of a service-flow and is associated with a transaction. The transaction details the overall service requirement for the entity consuming the service, as well as the associated services for the resources, workloads, workflows, and business functional and business level requirements. The services executed with the “terms” described may be managed at each layer in a way to assure real time, and runtime contractual compliance for the transaction during the lifecycle of the service. When a component in the transaction is missing its agreed to SLA, the system as a whole (components in the transaction) may provide the ability to (1) understand the impact of the SLA violation, and (2) augment other components in the system to resume overall transaction SLA, and (3) implement steps to remediate.
Thus, with these variations and service features in mind, edge computing within the edge cloud 1610 may provide the ability to serve and respond to multiple applications of the use cases 1705 (e.g., object tracking, video surveillance, connected cars, etc.) in real-time or near real-time, and meet ultra-low latency requirements for these multiple applications. These advantages enable a whole new class of applications (Virtual Network Functions (VNFs), Function as a Service (FaaS), Edge as a Service (EaaS), standard processes, etc.), which cannot leverage conventional cloud computing due to latency or other limitations.
However, with the advantages of edge computing comes the following caveats. The devices located at the edge are often resource constrained and therefore there is pressure on usage of edge resources. Typically, this is addressed through the pooling of memory and storage resources for use by multiple users (tenants) and devices. The edge may be power and cooling constrained and therefore the power usage needs to be accounted for by the applications that are consuming the most power. There may be inherent power-performance tradeoffs in these pooled memory resources, as many of them are likely to use emerging memory technologies, where more power requires greater memory bandwidth. Likewise, improved security of hardware and root of trust trusted functions are also required, because edge locations may be unmanned and may even need permissioned access (e.g., when housed in a third-party location). Such issues are magnified in the edge cloud 1610 in a multi-tenant, multi-owner, or multi-access setting, where services and applications are requested by many users, especially as network usage dynamically fluctuates and the composition of the multiple stakeholders, use cases, and services changes.
At a more generic level, an edge computing system may be described to encompass any number of deployments at the previously discussed layers operating in the edge cloud 1610 (network layers 1700-1740), which provide coordination from client and distributed computing devices. One or more edge gateway nodes, one or more edge aggregation nodes, and one or more core data centers may be distributed across layers of the network to provide an implementation of the edge computing system by or on behalf of a telecommunication service provider (“telco”, or “TSP”), internet-of-things service provider, cloud service provider (CSP), enterprise entity, or any other number of entities. Various implementations and configurations of the edge computing system may be provided dynamically, such as when orchestrated to meet service objectives.
Consistent with the examples provided herein, a client compute node may be embodied as any type of endpoint component, device, appliance, or other thing capable of communicating as a producer or consumer of data. Further, the label “node” or “device” as used in the edge computing system does not necessarily mean that such node or device operates in a client or agent/minion/follower role; rather, any of the nodes or devices in the edge computing system refer to individual entities, nodes, or subsystems which include discrete or connected hardware or software configurations to facilitate or use the edge cloud 1610.
As such, the edge cloud 1610 is formed from network components and functional features operated by and within edge gateway nodes, edge aggregation nodes, or other edge compute nodes among network layers 1710-1730. The edge cloud 1610 thus may be embodied as any type of network that provides edge computing or storage resources which are proximately located to radio access network (RAN) capable endpoint devices (e.g., mobile computing devices, IoT devices, smart devices, etc.), which are discussed herein. In other words, the edge cloud 1610 may be envisioned as an “edge” which connects the endpoint devices and traditional network access points that serve as an ingress point into service provider core networks, including mobile carrier networks (e.g., Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) networks, Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks, 5G/6G networks, etc.), while also providing storage or compute capabilities. Other types and forms of network access (e.g., Wi-Fi, long-range wireless, wired networks including optical networks) may also be utilized in place of or in combination with such 3GPP carrier networks.
The network components of the edge cloud 1610 may be servers, multi-tenant servers, appliance computing devices, or any other type of computing devices. For example, the edge cloud 1610 may include an appliance computing device that is a self-contained electronic device including a housing, a chassis, a case or a shell. In some circumstances, the housing may be dimensioned for portability such that it can be carried by a human or shipped. Example housings may include materials that form one or more exterior surfaces that partially or fully protect contents of the appliance, in which protection may include weather protection, hazardous environment protection (e.g., EMI, vibration, extreme temperatures), or enable submergibility. Example housings may include power circuitry to provide power for stationary or portable implementations, such as AC power inputs, DC power inputs, AC/DC or DC/AC converter(s), power regulators, transformers, charging circuitry, batteries, wired inputs or wireless power inputs. Example housings or surfaces thereof may include or connect to mounting hardware to enable attachment to structures such as buildings, telecommunication structures (e.g., poles, antenna structures, etc.) or racks (e.g., server racks, blade mounts, etc.). Example housings or surfaces thereof may support one or more sensors (e.g., temperature sensors, vibration sensors, light sensors, acoustic sensors, capacitive sensors, proximity sensors, etc.). One or more such sensors may be contained in, carried by, or otherwise embedded in the surface or mounted to the surface of the appliance. Example housings or surfaces thereof may support mechanical connectivity, such as propulsion hardware (e.g., wheels, propellers, etc.) or articulating hardware (e.g., robot arms, pivotable appendages, etc.). In some circumstances, the sensors may include any type of input devices such as user interface hardware (e.g., buttons, switches, dials, sliders, etc.). In some circumstances, example housings include output devices contained in, carried by, embedded therein or attached thereto. Output devices may include displays, touchscreens, lights, LEDs, speakers, I/O ports (e.g., USB), etc. In some circumstances, edge devices are devices presented in the network for a specific purpose (e.g., a traffic light), but may have processing or other capacities that may be utilized for other purposes. Such edge devices may be independent from other networked devices and may be provided with a housing having a form factor suitable for its primary purpose; yet be available for other compute tasks that do not interfere with its primary task. Edge devices include Internet of Things devices. The appliance computing device may include hardware and software components to manage local issues such as device temperature, vibration, resource utilization, updates, power issues, physical and network security, etc. Example hardware for implementing an appliance computing device is described in conjunction with
In
In the example of
It should be understood that some of the devices in 1910 are multi-tenant devices where Tenant 1 may function within a tenant1 ‘slice’ while a Tenant 2 may function within a tenant2 slice (and, in further examples, additional or sub-tenants may exist; and each tenant may even be specifically entitled and transactionally tied to a specific set of features all the way day to specific hardware features). A trusted multi-tenant device may further contain a tenant specific cryptographic key such that the combination of key and slice may be considered a “root of trust” (RoT) or tenant specific RoT. A RoT may further be computed dynamically composed using a DICE (Device Identity Composition Engine) architecture such that a single DICE hardware building block may be used to construct layered trusted computing base contexts for layering of device capabilities (such as a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)). The RoT may further be used for a trusted computing context to enable a “fan-out” that is useful for supporting multi-tenancy. Within a multi-tenant environment, the respective edge nodes 1922, 1924 may operate as security feature enforcement points for local resources allocated to multiple tenants per node. Additionally, tenant runtime and application execution (e.g., in instances 1932, 1934) may serve as an enforcement point for a security feature that creates a virtual edge abstraction of resources spanning potentially multiple physical hosting platforms. Finally, the orchestration functions 1960 at an orchestration entity may operate as a security feature enforcement point for marshalling resources along tenant boundaries.
