Method and apparatus for providing authenticated challenges for broadcast-multicast communications in a communication system

Abstract

A method and apparatus for secure generation of a short-term key SK for viewing information content in a Multicast-broadcast-multimedia system are described. A short-term key is generated by a memory module residing in user equipment (UE) only when the source of the information used to generate the short-term key can be validated. A short-term key can be generated by a Broadcast Access Key (BAK) or a derivative of BAK and a changing value with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) appended to the changing value. A short-term key (SK) can also be generated by using a private key and a short-term key (SK) manager with a corresponding public key distributed to the memory module residing in the user equipment (UE), using a digital signature.

Description

BACKGROUND

1. Field

The present invention relates generally to communications, and, more specifically, to a method and apparatus for providing authenticated challenges for broadcast-multicast services (BCMCS) in a wireless communication system.

2. Description

In a wireless communication system that carries non-voice traffic, such as video, data, multimedia, or other types of traffic in addition to voice traffic, a typical cellular base station may broadcast a multimedia traffic service to a plurality of mobile stations within the coverage area of the base station. The multimedia traffic service may include any number of information services similar to a number of channels included in a cable television service plan, for example. These information services typically rely upon security to maintain accountability, fairness, accuracy, confidentiality, and operability. Encryption, or the general field of cryptography, is used in electronic commerce, wireless communications, and broadcasting. In electronic commerce, encryption is used to prevent fraud and verify financial transactions. In data processing systems, encryption is used to verify a participant's identity. In broadcast-multicast service, security is maintained based on the broadcast-multicast service (BCMCS) key hierarchy. Content is encrypted with a short term key (SK) and is sent over the air. A long-term encryption key, often referred to as a broadcast access key (BAK), is provisioned into a memory module referred to as a user identification module (UIM) or universal integrated circuit card (UICC) of the mobile station. The user may be charged for the long-term encryption key BAK. The short-term key SK is derived from the BAK and a random number referred to as SKRAND. The UIM uses the BAK and the SKRAND to compute the short-term key SK. Once the UIM computes the SK, it is sent to the mobile station and the mobile station uses the SK to decrypt and view the information content. Typically, information content charging based on this method charges the user upon receipt of the BAK. Thus, the user is charged whether or not the user actually views the broadcast content. Unlike cable television, in a wireless communication system, it is desired that the actual view time of information services by a user be maintained. This is to ensure accurate billing for the content viewed and to ensure that unauthorized users, such as under-age users, for example, cannot access certain types of content. Methods that require the mobile station to register periodically or on demand have been proposed to maintain a record of actual view time by the user.

The registration message contains a list of channels the user is watching or is capable of watching. The list is used to charge the user for information services.

Typically, the methods requiring the user to register periodically or on demand are prone to theft-of-service because the mobile station may continue to receive the broadcast content without registering again in the system, thus obtaining free access to the content. In addition, an unauthorized user, such as an under-age user, for example, may access content that is prohibited by regulatory statute. Other proposed methods introduce additional encryption keys necessary to view the content of the information services. These methods suffer from a severe decrease in data-carrying capacity of the wireless system caused by the increase in overhead messages required for encryption key management.

The present invention is directed to overcoming, or at least reducing the effects of, one or more problems provided above.

SUMMARY

According to one aspect, in a wireless communication system providing authenticated challenges for broadcast-multicast services, a method for receiving a first value and a first message authentication code, generating a second message authentication code of the first value by running a hashing function on the first value using a second value wherein the second value is stored in a memory module as a second key, comparing the second message authentication code with the first message authentication code, and computing the short-term key using the first value and the second value when the second message authentication code is equal to the first message authentication code.

In another aspect, a method of obtaining an encryption key in a communication system using a first protocol, the method comprising: receiving a packet index value and a first message authentication code, generating a second message authentication code of the packet index value by running a hashing function on the packet index value using a second value wherein the second value is stored in a memory module, comparing the second message authentication code with the first message authentication code, and computing an encryption key using the packet index value and the second value when the second message authentication code is equal to the first message authentication code.

In another aspect, a mobile station apparatus for obtaining a short-term key comprising: a means for receiving a first value and a first message authentication code, a means for generating a second message authentication code of the first value by running a hashing function on the first value using a second value wherein the second value is stored in a memory module, a means for comparing the second message authentication code with the first message authentication code, and a means for computing a short-term key using the first value and the second value when the second message authentication code is equal to the first message authentication code.

