Information system

Information

  • Patent Grant
  • 8218765
  • Patent Number
    8,218,765
  • Date Filed
    Friday, February 22, 2002
    22 years ago
  • Date Issued
    Tuesday, July 10, 2012
    12 years ago
Abstract
A trusted service which publishes information describing security attributes of computing platforms in a defined physical area, for use by a visitor to a building, for example, who is unfamiliar with the computing platforms available for use therein. In a preferred embodiment, the system provides only details and/or a list of public keys of genuine trusted computing platforms within the area.
Description
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The subject matter of the present application may also be related to the following U.S. patent applications: “Data Event Logging in Computing Platform,” Ser. No. 09/979,902, filed Nov. 27, 2001; “Data Integrity Monitoring in Trusted Computing Entity,” Ser. No. 09/979,903, filed Nov. 27, 2001; “Trusted Computing Environment,” Ser. No. 10/080,477, filed Feb. 22, 2002; “Method of and Apparatus for Investigating Transactions in a Data Processing Environment,” Ser. No. 10/080,478, filed Feb. 22, 2002; “Method of and Apparatus for Ascertaining the Status of a Data Processing Environment,” Ser. No. 10/080,479, filed Feb. 22, 2002; “Trusted Platform Evaluation,” Ser. No. 10/194,831, filed Jul. 11, 2002; “Privacy of Data on a Computer Platform,” Ser. No. 10/206,812, filed Jul. 26, 2002; and “Method and Apparatus for Locking an Application Within a Trusted Environment,” Ser. No. 10/208,718, filed Jul. 29, 2002.


FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates to an information system and, in particular, to a system for providing information relating to a predetermined geographical area.


BACKGROUND TO THE INVENTION

Conventional prior art mass market computing platforms include personal computers, server computers, information appliances, communication devices, display devices, hard copy devices, and the like.


There is substantial potential, at least in theory, for widespread interaction between such computing platforms. However, because of the potential for fraud and manipulation of electronic data, such interaction and, in particular, fully automated transactions between such computing platforms are often avoided. The fundamental issue is one of trust between interacting computer platforms.


There have been several prior art schemes which are aimed at increasing the security and trustworthiness of computing platforms. Predominantly, these rely upon adding in security features at the application level, as opposed to building them into the fundamental hardware components of the computing platform, and although such prior art schemes go some way to improving the security of computer platforms, the levels of security and trust gained thereby may be considered insufficient for some applications in which greater confidence in the trustworthiness of the underlying technology may be required.


In the applicant's co-pending disclosures ‘Trusted Computing Platform’, filed at the European Patent Office on Feb. 15, 1999, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference, and ‘Computing Apparatus and Methods of Operating Computing Apparatus’, there is disclosed a concept of a ‘trusted computing platform’ comprising a computing platform which has a ‘trusted component’ in the form of a built-in hardware and software component. Two computing entities, each provisioned with such a trusted component, may interact with each other with a high degree of ‘trust’. That is to say, where the first and second computing entities interact with each other, the security of the transaction is enhanced compared to the case where no trusted component is present, because:

    • A user of a computing entity has higher confidence in the integrity and security of his/her own computer entity and in the integrity and security of the computer entity belonging to the other computing entity.
    • Each entity is confident that the other entity is in fact the entity which it purports to be.
    • Where one or both of the entities represent a party to a transaction, e.g. a data transfer transaction, because of the built-in trusted component, third party entities interacting with the entity have a high degree of confidence that the entity does in fact represent such a party.
    • The trusted component increases the inherent security of the entity itself, through verification and monitoring processes implemented by the trusted component.
    • The computer entity is more likely to behave in the way it is expected to behave.


However, if a first computer platform user enters a geographical area, for example, a building, in which the computer platforms are unfamiliar to him/her, the security attributes of such computer platforms will also be unknown. Thus, the user will be unaware of the computer platforms available for use, and also the degree of confidence with which he/she may interact therewith.


Existing methods of providing or publishing security information include a “Public Key Infrastructure” and key distribution systems.


In a Public Key Infrastructure, a certificate states certain attributes of a target and is signed by some previously trusted entity. A visitor to, for example, a building, obtains a certificate and is able to verify the authenticity of the certificate because of prior knowledge of the trusted entity. The visitor trusts the trusted entity, and therefore trusts the attributes (including security attributes) stated in the certificate.


In known key distribution schemes, the visitor receives keys of a target from a key distribution service. The key distribution service is expected to trust the visitor, and vice versa. Keys may be expected to be trusted by the visitor because they are signed by the key distribution service, and the visitor is able to verify such signatures. Keys may be rendered confidential because of intimate contact with a node of the key distribution service. Alternatively, keys may be rendered confidential because they are encrypted by the key distribution service, and the visitor is able to decrypt such data.


Many geographical areas have a central information point from which general information may be obtained by a visitor who is unfamiliar with that area. However, such information is usually only displayed on a screen for perusal by the visitor. There is usually no way of saving such information electronically in a user's computer platform, for example, for reference or use later, and even if there were, it is unlikely that the user would trust the integrity and security of the information point sufficiently to allow it to interact with his/her computer platform.


SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In accordance with a first aspect of the invention, there is provided an information system comprising an information access point relating to at least one predetermined geographical area, said information access point including apparatus for retrieving information relating to computing platforms located within said predetermined geographical area, together with security attributes of said computing platforms, said information system being arranged to provide said information to a user upon request.


Thus, a visitor to a building, for example, who is unfamiliar with the computing platforms available for use therein can obtain such information from a central information access point. In a preferred embodiment, the system provides only details and/or a list of public keys of genuine trusted computing platforms within the area, i.e. those including a ‘trusted component’. In this case, the information system preferably also comprises a trusted computing platform.


Beneficially, the information system comprises means for communicating or interacting with a user's portable computing apparatus. Such apparatus may be in the form of a smart card, such that the information system includes a smart card reader, or, for example, a laptop computer or the like. In any event, it is preferable for communications between the information system and the user's portable computer apparatus to be unambiguous, such that the system preferably comprises a contact reader or directional wireless communication such as IR, for example.


If the information system is for use within an area owned by a private organisation, the system preferably includes means for verifying the identity of the user. However, if the system is for use in a publicly-owned area, such as a library or government building, then the system may preferably be arranged to provide the requested information indiscriminately upon request.


The system may include means to enable the user to perform operations, either locally or remotely, upon the information provided thereby.


Thus, in summary, the first aspect of the present invention provides a trusted service which publishes information describing security attributes of computing platforms in a defined physical area. Distribution of the information preferably requires intimate contact with a node of the information system. The information system may be indiscriminate and provide information on demand to any user, it may require identification of a user before distributing the requested information. Of course, various levels of information may be available to different levels of authority of a user.


In use, the information system is preferably presented to users accompanied by an explicit or implicit declaration by the provider of the service about the trustworthiness of the system and its information. Such a declaration may be implicit due. to the physical location of the system within the predefined area and/or it may be explicit by virtue of a statement located on or near the system. The declaration may be the primary or only basis of trust in the system and its information and, as such, the user is expected to base his/her trust of the system upon the basis of such a declaration. The declaration is preferably capable of interpretation by a user without preprocessing by an information processing system.


The system may provide an additional restricted set of services to the user, which may optionally permit the user to perform tests (either locally or remotely) on the information, thereby to increase confidence in the information about the computing platforms in the predefined area. The system is preferably arranged to erase all memory of a user's use of the system, to preserve the user's privacy. Such memory may be erased after a predetermined period of time, or upon the user's exit from the predefined area or on command. The system may also be arranged to delete upon command any information in the user's personal computing apparatus that was previously provided to the user's personal computing apparatus.


In a most preferred embodiment of the first aspect of the invention, the set of described computing platforms provided by the information system is restricted to ‘trusted computing platforms’. Thus, the information system may comprise a smartcard reader that contains a list of public keys that identify trusted platforms within the vicinity. The list would preferably be signed by the attesting entity. When a visitor to an area wishes to use a trusted computing platform within that area, the visitor can use their personal smartcard to obtain details of genuine trusted computing platforms in the area and, optionally, verify such details before using the platforms. The visitor's smartcard thereafter knows which platforms in the vicinity are genuine trusted platforms.


In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided an information system comprising a computing platform having a trusted component, apparatus for communicating with a user's portable computing apparatus, said information system being arranged to retrieve information relating to a predetermined geographical area and to communicate said information to said user's portable computing apparatus upon request.


Thus, the second aspect of the present invention provides a general information system which enables selected trustworthy information about an unfamiliar geographical area to be retrieved and distributed to a user's personal computing apparatus. Such information may relate to computing platforms within the area, as in the first aspect of the present invention, and the system may be arranged to provide a list of public keys of trusted computing platforms and/or a list of the public keys or the certificates of the public keys for other equipment. Thus, the system provides a key distribution service which may be implemented using a standard key distribution mechanism, for example, one of the mechanisms in ISO/IEC 11770.


In addition, or alternatively, it may comprise information such as maps, contact information, shopping information, etc. depending upon the predefined area in which the system is located. Some or all of the provided information may also be displayed on a screen or monitor.


The user's personal computing apparatus may comprise a smartcard, in which case the system comprises a smartcard reader. However, the user's personal computing apparatus may alternatively comprise a PDA, mobile phone, USB token (i.e. a reader-less smartcard), and the like. The integrity of the information system computing platform can preferably be verified via the user's personal computing apparatus. In one embodiment of the invention, the system is preferably arranged to verify the identity of the user before providing the requested information.





BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

An embodiment of the present invention will now be described by way of example only and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:



FIG. 1 illustrates schematically a trusted computing platform as previously described in the applicant's European patent application entitled ‘Trusted Computing Platform’ filed Feb. 15, 1999;



FIG. 2 illustrates schematically connectivity of selected components of the computing platform of FIG. 1;



FIG. 3 illustrates schematically a hardware architecture of components of the computing platform of FIG. 1;



FIG. 4 illustrates schematically and architecture of a trusted component comprising the computing platform of FIG. 1;



FIG. 5 illustrates schematically a hardware architecture of components of an exemplary embodiment of an information system according to the present invention; and



FIG. 6 illustrates schematically an exemplary embodiment of an information system according to the present invention.





DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art, that the invention may be practiced without limitation to these specific details. In other instances, well known methods and structures have not been described in detail so as to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the present invention.


Referring to FIG. 1 of the drawings, there is illustrated schematically one example of a trusted computing platform as previously described in the applicant's co-pending European patent application entitled ‘Trusted Computing Platform’ filed Feb. 15, 1999. Referring to FIG. 2, there is illustrated schematically the physical connectivity of some of the components of the trusted computer platform of FIG. 1. Referring to FIG. 3, there is illustrated schematically an architecture of the trusted computing platform of FIGS. 1 and 2, showing physical connectivity of components of the platform. Referring to FIG. 4, there is illustrated schematically an architecture of a trusted component included in the computer platform of FIG. 1.


In the example shown in FIGS. 1 to 4, the trusted computing platform is shown in the form of a personal computer suitable for domestic or business use. However, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that this is just one specific example of a trusted computing platform, and other example may take the form of a palmtop computer, a laptop computer, a server-type computer, a mobile phone-type computer, information appliances, communication devices, display devices and hard copy devices generally, and the like, and the invention is limited only by the scope of the appended claims.


In the example illustrated by FIG. 1, the computing platform comprises a display monitor 100, a keyboard data entry means 101, a casing 102 comprising a motherboard on which is mounted a data processor, one or more data storage means, a dynamic random access memory, various input and output ports (not illustrated in FIG. 1), a smart card reader 103 for accepting a user's smart card, a confirmation key 104, which a user can activate when confirming a transaction via the trusted computing platform, and a pointing device, e.g. a mouse or trackball device 105. The trusted computing platform also has a trusted component as described in the applicant's previous disclosure and as further described herein.


Referring to FIG. 2 of the drawings, there are illustrated some of the components included in the trusted computing platform, including keyboard 101 which incorporates confirmation key 104 and a smart card reader 103, a main motherboard 200 on which is mounted first data processor 201 and trusted component 202, and example of a hard disk drive 203, and monitor 100. Additional components which may be included in the computing platform, such as an internal frame to the casing 102 housing one or more local area network (LAN) ports, one or more modem ports, one or more power supplies, cooling fans, and the like, are not shown in FIG. 2.


Referring to FIG. 3 of the drawings, main motherboard 200 is manufactured comprising a processor 201, and a preferably permanently fixed trusted component 202, a memory device 300 local to the processor, a BIOS memory area 301, smart card interface 305, a plurality of control lines 302, a plurality of address lines 303, a confirmation key interface 306, and a databus 304 connecting the processor 201, trusted component 202, memory area 300, BIOS memory area 301 and smart card interface 305. A hardware random number generator 309 is also able to communicate with the processor 201 using the bus 304.


External to the motherboard and connected thereto by the databus 304, are provided one or more hard disk drive memory devices 203, keyboard data entry device 101, pointing device 105, monitor 100, smart card reader 103, and one or more peripheral devices 307, 308, for example, a modem , printer, scanner, or other known peripheral device.


In the illustrated example, smart card reader 103 is wired directly to smart card interface 305 on the motherboard and does not connect directly to the databus 304. In an alternative example, however, the smartcard reader 103 may be connected directly to databus 304. To provide enhanced security, confirmation key switch 104 is hard wired directly to confirmation key interface 306 on motherboard 200, which provides a direct signal input to trusted component 202 when confirmation key 104 is activated by a user such that a user activation the confirmation key sends a signal directly to the trusted component, by-passing the first data processor and first memory means of the computer platform.


Trusted component 202 is positioned logically and physically between monitor 100 and processor 201 of the computing platform, so that trusted component 202 has direct control over the views displayed on monitor 100 which cannot be interfered with by processor 201.


Confirmation key 104 and confirmation key driver 306 provide a protected communication path (PCP) between a user and the trusted component, which cannot be interfered with by processor 201, which by-passes databus 304 and which is physically and logically unconnected to memory area 300 or hard disk drive memory device(s) 203.


The trusted component lends its identity and trusted processes to the computer platform and the trusted component has those properties by virtue of its tamper-resistance, resistance to forgery, and resistance to counterfeiting, only selected entities with appropriate authorisation mechanisms are able to influence the processes running inside the trusted component. Neither an ordinary user of the trusted computer entity, nor any ordinary user or any ordinary entity connected via a network to the computer entity may access or interfere with the processes running inside the trusted component. The trusted component has the property of being “inviolate”.


In the illustrated example, the trusted component operates to monitor data, including user data files and applications, on the computer platform by creating a set of data files which the trusted component dynamically monitors for any changes in the data, including absence of the data, which may occur as a result of the computer platform being compromised by a virus attack, or other interference. The trusted component is allocated or seizes a plurality of memory location addresses and/or file directories in the first memory area of the computer platform, which become a user space reserved for use by the trusted component.


