The present application relates in general to virtual machines and more specifically to methods and apparatus of locating an unauthorized use of a virtual machine.
Virtual machines are becoming increasingly prevalent, and virtual machines and virtual machine environments frequently change. It is preferable for virtual machines to be compatible with various environments, and as a result, there are utilities to convert virtual machines from one environment to another. A challenge for virtual machine developers and virtual machine owners is that the virtual machines are easily copied and transferred to an unauthorized environment, and the developer or owner may never know the unauthorized copy was made. Because a virtual machine is not a physical item, theft detection and locating an unauthorized copy of a virtual machine is often difficult.
Current measures taken to stop unauthorized copies of virtual machines include many conventional methods to stop unauthorized copying of software. For example, virtual machines may be protected by copyright laws and license agreements. These laws and agreements may impose requirements on a virtual machine user such as restricting access authorized personnel. In addition, license agreements may impose procedures for keeping copies of virtual machines secured. However, these measures are inefficient and often ineffective in light of the intangible properties of a virtual machine, and the considerable difficulty in detecting whether an unauthorized copy of a virtual machine has been made.
The present system is most readily realized in a network communications system. A high level block diagram of an example network communications system 100 is illustrated in
One host physical machine 104 may interact with a large number of users 114 at a plurality of different client devices 102. Accordingly, each host physical machine 104 is typically a high end computer with a large storage capacity, one or more fast microprocessors, and one or more high speed network connections. Conversely, relative to a typical host physical machine 104, each client device 102 typically includes less storage capacity, a single microprocessor, and a single network connection.
Each host physical machine 104 stores a plurality of files, programs, and/or web pages in one or more memories for use by the client devices 102. A single host physical machine 104 typically hosts a plurality of virtual machines 108. A virtual machine 108 appears to be a complete physical machine to end users. Each virtual machine 108 may be configured differently with its own operating system, applications, memory, virtual hardware, etc. A host physical machine 104 can have various container types for hosting the virtual machines 108 (e.g., VMware, Xen, Microsoft, etc.). The host physical machine 104 may have various options for managing the execution of the plurality of virtual machines 108.
A detailed block diagram of the electrical systems of an example computing device (e.g., a client device 102, and physical machine 104 hosting a virtual machine 108) is illustrated in
The interface circuit 212 may be implemented using any suitable interface standard, such as an Ethernet interface and/or a Universal Serial Bus (USB) interface. One or more input devices 214 may be connected to the interface circuit 212 for entering data and commands into the main unit 202. For example, the input device 214 may be a keyboard, mouse, touch screen, track pad, track ball, isopoint, and/or a voice recognition system.
One or more displays 112, printers, speakers, and/or other output devices 216 may also be connected to the main unit 202 via the interface circuit 212. The display 112 may be a cathode ray tube (CRTs), liquid crystal displays (LCDs), or any other type of display. The display 112 generates visual displays of data generated during operation of the computing device 102, 104. For example, the display 112 may be used to display web pages received from a computing device 102, 104. The visual displays may include prompts for human input, run time statistics, calculated values, data, etc.
One or more storage devices 218 may also be connected to the main unit 202 via the interface circuit 212. For example, a hard drive, CD drive, DVD drive, and/or other storage devices may be connected to the main unit 202. The storage devices 218 may store any type of data, such as a plurality of virtual machines 108, which may be used by the computing device 102, 104. As described in more detail below, a virtual machine 108 preferably includes one or more virtual disks 222 and a virtual machine description file 224.
The computing device 102, 104 may also exchange data with other network devices 220 via a connection to the network 106. The network connection may be any type of network connection, such as an Ethernet connection, digital subscriber line (DSL), telephone line, coaxial cable, etc. Access to a computing device 102, 104 can be controlled by appropriate security software or security measures. An individual users' access can be defined by the computing device 102, 104 and limited to certain data and/or actions. Accordingly, users of the system 100 may be required to register with one or more computing devices 102, 104.
As noted previously, a host physical machine 104 may have various options for managing the execution of the plurality of virtual machines 108. A management system is a system of managing one or more host physical machines 104 and/or virtual machines 108 which may accomplish various tasks, such as facilitating the prevention of the virtual machines 108 being copied and used in an unauthorized manner. A management system may be implemented in both a host physical machine 104 and associated virtual machines 108.