In another aspect, A mobile station apparatus for of obtaining an encryption key using a first protocol, comprising: a means for receiving a packet index value and a first message authentication code a means for generating a second message authentication code of the packet index value by running a hashing function on the packet index value using a second value wherein the second value is stored in a memory module as, a means for comparing the second message authentication code with the first message authentication code, and a means for computing an encryption key using the packet index value and the second value when the generated message authentication code is equal to the received message authentication code.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is an exemplary block diagram illustrating a wireless communication system providing a broadcast-multicast communication service (BCMCS) according to one embodiment;

FIG. 2 is an exemplary block diagram for short-term key (SK) generation in a user equipment using a random number according to one embodiment;

FIG. 3 is an exemplary block diagram for short-term key (SK) generation in a user equipment using a seed value (SKSeed) with a message authentication code appended thereto according to one embodiment;

FIG. 4 is an exemplary flow diagram for short-term key (SK) generation using a seed value (SKSeed) with a message authentication code appended thereto according to one embodiment;

FIG. 5 is an exemplary block diagram for short-term key (SK) generation with an SK Manager having a private key for which a corresponding public key is distributed to the user equipment according to one embodiment;

FIG. 6 is an exemplary block diagram for encryption key (EK) generation in a user equipment using a packet index seed value (PISeed) with a message authentication code appended thereto according to one embodiment;

FIG. 7 is an exemplary flow diagram for encryption key (EK) generation using a packet index seed value (PISeed) with a message authentication code appended thereto according to one embodiment; and

FIG. 8 is an exemplary block diagram for encryption key (EK) generation with a PI Manager having a private key for which a corresponding public key is distributed to the user equipment according to one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The word “exemplary” is used herein to mean “serving as an example, instance, or illustration.” Any embodiment described herein as “exemplary” is not necessarily to be construed as preferred or advantageous over other embodiments. All of the embodiments described in this Detailed Description are exemplary embodiments provided to enable persons skilled in the art to make or use the invention and not to limit the scope of the invention which is defined by the claims.

A mobile station, also referred to as a user equipment (UE), may communicate with one or more base stations. A mobile station transmits and receives data packets through one or more base stations to a base station controller or, as described herein, a broadcast-multicast service (BCMCS) controller (also referred to as a multicast-broadcast-multimedia system (MBMS) controller in 3GPP). Base stations and base station controllers are parts of a network called an access network (AN). Base stations and mobile stations are parts of a network called a radio access network (RAN). The radio access network transports data packets between multiple mobile stations. The radio access network may further be connected to additional networks, such as an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server or the Internet, for example, and may transport data packets between each mobile station and such outside networks through the base station controller or a BCMCS controller.

The BCMCS controller transports data through a short-term key manager (SK-manager). The SK-manager determines seed values, which may be a random number, a sequence number, time stamp, or other changing value that is convenient for implementation. Once the SK-manager determines a seed value (SKSeed), it appends a message authentication code (MAC) to the seed value. The message authentication code (MAC) is a digital identifier and works like a digital signature to validate the source of the seed value. The MAC may be created by using a well known hashing function, such as SHA-1 or MD-5, for example, or the MAC may be generated by a variation of well known hashing functions. The hashing function uses the broadcast access key (BAK) (or a derivative of BAK) as the key to compute the MAC from a seed value. Because only the broadcast network and the subscribers to the broadcast network have the broadcast access key (BAK), the BAK (or a derivative of BAK) is used as the shared secret between the network and the user.

The mobile station (user equipment (UE)) may be a mobile telephone that includes a mobile telephone handset (referred to as a mobile equipment (ME)), and a memory module, such as a physically secure integrated circuit card or smart card (referred to as a user identification module (UIM) or universal integrated circuit card (UICC)), which may be removable or permanently attached to the mobile equipment ME. In a broadcast-multicast service (BCMCS), the memory module of the user equipment is provisioned with the broadcast access key (BAK).

