Embodiments pertain to air traffic management for commercial and military airport environments. Embodiments also pertain to responding to threats in commercial and military airport environments.
One problem with current air traffic management in commercial and military airport environments is the lack of available and consistent situational awareness and response capability in and around airports and airbases. Individual systems exist that perform independent functions, but they do not work in a collaborative environment. This could lead to an inability to respond to various threats in a timely manner.
Thus there are general needs for an Integrated Airport Domain Awareness and Response System and Method that integrates individual systems, operates collaboratively, and responds to various threats in a timely manner. There are also general needs for a system for Ground-Based Transportable Defense of Airports against man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to provide airspace security for high profile events like the Olympics, for overseas military and logistics bases, and for the destinations of VIP aircraft such as Air Force One.
An apparatus and method for defending a physical zone from airborne and ground-based threats are described. In an aspect, an apparatus may include a detection component configured to detect and track a ground-based or airborne threat proximate to the physical zone, an integration component to receive data from the detection component and process the data to determine a threat assessment. A defensive component receives the determined threat assessment and disables the ground-based and airborne threat based upon the determined threat assessment. In another aspect, a method may include detecting an object proximate to the physical zone to be protected, identifying the object as a hostile threat, determining at least one of a path and a point-of-origin for the object, and actuating a defensive system in response to the hostile threat.
The following description and the drawings sufficiently illustrate the various embodiments to enable those skilled in the art to practice them. Other embodiments may incorporate structural, logical, electrical, process, and other changes. Accordingly, the examples described herein merely typify possible variations. Individual components and functions may be optional, and the sequence of operations may also vary. Portions and features of the various embodiments may be included in, or substituted for, those of other embodiments. Therefore, the various embodiments as set forth in the claims are to be interpreted as encompassing all available equivalents of those claims.
The various embodiments provide an Integrated Airport Domain Awareness and Response System (IADARS) and methods that provide increased situational awareness and response time reduction when external threats are directed to a protected location or zone. For example, the protected location may include a commercial airport, a military base, a nuclear facility, or other sensitive locations and their immediate environs. In the various embodiments, the IADARS may provide data generation and analysis, information sharing and knowledge in a persistent, three-dimensional infrastructure that enhances situational awareness and response capability. Through shared resources and data management and storage, both real-time and post-event forensic capability become available. Infrastructure costs and user workload are also reduced through common subsystems.
The IADARS 10 may also include an airspace detection component 14, such as a radar-based air-traffic control (ATC) system. The ATC system may include, for example, a system operable to provide radar surveillance of an airspace and to provide positive control of flight vehicles within the radar-monitored airspace. In the various embodiments, the ATC system may be configured to monitor an airport terminal airspace environment using at least one of a control tower (CT) facility, a Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility, a Flight Service Station (FSS) or an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). Briefly, and in general terms, the ATC system is configured to monitor and direct approaching and departing aircraft in the airport terminal airspace environment in order to ensure the safety of traffic within the immediate airport terminal airspace, or in other airspace environments, which may include Class B, Class C or Class D airspaces. Other outlying airspace areas, such as Classes A, E, F and G may also be monitored by radar systems associated with the ATC system. The ATC system may also be configured to identify flight vehicles and track flight vehicle positions by primary (e.g., skin-painting) radars and secondary surveillance radar (SSR), such as the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS), which relies upon an aircraft-based transponder that is configured to transmit (e.g., “squawk”) signals that include pertinent flight-related information in response to signals from an interrogating ground-based radar.