Edge computing nodes may partition resources (memory, central processing unit (CPU), graphics processing unit (GPU), interrupt controller, input/output (I/O) controller, memory controller, bus controller, etc.) where respective partitionings may contain a RoT capability and where fan-out and layering according to a DICE model may further be applied to Edge Nodes. Cloud computing nodes often use containers, FaaS engines, Servlets, servers, or other computation abstraction that may be partitioned according to a DICE layering and fan-out structure to support a RoT context for each. Accordingly, the respective RoTs spanning devices 1910, 1922, and 1940 may coordinate the establishment of a distributed trusted computing base (DTCB) such that a tenant-specific virtual trusted secure channel linking all elements end to end can be established.
Further, it will be understood that a container may have data or workload specific keys protecting its content from a previous edge node. As part of migration of a container, a pod controller at a source edge node may obtain a migration key from a target edge node pod controller where the migration key is used to wrap the container-specific keys. When the container/pod is migrated to the target edge node, the unwrapping key is exposed to the pod controller that then decrypts the wrapped keys. The keys may now be used to perform operations on container specific data. The migration functions may be gated by properly attested edge nodes and pod managers (as described above).
In further examples, an edge computing system is extended to provide for orchestration of multiple applications through the use of containers (a contained, deployable unit of software that provides code and needed dependencies) in a multi-owner, multi-tenant environment. A multi-tenant orchestrator may be used to perform key management, trust anchor management, and other security functions related to the provisioning and lifecycle of the trusted ‘slice’ concept in
For instance, each edge node 1922, 1924 may implement the use of containers, such as with the use of a container “pod” 1926, 1928 providing a group of one or more containers. In a setting that uses one or more container pods, a pod controller or orchestrator is responsible for local control and orchestration of the containers in the pod. Various edge node resources (e.g., storage, compute, services, depicted with hexagons) provided for the respective edge slices 1932, 1934 are partitioned according to the needs of each container.
With the use of container pods, a pod controller oversees the partitioning and allocation of containers and resources. The pod controller receives instructions from an orchestrator (e.g., orchestrator 1960) that instructs the controller on how best to partition physical resources and for what duration, such as by receiving key performance indicator (KPI) targets based on SLA contracts. The pod controller determines which container requires which resources and for how long in order to complete the workload and satisfy the SLA. The pod controller also manages container lifecycle operations such as: creating the container, provisioning it with resources and applications, coordinating intermediate results between multiple containers working on a distributed application together, dismantling containers when workload completes, and the like. Additionally, a pod controller may serve a security role that prevents assignment of resources until the right tenant authenticates or prevents provisioning of data or a workload to a container until an attestation result is satisfied.
Also, with the use of container pods, tenant boundaries can still exist but in the context of each pod of containers. If each tenant specific pod has a tenant specific pod controller, there will be a shared pod controller that consolidates resource allocation requests to avoid typical resource starvation situations. Further controls may be provided to ensure attestation and trustworthiness of the pod and pod controller. For instance, the orchestrator 1960 may provision an attestation verification policy to local pod controllers that perform attestation verification. If an attestation satisfies a policy for a first tenant pod controller but not a second tenant pod controller, then the second pod could be migrated to a different edge node that does satisfy it. Alternatively, the first pod may be allowed to execute and a different shared pod controller is installed and invoked prior to the second pod executing.
The system arrangements of depicted in
In the context of
In further examples, aspects of software-defined or controlled silicon hardware, and other configurable hardware, may integrate with the applications, functions, and services an edge computing system. Software defined silicon (SDSi) may be used to ensure the ability for some resource or hardware ingredient to fulfill a contract or service level agreement, based on the ingredient's ability to remediate a portion of itself or the workload (e.g., by an upgrade, reconfiguration, or provision of new features within the hardware configuration itself).
In further examples, any of the compute nodes or devices discussed with reference to the present edge computing systems and environment may be fulfilled based on the components depicted in
In the simplified example depicted in
The compute node 2100 may be embodied as any type of engine, device, or collection of devices capable of performing various compute functions. In some examples, the compute node 2100 may be embodied as a single device such as an integrated circuit, an embedded system, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a system-on-a-chip (SOC), or other integrated system or device. In the illustrative example, the compute node 2100 includes or is embodied as a processor 2104 and a memory 2106. The processor 2104 may be embodied as any type of processor capable of performing the functions described herein (e.g., executing an application). For example, the processor 2104 may be embodied as a multi-core processor(s), a microcontroller, a processing unit, a specialized or special purpose processing unit, or other processor or processing/controlling circuit.
In some examples, the processor 2104 may be embodied as, include, or be coupled to an FPGA, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), reconfigurable hardware or hardware circuitry, or other specialized hardware to facilitate performance of the functions described herein. Also in some examples, the processor 2104 may be embodied as a specialized x-processing unit (xPU) also known as a data processing unit (DPU), infrastructure processing unit (IPU), or network processing unit (NPU). Such an xPU may be embodied as a standalone circuit or circuit package, integrated within an SOC, or integrated with networking circuitry (e.g., in a SmartNIC, or enhanced SmartNIC), acceleration circuitry, storage devices, or AI hardware (e.g., GPUs or programmed FPGAs). Such an xPU may be designed to receive programming to process one or more data streams and perform specific tasks and actions for the data streams (such as hosting microservices, performing service management or orchestration, organizing or managing server or data center hardware, managing service meshes, or collecting and distributing telemetry), outside of the CPU or general purpose processing hardware. However, it will be understood that a xPU, a SOC, a CPU, and other variations of the processor 2104 may work in coordination with each other to execute many types of operations and instructions within and on behalf of the compute node 2100.
The memory 2106 may be embodied as any type of volatile (e.g., dynamic random access memory (DRAM), etc.) or non-volatile memory or data storage capable of performing the functions described herein. Volatile memory may be a storage medium that requires power to maintain the state of data stored by the medium. Non-limiting examples of volatile memory may include various types of random access memory (RANI), such as DRAM or static random access memory (SRAM). One particular type of DRAM that may be used in a memory module is synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM).
In an example, the memory device is a block addressable memory device, such as those based on NAND or NOR technologies. A memory device may also include a three dimensional crosspoint memory device (e.g., Intel® 3D XPoint™ memory), or other byte addressable write-in-place nonvolatile memory devices. The memory device may refer to the die itself or to a packaged memory product. In some examples, 3D crosspoint memory (e.g., Intel® 3D XPoint™ memory) may comprise a transistor-less stackable cross point architecture in which memory cells sit at the intersection of word lines and bit lines and are individually addressable and in which bit storage is based on a change in bulk resistance. In some examples, all or a portion of the memory 2106 may be integrated into the processor 2104. The memory 2106 may store various software and data used during operation such as one or more applications, data operated on by the application(s), libraries, and drivers.
The compute circuitry 2102 is communicatively coupled to other components of the compute node 2100 via the I/O subsystem 2108, which may be embodied as circuitry or components to facilitate input/output operations with the compute circuitry 2102 (e.g., with the processor 2104 or the main memory 2106) and other components of the compute circuitry 2102. For example, the I/O subsystem 2108 may be embodied as, or otherwise include, memory controller hubs, input/output control hubs, integrated sensor hubs, firmware devices, communication links (e.g., point-to-point links, bus links, wires, cables, light guides, printed circuit board traces, etc.), or other components and subsystems to facilitate the input/output operations. In some examples, the I/O subsystem 2108 may form a portion of a system-on-a-chip (SoC) and be incorporated, along with one or more of the processor 2104, the memory 2106, and other components of the compute circuitry 2102, into the compute circuitry 2102.