FIG. 1 is an exemplary block diagram illustrating a wireless communication system 100 for providing authenticated challenges in a broadcast-multicast communication service (BCMCS) according to one embodiment of the present invention. The wireless communication system 100 comprises a plurality of user equipments (UE) 102 that communicate with at least one base station (BS) 112 over a wireless communication link. Communication from the user equipment 102 to the base station 112 is performed over a reverse link and communication from the base station 112 to the user equipment 102 is performed over a forward link over the wireless communication link. Although only one base station 112 is illustrated in the figure, this is merely for simplicity sake in illustrating the present invention. Accordingly, the wireless communication system 100 may include several base stations 112 that are geographically dispersed to provide continuous communication coverage with the user equipments 102 as they traverse the wireless communication system 100. A radio access network 116, through the base station 112, transmits radio signals to and receives radio signals from the user equipment 102 over the wireless communication link. The radio access network 116 may either be owned by the wireless carrier that provides subscription service to the user equipment 102, or may be a visited network owned by another carrier that provides service to the user equipment 102 while the user equipment 102 is roaming.

The user equipment 102 may take the form of any device that is capable of receiving information from the base station 102, including a personal digital assistant (PDA), wireless telephone, laptop computer with wireless capability, wireless modem, or any other wireless-capable device. The user equipment 102 includes mobile equipment (ME) 110, which provides communication with the base station 112 over the wireless communication link among various other functions. The user equipment 102 further includes a memory module (MM) 108 (referred to as a user identification module (UIM) or Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)). The MM 108 may be either a removable memory module attached to the mobile equipment 110 or a permanent part of the mobile equipment 110. The functionality of the memory module 108 will be further appreciated as the detailed description proceeds.

According to one embodiment, the wireless communication system 100 employs a Broadcast-Multicast Service (BCMCS) for point-to-multipoint transmission of data packets to a predetermined group of user equipment 102 communicating within the wireless communication system 100. In one embodiment, the data packets provide content such as, for example, news, movies, sporting events, and the like that is transmitted from the base station 112 over the wireless communication link to the user equipment 102. It will be appreciated that the specific type of content transmitted to the user equipment 102 may include a wide array of multi-media data (e.g., text, audio, picture, streaming video, etc.), and, thus, need not necessarily be limited by the aforementioned examples.

The wireless communication system 100 further comprises a home service network 114 that is owned by the wireless carrier that provides subscription service to a user of the user equipment 102, and may or may not be owned by the same carrier as that of the radio access network 116 (depending upon whether the user equipment 102 is roaming outside the service area of the carrier). The home service network 114 includes a broadcast-multicast-service (BCMCS) controller 101, a short-term key SK-manager 106, and a home subscriber server (HSS) 104. Communication link 118 provides a data path on which information-bearing signals are carried from the BCMCS controller 101 to the SK-manager 106. Communication link 120 provides a data path from the SK-manager 106 to the base station 112, which is then broadcast/multicast to the plurality of user equipments 102.

Content provider 122 provides the content that is broadcast/multicast to the user equipment 102. The content provider 122 may be a third-party content source that is owned by neither the home network carrier nor the serving network carrier. The home subscriber server 104 in the home service network 114 may include a database for holding mobile telephone subscription and collecting billing data for broadcast-multicast services. In the illustrated embodiment, the home service network 114 also includes the broadcast-multicast service (BCMCS) controller 101, which schedules broadcasting/multicasting of content from content provider 122 and performs at least some security functions for the broadcast-multicast service. The radio access network 116 transmits the content to a single user through a dedicated channel, multicasts the content to a plurality of users through dedicated channels if the number of users demanding the service does not justify broadcasting the service to all users in the coverage area, or broadcasts the content to all users in the coverage area if the number of users demanding the service exceeds a predetermined threshold.

Broadcast-multicast service (BCMCS) (or multicast-broadcast-multimedia system (MBMS)) content viewing is based on a key hierarchy. The BCMCS or MBMS may use the same key hierarchy, and the terms are used depending on the context in which they are used (e.g., MBMS is often used when referring to broadcast services in a 3GPP network). Content viewing may require monitoring for billing or for regulatory issues, such as “adult” services, for example, that require a content provider to ensure the viewer is allowed to view “adult” services. For example, a content viewer of “adult” services may be required to verify that they are of a minimum age, determined by a regulator, to view such content. A key is a value that works with a cryptographic algorithm to produce specific ciphertext. Keys are usually very large numbers and are measured in bits. To decrypt the broadcast content at a particular time, the ME 110 of the user equipment should know the current decryption key. To avoid unauthorized access or theft-of-service, the decryption key should be changed frequently, for example, once every minute. These decryption keys are referred to as short-term keys (SK), and are used to decrypt the broadcast content for a relatively short-amount of time so the SK may be assumed to have some amount of intrinsic monetary value for a user.