The reserved memory area comprises a selected proportion of the total memory area of the computer platform. Within the reserved memory area, the trusted component also creates a plurality of data files, which can either be copies from real user data files on the computer platform, or which can be created by the trusted component. The primary purpose of these files is to act as a set of files to which the trusted component has access, and to which ordinary user accounts of the computer platform, under normal operation, do not have access. Because the files in the reserved memory area are reserved for use by the trusted component and under normal operation, are not accessed by applications on the computer platform, the trusted component can use files stored in the reserve memory area as a “control” set of files by which to monitor unauthorised changes to the data, for example as caused by a virus.


Because the files stored in the reserved memory area are either duplicates of user files, duplicates of applications or files created specifically by the trusted component, they are of little or no value to the computer platform for performing its normal operating functions. If the files in the reserve memory area become corrupted for any reason, they may be sacrificed and are easily replaceable. However, since access to the reserve memory area is restricted to the trusted component, any corruption of the files in the reserve memory area is deemed to be indicative of changes to files occurring through undesirable mechanisms, e.g. by a virus program. The files in the reserve memory area are periodically monitored by the trusted component to check for such corruption. If corruption is discovered by the monitoring process, then a measure of the likely corruption of the remaining memory area on the computer platform can be determined by probabilistic methods.


By providing a reserve memory area containing files which can be sacrificed, if the computer platform is compromised by a hostile attack, e.g. a virus, then the sacrificial files stored in the reserve memory area are at least as likely to be affected as other user data files stored in the remaining portion of the memory of the computer platform. Thus any corruption of the files in the reserve memory area, if detected early enough, may give an indication to the trusted component that file corruption is occurring on the computer platform, in which case the trusted component can take action to limit the spread of corruption at an early stage, and preferably before damage is done to important data files stored in the remaining memory area of the computer platform.


Referring to FIG. 4 of the drawings, there is illustrated schematically an internal architecture of trusted component 202. The trusted component comprises a processor 400, a volatile memory area 401, a non-volatile memory area 402, a memory area storing native code 403, and a memory area storing one or a plurality of cryptographic functions 404, the non-volatile memory 401, native code memory 403 and cryptographic memory 404 collectively comprising the second memory means hereinbefore referred to. The cryptographic functions 404 may include or comprise a source of random numbers.


Trusted component 202 comprises a completely independent computing entity from the computer platform. In the illustrated example, the trusted component shares a motherboard with the computer platform so that the trusted component is physically linked to the computer platform. In a preferred embodiment, the trusted component is physically distinct from the computer platform, that is to say it does not exist solely as a sub-functionality of the data processor and memory means comprising the computer platform, but exists separately as a separate physical data processor 400 and separate physical memory area 401, 402, 403, 404. By providing a physically separate trusted component, the trusted component becomes more difficult to mimic or forge through software introduced onto the computer platform. Programs within the trusted component are pre-loaded at manufacture of the trusted component, and are not generally user configurable. The physicality of the trusted component, and the fact that the trusted component is not configurable by the user enables the user to have confidence in the inherent integrity of the trusted component, and therefore a high degree of “trust” in the operation and presence of the trusted component on the computer platform.


The user's smart card may comprise a “cash card” or a “crypto card”, the functions of which are described in the applicant's above-mentioned previous disclosure ‘Computing Apparatus and Methods of Operating Computing Apparatus’.


On each individual smart card may be stored a corresponding respective security data which is different for each smart card. For user interactions with the trusted component, e.g. for a dialogue box monitor display generated by the trusted component, the trusted component takes the security data (e.g. image data) from the user's smart card, and displays it in, or uses it as a background to the dialogue box displayed on the monitor 100. Thus, the user has confidence that the dialogue box displayed on the monitor 100 is generated by the trusted component.


Referring to FIG. 5 of the drawings, an exemplary embodiment of an information system according to the present invention is based on the trusted computing platform principle described above. Thus, the information system comprises at least a monitor or screen 500, an input entry device, such as a keyboard, 501 and/or a pointing device, such as a mouse or trackball device, 505, a smart card reader 503, a confirmation key 504, and a main motherboard 600.


The main motherboard may be manufactured comprising a processor 601, a preferably permanently fixed trusted component 602, a memory device 700 local to the processor 601, a smart card interface 705, one or more control lines 702, one or more address lines 703, a confirmation key interface 706, and a databus 704 connecting the processor 601, trusted component 602, memory area 700, and smart card interface 705.


Referring to FIG. 6 of the drawings, the information system 800 of FIG. 5 is located in a prominent position in the predetermined area of interest, e.g. at the reception desk of a building, and is connected to, or includes integrally therein, a database 801 in which is stored information relating to computing platforms within the building and their security attributes. The information system may also be linked or connected to one or more of the computing platforms 802a-802n, and optionally to an external link 804 such as the Internet.


