The present invention is directed to the field of establishing an underground or above ground intrusion detection system utilizing radio frequency identification (RFID) transponders.
Over the last several years and particularly since September 11, there has been a significant increase in the number of intrusions into various security zones as well as acts of international terrorism. Although a large amount of time, effort and money has been budgeted to agencies like the Department of Homeland Security, these intrusions and attempts to protect individuals as well as property have not lessened the threat.
Access control devices supervise access at perimeter doors of a facility, but fail to detect vandalism or terrorist threats to the exterior of the facility and the immediate vicinity of a structure or area to be protected.
Existing perimeter security systems and the prior art consist of CCTV cameras, sense cables either buried or attached to metal fences, infrared (IR) and microwave sensors. Limitations are the rule since CCTV cameras are less effective at night and both IR sensors and CCTV cameras are compromised by fog and rain. Furthermore, IR and microwave sensors do not locate the point of the attempted intrusion and fence cables are limited to the use with metal fences. Buried cable sensors require significant site engineering. None of the present solutions can locate intrusions accurately on hard surfaces such as brick walls or buildings.
Vibration based systems often result in false-positive alarms due to trucks traveling on nearby roads, weather, lightening, sonic booms from military aircraft, vibrations from trees/shrubs and animals as well as earthquakes, tremors, seismic rumblings and explosions. Repair and maintenance are frequent and costly. Sophisticated software requiring complicated algorithms must also be developed to determine the approximate location of an alarm.
U.S. Pat. No. 7,069,160 overcomes the shortcomings of the older technologies by utilizing radio frequency identification (RFID) passive proximity microchips to precisely locate intrusions regardless of weather or of the structural material it is attached to or imbedded in. However, this patent includes a power transmission cable that broadcasts an RF UHF signal and a data transmission cable with transponder microchips connected by a data bus that are powered by the transmission cable via electromagnetic coupling. Therefore, an intrusion is sensed by interference in the ability of the transponders to receive the EM field by an individual entering the field. Hydrogen absorption inhibits the EM field by an individual entering the field, and the transponder(s) fail to communicate their encrypted code down the data bus.
The teachings of the present invention results in many benefits. For example, the manner in which the intrusion detection system of the present invention is constructed around or under a security zone would greatly reduce the site work in engineering that was formerly required in the prior art devices. Since off-the-shelf RFID transponders are utilized, the cost of establishing the intrusion detection system with respect to the security zone is greatly reduced. Furthermore, because the RFID transponders are passive, maintenance and repair work are simplified or significantly eliminated. This is particularly true since the RFID transponders operate on energy received from the electromagnetic field radiated from operating transceivers. Each of the transponders has a unique encrypted identification code further adding to the security of the system by eliminating non-encrypted transponders from being powered by the EM field.
Because the present invention does not require that the transponders or transceivers are affixed to metal fences, the system can be easily installed on hard surfaces, such as brick or concrete walls as well as the side of buildings and metal structures.
The present invention is also designed to identify the exact longitudinal locations of an intrusion in real time within 18 inches (46 cm). It would also result in a very low false alarm rate since blowing debris and small animals will not cause an intrusion alarm.
The present invention is directed to a method and system for producing an above ground or below ground security zone. A transceiver module (TM) would be provided with one or more radio frequency (RF) transceivers. The plurality of radio frequency identification (RFID) transponders would be associated with the TM. The TM would be positioned to broadcast an electromagnetic (EM) field to excite the RFID transponders. The TM would be in communication with a system controller (SC), a CPU as well as a display. The CPU and display would generally be located at a central location, such as a guard station or a central monitoring command center. If one or more of the RFID transponders would not respond to the EM signals transmitted from the TM, an intrusion would be sensed and an appropriate alarm would be sounded and/or transmitted to the display. The RFID transponders would either transmit a unique code directly to a transceiver after being powered from the EM field, or will directly transmit the unique code to the SC via a data bus.
As illustrated in
The RF transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20 would broadcast an RF frequency such as shown by 34, 35 or 38 allowed by the FCC and/or other governmental agencies, such as a UHF radio signal. An electromagnetic (EM) inductive coupling would be established between the transceivers in the TM 12 and the passive RFID transponders 26 in DM 22, 23. The RF signal produced by the transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20 would power the RFID transponders 26. Each of the RF transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20 would broadcast its unique signal to the RFID transponders 26 which would then transmit its own unique code back to its respective RF transceiver 14, 16, 18 and 20.
