The present disclosure relates to electromagnetic protection of security equipment. In particular, the present disclosure relates to electromagnetic protection for integrated video and electromagnetic detector security system equipment.
Exposure to electromagnetic fields can cause interference or damage to electrical equipment, causing that equipment to malfunction or rendering it nonoperational. For example, electrical equipment can be blown or otherwise fail in the event of a strong electromagnetic pulse or intentional electromagnetic interference event (EMP/IEMI).
EMP/IEMI events typically take one of two forms. First, high field events correspond to short-duration, high voltage events (e.g., up to and exceeding 100 kilovolts per meter), and typically are of the form of short pulses of narrow-band or distributed signals (e.g., in the frequency range of 14 kHz to 10 GHz). These types of events typically generate high voltage differences in equipment, leading to high induced currents and burnout of electrical components. Second, low field events (e.g., events in the range of 0.01 to 10 volts per meter) are indications of changing electromagnetic environments below the high field damaging environments, but still of interest in certain applications.
Existing systems are used to defeat a narrow range of threats. The protection schemes built into electronic systems are generally developed to address a certain possible issue, are not useful to address other electromagnetic interference issues. Although attempts have been made to “harden” or protect, certain military systems against these threats, many commercial electronic systems remain unprotected. However, these existing “hardening” solutions are cost-prohibitive to apply to a wide range of electronics, exposing critical assets to possible damage One such unaddressed concern is for example equipment that is designed for security systems at various facilities.
For these and other reasons, improvements are desirable.
In accordance with the following disclosure, the above and other issues are addressed by the following:
In a first aspect, a security system configured to be protected from electromagnetic events includes a plurality of cameras and a plurality of electromagnetic event detectors disposed at a facility. The system also includes an electromagnetically-shielded cabinet containing computing equipment and a storage media. The electromagnetically-shielded cabinet is configured to receive data from each of the plurality of video cameras and electromagnetic detectors and store the data on the storage media, whereby, in the event of an electromagnetic event, video image information at the time of the event and for a period of time after the event can be preserved on the storage media. The capture of such video data can later be used for forensic investigations related to the IEMI or EMP attack.
In a second aspect, a security system for a facility configured to be protected from electromagnetic events includes a detection system configured to detect an electromagnetic event. The security system also includes a monitoring system coupled to the detection system; wherein upon detection of the electromagnetic event, the monitoring system is configured to scan an area around the facility, capture images, tag the images, and store the images in a storage media.
In another embodiment of the present invention, a method of securing a facility against an electromagnetic event includes: monitoring the facility with a plurality of cameras disposed at the facility, detecting an electromagnetic event with a plurality of electromagnetic detectors disposed at the facility, and storing data in the system in a storage media. If the plurality of cameras are electromagnetic shielded and electrically filtered, the method also includes: scanning a first area around the facility, capturing images of the area around the facility, tagging the images, storing the images in the storage media, and reviewing the images after the event. The method also includes reviewing the data and images after the electromagnetic event.
Various embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings, wherein like reference numerals represent like parts and assemblies throughout the several views. Reference to various embodiments does not limit the scope of the invention, which is limited only by the scope of the claims attached hereto. Additionally, any examples set forth in this specification are not intended to be limiting and merely set forth some of the many possible embodiments for the claimed invention.
In general the present disclosure relates to methods and systems for protection of security systems from various electromagnetic interference events, including Electromagnetic Pulse, Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (EMP/IEMI) threats, or any other electromagnetic event having an amplitude and frequency capable of damaging building electrical systems data centers and/or electronic equipment. In one embodiment, the present invention uses an EMP/IEMI protected camera, EMP/IEMI detectors, and an EMP/IMEI shielded and filtered cabinet for protecting video and detector data storage.
The logical operations of certain aspects of the disclosure described herein are implemented as: (1) a sequence of computer implemented steps, operations, or procedures running on a programmable circuit within a computer, and/or (2) a sequence of computer implemented steps, operations, or procedures running on a programmable circuit within a directory system, database, or compiler.
Referring now to
In the embodiment shown, one or more video cameras 102 and electromagnetic detectors 104 are positioned around the facility 110 on the buildings 112, 114. In other embodiments, the facility 110 can include more or less than two buildings and/or structures and/or operations.