In one embodiment, the content of the multimedia event is encrypted and decrypted in the broadcast-multicast system through several levels of encryption and decryption to provide at least some level of assurance that unauthorized users will not be able to decrypt the data and watch the multimedia event. Communication link 118 is used by the BCMCS controller 101 to transport the broadcast access key BAK to the SK-manager 106. The SK-manager 106 determines a value, SKSeed, and appends a message authentication code (MAC), formed from SKSeed and the shared secret, BAK. SKSeed can be a random number, a sequence number, time stamp or other changing value. The challenge SKSeed∥MAC is then transmitted to the user equipment 102 via the radio access network 116. The user equipment 102, upon receiving this challenge in the memory module 108, first computes XMAC from SKSeed and BAK. XMAC is the message authentication code of the seed value derived by running a hashing function, using BAK or a derivative of BAK as the key. The memory module 108 then compares XMAC with the received MAC. If the computed value of XMAC is the same value as the received MAC, then the memory module generates SK and transmits SK to the ME. Thus, if these functions are implemented in sufficiently secure hardware (such as a smart card, for example) protecting the BAK (or keys derived from the BAK) substantially prevent an unauthorized user to pre-compute the short-term SK even with the full knowledge of the stream of SKSeed.

FIG. 2 is an exemplary block diagram for short-term key SK generation at the user equipment 102 using a random number. A function, such as a hashing function, in the memory module 108 computes the short-term key SK with any random number input 201 from the ME 110. All broadcast subscribers have the broadcast access key BAK provisioned in the memory module 108. Since the short-term key SK 202 is a function of the random number 201 and the BAK, any random number input will generate the short-term key (SK) 202. Thus, in this scenario, a subscriber with the BAK provisioned in the memory module 108 may input any range of random numbers 201 to the memory module 108 and generate values of the short-term key SK 202. The subscriber may then publish or distribute these values of the short-term key SK 202, for example on the internet, and unauthorized users can use these SK values to view content.

FIG. 3 is an exemplary block diagram for short-term key SK generation at the user equipment 102 using a seed value (SKSeed) with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) 304 appended thereto. The user equipment 102 of a BCMCS subscriber has a memory module 108 provisioned with the broadcast access key BAK. In this embodiment, memory module 108 also contains a hashing function. The hashing function can be a well know hashing function such as SHA-1 or MD-5 or a variation of a well known hashing function. The memory module 108 computes XMAC, the generated message authentication code, of the seed value SKSeed by running a hashing function using the BAK (or a derivative of BAK) as the key. The memory module 108 then compares the computed XMAC with the appended MAC. If XMAC and MAC are the same value, the memory module 108 generates a short-term (SK) 202 key, and transmits SK 202 to the mobile equipment (ME) 110. The ME 110 can now view content. In this scenario SK cannot be generated without validating the source of SK. Thus, this scenario prevents unauthorized users from viewing information content. Thus, unlike the method in FIG. 2, an unauthorized user cannot retrieve the value of SK because, SK can only be generated by validating the source of SK. A method for generating the short-term key SK in accordance with one embodiment for decrypting received content at a user equipment 102 is illustrated in FIG. 4. The short-term key SK generation process 400 commences at block 402 where the memory module 108 of the user equipment 102 receives a seed value SKSeed appended with a Message Authentication Code. At block 404 the memory module 108 computes a message authentication code (XMAC) of the seed value (SKSeed) by running a hashing function using the BAK (or a derivative of BAK) as the key. Keeping in mind that BAK is provisioned in the memory module (108), and the Seed value can be generated by the SK manager or the BCMCS controller. The hashing function resides in the memory module. At block 406, the memory module 108 compares the computed XMAC with the received MAC. The memory module 108 then determines if the values of XMAC and MAC are equal at block 408. If the values are equal, the memory module 108 knows the source of the seed value, SKSeed, is trusted because it has the shared secret BAK. Once the memory module 108 determines the source of SKSeed is trusted, it generates the short-term key SK and transmits the SK to the ME 110 at block 412. The ME 108 can now use the short-term key SK to decrypt the received content to allow successful viewing of the content by the user of the user equipment 102. If, however, the computed value of XMAC and the received value of MAC are not equal at block 408, the SKSeed is discarded and the process starts again at block 402.

