The present application claims priority from Japanese application JP2005-369021 filed on Dec. 22, 2005, the content of which is hereby incorporated by reference into this application.
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to an apparatus and method for providing a user authentication function, and more particularly to an apparatus and method applicable to access management of an information system for providing services only to users registered beforehand, user confirmation when services with toll are supplied, entrance/exit management for important facilities and rooms, and the like.
2. Description of the Related Art
In biometric authentication, biometric information of a user has the same function as that of a key of cryptography. It is therefore necessary in terms of security to prevent leak of biometric information or illegal acquisition thereof by an attacker. Leak of biometric information is generally protected by encryption of biometric information or the like. However, if forgery of a biometric authentication system itself is made by an attacker and if a user not knowing forgery enters biometric information, there is a risk that the attacker acquires illegally the biometric information of the user.
In order to address this issue, it is necessary that users can confirm by themselves validity of a biometric authentication system, particularly a sensor unit for entering biometric information. Although techniques of allowing users to confirm validity of a sensor unit for entering biometric information are still not disclosed, related techniques are disclosed in JP-A-2005-92697 and JP-A-2005-92788.
JP-A-2005-92697 describes techniques of preventing unauthorized authentication by a third party, in which at least one cipher only a user can understand is defined for biometric information, a randomly selected cipher is presented to the user, biometric information corresponding to the cipher is acquired from the user, and the biometric information corresponding to the cipher is compared with the biometric information acquired from the user. Namely, JP-A-2005-92697 aims to prevent impersonation through forgery of biometric information and discloses techniques of entering secret information only a user can know and entering biometric information of the user both of which are performed at the same time. Resistance against impersonation can therefore be improved more than the case authentication is performed only by biometric information.
JP-A-2005-92788 discloses techniques in which an IC card confirms validity of an IC card reader/writer and a confirmation result is notified to a user from an IC card issue unit. It is therefore possible to prevent a user from entering user confirmation information such as a password into an IC card reader/writer forged by an attacker.
However, in the case of JP-A-2005-92697, even if an attacker forges a sensor unit to illegally acquire input biometric information, there is a fear that secret information stored in the system is presented to the user to urge the user enter biometric information. If a biometric authentication system is forged by an attacker, there is a fear that a user erroneously enters biometric information before secret information is presented.
In the case of JP-A-2005-92788, it is essential to use an IC card because the IC card authenticates the IC card reader/writer.
It is an object of the present invention to provide an apparatus and method capable of, without using an IC card, suppressing theft and appropriation of authentication information of a user by a third party through forgery of the apparatus.
In a biometric information illegal acquisition preventing method and apparatus of the present invention, secret information is encrypted and a decryption key is stored in a sensor unit. The sensor unit has a secret information decryption unit and a unit for presenting the decrypted secret information to a user. The sensor unit further includes a unit for detecting that biometric information is presented to a biometric information input unit and a unit for issuing an alarm to the user if the biometric information is presented before the secret information is presented.
According to the present invention, it is possible to obtain the advantages of, without using an IC card, suppressing theft and appropriation of authentication information of a user by a third party through forgery of the apparatus. Specifically, according to the present invention, since the sensor unit has a decryption key for decrypting secret information, there is an advantage that a user can confirm validity of the sensor unit so that even if the sensor unit itself is forged by an attacker, the secret information of the user cannot be displayed correctly. Another advantage is that since an alarm is issued to the user if a user presents biometric information before the biometric authentication system presents secret information, it is possible to suppress the user from inadvertently presenting the biometric information to the forged sensor unit. Still another advantage is that since the secret information validity verification unit is provided and secret information is presented only when validity of the secret information is confirmed, it is possible to suppress the user from inadvertently confirming false secret information as the user's secret information and presenting biometric information.
Other objects, features and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the following description of the embodiments of the invention taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
Description will now be made on an embodiment by illustratively using a biometric authentication system constituted of a personal computer (PC) and a biometric information sensor externally mounted on PC.