The one or more illustrative data storage devices 2110 may be embodied as any type of devices configured for short-term or long-term storage of data such as, for example, memory devices and circuits, memory cards, hard disk drives, solid-state drives, or other data storage devices. Individual data storage devices 2110 may include a system partition that stores data and firmware code for the data storage device 2110. Individual data storage devices 2110 may also include one or more operating system partitions that store data files and executables for operating systems depending on, for example, the type of compute node 2100.
The communication circuitry 2112 may be embodied as any communication circuit, device, or collection thereof, capable of enabling communications over a network between the compute circuitry 2102 and another compute device (e.g., an edge gateway of an implementing edge computing system). The communication circuitry 2112 may be configured to use any one or more communication technology (e.g., wired or wireless communications) and associated protocols (e.g., a cellular networking protocol such a 3GPP 4G or 5G standard, a wireless local area network protocol such as IEEE 802.11/Wi-Fi®, a wireless wide area network protocol, Ethernet, Bluetooth®, Bluetooth Low Energy, a IoT protocol such as IEEE 802.15.4 or ZigBee®, low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) or low-power wide-area (LPWA) protocols, etc.) to effect such communication.
The illustrative communication circuitry 2112 includes a network interface controller (MC) 2120, which may also be referred to as a host fabric interface (HFI). The NIC 2120 may be embodied as one or more add-in-boards, daughter cards, network interface cards, controller chips, chipsets, or other devices that may be used by the compute node 2100 to connect with another compute device (e.g., an edge gateway node). In some examples, the NIC 2120 may be embodied as part of a system-on-a-chip (SoC) that includes one or more processors, or included on a multichip package that also contains one or more processors. In some examples, the MC 2120 may include a local processor (not shown) or a local memory (not shown) that are both local to the NIC 2120. In such examples, the local processor of the NIC 2120 may be capable of performing one or more of the functions of the compute circuitry 2102 described herein. Additionally, or alternatively, in such examples, the local memory of the MC 2120 may be integrated into one or more components of the client compute node at the board level, socket level, chip level, or other levels.
Additionally, in some examples, a respective compute node 2100 may include one or more peripheral devices 2114. Such peripheral devices 2114 may include any type of peripheral device found in a compute device or server such as audio input devices, a display, other input/output devices, interface devices, or other peripheral devices, depending on the particular type of the compute node 2100. In further examples, the compute node 2100 may be embodied by a respective edge compute node (whether a client, gateway, or aggregation node) in an edge computing system or like forms of appliances, computers, subsystems, circuitry, or other components.
In a more detailed example,
The edge computing device 2150 may include processing circuitry in the form of a processor 2152, which may be a microprocessor, a multi-core processor, a multithreaded processor, an ultra-low voltage processor, an embedded processor, an xPU/DPU/IPU/NPU, special purpose processing unit, specialized processing unit, or other known processing elements. The processor 2152 may be a part of a system on a chip (SoC) in which the processor 2152 and other components are formed into a single integrated circuit, or a single package, such as the Edison™ or Galileo™ SoC boards from Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, Calif. As an example, the processor 2152 may include an Intel® Architecture Core™ based CPU processor, such as a Quark™, an Atom™, an i3, an i5, an i7, an i9, or an MCU-class processor, or another such processor available from Intel®. However, any number other processors may be used, such as available from Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD®) of Sunnyvale, Calif., a MPS®-based design from MIPS Technologies, Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., an ARM®-based design licensed from ARM Holdings, Ltd. or a customer thereof, or their licensees or adopters. The processors may include units such as an A5-A13 processor from Apple® Inc., a Snapdragon™ processor from Qualcomm® Technologies, Inc., or an OMAP™ processor from Texas Instruments, Inc. The processor 2152 and accompanying circuitry may be provided in a single socket form factor, multiple socket form factor, or a variety of other formats, including in limited hardware configurations or configurations that include fewer than all elements shown in
The processor 2152 may communicate with a system memory 2154 over an interconnect 2156 (e.g., a bus). Any number of memory devices may be used to provide for a given amount of system memory. As examples, the memory 2154 may be random access memory (RAM) in accordance with a Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council (JEDEC) design such as the DDR or mobile DDR standards (e.g., LPDDR, LPDDR2, LPDDR3, or LPDDR4). In particular examples, a memory component may comply with a DRAM standard promulgated by JEDEC, such as JESD79F for DDR SDRAM, JESD79-2F for DDR2 SDRAM, JESD79-3F for DDR3 SDRAM, JESD79-4A for DDR4 SDRAM, JESD209 for Low Power DDR (LPDDR), JESD209-2 for LPDDR2, JESD209-3 for LPDDR3, and JESD209-4 for LPDDR4. Such standards (and similar standards) may be referred to as DDR-based standards and communication interfaces of the storage devices that implement such standards may be referred to as DDR-based interfaces. In various implementations, the individual memory devices may be of any number of different package types such as single die package (SDP), dual die package (DDP) or quad die package (Q17P). These devices, in some examples, may be directly soldered onto a motherboard to provide a lower profile solution, while in other examples the devices are configured as one or more memory modules that in turn couple to the motherboard by a given connector. Any number of other memory implementations may be used, such as other types of memory modules, e.g., dual inline memory modules (DIMMs) of different varieties including but not limited to microDIMMs or MiniDIMMs.
To provide for persistent storage of information such as data, applications, operating systems and so forth, a storage 2158 may also couple to the processor 2152 via the interconnect 2156. In an example, the storage 2158 may be implemented via a solid-state disk drive (SSDD). Other devices that may be used for the storage 2158 include flash memory cards, such as Secure Digital (SD) cards, microSD cards, eXtreme Digital (XD) picture cards, and the like, and Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drives. In an example, the memory device may be or may include memory devices that use chalcogenide glass, multi-threshold level NAND flash memory, NOR flash memory, single or multi-level Phase Change Memory (PCM), a resistive memory, nanowire memory, ferroelectric transistor random access memory (FeTRAM), anti-ferroelectric memory, magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM) memory that incorporates memristor technology, resistive memory including the metal oxide base, the oxygen vacancy base and the conductive bridge Random Access Memory (CB-RAM), or spin transfer torque (STT)-MRAM, a spintronic magnetic junction memory based device, a magnetic tunneling junction (MTJ) based device, a DW (Domain Wall) and SOT (Spin Orbit Transfer) based device, a thyristor based memory device, or a combination of any of the above, or other memory.
In low power implementations, the storage 2158 may be on-die memory or registers associated with the processor 2152. However, in some examples, the storage 2158 may be implemented using a micro hard disk drive (HDD). Further, any number of new technologies may be used for the storage 2158 in addition to, or instead of, the technologies described, such resistance change memories, phase change memories, holographic memories, or chemical memories, among others.
The components may communicate over the interconnect 2156. The interconnect 2156 may include any number of technologies, including industry standard architecture (ISA), extended ISA (EISA), peripheral component interconnect (PCI), peripheral component interconnect extended (PCIx), PCI express (PCIe), or any number of other technologies. The interconnect 2156 may be a proprietary bus, for example, used in an SoC based system. Other bus systems may be included, such as an Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) interface, a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) interface, point to point interfaces, and a power bus, among others.