The management system facilitates many features including the prevention of unauthorized virtual machine use. A managed virtual machine 108a is a virtual machine 108 managed by such a management system. Installing the management system converts an ordinary unmanaged host environment 300 into a managed host environment 500 and the associated unmanaged virtual machines 108 into managed virtual machines 108a. Preferably, the host physical machine 104 and each virtual machine 108 are registered with the management system, to be associated with each other as managed host environment 500 and an associated managed virtual machine 108a. An authorized environment exists if both the host physical machine 104 and the virtual machine 108 are registered with the management system to be associated with each other. Put another way, an authorized environment is an environment where a managed virtual machine 108a and a managed host physical machine 104 are associated with each other and the managed virtual machine 108a is hosted by a managed host physical machine 104. An unauthorized environment exists when either the host physical machine 104 or the virtual machine 108 is not registered with the management system. Put another way, an unauthorized environment exists when a managed host physical machine 104 is attempting to host an unmanaged virtual machine 108 or when a managed virtual machine 108a is attempting to be hosted by an unmanaged host physical machine 104. An unauthorized environment also exists when a managed virtual machine 108a is attempting to be hosted by a managed host physical machine 104, but the managed virtual machine 108a and the managed host physical machine 104 are not associated with each other (e.g., Customer A's virtual machine 108 is registered to be associated with Customer A's host physical machine 104, so Customer A's virtual machine 108 is in an unauthorized environment if used with Customer B's host physical machine 104 registered to be associated with Customer B's virtual machines). A managed virtual machine 108a may operate normally in an authorized environment, but will operate differently in an unauthorized environment.
The addition of the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 and Management Agent 504 changes the unmanaged host environment 300 into a managed host environment 500. A Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 and Management Agent 504 typically only exist in a managed host environment 500. The Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 determines whether a virtual machine 108 is registered for use with the host physical machine 104. Preferably, the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 is operatively associated with one or more particular virtual machines 108 on one or more host physical machines 104, and can detect whether a virtual machine 108 attempting to run is operatively associated with the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502. If the managed virtual machine 108a is operatively associated with the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502, the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 and the Management Agent 504 enable the managed virtual machine 108a to operate normally. If a managed virtual machine 108a attempts to run in an unmanaged host environment 300, there will be no Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 and/or Management Agent 504. The host physical machine will still submit a start request to the managed virtual machine 108a, but the managed virtual machine 108a will not boot properly because the boot pointer has never been set to point to the virtual machine's boot code.
Even if a Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 is present, the management system determines whether the managed virtual machine 108a is attempting to run in an authorized environment. The Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 may intercept a start request and complete a policy check to determine if the virtual machine 108 is in an authorized environment. If the environment is not authorized, the Management Agent 504 does not enable the virtual machine 108 boot code 406 to run, so in an unauthorized environment the managed virtual machine 108a will not operate normally.
The example virtual machine 108 illustrated in
In an authorized environment, the Management Agent 504 will reset the boot pointer 404 to point back to the Locator Code 508 once the boot pointer 404 has pointed to the boot code 406, which is running normally (e.g., guest operating system code is running normally). Therefore, on the next startup, the boot pointer 404 will point to the Locator Code 508 unless the virtual machine 108 is running in an authorized environment.
The boot process 900 begins when the host physical machine 104 receives a request to start a virtual machine 108 (block 902). For example, a user 114 clicks a virtual machine 108 thumbnail to start a virtual machine 108. Next, the host physical machine 104 submits a start request to the virtual machine 108 (block 904). For example, the host physical machine 104 requests the virtual machine 108 to start by loading the standard boot sector 402 address.
Once the virtual machine 108 in this example is started, the virtual machine 108 operates normally (block 908). For example, once the boot code 406 loads, and the guest operating system is running, the virtual machine 108 may execute one or more applications. At some point, the virtual machine 108 may shut down (block 910). For example, the user 114 may end the virtual machine 108 session by closing down the virtual machine 108. The boot process 900 may be restarted after the virtual machine 108 shuts down. The boot process 900 is not affected by whether the virtual machine 108 is an original version of the virtual machine 108 or an unauthorized copy of the virtual machine 108.
The registration process 1000 occurs when the virtual machine 108 is registered with a management system (block 1004). For example, the virtual machine 108 boot pointer 404 is set to point to the Locator Code 508 in the Systems Management Partition 506, thereby disabling the virtual machine 108. It should be understood that the management system may implement different and/or supplemental methods of management via the registration process 1000. The various methods comprising the registration process 1000 may increase the difficulty of enabling a managed virtual machine 108a through unauthorized means. In one example, rather than setting the virtual machine 108 boot pointer 404 to point to the Locator Code 508, the management system removes and/or encrypts portions of the virtual machine's 108 data such that said virtual machine's 108 data may only be restored by the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502. The Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 may maintain the removed data and/or an encryption key, so only the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 may restore and/or decrypt the managed virtual machine's 108a data. Typically, when a multiplicity of methods are employed to disable a virtual machine 108, the multiplicity of methods are addressed in order to enable the virtual machine 108.
Once the virtual machine 108 has been registered with a management system, the host physical machine 104 may begin the boot process 1002 at the request of a user. The host physical machine 104 may receive requests to start a virtual machine 108 (block 1006). For example, a user 114 clicks a virtual machine 108 thumbnail to start a virtual machine 108. Next, the management system determines whether a management layer is present on the host physical machine 104 (block 1008). It should be appreciated that the management system may not affirmatively determine that no management layer is present following a start request, rather, this determination may be implicitly made by what the management system and/or management layer do not determine. For example, if there is no Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 present, the boot pointer which is previously set to point to the Locator Code 508, may load and execute upon a start request. Put another way, the management system may be set up to determine that the management layer is not present by the absence of the happening of an event, for example, an event the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 would perform if the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 was present.