The biometric information sensor 100 is constituted of: a biometric information acquisition unit (e.g., microcomputer) 115 for converting biometric information presented by a user into electronic data or image data; a biometric information detection unit (e.g., a scanner) 110 for detecting that a user presents biometric information to the biometric information acquisition unit 115; a decryption unit (e.g., a co-processor) 125 for decrypting encoded secret information; a decryption key 130 to be used as a key for decryption; a validity verification unit (e.g., microcomputer) 120 for verifying validity of secret information; a secret information display unit (e.g., LEDs) 105 for displaying secret key to a user when validity of the secret key is verified; and an alarm notice unit (e.g., a speaker) 107 for issuing an alarm to a user when biometric information is detected before the secret information is presented. The decryption key 130 is stored in a storage unit (e.g., an EEPROM). In this embodiment, the secret information display unit 105 can turn on and off a plurality of colors (e.g., three colors) during a desired time period, by way of example and not limitative. For example, the secret information display unit 105 may display a plurality of marks. Instead of the secret information display unit 105, an output unit for outputting a plurality of sounds (melody) or an output unit for outputting a plurality of vibrations may also be used. In this embodiment, the alarm notice unit 107 issues an alarm sound, by way of example and not limitative. The alarm notice unit 107 may be a luminescent member. The decryption unit 125 and the validity verification unit 120 have higher tamper resistance than other units.
PC 135 is preferably constituted of a processor, an input unit, a display unit, a storage unit, a memory and a bus interconnecting these components. PC 135 may further include a communication unit. PC 135 has: encrypted secret information 140 obtained by encrypting secret information only a user can know; templates 150 which are biometric information of users registered beforehand; and a collation unit (processor) 145 for collating biometric information of a user acquired by the biometric information sensor 100 with templates. The encrypted secret information 140 and templates 150 are stored in the storage unit (e.g., a hard disk). It is preferable that biometric information of each user is registered beforehand by the user. The secret information of a user may be registered beforehand by the user or it may be generated by PC 135, presented to the user and registered. The template 150 preferably holds biometric information for each user ID.
As biometric authentication starts, the biometric information sensor 100 releases a secret information flag loaded in an inner holding unit (e.g., a register) (Step S2070). The secret information flag is a flag for judging whether the secret information has been presented to a user. The released state of this flag indicates that the secret information has not been presented to the user, whereas a set state indicates that the secret information has been presented by the user. At the same time, the biometric information detection unit 110 of the biometric information sensor 100 starts detecting biometric information (Step S2010).
First, processes after Step S2070 will be described. The decryption unit 125 reads the encrypted secret information 140 from PC 135, reads the decryption key 130 from the storage unit, decrypts the secret information 140 by using the decryption key 130, and temporarily stores the secret information in a work memory or the like (Step S2080).
The validity verification unit 120 generates a hash value from the user ID 310 of the user having the secret information and the emission pattern data 320 by using a hash function (Step S2090). If the generated hash value is the same as the hash value 330 of the secret information 300, it is judged that the secret information is valid, to thereafter advance to the next Step, whereas in other cases (e.g., if not coincident), the process is terminated (Step 2095).
Next, the secret information display unit 105 displays an emission pattern of three colors in accordance with the emission pattern data 320 of the secret information 300 (Step S2100). Thereafter, the secret information flag held in the holding unit in the biometric information sensor 100 is set to thereafter terminate the process (Step S2110). Validity of the emission pattern is confirmed by the user. Namely, the biometric information sensor 100 displays the emission pattern to the user in order to guarantee validity of the biometric information sensor 100 itself.
When the emission pattern is displayed on the secret information display unit 105, PC 135 may display a confirmation message of whether the emission pattern is valid on the display unit of PC 135, to receive an input indicating validity of the emission pattern from the user via the input device of PC 135. In this case, when the emission pattern is displayed on the secret information display unit 105, PC 135 may receive a notice from the secret information display unit 105, may display the confirmation message in response to the notice, and may notify the biometric information sensor 100 of reception of an input indicating validity of the emission pattern from the user.