The interconnect 2156 may couple the processor 2152 to a transceiver 2166, for communications with the connected edge devices 2162. The transceiver 2166 may use any number of frequencies and protocols, such as 2.4 Gigahertz (GHz) transmissions under the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, using the Bluetooth® low energy (BLE) standard, as defined by the Bluetooth® Special Interest Group, or the ZigBee® standard, among others. Any number of radios, configured for a particular wireless communication protocol, may be used for the connections to the connected edge devices 2162. For example, a wireless local area network (WLAN) unit may be used to implement Wi-Fi® communications in accordance with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard. In addition, wireless wide area communications, e.g., according to a cellular or other wireless wide area protocol, may occur via a wireless wide area network (WWAN) unit.
The wireless network transceiver 2166 (or multiple transceivers) may communicate using multiple standards or radios for communications at a different range. For example, the edge computing node 2150 may communicate with close devices, e.g., within about 10 meters, using a local transceiver based on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), or another low power radio, to save power. More distant connected edge devices 2162, e.g., within about 50 meters, may be reached over ZigBee® or other intermediate power radios. Both communications techniques may take place over a single radio at different power levels or may take place over separate transceivers, for example, a local transceiver using BLE and a separate mesh transceiver using ZigBee®.
A wireless network transceiver 2166 (e.g., a radio transceiver) may be included to communicate with devices or services in a cloud (e.g., an edge cloud 2195) via local or wide area network protocols. The wireless network transceiver 2166 may be a low-power wide-area (LPWA) transceiver that follows the IEEE 802.15.4, or IEEE 802.15.4g standards, among others. The edge computing node 2150 may communicate over a wide area using LoRaWAN™ (Long Range Wide Area Network) developed by Semtech and the LoRa Alliance. The techniques described herein are not limited to these technologies but may be used with any number of other cloud transceivers that implement long range, low bandwidth communications, such as Sigfox, and other technologies. Further, other communications techniques, such as time-slotted channel hopping, described in the IEEE 802.15.4e specification may be used.
Any number of other radio communications and protocols may be used in addition to the systems mentioned for the wireless network transceiver 2166, as described herein. For example, the transceiver 2166 may include a cellular transceiver that uses spread spectrum (SPA/SAS) communications for implementing high-speed communications. Further, any number of other protocols may be used, such as Wi-Fi® networks for medium speed communications and provision of network communications. The transceiver 2166 may include radios that are compatible with any number of 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project) specifications, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) and 5th Generation (5G) communication systems, discussed in further detail at the end of the present disclosure. A network interface controller (MC) 2168 may be included to provide a wired communication to nodes of the edge cloud 2195 or to other devices, such as the connected edge devices 2162 (e.g., operating in a mesh). The wired communication may provide an Ethernet connection or may be based on other types of networks, such as Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), DeviceNet, ControlNet, Data Highway+, PROFIBUS, or PROFINET, among many others. An additional NIC 2168 may be included to enable connecting to a second network, for example, a first NIC 2168 providing communications to the cloud over Ethernet, and a second MC 2168 providing communications to other devices over another type of network.
Given the variety of types of applicable communications from the device to another component or network, applicable communications circuitry used by the device may include or be embodied by any one or more of components 2164, 2166, 2168, or 2170. Accordingly, in various examples, applicable means for communicating (e.g., receiving, transmitting, etc.) may be embodied by such communications circuitry.
The edge computing node 2150 may include or be coupled to acceleration circuitry 2164, which may be embodied by one or more artificial intelligence (AI) accelerators, a neural compute stick, neuromorphic hardware, an FPGA, an arrangement of GPUs, an arrangement of xPUs/DPUs/IPU/NPUs, one or more SoCs, one or more CPUs, one or more digital signal processors, dedicated ASICs, or other forms of specialized processors or circuitry designed to accomplish one or more specialized tasks. These tasks may include AI processing (including machine learning, training, inferencing, and classification operations), visual data processing, network data processing, object detection, rule analysis, or the like. These tasks also may include the specific edge computing tasks for service management and service operations discussed elsewhere in this document.
The interconnect 2156 may couple the processor 2152 to a sensor hub or external interface 2170 that is used to connect additional devices or subsystems. The devices may include sensors 2172, such as accelerometers, level sensors, flow sensors, optical light sensors, camera sensors, temperature sensors, global navigation system (e.g., GPS) sensors, pressure sensors, barometric pressure sensors, and the like. The hub or interface 2170 further may be used to connect the edge computing node 2150 to actuators 2174, such as power switches, valve actuators, an audible sound generator, a visual warning device, and the like.
In some optional examples, various input/output (110) devices may be present within or connected to, the edge computing node 2150. For example, a display or other output device 2184 may be included to show information, such as sensor readings or actuator position. An input device 2186, such as a touch screen or keypad may be included to accept input. An output device 2184 may include any number of forms of audio or visual display, including simple visual outputs such as binary status indicators (e.g., light-emitting diodes (LEDs)) and multi-character visual outputs, or more complex outputs such as display screens (e.g., liquid crystal display (LCD) screens), with the output of characters, graphics, multimedia objects, and the like being generated or produced from the operation of the edge computing node 2150. A display or console hardware, in the context of the present system, may be used to provide output and receive input of an edge computing system; to manage components or services of an edge computing system; identify a state of an edge computing component or service; or to conduct any other number of management or administration functions or service use cases.
A battery 2176 may power the edge computing node 2150, although, in examples in which the edge computing node 2150 is mounted in a fixed location, it may have a power supply coupled to an electrical grid, or the battery may be used as a backup or for temporary capabilities. The battery 2176 may be a lithium ion battery, or a metal-air battery, such as a zinc-air battery, an aluminum-air battery, a lithium-air battery, and the like.
A battery monitor/charger 2178 may be included in the edge computing node 2150 to track the state of charge (SoCh) of the battery 2176, if included. The battery monitor/charger 2178 may be used to monitor other parameters of the battery 2176 to provide failure predictions, such as the state of health (SoH) and the state of function (SoF) of the battery 2176. The battery monitor/charger 2178 may include a battery monitoring integrated circuit, such as an LTC4020 or an LTC2990 from Linear Technologies, an ADT7488A from ON Semiconductor of Phoenix Ariz., or an IC from the UCD90xxx family from Texas Instruments of Dallas, Tex. The battery monitor/charger 2178 may communicate the information on the battery 2176 to the processor 2152 over the interconnect 2156. The battery monitor/charger 2178 may also include an analog-to-digital (ADC) converter that enables the processor 2152 to directly monitor the voltage of the battery 2176 or the current flow from the battery 2176. The battery parameters may be used to determine actions that the edge computing node 2150 may perform, such as transmission frequency, mesh network operation, sensing frequency, and the like.
A power block 2180, or other power supply coupled to a grid, may be coupled with the battery monitor/charger 2178 to charge the battery 2176. In some examples, the power block 2180 may be replaced with a wireless power receiver to obtain the power wirelessly, for example, through a loop antenna in the edge computing node 2150. A wireless battery charging circuit, such as an LTC4020 chip from Linear Technologies of Milpitas, Calif., among others, may be included in the battery monitor/charger 2178. The specific charging circuits may be selected based on the size of the battery 2176, and thus, the current required. The charging may be performed using the Airfuel standard promulgated by the Airfuel Alliance, the Qi wireless charging standard promulgated by the Wireless Power Consortium, or the Rezence charging standard, promulgated by the Alliance for Wireless Power, among others.