The one or more video cameras 102 and electromagnetic detectors 104 can be placed throughout the facility 110, including the exterior of the buildings 112, 114, as well as the interior of the buildings 112, 114. In certain embodiments, the video cameras 102 can be electromagnetically protected video cameras, such as are disclosed in copending U.S. Provisional Application No. 13/289,849, and entitled “Electromagnetically Shielded Video Camera and Shielded Enclosure for Image Capture Devices,” the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. In still further embodiments, the electromagnetic detectors 104 can be any of a number of types of detectors of electromagnetic events; example detectors useable in the system 100 are disclosed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/906,902, filed Oct. 18, 2010, and entitled “Electromagnetic Field Detection Systems and Methods,” the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
In use, video data captured by the video cameras 102 is streamed, for example via a protected electrical data cable or a fiber cable, to a storage media within an EMP/IEMI protected cabinet 106 containing computing equipment. Likewise, any signals received from the electromagnetic detectors 104 are streamed into this same EMP/IEMI protected cabinet 106. Should the facility 110 experience either an EMP or IEMI pulse, signals would be transmitted to the computing equipment and storage media, and optionally the incident would immediately give a warning signal to security officers at the facility 110. In certain embodiments, any video data stored in the media would also be tagged as to the time of the incident, either by the video cameras 102 or a computing system within the cabinet 106. Security personnel would then be able to review the video information to identify the source of the electromagnetic event, specifically including suspect vehicles, persons, packages, or other items that might be related to the cause of the incident.
In a second embodiment, one or more video cameras 102 can be a non-EMP/IEMI protected camera, which would record and transmit video up until an EMP/IEMI event. At the time of such an event, the camera would likely be damaged; however, any stored video up until the time of the event could be used as forensic evidence to determine the identity of a vehicle, person or packages that may have been involved in the EMP/IEMI attack. Other embodiments may include a combination of shielded and unshielded cameras wherein those cameras that are shielded would continue scanning upon detecting an electromagnetic event. In yet further embodiments, the cameras 102 can be still or infrared cameras.
The detectors 104 can take any of a number of forms. In some embodiments, the detectors 104 can be a standalone high field or low field electromagnetic event detector. In such embodiments, the detectors 104 can optionally also include other sensors, such as temperature, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, smoke, fire, radiation, or chemical sensors as well. Additionally, one or more different types of detectors can be used at a single facility 102.
In some embodiments, the detectors 104 are communicatively connected to a detection system 108, which in various embodiments can be a centrally-located, shielded computing system configured to receive signals from the detectors 104. The detection system 108 can analyze the signals received from the detectors and, based on one or more different types of calculations (as described below), can detect the presence of a high field or low field electromagnetic event, such as an EMP/IEMI event. The detection system 108 can also communicate status information regarding electromagnetic events, or observed electrical field readings, to a remote system (not shown) such as a data archival system or for purposes of alarming to a remote monitoring system, or for forensic information. The detection system 108 may be positioned at any location around the facility 110 that enables communication with the detectors 104, including within the cabinet 106, or on the exterior or interior of buildings 112, 114.
Referring now to
The antennas 200, 220 are, in the embodiments shown, a shielded loop magnetic antenna. For example, in
In the embodiments shown, the antennas 200, 220 are configured to output voltages that are directly proportional to the electrical field amplitude that corresponds to the component of the observed magnetic field at a given frequency at the antenna. In certain embodiments, the antennas 200, 220 are configured to output voltages of zero to five volts, depending upon the field strength of the electrical field observed (as inferred from the observed magnetic field strength). Preferably, the antennas 200, 220 have tailored inductance and resistance values to result in output of such voltages and has a sufficiently fast (nanosecond range) response times to detect EMP/IEMI pulse events. In certain embodiments, the antennas 200, 220 have output amplitudes that in combination with an equalizer are independent of frequency, at least over a predetermined frequency range. In certain embodiments, that frequency range can include about 200 MHz to about 10 GHz; in other embodiments, the frequency range can extend from about 10 MHz to about 10 GHz.
Additionally, although the antennas 200, 220 are described as being approximately ¼ inch in diameter, other sizes or dimensions of antennas are possible as well. By changing the size of the antennas 200, 220, different ranges of frequencies can be detected. The ¼ inch or less antennas described herein are intended to be responsive across the range of frequencies in which EMP/IEMI events occur, as described in the preceding paragraph.