In use, a visitor to a building first identifies an information system according to the invention, which may be accompanied by some form of written statement by the service provider attesting the trustworthiness of the system. Thus, the statement may read “Organisation XYZ attests that this equipment is a Trusted System. This means that the organisation has taken every reasonable step to ensure the trustworthiness of information provided or published by the system, to ensure the trustworthiness of the verification services provided by the system and to ensure that the system maintains the privacy of its users”.


Having located the information system, the visitor presents his/her personal computing platform or apparatus to the system and authorises the personal computing apparatus to interact with the information system. The personal computing apparatus could, for example, be a smart card or laptop computer. Communications between the system and the personal computing apparatus must be unambiguous, i.e. it must be obvious which information system is communicating with the computing apparatus. Thus, the system must be a contact device or use, for example, directional wireless communication, such as IR. In any event, if the personal computing apparatus is a smart card, the interaction authorisation step may consist of entering into the information system a Personal Identification Number (PIN) which is then forwarded to the smart card for verification.


In some circumstances, such as within the premises of a private organisation, it may be desirable for the information system to verify the identity of the visitor before commencing communication. Such verification may take the form of a cryptographic challenge by the information system, i.e. a request for a password or code to be entered, in response to which the visitor (or his/her personal computing apparatus) must enter the correct password or code before communication will continue. This step may, however, be unnecessary or undesirable in public buildings such as libraries and museums, for example.


Once the authorisation and verification process has been completed, the information system provides information about computer platforms within the building, together with their security attributes where appropriate, and also indicates any additional services which the system provides. At least the information regarding the additional services available to the visitor is preferably presented on the monitor or screen of the system, although, the system itself may not have a screen, in which case such information may be displayed on the screen of the visitor's personal computing apparatus, where appropriate. In any event, the system provides the information regarding computer platforms within the predetermined area to the visitor's personal computing apparatus.


The additional services offered by the information system may permit the visitor to perform operations on the information provided by the system and/or to perform remote operations upon the information provided by the system, and report the results back to the visitor. For example, the information system may have greater computational power than the visitor's personal computing apparatus, in which case, the visitor may ask the information system to communicate with another service of the visitor's choosing (e.g. the visitor's smart card may ask the system to send the provided information to a service that is trusted by the visitor). The service would examine the information and return the results to the information system, which would forward the results to the visitor's personal computing apparatus. Of course, the information provided to the visitor may depend on the identity and/or level of authorisation of the visitor.


The visitor can then use the information provided by the information system during his/her visit to the building (or other predetermined area) of interest. When leaving the building, the visitor may once again present their personal computing apparatus to the information system so that the system can erase the building information from the visitor's personal computing apparatus. In any event, the system is preferably arranged to not to retain any unnecessary information relating to the visitor, thereby maintaining a high degree of privacy for the visitor.


In one particularly preferred exemplary embodiment of the invention, the information system is arranged to only provide details of trusted computing platforms within the predetermined area of interest. The visitor's personal computing apparatus (preferably a smart card or the like) may ask the information system to send that information to the visitor's verification service, which does the computationally intensive work of verifying identities and their associated certificates. The verification service would sign its conclusions and send the results back to the visitor's personal computing apparatus via the information system, so that the visitor's personal computing apparatus can then identify the platforms in the area which can be trusted by the visitor.


In general, the implementation of the information system of the invention must be trustworthy and, as such, should be designed and built such that its operations cannot be subverted. It may, for example, be incapable of executing any function other than one built into it. It may have physical protection to minimise the chance of physical alteration and/or it may periodically execute a self-test algorithm and report the result to a control centre. Alternatively or additionally, it may periodically execute a cryptographic challenge /response protocol to a control centre to request permission to operate, and stop operating if such permission is not forthcoming.


Embodiments of the present invention have been described above by way of examples only and it will be apparent to persons skilled in the art that modifications and variations can be made to the described embodiments without departing from the scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