The storage 2158 may include instructions 2182 in the form of software, firmware, or hardware commands to implement the techniques described herein. Although such instructions 2182 are shown as code blocks included in the memory 2154 and the storage 2158, it may be understood that any of the code blocks may be replaced with hardwired circuits, for example, built into an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC).
In an example, the instructions 2182 provided via the memory 2154, the storage 2158, or the processor 2152 may be embodied as a non-transitory, machine-readable medium 2160 including code to direct the processor 2152 to perform electronic operations in the edge computing node 2150. The processor 2152 may access the non-transitory, machine-readable medium 2160 over the interconnect 2156. For instance, the non-transitory, machine-readable medium 2160 may be embodied by devices described for the storage 2158 or may include specific storage units such as optical disks, flash drives, or any number of other hardware devices. The non-transitory, machine-readable medium 2160 may include instructions to direct the processor 2152 to perform a specific sequence or flow of actions, for example, as described with respect to the flowchart(s) and block diagram(s) of operations and functionality depicted above. As used herein, the terms “machine-readable medium” and “computer-readable medium” are interchangeable. Also in a specific example, the instructions 2182 on the processor 2152 (separately, or in combination with the instructions 2182 of the machine readable medium 2160) may configure execution or operation of a trusted execution environment (TEE) 2190. In an example, the TEE 2190 operates as a protected area accessible to the processor 2152 for secure execution of instructions and secure access to data. Various implementations of the TEE 2190, and an accompanying secure area in the processor 2152 or the memory 2154 may be provided, for instance, through use of Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX) or ARM® TrustZone® hardware security extensions, Intel® Management Engine (ME), or Intel® Converged Security Manageability Engine (CSME). Other aspects of security hardening, hardware roots-of-trust, and trusted or protected operations may be implemented in the device 2150 through the TEE 2190 and the processor 2152.
In the illustrated example of
In the illustrated example of
When a device, such as publisher 2340, that has content matching the name in the interest packet 2330 is encountered, that device 2340 may send a data packet 2345 in response to the interest packet 2330. Typically, the data packet 2345 is tracked back through the network to the source (e.g., device 2305) by following the traces of the interest packet 2330 left in the network element PITs. Thus, the PIT 2335 at each network element establishes a trail back to the subscriber 2305 for the data packet 2345 to follow.
Matching the named data in an ICN may follow several strategies. Generally, the data is named hierarchically, such as with a universal resource identifier (URI). For example, a video may be named www.somedomain.com or videos or v8675309. Here, the hierarchy may be seen as the publisher, “www.somedomain.com,” a sub-category, “videos,” and the canonical identification “v8675309.” As an interest 2330 traverses the ICN, ICN network elements will generally attempt to match the name to a greatest degree. Thus, if an ICN element has a cached item or route for both “www.somedomain.com or videos” and “www.somedomain.com www.somedomain.com or videos or v8675309,” the ICN element will match the later for an interest packet 2330 specifying “www.somedomain.com or videos or v8675309.” In an example, an expression may be used in matching by the ICN device. For example, the interest packet may specify “www.somedomain.com or videos or v8675*” where is a wildcard. Thus, any cached item or route that includes the data other than the wildcard will be matched.
Item matching involves matching the interest 2330 to data cached in the ICN element. Thus, for example, if the data 2345 named in the interest 2330 is cached in network element 2315, then the network element 2315 will return the data 2345 to the subscriber 2305 via the network element 2310. However, if the data 2345 is not cached at network element 2315, the network element 2315 routes the interest 2330 on (e.g., to network element 2320). To facilitate routing, the network elements may use a forwarding information base 2325 (FIB) to match named data to an interface (e.g., physical port) for the route. Thus, the FIB 2325 operates much like a routing table on a traditional network device.
In an example, additional metadata may be attached to the interest packet 2330, the cached data, or the route (e.g., in the FIB 2325), to provide an additional level of matching. For example, the data name may be specified as “www.somedomain.com www.somedomain.com or videos or v8675309,” but also include a version number—or timestamp, time range, endorsement, etc. In this example, the interest packet 2330 may specify the desired name, the version number, or the version range. The matching may then locate routes or cached data matching the name and perform the additional comparison of metadata or the like to arrive at an ultimate decision as to whether data or a route matches the interest packet 2330 for respectively responding to the interest packet 2330 with the data packet 2345 or forwarding the interest packet 2330.
ICN has advantages over host-based networking because the data segments are individually named. This enables aggressive caching throughout the network as a network element may provide a data packet 2330 in response to an interest 2330 as easily as an original author 2340. Accordingly, it is less likely that the same segment of the network will transmit duplicates of the same data requested by different devices.
Fine grained encryption is another feature of many ICN networks. A typical data packet 2345 includes a name for the data that matches the name in the interest packet 2330. Further, the data packet 2345 includes the requested data and may include additional information to filter similarly named data (e.g., by creation time, expiration time, version, etc.). To address malicious entities providing false information under the same name, the data packet 2345 may also encrypt its contents with a publisher key or provide a cryptographic hash of the data and the name. Thus, knowing the key (e.g., from a certificate of an expected publisher 2340) enables the recipient to ascertain whether the data is from that publisher 2340. This technique also facilitates the aggressive caching of the data packets 2345 throughout the network because each data packet 2345 is self-contained and secure. In contrast, many host-based networks rely on encrypting a connection between two hosts to secure communications. This may increase latencies while connections are being established and prevents data caching by hiding the data from the network elements.
Example ICN networks include content centric networking (CCN), as specified in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) draft specifications for CCNx 0.x and CCN 1.x, and named data networking (NDN), as specified in the NDN technical report DND-0001.
At operation 2405, a data handle for data is received at an ICN router. Here, the data handle includes an indication of security metadata. In an example, the security metadata includes a policy for data security or integrity with respect to one or more target hardware or software platforms.
At operation 2410, the security metadata is obtained based on the data handle. In an example, obtaining the security metadata includes extracting the security metadata from the data handle. In an example, obtaining the security metadata includes processing a portion of the data handle using a local function to generate the security metadata.
In an example, obtaining the security metadata includes extracting an index from the data handle and retrieving the security metadata from a local repository based on the index. In an example, the ICN router includes hardware assisted lookup circuitry (HALO) to perform hash based lookups. Here, retrieving the security metadata includes using a HALO to lookup the security metadata in the local repository. In an example, the ICN router uses the HALO, or a second HALO, to perform lookups in a content store, pending interest table, or forwarding interest base of the ICN router.
At operation 2415, the data is cached based on the security metadata. In an example, caching the data based on the security metadata includes collecting ICN router platform information, retrieving a policy directive from the policy based on the ICN router platform information, and applying the policy directive. In an example, the policy directive is at least one of no-cache, encrypt, or compress. In an example, a second policy directive establishes one of several different levels of encryption based on the ICN router platform information.
At operation 2420, an ICN node at an interface of the ICN router is tested for compatibility with the security metadata. In an example, testing the ICN node includes transmitting the data handle to the ICN node and receiving a response from the ICN node. Here, the ICN node tests whether the security metadata is in one or more sets installed at the ICN node.
In an example, the method 2400 includes the operations of receiving a set definition at the ICN router and using the set definition to respond to tests from other ICN nodes about compatibility with other security metadata. In an example, the set corresponds to a virtual private network. Here, each ICN node with the set definition is a participant in the virtual private network.