For example, each of the transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20 would produce a unique coded signal directed to only a portion of the total number of RFID transponders. Although the exact number is not important, it has been found that each of the transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20 could supervise up to 20 RFID transponders. Therefore, signal 34 generated by transceiver 20 is directed to the RFID transponders 26 provided on the top right portion of detection module 22. Each individual transponder 26 in that section of the detection module 22 would produce its own unique signal which is then directed back to the transceiver 20. For example, one of the transponders 26 would produce a signal 36a and a second transponder would produce a signal 36b.
Although not depicted in
Responsive to the signal from transceiver 18, each of the RFID transponders 26 would produce a signal having its own unique code such as signal 40 which is received by the transceiver 18. It is noted that based upon the configuration of the security zone 10, not all of the transceivers would be transmitting information, such as transceiver 16 in TM 12. This is due to the fact that the detection module 23 does not have any RFID transponders located therein. If the configuration of the area to be projected changes, detection module 23 could be removed from the DM PVC pipe and additional RFID transponders would be inserted therein and then the detection module 23 would be redeployed into the DM PVC pipe.
Each of the RF transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20 would have a unique RF code that would allow electromagnetic inductive coupling with the RFID transponders within its field, thereby enabling each of the RFID transponders only when they sense the proper code transmitted by the RF transceivers, thereby protecting the integrity of the security zone by not allowing any stray RF signals or intentional spoofing from RF emitting devices to reduce the integrity of the security zone.
Each of the transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20 included in the TM 12 would be powered by a continuous cable 42 and would be equipped with a buffered memory, allowing for storage of the transmissions from its associated RFID transponders. It would also include anti-collision firmware, allowing for each RFID transponder to be read independently of other RFID transponders reporting at the same time. The length of the PVC pipes 12, 22 and 23 can vary based upon the requirements of the detection field. Multiple TMs 12 and DMs 22 are placed at defined distances, such as between 6 and 12 feet apart to cover an extended area.
As shown in
Each of the TMs 12 would be connected to a watertight fitting at the top of the pipe which is also equipped with a tamper switch connected to a system controller 28 via the conductor cable 42. The system controller communicates with a CPU 30 containing firmware and software therein that can adjust the sensitivity of each of the transceivers 14, 16, 18 and 20, as well as correlate the transponder's code to distances in feet or meters and perform diagnostic operations.
The array of RFID transponders in each DM 22 would identify its location to the firmware in the security controller 28 through use of its unique code, and the fact that the exact location of each RFID transponder within its respective module 22, 23 is known and included in the memory of the SC 28 and/or CPU 30. The security controller 28 is polled by the CPU 30, which in turn polls the transceiver 14, 16, 18 and 20 and displays the location of an intrusion on a screen or on an enunciated panel of the display 30. An audio alarm 33 could produce a signal based on the sensing of an intrusion. A line drawing diagram locating each DM 22, 23 or a more sophisticated dimensional drawing or map overlay can be used to display each alarm location within the security zone. Thus, any digging, tunneling or trenching would cause one or more of the RFID transponders 26 to fail to produce a signal transmitted to its respective transponder, thereby resulting in an alarm intrusion. The alarm detection and its location would be reported to the security controller 28. Cutting a network line or cutting as well as tampering with a TM 12 or a DM 22, 23 would also create an alarm and establish the specific location of the intrusion.
Each transponder 26 would send a signal with its own unique code based upon the receipt of the proper signal from its assigned transceiver, either directly to the security controller 28 as will be explained with respect to
In normal operation, the security controller 28 would periodically or continually poll the buffered memory in each of the transponders of the TM 12 and thereby review the RFID transponder identification codes stored therein. Any intrusion within the supervised security zone would be detected by the security controller 28 in conjunction with the CPU 30, since the appropriate transceiver would not receive transmission from one or more of the RFID transponders, due to the blocking of the transmission signal or signals by the intrusion, or by blocking the transceiver signals broadcast to the RFID transponders. The failure to receive the signal or signals would create an alarm condition and the location of the alarm is determined by the security controller 28 and identified by the CPU 30 and displayed on the display 32 as well as producing an audio signal by alarm 33.
The present invention through the use of the security controller 28 and the CPU 30 would be able to disarm one or more of the transceivers and RFID transponders for maintenance purposes. Once the maintenance is complete, those transceivers and RFID transponders which were disarmed would then be armed.
The present invention could interface with existing systems such as motion, fire, CCTV and access control systems as well as to transmit the occurrence of a breach as well as its location to pagers, PDAs, SMART phones and other devices.
It is to be understood that the above-described embodiments of the invention are illustrative only, and that modifications thereof may occur to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, this invention is not to be regarded as limited to the embodiments disclosed herein.
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Number | Date | Country | |
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20090309724 A1 | Dec 2009 | US |