In another embodiment, shown in FIG. 5, The SK manager 106 determines a seed value (SKSeed) and appends a digital signature that is verified by the memory module 108. In this particular embodiment, the SK manager 106 has a private key 504 and the memory module 108 has the corresponding public key 506. This public approach could make use of well known digital signatures such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), The Digital Signature Algorithm, DSA, Elliptic Curve DSA, or other well known signatures. The SK manager 106 determines a seed value (SKSeed) and appends a digital signature formed from the private key 504 in the SK manager 106. The challenge SKSeed∥Digital signature is then transmitted to the memory module 108. The ME 110 receives this challenge through the base station 112 and passes the SKSeed and Digital signature 508 to the memory module 108 of the user equipment 102. The memory module 108 uses the public key, by using RSA, the Digital Signature Algorithm DSA, Elliptic Curve DSA or other well known or not known signature schemes to verify the signature transmitted from the SK manager through base station 112, through the ME 110 to the memory module 108. In the memory module 108, the public key 506 is used to verify the digital signature by using the public key 506 and the appended private key 504. If the memory module 108 determines the digital signature was created by the SK manager 106, the memory module 108 generates the short-term key SK 202 and transmits the SK 202 to the ME 110. Upon successfully generating the short-term key SK 202, the ME 110 permits the user to view the received information content. If the memory module 108 determines the digital signature may not have been created by the SK manager 106, the memory module 108 discards the signature and waits for the next digital signature, and the ME 110 cannot determine or publish the SK value corresponding to this SKSeed. This prevents pre-computation of SK and helps to protect information content from unauthorized access.

In another embodiment, the same method and apparatus is used as an enhancement in the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP). Reference SRTP draft 09, which expires December 2003 describes this protocol. A Master Key (MK) is treated like the shared secret BAK. Each MK has an index similar to the index in the BAK. The index identifies a specific content. The MK resides in the memory module 108, and when used with the packet index generates a short-term key (SK). The packet index in the SRTP is typically a sequence number, and in this context may be considered like SKSeed, which is taken to be a random number, a sequence number, time stamp or other changing value. The MK and the packet index are used to generate a SRTP encryption key (EK). This encryption key, like SK, is used to view or access content. Thus, the packet index must be secure to prevent unauthorized access or theft of content. The packet index can be protected in the same manner as the seed value (SKSeed) with an appended Message Authentication Code (MAC) as is used to protect SK. By appending a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to the packet index, the memory module 108 will know whether or not the packet index came from the intended, trusted, source. The memory module 108 handles this process in the same manner used to generate SK. As well as generating encryption keys, SRTP specifies further keys may be generated from the master key MK in an analogous manner to perform other functions including message authentication, and the security enhancements to the encryption key, detailed above, apply equally to other keys so generated.

FIG. 6 is an exemplary block diagram of Encryption Key (EK) generation using a packet index value (PI) with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) appended thereto 602. The User Equipment (UE) 102 of any broadcast subscriber has a memory module 108 provisioned with the MK. In this embodiment, memory module 108 also contains a hashing function. The hashing function can be a well know hashing function such as SHA-1 or MD-5 or a variation of a well known hashing function. The memory module 108 computes XMAC of the packet index value PI by running a hashing function using MK or a derivative of MK as the key. The memory module 108 then compares the computed XMAC with the appended MAC. If XMAC and MAC are the same value, the memory module 108 generates an encryption key (EK) 604 key and transmits EK 604 to the mobile equipment (ME) 110. The ME 110, upon successful generation of the EK 604, may now view the content by using EK 604 to decrypt the received encrypted content. In this scenario, EK 604 cannot be generated without validating the source of EK 604. Thus, this scenario prevents unauthorized users from viewing or accessing information content.

FIG. 7 illustrates the SRTP encryption key generation process 700 wherein the memory module 108 receives an packet index value PI appended with a Message Authentication Code at block 702. At block 704 the memory module 108 computes a message authentication code (XMAC) of the packet index value (PI) by running a hashing function using MK or a derivative of MK as the key. All broadcast subscribers have MK provisioned in the memory module 108. At block 706, the memory module 108 compares the computed XMAC with the received MAC. The memory module 108 determines if the values of XMAC and MAC are equal at block 708. If the values are equal, the memory module 108 knows the source of the packet index value (PI) is trusted because it has the shared secret MK. Once the memory module 108 determines the source of PI is trusted it generates an encryption key (EK) 604 and transmits the encryption key EK 604 to the ME 110 at block 712. The ME 110 can now view content upon successful generation of the EK 604. If XMAC and MAC are not equal at block 708, the PI is discarded and the process starts again at block 702.