Claims
  • 1. An information system comprising an information access point relating to at least one pre-determined geographical area, said information access point including apparatus for retrieving information relating to trusted computing platforms located within said pre-determined geographical area, said information system being arranged to provide said information relating to the trusted computing platforms located within the pre-determined geographical area to a portable computing apparatus visiting the pre-determined geographical area, wherein providing said information to the portable computing apparatus enables the portable computing apparatus to interact with trusted components of said trusted computing platforms within the pre-determined geographical area.
  • 2. A system according to claim 1, wherein said information system is arranged to provide to the portable computing apparatus as said information only details and/or a list of public keys of genuine trusted computing platforms within said pre-determined geographical area.
  • 3. A system according to claim 1, wherein said information access point comprises a trusted computing platform.
  • 4. A system according to claim 1, comprising apparatus for communicating or interacting with the portable computing apparatus.
  • 5. A system according to claim 4, wherein said apparatus for communicating or interacting with the portable computing apparatus is arranged to perform said communication or interaction by physical contact or directional wireless communication.
  • 6. A system according to claim 1, incorporating or accompanied by a declaration concerning the trustworthiness of the system.
  • 7. A system according to claim 6, wherein said declaration is capable of interpretation by a user of the portable computing apparatus without preprocessing by an information processing system.
  • 8. A system according to claim 1, arranged to verify the identity of a user.
  • 9. A system according to claim 1, arranged to enable a user to perform operations, either locally or remotely, upon the information that the system provided to the portable computing system.
  • 10. A system according to claim 1, wherein the information provided to the portable computing apparatus includes security attributes of the trusted computing platforms within said pre-determined geographical area.
  • 11. A method comprising: providing an information access point for a geographical area; retrieving to the information access point information relating to trusted computing platforms within the geographical area; and the information access point providing the information relating to the trusted computing platforms within the geographical area to a portable computing apparatus visiting the geographical area, wherein the information provided to the portable computing apparatus enables the portable computing apparatus to interact with trusted components of said trusted computing platforms.
  • 12. The method of claim 11, wherein providing the information relating to the trusted computing platforms within the geographical area comprises providing to the portable computing apparatus only information relating to genuine trusted computing platforms within the geographical area.
  • 13. The method of claim 12, wherein providing the information relating to the trusted computing platforms within the geographical area comprises providing to the portable computing apparatus a list of public keys of the genuine trusted computing platforms within the geographical area.
  • 14. The method of claim 11, wherein providing the information relating to the trusted computing platforms within the geographical area to the portable computing apparatus comprises the information access point communicating with the portable computing apparatus when the portable computing apparatus is in physical contact with the information access point.
  • 15. The method of claim 11, wherein providing the information relating to the trusted computing platforms within the geographical area to the portable computing apparatus comprises the information access point communicating with the portable computing apparatus when the portable computing apparatus is in position for directional wireless communication with the information access point.
  • 16. The method of claim 11, further comprising the portable computing apparatus using said information from the information access point to interact with a trusted component of one of said trusted computing platforms within the geographical area.