At operation 2425, a version of the data is transmitted to the ICN node based on the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata. In an example, when the ICN node is not compatible with the security metadata, the version of the data is the data handle. In an example, when the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata indicates that the data must be encrypted, the version of the data is an encrypted form of the data.
In an example, the operations of the method 2400 include receiving an interest packet from a second ICN node connectable to the ICN router through the ICN node. Here the interest packet indicates compatibility with the security metadata and an encryption protocol to use. Then, the data is encrypted in accordance with the encryption protocol to create encrypted data. The encrypted data may then be transmitted in a data packet to the ICN node for delivery to the second ICN node.
In alternative embodiments, the machine 2500 may operate as a standalone device or may be connected (e.g., networked) to other machines. In a networked deployment, the machine 2500 may operate in the capacity of a server machine, a client machine, or both in server-client network environments. In an example, the machine 2500 may act as a peer machine in peer-to-peer (P2P) (or other distributed) network environment. The machine 2500 may be a personal computer (PC), a tablet PC, a set-top box (STB), a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile telephone, a web appliance, a network router, switch or bridge, or any machine capable of executing instructions (sequential or otherwise) that specify actions to be taken by that machine. Further, while only a single machine is illustrated, the term “machine” shall also be taken to include any collection of machines that individually or jointly execute a set (or multiple sets) of instructions to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein, such as cloud computing, software as a service (SaaS), other computer cluster configurations.
The machine (e.g., computer system) 2500 may include a hardware processor 2502 (e.g., a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a hardware processor core, or any combination thereof), a main memory 2504, a static memory (e.g., memory or storage for firmware, microcode, a basic-input-output (BIOS), unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI), etc.) 2506, and mass storage 2508 (e.g., hard drives, tape drives, flash storage, or other block devices) some or all of which may communicate with each other via an interlink (e.g., bus) 2530. The machine 2500 may further include a display unit 2510, an alphanumeric input device 2512 (e.g., a keyboard), and a user interface (UI) navigation device 2514 (e.g., a mouse). In an example, the display unit 2510, input device 2512 and UI navigation device 2514 may be a touch screen display. The machine 2500 may additionally include a storage device (e.g., drive unit) 2508, a signal generation device 2518 (e.g., a speaker), a network interface device 2520, and one or more sensors 2516, such as a global positioning system (GPS) sensor, compass, accelerometer, or other sensor. The machine 2500 may include an output controller 2528, such as a serial (e.g., universal serial bus (USB), parallel, or other wired or wireless (e.g., infrared (IR), near field communication (NFC), etc.) connection to communicate or control one or more peripheral devices (e.g., a printer, card reader, etc.).
Registers of the processor 2502, the main memory 2504, the static memory 2506, or the mass storage 2508 may be, or include, a machine readable medium 2522 on which is stored one or more sets of data structures or instructions 2524 (e.g., software) embodying or utilized by any one or more of the techniques or functions described herein. The instructions 2524 may also reside, completely or at least partially, within any of registers of the processor 2502, the main memory 2504, the static memory 2506, or the mass storage 2508 during execution thereof by the machine 2500. In an example, one or any combination of the hardware processor 2502, the main memory 2504, the static memory 2506, or the mass storage 2508 may constitute the machine readable media 2522. While the machine readable medium 2522 is illustrated as a single medium, the term “machine readable medium” may include a single medium or multiple media (e.g., a centralized or distributed database, or associated caches and servers) configured to store the one or more instructions 2524.
The term “machine readable medium” may include any medium that is capable of storing, encoding, or carrying instructions for execution by the machine 2500 and that cause the machine 2500 to perform any one or more of the techniques of the present disclosure, or that is capable of storing, encoding or carrying data structures used by or associated with such instructions. Non-limiting machine readable medium examples may include solid-state memories, optical media, magnetic media, and signals (e.g., radio frequency signals, other photon based signals, sound signals, etc.). In an example, a non-transitory machine readable medium comprises a machine readable medium with a plurality of particles having invariant (e.g., rest) mass, and thus are compositions of matter. Accordingly, non-transitory machine-readable media are machine readable media that do not include transitory propagating signals. Specific examples of non-transitory machine readable media may include: non-volatile memory, such as semiconductor memory devices (e.g., Electrically Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM)) and flash memory devices; magnetic disks, such as internal hard disks and removable disks; magneto-optical disks; and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM disks.
In an example, information stored or otherwise provided on the machine readable medium 2522 may be representative of the instructions 2524, such as instructions 2524 themselves or a format from which the instructions 2524 may be derived. This format from which the instructions 2524 may be derived may include source code, encoded instructions (e.g., in compressed or encrypted form), packaged instructions (e.g., split into multiple packages), or the like. The information representative of the instructions 2524 in the machine readable medium 2522 may be processed by processing circuitry into the instructions to implement any of the operations discussed herein. For example, deriving the instructions 2524 from the information (e.g., processing by the processing circuitry) may include: compiling (e.g., from source code, object code, etc.), interpreting, loading, organizing (e.g., dynamically or statically linking), encoding, decoding, encrypting, unencrypting, packaging, unpackaging, or otherwise manipulating the information into the instructions 2524.
In an example, the derivation of the instructions 2524 may include assembly, compilation, or interpretation of the information (e.g., by the processing circuitry) to create the instructions 2524 from some intermediate or preprocessed format provided by the machine readable medium 2522. The information, when provided in multiple parts, may be combined, unpacked, and modified to create the instructions 2524. For example, the information may be in multiple compressed source code packages (or object code, or binary executable code, etc.) on one or several remote servers. The source code packages may be encrypted when in transit over a network and decrypted, uncompressed, assembled (e.g., linked) if necessary, and compiled or interpreted (e.g., into a library, stand-alone executable etc.) at a local machine, and executed by the local machine.
The instructions 2524 may be further transmitted or received over a communications network 2526 using a transmission medium via the network interface device 2520 utilizing any one of a number of transfer protocols (e.g., frame relay, internet protocol (IP), transmission control protocol (TCP), user datagram protocol (UDP), hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), etc.). Example communication networks may include a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a packet data network (e.g., the Internet), LoRa/LoRaWAN, or satellite communication networks, mobile telephone networks (e.g., cellular networks such as those complying with 3G, 4G LTE/LTE-A, or 5G standards), Plain Old Telephone (POTS) networks, and wireless data networks (e.g., Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 family of standards known as Wi-Fi®, IEEE 802.16 family of standards known as WiMax®, IEEE 802.15.4 family of standards, peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, among others. In an example, the network interface device 2520 may include one or more physical jacks (e.g., Ethernet, coaxial, or phone jacks) or one or more antennas to connect to the communications network 2526. In an example, the network interface device 2520 may include a plurality of antennas to wirelessly communicate using at least one of single-input multiple-output (SIMO), multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), or multiple-input single-output (MISO) techniques. The term “transmission medium” shall be taken to include any intangible medium that is capable of storing, encoding or carrying instructions for execution by the machine 2500, and includes digital or analog communications signals or other intangible medium to facilitate communication of such software. A transmission medium is a machine readable medium.
Example 1 is a device for Information Centric Networking (ICN) tunneling, the device comprising: a memory including instructions; and processing circuitry that, when in operation, is configured by the instructions to: receive, at an ICN router, a data handle for data, the data handle including an indication of security metadata; obtain the security metadata based on the data handle; cache the data based on the security metadata; test an ICN node at an interface of the ICN router for compatibility with the security metadata; and transmit a version of the data to the ICN node based on the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata.