In another embodiment, the packet index can be protected by using the packet index appended with a digital signature. In this embodiment, shown in FIG. 8, the Packet Index (PI) manager 802 determines a packet index value (PI) and appends a digital signature which will be verified by the memory module 108. In this embodiment, the PI manager 802 has a private key 504 and the memory module 108 has the corresponding public key 506. This public approach could make use of well known digital signatures such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), The Digital Signature Algorithm, DSA, Elliptic Curve DSA, or other well know signatures. The PI manager 802 determines a packet index value (PI) and appends a digital signature formed from the private key 504 in the PI manager 802. The challenge PI∥Digital signature is then transmitted. The ME 110 receives this challenge through the base station 112 and passes the PI and Digital Signature 804 to the memory module 108. The memory module 108 uses the public key, by using RSA, the Digital Signature Algorithm DSA, Elliptic Curve DSA or other well known or not known signature schemes to verify the signature transmitted from the PI manager 802 through the base station 112, through the ME 110 to the memory module 108. In the memory module 108, the public key 506 is used to verify the digital signature by using the public key 506 and the appended private key 504. If the memory module 108 determines the digital signature was created by the PI manager 802, the memory module 108 generates an Encryption Key (EK) 604 and transmits EK 604 to the ME 110. The ME 110 can now view information content upon successful generation of the EK 604. If the memory module 108 determines the digital signature may not have been created by the PI manager 802, the memory module 108 discards the signature and waits for the next digital signature, and the ME 110 cannot determine or publish the EK 604 value corresponding to this PI. This prevents pre-computation of the packet index and helps to protect information content from unauthorized access.

The embodiments related to SRTP also provide the additional security of protecting against the unauthorized generation of authentication and salting keys. This is similar to protecting against pre-computation of SK in a BCMCS/MBMS. Also, in SRTP, once the service provider deploys the same Master Key (MK) to the secure memory module 108 in a plurality of end-users, the end user can masquerade as the service provider. This is because any end user who has MK provisioned in the secure memory module 108 could use the secure memory module 108 to encrypt and add authentication to data. The embodiments described above prevent this scenario because the PI manager 802, by using a MAC or digital signature, ensures encryption key generation can only take place when the source of the packet index is verified as a trusted source.

Those of skill in the art would understand that information and signals may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies and techniques. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, and chips that may be referenced throughout the above description may be represented by voltages, currents, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or particles, optical fields or particles, or any combination thereof.

Those of skill would further appreciate that the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present invention.

The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented or performed with a general purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.

The steps of a method or algorithm described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two. A software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor such the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium. In the alternative, the storage medium may be integral to the processor. The processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC. The ASIC may reside in a user terminal. In the alternative, the processor and the storage medium may reside as discrete components in a user terminal.

The previous description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A method of securely obtaining a short-term key for accessing content using a mobile station in a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, the method comprising: receiving a first value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of the communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key;verifying the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key, wherein the public key is stored in a first secure memory of a receiving mobile station and the signature scheme is stored in the first secure memory, and wherein the public key stored in the secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the receiving mobile station;determining that a source of the first digital signature is the short-term key manager; andcomputing the short-term key using the first value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the short-term key.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first value is determined by the short-term key manager.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first value includes a time stamp.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising transmitting the computed short-term key from the secure memory to the mobile equipment.

5. A method of obtaining an encryption key in a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, the method comprising: receiving a packet index value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of the communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key;verifying the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key, wherein the public key is stored in a first secure memory of a receiving mobile station and the signature scheme is stored in the first secure memory, and wherein the public key stored in the secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the receiving mobile station;determining that a source of the digital signature is the short-term key manager; andcomputing an encryption key using the packet index value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the encryption key.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the packet index value includes a sequence number.