  • 17. The method of claim 11, further comprising: the portable computing apparatus requesting that a verification service verify the information relating to the trusted computing platforms within the geographical area; the verification service verifying identities of the trusted computing platforms, signing results, and returning signed results to the portable computing apparatus; and the portable computing apparatus using the signed results to identify which of the trusted computing platforms can be trusted.
  • 18. A system comprising: one or more trusted computing platforms located within a geographical area; and an information access point in the geographical area, the information access point including an apparatus for retrieving information needed for interaction with trusted components of the trusted computing platforms and an interface arranged to provide the information needed for interaction with trusted components of the trusted computing platforms to a portable computing apparatus visiting the geographical area.
  • 19. The system of claim 18, wherein the interface comprises at least one of a contact reader and a directional wireless communication interface through which the portable computing apparatus can communicate with the information access point.
  • 20. The system of claim 18, wherein the information needed for interaction with trusted components of the trusted computing platforms includes public keys associated with the trusted computing platforms within the geographical area.
Priority Claims (1)
Number Date Country Kind
0104584.8 Feb 2001 GB national
US Referenced Citations (196)
Number Name Date Kind
4747040 Blanset et al. May 1988 A
4799156 Shavit et al. Jan 1989 A
4926476 Covey May 1990 A
4933969 Marshall et al. Jun 1990 A
4962533 Krueger et al. Oct 1990 A
4984272 McIlroy Jan 1991 A
5029206 Marino et al. Jul 1991 A
5032979 Hecht et al. Jul 1991 A
5038281 Peters Aug 1991 A
5136711 Hugard et al. Aug 1992 A
5144660 Rose Sep 1992 A
5261104 Bertram et al. Nov 1993 A
5278973 O'Brien et al. Jan 1994 A
5283828 Saunders et al. Feb 1994 A
5325529 Brown et al. Jun 1994 A
5341422 Blackledge et al. Aug 1994 A
5359659 Rosenthal Oct 1994 A
5361359 Tajalli et al. Nov 1994 A
5379342 Arnold et al. Jan 1995 A
5404532 Allen et al. Apr 1995 A
5410707 Bell Apr 1995 A
5414860 Canova et al. May 1995 A
5421006 Jablon et al. May 1995 A
5440723 Arnold et al. Aug 1995 A
5444850 Chang Aug 1995 A
5448045 Clark Sep 1995 A
5454110 Kannan et al. Sep 1995 A
5473692 Davis Dec 1995 A
5483649 Kuznetsov et al. Jan 1996 A
5491750 Bellare et al. Feb 1996 A
5495569 Kotzur Feb 1996 A
5497490 Harada et al. Mar 1996 A
5497494 Combs et al. Mar 1996 A
5504814 Miyahara Apr 1996 A
5504910 Wisor et al. Apr 1996 A
5511184 Lin Apr 1996 A
5530758 Marino et al. Jun 1996 A
5535411 Speed et al. Jul 1996 A
5548763 Combs et al. Aug 1996 A
5555373 Dayan et al. Sep 1996 A
5572590 Chess Nov 1996 A
5619571 Sandstrom et al. Apr 1997 A
5680452 Shanton Oct 1997 A
5680547 Chang Oct 1997 A
5692124 Holden et al. Nov 1997 A
5694590 Thuraisingham et al. Dec 1997 A
5701343 Takashima et al. Dec 1997 A
5706431 Otto Jan 1998 A
5768382 Schneier et al. Jun 1998 A
5771354 Crawford Jun 1998 A
5774717 Porcaro Jun 1998 A
5787175 Carter Jul 1998 A
5809145 Slik et al. Sep 1998 A
5815665 Teper et al. Sep 1998 A
5815702 Kannan et al. Sep 1998 A
5819261 Takahashi et al. Oct 1998 A
5841868 Helbig, Sr. Nov 1998 A
5841869 Merkling et al. Nov 1998 A
5844986 Davis Dec 1998 A
5845068 Winiger Dec 1998 A
5867646 Benson et al. Feb 1999 A
5887163 Nguyen et al. Mar 1999 A
5889989 Robertazzi et al. Mar 1999 A
5890142 Tanimura et al. Mar 1999 A
5892900 Ginter et al. Apr 1999 A
5892902 Clark Apr 1999 A
5903732 Reed et al. May 1999 A
5917360 Yasutake Jun 1999 A
5922074 Richard et al. Jul 1999 A
5933498 Schneck et al. Aug 1999 A
5937066 Gennaro et al. Aug 1999 A
5937159 Meyers et al. Aug 1999 A
5940513 Aucsmith et al. Aug 1999 A
5958016 Chang et al. Sep 1999 A
5960177 Tanno Sep 1999 A
5966732 Assaf Oct 1999 A
5987605 Hill et al. Nov 1999 A
5987608 Roskind Nov 1999 A
6006332 Rabne et al. Dec 1999 A
6012080 Ozden et al. Jan 2000 A
6021510 Nachenberg Feb 2000 A
6023765 Kuhn Feb 2000 A
6038667 Helbig Mar 2000 A
6067559 Allard et al. May 2000 A
6078948 Podgorny et al. Jun 2000 A
6079016 Park Jun 2000 A
6081830 Schindler Jun 2000 A
6081894 Mann Jun 2000 A
6091956 Hollenberg Jul 2000 A
6098133 Summers et al. Aug 2000 A
6100738 Illegems Aug 2000 A
6115819 Anderson Sep 2000 A
6125114 Blanc et al. Sep 2000 A
6138239 Veil Oct 2000 A
6154838 Le et al. Nov 2000 A
6157719 Wasilewski et al. Dec 2000 A
6175917 Arrow et al. Jan 2001 B1
6185678 Arbaugh et al. Feb 2001 B1
6211583 Humphreys Apr 2001 B1
6253193 Ginter et al. Jun 2001 B1