In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1, wherein the security metadata includes a policy for data security or integrity with respect to one or more target hardware or software platforms.
In Example 3, the subject matter of Example 2, wherein, to cache the data based on the security metadata, the processing circuitry: collects ICN router platform information; retrieves a policy directive from the policy based on the ICN router platform information; and applies the policy directive.
In Example 4, the subject matter of Example 3, wherein the policy directive is at least one of no-cache, encrypt, or compress.
In Example 5, the subject matter of any of Examples 3-4, wherein a second policy directive establishes one of several different levels of encryption based on the ICN router platform information.
In Example 6, the subject matter of any of Examples 1-5, wherein, to test the ICN node, the processing circuitry: transmits the data handle to the ICN node; and receives a response from the ICN node, the ICN node testing whether the security metadata is in one or more access sets installed at the ICN node.
In Example 7, the subject matter of Example 6, wherein the instructions configure the processing circuitry to: receive an access set definition at the ICN router; and use the access set definition to respond to tests from other ICN nodes about compatibility with other security metadata.
In Example 8, the subject matter of Example 7, wherein the access set definition corresponds to a virtual private network, and wherein each ICN node with the set definition is a participant in the virtual private network.
In Example 9, the subject matter of any of Examples 1-8, wherein the ICN node was not compatible with the security metadata, and wherein the version of the data is the data handle.
In Example 10, the subject matter of Example 9, wherein the instructions configure the processing circuitry to: receive an interest packet from a second ICN node connectable to the ICN router through the ICN node, the interest packet indicating compatibility with the security metadata and an encryption protocol to use; encrypt the data in accordance with the encryption protocol to create encrypted data; and transmit the encrypted data in a data packet to the ICN node for delivery to the second ICN node.
In Example 11, the subject matter of any of Examples 1-10, wherein the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata indicates that the data must be encrypted, and wherein the version of the data is an encrypted form of the data.
In Example 12, the subject matter of any of Examples 1-11, wherein, to obtain the security metadata, the processing circuitry extracts the security metadata from the data handle.
In Example 13, the subject matter of any of Examples 1-12, wherein, to obtain the security metadata, the processing circuitry processes a portion of the data handle using a local function to generate the security metadata.
In Example 14, the subject matter of any of Examples 1-13, wherein, to obtain the security metadata, the processing circuitry: extracts an index from the data handle; and retrieves the security metadata from a local repository based on the index.
In Example 15, the subject matter of Example 14, wherein the ICN router includes hardware assisted lookup circuitry (HALO) to perform hash based lookups, and wherein, to retrieve the security metadata, the processing circuitry uses a HALO to lookup the security metadata in the local repository.
In Example 16, the subject matter of Example 15, wherein the ICN router uses the HALO, or a second HALO, to perform lookups in a content store, pending interest table, or forwarding interest base of the ICN router.
Example 17 is a method for Information Centric Networking (ICN) tunneling, the method comprising: receiving, at an ICN router, a data handle for data, the data handle including an indication of security metadata; obtaining the security metadata based on the data handle; caching the data based on the security metadata; testing an ICN node at an interface of the ICN router for compatibility with the security metadata; and transmitting a version of the data to the ICN node based on the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata.
In Example 18, the subject matter of Example 17, wherein the security metadata includes a policy for data security or integrity with respect to one or more target hardware or software platforms.
In Example 19, the subject matter of Example 18, wherein caching the data based on the security metadata includes: collecting ICN router platform information; retrieving a policy directive from the policy based on the ICN router platform information; and applying the policy directive.
In Example 20, the subject matter of Example 19, wherein the policy directive is at least one of no-cache, encrypt, or compress.
In Example 21, the subject matter of any of Examples 19-20, wherein a second policy directive establishes one of several different levels of encryption based on the ICN router platform information.
In Example 22, the subject matter of any of Examples 17-21, wherein testing the ICN node includes: transmitting the data handle to the ICN node; and receiving a response from the ICN node, the ICN node testing whether the security metadata is in one or more access sets installed at the ICN node.
In Example 23, the subject matter of Example 22, comprising: receiving an access set definition at the ICN router; and using the access set definition to respond to tests from other ICN nodes about compatibility with other security metadata.
In Example 24, the subject matter of Example 23, wherein the access set definition corresponds to a virtual private network, and wherein each ICN node with the set definition is a participant in the virtual private network.
In Example 25, the subject matter of any of Examples 17-24, wherein the ICN node was not compatible with the security metadata, and wherein the version of the data is the data handle.
In Example 26, the subject matter of Example 25, comprising: receiving an interest packet from a second ICN node connectable to the ICN router through the ICN node, the interest packet indicating compatibility with the security metadata and an encryption protocol to use; encrypting the data in accordance with the encryption protocol to create encrypted data; and transmitting the encrypted data in a data packet to the ICN node for delivery to the second ICN node.
In Example 27, the subject matter of any of Examples 17-26, wherein the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata indicates that the data must be encrypted, and wherein the version of the data is an encrypted form of the data.
In Example 28, the subject matter of any of Examples 17-27, wherein obtaining the security metadata includes extracting the security metadata from the data handle.
In Example 29, the subject matter of any of Examples 17-28, wherein obtaining the security metadata includes processing a portion of the data handle using a local function to generate the security metadata.
In Example 30, the subject matter of any of Examples 17-29, wherein obtaining the security metadata includes: extracting an index from the data handle; and retrieving the security metadata from a local repository based on the index.
In Example 31, the subject matter of Example 30, wherein the ICN router includes hardware assisted lookup circuitry (HALO) to perform hash based lookups, and wherein retrieving the security metadata includes using a HALO to lookup the security metadata in the local repository.
In Example 32, the subject matter of Example 31, wherein the ICN router uses the HALO, or a second HALO, to perform lookups in a content store, pending interest table, or forwarding interest base of the ICN router.
Example 33 is at least one machine readable medium for including instructions for Information Centric Networking (ICN) tunneling, the instructions, when executed by processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to perform operations comprising: receiving, at an ICN router, a data handle for data, the data handle including an indication of security metadata; obtaining the security metadata based on the data handle; caching the data based on the security metadata; testing an ICN node at an interface of the ICN router for compatibility with the security metadata; and transmitting a version of the data to the ICN node based on the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata.
In Example 34, the subject matter of Example 33, wherein the security metadata includes a policy for data security or integrity with respect to one or more target hardware or software platforms.
In Example 35, the subject matter of Example 34, wherein caching the data based on the security metadata includes: collecting ICN router platform information; retrieving a policy directive from the policy based on the ICN router platform information; and applying the policy directive.
In Example 36, the subject matter of Example 35, wherein the policy directive is at least one of no-cache, encrypt, or compress.
In Example 37, the subject matter of any of Examples 35-36, wherein a second policy directive establishes one of several different levels of encryption based on the ICN router platform information.
In Example 38, the subject matter of any of Examples 33-37, wherein testing the ICN node includes: transmitting the data handle to the ICN node; and receiving a response from the ICN node, the ICN node testing whether the security metadata is in one or more access sets installed at the ICN node.
In Example 39, the subject matter of Example 38, wherein the operations comprise: receiving an access set definition at the ICN router; and using the access set definition to respond to tests from other ICN nodes about compatibility with other security metadata.
In Example 40, the subject matter of Example 39, wherein the access set definition corresponds to a virtual private network, and wherein each ICN node with the set definition is a participant in the virtual private network.