Processes to be executed after Step S2010 are as follows. If the biometric information detection unit 110 detects biometric secret information, the flow advances to the next Step, whereas if not, the flow returns to Step S2010 to repeat the detection process (Step S2020).
The biometric information sensor 100 checks the secret information flag (predetermined value) held therein, and if the secret information flag is set, the flow advances to the next Step S2040, whereas if not, the flow advances to Step S2060 (Step S2030). If the secret information flag is set, the biometric information acquisition unit 115 acquires biometric information, and transmits the acquired biometric information to the collation unit 145 (Step S2040) to thereafter terminate the process. If the secret information flag has been reset, the alarm notice unit 107 issues an alarm sound (Step 2060) to thereafter return to Step S2010 to repeat the above-described processes. Namely, the emission pattern of each user (user ID) and biometric information are managed not by one table but by different tables, and checking the secret information of the biometric information sensor 100 by the user and authenticating the biometric information of the user by the biometric information sensor 100 are combined with involvement of the secret information flag.
The collation unit 145 receives the user ID and biometric information from the biometric information acquisition unit 115, reads biometric information corresponding to the user ID from the templates 150 by using the user ID, and collates the biometric information from the biometric information acquisition unit 115 with the biometric information in the template 150. Namely, it is compared whether the biometric information from the biometric information acquisition unit 115 corresponds (e.g. coincides with) the biometric information in the template 150. If both information corresponds, the collation unit 145 judges as a collation success to execute a transaction requested from the user, whereas if collation fails, the request from the user is rejected. The processor of PC 135 permits the user to use PC 135 in the case of the collation success.
The secret information display unit 105 is preferably disposed near the biometric information detection unit 110. For example, the secret information display unit 105 is preferably disposed adjacent to the up, down, right and left of the biometric information detection unit 110. The secret information is preferably registered not for each biometric information but for each user, i.e., for each user ID. Namely, it is preferable that secret information is registered for each user.
PC 135 and biometric information sensor 100 may be a single unified apparatus. Secret information may be stored in the storage unit of the biometric information sensor 100 instead of the storage unit in PC 135. If secret information is stored in the storage unit of the biometric sensor 100, the secret information may not be encrypted. The collation unit 145 and templates 150 may be disposed in another computer (e.g., a server) connected to PC 135 via a network, instead of being disposed in PC 135.
The technical idea of the present invention is applicable not only to PC but also to an automatic teller machine (ATM) and a lock apparatus. The technical idea of the present invention is applicable not only to biometric information but also to password.
The present invention is applicable to a biometric authentication system which performs user authentication through positive presentation of biometric information from a user. For example, the present invention is applicable to biometric authentication techniques including a motion (behavior) presenting a portion of a body to the biometric authentication system, such as finger print authentication, vein pattern authentication, and palm authentication. The present invention is also applicable to biometric authentication techniques based on a motion of a user, voice (voice print) authentication and dynamic signature authentication. The present invention is applicable to biometric authentication techniques such as face authentication not requiring specific motions for presenting biometric information, if a user has means capable of instructing explicitly to photograph the face. The present invention is applicable to arbitrary applications for performing user authentication by utilizing these biometric authentication techniques. For example, the present invention is applicable to information access control of a network in a company, user confirmation at an Internet banking system and ATM, login to a Web site for participants, individual authentication for entrance to a protected area, login to a personal computer, entrance/exit management for important facilities and rooms, and the like.
It should be further understood by those skilled in the art that although the foregoing description has been made on embodiments of the invention, the invention is not limited thereto and various changes and modifications may be made without departing from the spirit of the invention and the scope of the appended claims.
| Number | Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-369021 | Dec 2005 | JP | national |