7. The method of claim 5, further comprising transmitting the encryption key to the mobile equipment.

8. An integrated circuit, comprising: means for verifying a first digital signature using a signature scheme based on a private key and a public key, wherein the public key is stored in a first secure memory of the integrated circuit and the signature scheme is stored in the first secure memory, wherein the first digital signature is provided by a short-term key manager of a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the digital signature is formed using the private key, and wherein the public key stored in the secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the integrated circuit;means for determining that a source of the first digital signature is the short-term key manager; andmeans for computing a short-term key using a first value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the first value is provided by the short-term key manager, and wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the short-term key.

9. The integrated circuit of claim 8, wherein the first value is determined by the short-term key manager.

10. The integrated circuit of claim 8, wherein the first value includes a time stamp.

11. A mobile station, comprising: means for receiving a first value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key;means for verifying the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key;means for storing the public key in a first secure memory of the mobile station, wherein the public key stored in the secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the mobile station;means for storing the signature scheme in the first secure memory;means for determining that a source of the first digital signature is the short-term key manager; andmeans for computing a short-term key using the first value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the short-term key.

12. The mobile station of claim 11, wherein the first value is determined by the short-term key manager.

13. The mobile station of claim 11, wherein the first value includes a time stamp.

14. A non-transitory computer readable medium embodying a method for securely obtaining a short-term key for accessing content using a mobile station in a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, the method comprising: receiving a first value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of the communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key;verifying the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key, wherein the public key is stored in a first secure memory of a receiving mobile station and the signature scheme is stored in the first secure memory, and wherein the public key stored in the secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the receiving mobile station;determining that a source of the first digital signature is the short-term key manager; andcomputing the short-term key using the first value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the short-term key.

15. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 14, wherein the first value includes a time stamp.

16. An integrated circuit, comprising: means for verifying a first digital signature using a signature scheme based on a private key and a public key, wherein the public key is stored in a first secure memory of the integrated circuit and the signature scheme is stored in a first secure memory, wherein the first digital signature is provided by a short-term key manager of a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from the private key; and wherein the public key stored in the secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the integrated circuit;means for determining that a source of the digital signature is the short-term key manager; andmeans for computing an encryption key using a packet index value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the packet index value is provided by the short-term key manager, and wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the encryption key.

17. The integrated circuit of claim 16, wherein the packet index value includes a sequence number.

18. A mobile station, comprising: means for receiving a packet index value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key;means for verifying the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key;means for storing the public key in a first secure memory of the mobile station, wherein the public key stored in the first secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the mobile station;means for storing the signature scheme in the first secure memory;means for determining that a source of the first digital signature is the short-term key manager; andmeans for computing an encryption key using the packet index value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the encryption key.

19. The mobile station of claim 18, wherein the packet index value includes a sequence number.

20. A non-transitory computer readable medium embodying a method for obtaining an encryption key in a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, the method comprising: receiving a packet index value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of the communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key;verifying the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key, wherein the public key is stored in a first secure memory of a receiving mobile station and the signature scheme is stored in the first secure memory, and wherein the public key stored in the secure memory is not accessible to a mobile equipment of the receiving mobile station;determining that a source of the digital signature is the short-term key manager; andcomputing an encryption key using the packet index value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature, wherein the mobile equipment accesses the content using the encryption key.

21. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 20, wherein the packet index value includes a sequence number.

22. A mobile station, comprising: a mobile equipment configured to: receive a packet index value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key, andaccess the content using an encryption key; and a memory module configured to:verify the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key,store the public key, wherein the public key stored in the memory module is not accessible to the mobile equipment of the mobile station,store the signature scheme,determine that a source of the first digital signature is the short-term key manager, andcompute the encryption key using the packet index value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature.

23. The mobile station of claim 22, wherein the packet index value includes a sequence number.

24. A mobile station, comprising: a mobile equipment configured to:receive a first value and a first digital signature from a short-term key manager of a communication system for point-to-multipoint transmission of content to mobile stations, wherein the first digital signature is formed from a private key, andaccess the content using a short-term key; and a memory module configured to:verify the first digital signature using a signature scheme based on the private key and a public key,store the public key, wherein the public key stored in the memory module is not accessible to the mobile equipment of the mobile station,store the signature scheme,determine that a source of the first digital signature is the short-term key manager, andcompute the short-term key using the first value and the public key provided that the short-term key manager is determined to have been the source of the first digital signature.

25. The mobile station of claim 24, wherein the first value is determined by the short-term key manager.

26. The mobile station of claim 24, wherein the first value includes a time stamp.