In use, the antennas 200, 220 can each be used on the detectors 104 to obtain measurements of far field magnetic field measurements to infer electric field intensity, and therefore to detect electromagnetic pulses or other electromagnetic events in the security system 100, as previously described. When placed in a far field from the electromagnetic radiation source (e.g., spaced such that a radiation source is more than several wavelengths away from the antenna), the magnetic field strength detected by the antenna, , is directly correlated to the electric field strength component Ē by the impedance of free space, approximately 377Ω. Through use of the antennas 200, 220, electrical field strengths can be inferred for fields of very high intensity, including fields in the range of 100 volts per meter to 100,000 volts per meter or more without additional attenuation of the inbound signal.
Referring now to
Referring now to
In the embodiment shown, the electromagnetically shielded camera 400 includes a waveguide beyond cutoff 402 mounted in a wall of an enclosure 404. Specifically, the arrangement 400 includes a waveguide 402, usually comprised of small, thin-walled conductive hexagonal or other shape cells 403, mounted in a wall of an enclosure 404 which encloses and shields a camera 406 and associated lens 408.
The enclosure 404 is generally configured to be an electromagnetically-shielding enclosure, capable of shielding an interior volume 410 of the enclosure from undesirable electromagnetic signals (e.g., electromagnetic signals exceeding a particular amplitude and frequency). In various embodiments, the enclosure 404 can be constructed from conductive materials, such as a metal (e.g., sheet metal or aluminum) having a thickness generally sufficient to attenuate electromagnetic signals to acceptable levels. Although in the embodiment shown the enclosure 404 is generally rectangular, it is understood that the enclosure 404 could be any of a variety of shapes. In an example embodiment, the enclosure 404 provides about 70 dB or more of attenuation. However, in alternative embodiments, other levels of attenuation could be provided as well.
In the embodiment shown, a frame 405 can be used to mount the waveguide beyond cutoff 402 to the enclosure 404. In various embodiments, the frame can provide a sealing connection to the enclosure 404, for example using an electromagnetically-shielded gasket arrangement or other arrangements.
In some embodiments, the camera 406 may include a shielded window or lens configured to prevent electromagnetic energy from entering the camera enclosure 404. Such a shielded window or lens may include a conductive coating suitable for rejecting electromagnetic radiation from damaging the various electrical components of the camera 406. Details regarding such an embodiment are disclosed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/289,861, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. Additional details of a shielded camera, such as camera 406, are discussed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/289,849, the disclosure of which was previously incorporated by reference.
As illustrated in further detail in
The lens 408 can be any of a variety of types of automatically focusing or manually focused lenses. Generally, the lens 408 will have a focus length at a distance greater than the distance at which the waveguide beyond cutoff 402 is placed, such that the camera 406 does not focus on the waveguide, but instead focuses “through” the waveguide beyond cutoff on objects external to the enclosure 404. That is, the camera lens 408 can be selected, specific focal length and f-stop, such that the camera 406 focuses on objects in the far field. Hence the honeycomb waveguide material of the cells 403, which is in the near field, will be outside the depth of focus of the camera, and obscuration will be minimized. In this way, the imaging quality of the camera image will be retained with minimal distortion. In the embodiment shown, because the camera 406, lens 408 and waveguide 402 are mounted in alignment, viewing through the honeycomb waveguide cells 403 is nearly unobstructed.
In certain embodiments, an additional optical grade lens or window could optionally be located in “front” of the waveguide beyond cutoff 402 (external to the enclosure 404) to protect the camera and wave guide from exposure to environmental conditions.
In the embodiment shown, the method is initiated at a start operation 602, which corresponds to initial setup of one or more detectors, video cameras, and shielded cabinets at a facility or other location to be monitored, as well as connection of the one or more detectors to other computing devices configured to coordinate detection and analysis of high field and/or low field electromagnetic events, such as those described above.
A field monitoring operation 604 corresponds to scanning of the facility with the use of the cameras and detecting a field at an antenna of the electromagnetic (EM) detectors. The monitoring operation 604 can correspond to detection of one or more directional components of a magnetic field using one or more oriented shielded loop electromagnetic antennas, as described above in
An electromagnetic event determination operation 606 determines whether an electromagnetic event has occurred. Typically the electromagnetic event determination operation 606 includes sampling a peak value detected using a standard circuit module and associated microprocessor, and performing one or more additional operations on that sample to determine whether a high or low field event occurs. For example, in the case of a high field event, the peak value may be summed or otherwise combined with other inferred electrical field values (e.g., by using the square root of a sum of squares) to arrive at an overall electromagnetic field value, and comparing that value to a preset known threshold, over which it is assumed that a high field event has occurred. In a further example, for low field events, the detected peak value can be directly compared to a known threshold value, and based on that comparison the existence of a low field event can be determined.