The IADARS 10 may further include an airspace threat defense component 16 that includes an array of sensors positioned at various locations that may be located within the physical perimeter, adjacent to the physical perimeter, or positioned at a distance from the physical perimeter. Each of the sensors in the array of sensors is configured to detect an airborne object moving across a field-of-view of the sensor. Accordingly, the sensors may be located on a surface of the earth, or positioned on a structure, or even positioned on a terrestrial vehicle so that the array may be readily reconfigured, if desired. In any case, each of sensors in the array of sensors is generally positioned to view a portion of an airspace adjacent to the sensor. In accordance with the various embodiments, the array of sensors may include optical sensors or infrared sensors. Information obtained from the array of sensors may be communicated to a communications and control (C2) apparatus that is configured to process the information and to provide direction and instructions to a directed energy device configured to interfere with the operation of a flight vehicle that is within or approaching the physical perimeter without authorization. For example, the directed energy device may include a directed microwave device that is configured to project microwave energy towards the unauthorized flight vehicle and disable a guidance system associated with the flight vehicle. Accordingly, the strength of an emission may be configured to affect a front end portion of a guidance system receiver, or to enter through other portions of the unauthorized flight vehicle, such as through seams between body portions of the unauthorized flight vehicle, or even through a body portion of the unauthorized vehicle. The emission of the directed energy device may also be suitably modulated to interfere with the unauthorized flight vehicle. One example of an airspace threat defense component 16 is the VIGILANT EAGLE Airport Defense System, available from the Raytheon Company, Missile Systems Division of Tucson Ariz., although other suitable alternatives exist. The VIGILANT EAGLE Airport Defense System may be configured to defeat airborne threats such as a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), or Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS), or from actively-guided (e.g., piloted) aircraft or remotely-guided aircraft using high-power microwave (HPM) interference from a focused microwave beam directed at the airborne threat. The VIGILANT EAGLE Airport Defense System may therefore include a distributed Missile Detect-and-Track (MDT) apparatus having a grid of passive airspace detection sensors for tracking airborne threats. VIGILANT EAGLE may also include a command and control (C2) system that receives information from the grid of passive airspace detection sensors and to communicate commands that steer the HPM beam. An Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) may be provided to direct the beam, which generally includes a billboard-size array of antennas that are linked to solid-state amplifiers.
The IADARS 10 may include a ground threat defense component 18 that includes a directed beam device that is configured to provide directed energy in response to an unauthorized physical perimeter intrusion by terrestrial objects, such as ground vehicles and personnel. In accordance with the various embodiments, the directed beam device may include an apparatus that is configured to provide a measured (e.g., a non-lethal) response to the unauthorized physical perimeter intrusion, so that the unauthorized ground vehicle or the personnel may be incapacitated when exposed to the directed energy. Alternatively, the directed beam device may be configured to provide a lethal response to an unauthorized perimeter intrusion by ground vehicles and personnel. Accordingly, the directed beam device may be configured to provide directed electromagnetic radiation, such as directed microwave energy, towards ground vehicles and personnel that approach or penetrate the physical perimeter. The directed beam device may also be configured to direct acoustic radiation towards ground vehicles and personnel that approach or penetrate the physical perimeter. Alternatively, the directed beam device may be configured to provide a lethal response to an unauthorized perimeter intrusion. One example of a directed beam device may include the SILENT GUARDIAN Protection System, available from the Raytheon Company, Missile Systems Division of Tucson Ariz., although other suitable alternatives exist. The SILENT GUARDIAN Protection System includes a source of microwave energy that is coupled to a directed antenna that is configured to focus the microwave energy towards unauthorized intruders that may be penetrating or threatening to penetrate the physical perimeter. Since the microwave energy has limited tissue penetration, the SILENT GUARDIAN Protection System is generally non-lethal since it principally generates an intolerable tissue heating effect in the unauthorized intruder. In still other embodiments, the ground defense system 18 may also include a propelled projectile weapon, such as the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), available from the Raytheon Company of Waltham, Mass., although other alternatives exist.
Still referring to
The integration unit 20 may also include a display device 34 that is configured to present visual information generated by the processing unit 22 to a system operator. The display device 34 may be operably coupled to one or more pointing devices 36 that allow the system operator to enter commands to the processing unit 22 based upon the visual information presented on the display device 34. A data storage device 38 may also be coupled to the processing unit 22 so that data received from the data interface 24 and information processed by the processing unit 22 may be stored for later review, or for later forensic analysis, if needed.
With reference now to
The processing unit 40 may also include a threat assessment unit 48 coupled to the CPU 42 that may also receive suitably processed information from at least one of the ground detection component 12, the airspace detection component 14, the airspace threat defense component 16, and the ground threat defense component 18 shown in
The Abstract is provided to comply with 37 C.F.R. Section 1.72(b) requiring an abstract that will allow the reader to ascertain the nature and gist of the technical disclosure. It is submitted with the understanding that it will not be used to limit or interpret the scope or meaning of the claims. The following claims are hereby incorporated into the detailed description, with each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment.
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/155,614, filed Feb. 26, 2009, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
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