In Example 41, the subject matter of any of Examples 33-40, wherein the ICN node was not compatible with the security metadata, and wherein the version of the data is the data handle.
In Example 42, the subject matter of Example 41, wherein the operations comprise: receiving an interest packet from a second ICN node connectable to the ICN router through the ICN node, the interest packet indicating compatibility with the security metadata and an encryption protocol to use; encrypting the data in accordance with the encryption protocol to create encrypted data; and transmitting the encrypted data in a data packet to the ICN node for delivery to the second ICN node.
In Example 43, the subject matter of any of Examples 33-42, wherein the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata indicates that the data must be encrypted, and wherein the version of the data is an encrypted form of the data.
In Example 44, the subject matter of any of Examples 33-43, wherein obtaining the security metadata includes extracting the security metadata from the data handle.
In Example 45, the subject matter of any of Examples 33-44, wherein obtaining the security metadata includes processing a portion of the data handle using a local function to generate the security metadata.
In Example 46, the subject matter of any of Examples 33-45, wherein obtaining the security metadata includes: extracting an index from the data handle; and retrieving the security metadata from a local repository based on the index.
In Example 47, the subject matter of Example 46, wherein the ICN router includes hardware assisted lookup circuitry (HALO) to perform hash based lookups, and wherein retrieving the security metadata includes using a HALO to lookup the security metadata in the local repository.
In Example 48, the subject matter of Example 47, wherein the ICN router uses the HALO, or a second HALO, to perform lookups in a content store, pending interest table, or forwarding interest base of the ICN router.
Example 49 is a system for Information Centric Networking (ICN) tunneling, the system comprising: means for receiving, at an ICN router, a data handle for data, the data handle including an indication of security metadata; means for obtaining the security metadata based on the data handle; means for caching the data based on the security metadata; means for testing an ICN node at an interface of the ICN router for compatibility with the security metadata; and means for transmitting a version of the data to the ICN node based on the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata.
In Example 50, the subject matter of Example 49, wherein the security metadata includes a policy for data security or integrity with respect to one or more target hardware or software platforms.
In Example 51, the subject matter of Example 50, wherein the means for caching the data based on the security metadata include: means for collecting ICN router platform information; means for retrieving a policy directive from the policy based on the ICN router platform information; and means for applying the policy directive.
In Example 52, the subject matter of Example 51, wherein the policy directive is at least one of no-cache, encrypt, or compress.
In Example 53, the subject matter of any of Examples 51-52, wherein a second policy directive establishes one of several different levels of encryption based on the ICN router platform information.
In Example 54, the subject matter of any of Examples 49-53, wherein the means for testing the ICN node include: means for transmitting the data handle to the ICN node; and means for receiving a response from the ICN node, the ICN node testing whether the security metadata is in one or more access sets installed at the ICN node.
In Example 55, the subject matter of Example 54, comprising: means for receiving an access set definition at the ICN router; and means for using the access set definition to respond to tests from other ICN nodes about compatibility with other security metadata.
In Example 56, the subject matter of Example 55, wherein the access set definition corresponds to a virtual private network, and wherein each ICN node with the set definition is a participant in the virtual private network.
In Example 57, the subject matter of any of Examples 49-56, wherein the ICN node was not compatible with the security metadata, and wherein the version of the data is the data handle.
In Example 58, the subject matter of Example 57, comprising: means for receiving an interest packet from a second ICN node connectable to the ICN router through the ICN node, the interest packet indicating compatibility with the security metadata and an encryption protocol to use; means for encrypting the data in accordance with the encryption protocol to create encrypted data; and means for transmitting the encrypted data in a data packet to the ICN node for delivery to the second ICN node.
In Example 59, the subject matter of any of Examples 49-58, wherein the compatibility of the ICN node with the security metadata indicates that the data must be encrypted, and wherein the version of the data is an encrypted form of the data.
In Example 60, the subject matter of any of Examples 49-59, wherein the means for obtaining the security metadata include means for extracting the security metadata from the data handle.
In Example 61, the subject matter of any of Examples 49-60, wherein the means for obtaining the security metadata include means for processing a portion of the data handle using a local function to generate the security metadata.
In Example 62, the subject matter of any of Examples 49-61, wherein the means for obtaining the security metadata include: means for extracting an index from the data handle; and means for retrieving the security metadata from a local repository based on the index.
In Example 63, the subject matter of Example 62, wherein the ICN router includes hardware assisted lookup circuitry (HALO) to perform hash based lookups, and wherein the means for retrieving the security metadata include means for using a HALO to lookup the security metadata in the local repository.
In Example 64, the subject matter of Example 63, wherein the ICN router uses the HALO, or a second HALO, to perform lookups in a content store, pending interest table, or forwarding interest base of the ICN router.
PNUM Example 65 is at least one machine-readable medium including instructions that, when executed by processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to perform operations to implement of any of Examples 1-64.
PNUM Example 66 is an apparatus comprising means to implement of any of Examples 1-64.
PNUM Example 67 is a system to implement of any of Examples 1-64.
PNUM Example 68 is a method to implement of any of Examples 1-64.
The above detailed description includes references to the accompanying drawings, which form a part of the detailed description. The drawings show, by way of illustration, specific embodiments that may be practiced. These embodiments are also referred to herein as “examples.” Such examples may include elements in addition to those shown or described. However, the present inventors also contemplate examples in which only those elements shown or described are provided. Moreover, the present inventors also contemplate examples using any combination or permutation of those elements shown or described (or one or more aspects thereof), either with respect to a particular example (or one or more aspects thereof), or with respect to other examples (or one or more aspects thereof) shown or described herein.
All publications, patents, and patent documents referred to in this document are incorporated by reference herein in their entirety, as though individually incorporated by reference. In the event of inconsistent usages between this document and those documents so incorporated by reference, the usage in the incorporated reference(s) should be considered supplementary to that of this document; for irreconcilable inconsistencies, the usage in this document controls.
In this document, the terms “a” or “an” are used, as is common in patent documents, to include one or more than one, independent of any other instances or usages of “at least one” or “one or more.” In this document, the term “or” is used to refer to a nonexclusive or, such that “A or B” includes “A but not B,” “B but not A,” and “A and B,” unless otherwise indicated. In the appended claims, the terms “including” and “in which” are used as the plain-English equivalents of the respective terms “comprising” and “wherein.” Also, in the following claims, the terms “including” and “comprising” are open-ended, that is, a system, device, article, or process that includes elements in addition to those listed after such a term in a claim are still deemed to fall within the scope of that claim. Moreover, in the following claims, the terms “first,” “second,” and “third,” etc. are used merely as labels, and are not intended to impose numerical requirements on their objects.
The above description is intended to be illustrative, and not restrictive. For example, the above-described examples (or one or more aspects thereof) may be used in combination with each other. Other embodiments may be used, such as by one of ordinary skill in the art upon reviewing the above description. The Abstract is to allow the reader to quickly ascertain the nature of the technical disclosure and is submitted with the understanding that it will not be used to interpret or limit the scope or meaning of the claims. Also, in the above Detailed Description, various features may be grouped together to streamline the disclosure. This should not be interpreted as intending that an unclaimed disclosed feature is essential to any claim. Rather, inventive subject matter may lie in less than all features of a particular disclosed embodiment. Thus, the following claims are hereby incorporated into the Detailed Description, with each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment. The scope of the embodiments should be determined with reference to the appended claims, along with the full scope of equivalents to which such claims are entitled.