If a management layer is present, the management system then determines if the managed virtual machine 108a is in an authorized environment (block 1010). If the managed virtual machine 108a is in an authorized environment, the management system determines that the managed virtual machine 108a should run. For example, the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 may determine that the managed virtual machine 108a is associated with the host physical machine 104 the managed virtual machine 108a is being requested to run on.
If the management layer determines that the managed virtual machine 108a is attempting to operate in an authorized environment, (block 1010) and that it therefore should run, the managed virtual machine 108a is enabled (block 1012). For example, the Management Agent 504 sets the boot pointer 404 to the virtual machine's 108 boot code 406.
Once the managed virtual machine 108a is enabled, the host physical machine 104 submits a start request to the managed virtual machine 108a (block 1014). For example, the host physical machine 104 requests the managed virtual machine 108a to start by loading the Standard boot sector 402 address. The managed virtual machine 108a then starts operating and continues to operate normally (block 1016). For example, the managed virtual machine 108a boot sector 402, which has been modified by the Management Agent 504, is set to point the boot pointer 404 to the boot code 406, which preferably contains the managed virtual machine 108a guest operating system. Once the boot code 406 loads, the guest operating system starts running and the virtual machine 108 may execute one or more applications.
Once the managed virtual machine 108a is operating normally, reset the managed virtual machine 108a management system settings (block 1018), thereby disabling the virtual machine 108. For example, the Management Agent 504 resets the boot sector 402 so that the boot pointer 404 points to the Locator Code 508 upon the restarting of the managed virtual machine 108a. The method of closing down the managed virtual machine 108a does not affect whether the boot sector 402 is reset because the Management Agent 504 preferably resets the boot sector 402 shortly after the managed virtual machine 108a is running normally.
At some point, the virtual machine 108 may shut down (block 1020). For example, the user 114 may end the managed virtual machine 108a session by closing down the managed virtual machine 108a. The boot process 1002 may be restarted at block 1004 after the managed virtual machine 108a shuts down. The boot process 1002 is not affected by whether the managed virtual machine 108a is an original version of the managed virtual machine 108a or an unauthorized copy of the managed virtual machine 108a. The registration process 1000 need not be repeated for each individual virtual machine.
If the management system determines that no management layer is present (block 1008) or that the managed virtual machine 108a is attempting to operate in an unauthorized environment (block 1010), the managed virtual machine 108a remains in the disabled state resulting from registration with the management system (block 1004) or resetting the virtual machine at the end of a boot sequence (block 1020). In one example, there is no Management Agent 504 to set the boot pointer 404 to the virtual machine's 108 boot code 406. In an unmanaged host environment, there is no Management Agent 504. The missing Management Agent 504, and resulting failure to set the boot pointer 404 to the virtual machine's 108 boot code 406 implicitly determines that the environment is unauthorized. In another example, in a managed host environment that is an unauthorized environment, the Virtual Machine Management Layer 502 preferably causes the Management Agent 504 to not set the boot pointer 404 to the virtual machine's 108 boot code 406.
If the managed virtual machine 108a receives a boot request and remains disabled because it either lacks a management layer (block 1008) or is operating in an unauthorized environment (1010), the host physical machine 104 submits a start request to the managed virtual machine 108 (block 1022). For example, the host physical machine 104 requests the managed virtual machine 108a to start by loading the standard boot sector 402 address.
Once the host physical machine 104 submits a start request to the managed virtual machine 108a, initiate the location information gathering function (block 1024). For example, the Management Agent 504 has not set the boot pointer 404 to the virtual machine's 108 boot code 406, so the boot pointer 404 points to the Locator Code 508 in the SMP 506, and the Locator Code 508 loads and executes.
Then, gather information indicative of location of unauthorized use (block 1026). For example, the Locator Code 508 gathers information about the unauthorized environment such as IP address and other host information.
Then, transmit information associated with unauthorized environment (block 1028). For example, the Locator Code 508 transmits a message to the managed virtual machine 108a owner notifying the owner of the unauthorized use with the associated location information about the unauthorized environment to the owner.
Once the information associated with the unauthorized environment is gathered and transmitted, shut down the managed virtual machine 108a (block 1030). For example, the Locator Code 508 shuts down the managed virtual machine 108a after the owner has been notified of the unauthorized use.
In summary, persons of ordinary skill in the art will readily appreciate that methods and apparatus of locating an unauthorized use of a virtual machine have been described. The foregoing description has been presented for the purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the exemplary embodiments disclosed. Many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teachings. It is intended that the scope of the invention be limited not by this detailed description of examples, but rather by the claims appended hereto.
It should be understood that various changes and modifications to the presently preferred embodiments described herein will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Such changes and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present subject matter and without diminishing its intended advantages. It is therefore intended that such changes and modifications be covered by the appended claims.
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