If no high or low field event is detected, operational flow can return to the field monitoring operation 604 to continue monitoring the electromagnetic fields present at the detector and scanning the facility with the cameras. However, if a high or low field event is detected, operational flow proceeds to a data storing operation 608, which stores any data (including field values and times at which the filed values were captured) obtained during the field monitoring operation 604. In some embodiments, the existing data will be transmitted to a shielded storage cabinet having a storage media in which the data can be stored and secured for later viewing. In some embodiments, the data storing operation 608 will also simultaneously include communicating the event to a remote location to report the incident. In other embodiments, communication of the event may occur at a later time.
A shielded-camera determination operation 610 determines whether the cameras used in the security system include an electromagnetic shielding. If it is determined that they do, a scanning operation 612 begins. Typically, the scanning operation 612 includes scanning the facility through the use of the cameras for unusual activity on or around the facility. A capture image operation 614 collects image data of the facility. The type of image captured can vary based on the type of cameras used. For example, in some embodiments, the images may be still, video, or infrared images. After the images are captured, a tagging image operation 616 tags the data with relevant information, such as, for example, field values and times at which the filed values were captured. In other embodiments, various other tags may exist. A storing image operation 618 stores the newly captured images for later review. In some embodiments, the images will be stored in a storage media located within the shielded cabinet so that the images will be protected from destruction by the electromagnetic event.
Whether the shielded camera determination operation 610 determines that the cameras are shielded or not, the operational flow eventually can continue to a reviewing data operation 620. The reviewing data operation 620 includes reviewing the stored data after the electromagnetic event. Specifically, the data can be reviewed to identify the source of the electromagnetic event, including suspect vehicles, persons, packages, or other items that might be related to the cause of the incident. In some embodiments, this step is implemented by security personnel. An end operation 622 corresponds to completed detection after a desired (e.g. preset or undetermined) amount of time after the electromagnetic event.
The above specification, examples and data provide a complete description of the manufacture and use of the composition of the invention. Since many embodiments of the invention can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, the invention resides in the claims hereinafter appended.
The present application claims priority from U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/425,152, filed Dec. 20, 2010, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
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NSA-94-106, National Security Agency Specification for Shielded Enclosures, 9 Pages, 1994. |
Holland Shielding Systems BV, Shielding Gaskets With or Without Water Seal (EMI-RFI-IP Gaskets), 2 Pages, (undated). |
Holland Shielding Systems BV, EMI-RFI-EMP—Shielded Doors for Faraday Cages and EMI-RFI Shielded Room, 5 Pages, (undated). |
Holland Shielding Systems BV, Innovative EMI Shielding Solutions—Gasket Selection, 36 Pages, (undated). |
Equipto Electronic Corporation—Technical Guide to EMI/RFI Suppression in Electronic Cabinets, 16 Pages, Apr. 2005. |
Crenlo-Emcor-Product-Options-Doors, 12 Pages, (undated). |
RFI/EMI Shielded Cabinets and Features Available, 4 Pages, (undated). |
Special Door Company, Radiation Shielding Doors: SH Door Tech, 2 Pages, (undated). |
Special Door Company, EMP Doors: Electro Magnetic Pulse Doors, 3 Pages, (undated). |
Braden Shielding Systems, Anechoic Chambers, EMC Chambers, MRI Enclosures, 1 Page, (undated). |
Magnetic Shield Corp.—Bensenville, Illinois, Magnetic Shielding, 2 Pages, (undated). |
EEP—Electromagnetic Radiation Shielding & Magnetic Field Shielding Technology—Products and Services, 3 Pages, (undated). |
Fleming—RF & EMI Shielded Doors, Radiation Shielded Doors, 3 Pages, (undated). |
H. Bloks, “NEMP/EMI Shielding,” EMC Technology, vol. 5, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1986, 5 Pages. |
W.E. Curran, “New Techniques in Shielding,” Item, 1984, 9 Pages. |
W. E. Curran, “Shielding for HEMP/TEMPEST Requirements,” Item, 1988, 10 Pages. |
Number | Date | Country | |
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20120243846 A1 | Sep 2012 | US |
Number | Date | Country | |
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61425152 | Dec 2010 | US |