6253324 Field et al. Jun 2001 B1
6253349 Maeda et al. Jun 2001 B1
6266774 Sampath et al. Jul 2001 B1
6272631 Thomlinson Aug 2001 B1
6275848 Arnold Aug 2001 B1
6289462 McNabb et al. Sep 2001 B1
6292900 Ngo et al. Sep 2001 B1
6304970 Bizzara et al. Oct 2001 B1
6327533 Chou Dec 2001 B1
6327579 Crawford Dec 2001 B1
6327652 England et al. Dec 2001 B1
6330669 McKeeth Dec 2001 B1
6330670 England et al. Dec 2001 B1
6334118 Benson Dec 2001 B1
6367012 Atkinson et al. Apr 2002 B1
6374250 Ajtai et al. Apr 2002 B2
6393412 Deep May 2002 B1
6393556 Arora May 2002 B1
6405318 Rowland Jun 2002 B1
6414635 Stewart et al. Jul 2002 B1
6446206 Aguilar et al. Sep 2002 B1
6449716 Rickey Sep 2002 B1
6477702 Yellin et al. Nov 2002 B1
6487601 Hubacher et al. Nov 2002 B1
6496847 Bugnion et al. Dec 2002 B1
6505300 Chan et al. Jan 2003 B2
6507909 Zurko et al. Jan 2003 B1
6510418 Case et al. Jan 2003 B1
6513156 Bak et al. Jan 2003 B2
6519623 Mancisidor Feb 2003 B1
6529143 Mikkola et al. Mar 2003 B2
6529728 Pfeffer et al. Mar 2003 B1
6530024 Proctor Mar 2003 B1
6539425 Stevens et al. Mar 2003 B1
6609199 DeTreville Aug 2003 B1
6609248 Srivastava et al. Aug 2003 B1
6622018 Erekson Sep 2003 B1
6650902 Richton Nov 2003 B1
6654800 Rieger, III Nov 2003 B1
6671716 Diedrichsen et al. Dec 2003 B1
6678827 Rothermel et al. Jan 2004 B1
6678833 Grawrock Jan 2004 B1
6681304 Vogt et al. Jan 2004 B1
6694434 McGee et al. Feb 2004 B1
6697944 Jones et al. Feb 2004 B1
6701440 Kim et al. Mar 2004 B1
6716101 Meadows et al. Apr 2004 B1
6732276 Cofler et al. May 2004 B1
6751680 Langerman et al. Jun 2004 B2
6757824 England Jun 2004 B1
6757830 Tarbotton et al. Jun 2004 B1
6772331 Hind et al. Aug 2004 B1
6775779 England et al. Aug 2004 B1
6785015 Smith et al. Aug 2004 B1
6799270 Bull et al. Sep 2004 B1
6837229 Mizutani et al. Jan 2005 B2
6853988 Dickinson et al. Feb 2005 B1
6868406 Ogg et al. Mar 2005 B1
6889325 Sipman et al. May 2005 B1
6892307 Wood et al. May 2005 B1
6931545 Ta et al. Aug 2005 B1
6948069 Teppler Sep 2005 B1
6948073 England et al. Sep 2005 B2
6965816 Walker Nov 2005 B2
6988250 Proudler et al. Jan 2006 B1
7051343 Bracha et al. May 2006 B2
7076655 Griffin et al. Jul 2006 B2
7076804 Kershenbaum et al. Jul 2006 B2
7159210 Griffin et al. Jan 2007 B2
7181608 Fallon et al. Feb 2007 B2
7194623 Proudler et al. Mar 2007 B1
7302698 Proudler et al. Nov 2007 B1
7529919 Lampson et al. May 2009 B2
7669238 Fee et al. Feb 2010 B2
7865876 Griffin et al. Jan 2011 B2
7877799 Proudler Jan 2011 B2
20010037450 Metlitski et al. Nov 2001 A1
20010051515 Rygaard Dec 2001 A1
20020012432 England et al. Jan 2002 A1
20020023212 Proudler Feb 2002 A1
20020089528 Hay et al. Jul 2002 A1
20020095454 Reed et al. Jul 2002 A1
20020120575 Pearson et al. Aug 2002 A1
20020120876 Pearson et al. Aug 2002 A1
20020184488 Amini et al. Dec 2002 A1
20020184520 Bush et al. Dec 2002 A1
20030009685 Choo et al. Jan 2003 A1
20030014466 Berger et al. Jan 2003 A1
20030018892 Tello Jan 2003 A1
20030037237 Abgrall et al. Feb 2003 A1
20030084436 Berger et al. May 2003 A1
20030145235 Choo Jul 2003 A1
20030191957 Hypponen et al. Oct 2003 A1
20030196083 Grawrock et al. Oct 2003 A1
20040073617 Milliken et al. Apr 2004 A1
20050256799 Warsaw et al. Nov 2005 A1
Foreign Referenced Citations (60)
Number Date Country
2187855 Jun 1997 CA
0 304 033 Feb 1989 EP
0421409 Apr 1991 EP
0510224 Oct 1992 EP
0 580 350 Jan 1994 EP
0 825 511 Feb 1998 EP
0 849 657 Jun 1998 EP
08-49680 Jun 1998 EP
0 465 016 Dec 1998 EP
0893751 Jan 1999 EP
0 895 148 Feb 1999 EP
0926605 Jun 1999 EP
0992958 Apr 2000 EP
1 030 237 Aug 2000 EP
1 056 014 Nov 2000 EP
1049036 Nov 2000 EP
1055990 Nov 2000 EP
1056010 Nov 2000 EP
1076279 Feb 2001 EP
1085396 Feb 2001 EP
1107137 Jun 2001 EP
2317476 Mar 1998 GB
2 336 918 Nov 1999 GB
2336918 Nov 1999 GB
2 353 885 Mar 2001 GB
2361153 Oct 2001 GB
9214493 Aug 1997 JP
10083382 Mar 1998 JP
10293704 Oct 1998 JP
10510647 Oct 1998 JP
10293705 Nov 1998 JP
11003248 Jan 1999 JP
2001-0016655 Jan 2001 JP
9325024 Dec 1993 WO
9411967 May 1994 WO
9524696 Sep 1995 WO
9527249 Oct 1995 WO
9729416 Aug 1997 WO
9826529 Jun 1998 WO
9836517 Aug 1998 WO
9840809 Sep 1998 WO
9845778 Oct 1998 WO
PCTUS1998015082 Feb 1999 WO
PCTUS1998044402 Feb 1999 WO
0031644 Jun 2000 WO
PCTUS2000019324 Jul 2000 WO
PCTUS2000073880 Jul 2000 WO
0048062 Aug 2000 WO
0048063 Aug 2000 WO
0054125 Sep 2000 WO
0054126 Sep 2000 WO
PCTUS2000052900 Sep 2000 WO
PCTUS2000058859 Oct 2000 WO
0073913 Dec 2000 WO
PCTUS2000073904 Dec 2000 WO
PCTUS2001013198 Feb 2001 WO
0123980 Apr 2001 WO
PCTUS2001027722 Apr 2001 WO
PCTUS2001065334 Sep 2001 WO
PCTUS2001065366 Sep 2001 WO
Related Publications (1)
Number Date Country
20020120862 A1 Aug 2002 US