The instant invention relates to the inspection of metering systems and, more particularly, to a cryptographically secure method of inspecting metering systems.
The United States Postal Service (USPS) is currently advocating the implementation of a new Information-Based Indicia Program (IBIP) in connection with the printing of postage indicium by postage metering systems. Under this new program, each postage indicium that is printed will include cryptographically secured information in a barcode format together with human readable information such as the postage amount and the date of submission to the post office. The cryptographically secured information is generated using public key cryptography and allows a verification authority, such as the post office, to verify the authenticity of the printed postage indicium based on the information printed in the indicium and the printed destination address.
In connection with the introduction of the cryptographically secure postage metering systems, the USPS is requiring that a remote inspection of these systems be implemented to verify 1) the location of the metering system, 2) the integrity of the cryptographically secured indicium, and 3) the integrity of the ascending and descending accounting register values. In at least one scenario, the USPS has suggested that in order to verify the location of the postage metering system the use of an indicium card is acceptable. The indicium card is sent by either the USPS or the metering system manufacturer (sender) to the registered address of the postage metering system. Upon receipt of the indicium card, the registered user of the metering system prints a zero dollar value indicia and returns the indicium card to the sender. The sender can then perform the standard cryptographic verification of the indicium to verify that it was printed by the appropriate metering system. If the verification is successfully completed, the sender assumes that the metering system is physically located at the address to which the inspection card was sent. The problem with this system is that a duplicate indicium card can be created and a valid indicium printed thereon even if the metering system is not located at its registered location. Moreover, the return of the indicium card is a manual process that is inefficient and prone to human error.
Thus, what is needed is a more secure method of verifying the location of a postage metering system. Additionally, it would be desirable that the more secure method be more fully automated than the system described above.
It is an object of the invention to provide a method that securely verifies the location of a value dispensing system. This object is met by a method comprising the steps of generating a code at a data center, the code being associated with the value dispensing system; creating a challenge card having the code therein; sending the challenge card via a carrier service to the specific location; retrieving the code from the challenge card and entering the code into the value dispensing system subsequent to receipt of the code at the specific location; communicating the code retrieved from the challenge card from the value dispensing system to the data center; and comparing the code received at the data center from the value dispensing system to the code generated at the data center to verify that the value dispensing system is physically located at the specific location.
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of the specification, illustrate a presently preferred embodiment of the invention, and together with the general description given above and the detailed description of the preferred embodiment given below, serve to explain the principles of the invention.
Referring to
The postage metering accounting subsystem 218 includes a processor 224 coupled to a memory 226. The processor 224 has associated with it a first cryptographic module 228, a secure clock 232 and a communications port 234. The memory 226 may have stored within it different data as well as the operating programs 235 for the postage metering accounting subsystem 218. The data shown as stored in memory 226 includes cryptographic key data 246, conventional postage accounting ascending/descending register circuitry 248 which accounts for the amount of postage dispensed, other data 250 which may be printed as part of the postage indicium (such as an algorithm identifier, customer identifier, and software identifier), indicium image data and associated programming 252 used to build the postage indicium image, the inventive inspection programming 254 discussed in more detail below, and a secret inspection key 256. The accounting circuitry 248 can be conventional accounting circuitry which has the added benefit of being capable of being recharged with additional prepaid postage funds via communication with a remote data center. Additionally, a second inspection cryptographic module is shown at 258. This cryptographic module 258 can be a physically separate device from the cryptographic module 228 or separate hardware in the same device, or a colocated cryptographic software program The final component of the inspection system 200 is a postal distribution network identified at 260.
Referring to
Referring to
The challenge card 272 is then mailed in a normal manner to the registered (licensed) postage metering system 202 address via the postal service distribution system 260 (step S26). Upon receipt of the challenge card 272, the user can manually enter the code 272a into the postage metering system 202 for its storage in memory 226 and future use as is described below (step S28). The inspection program 254 allows such entry to be made, such as for example, through the selection of a predesignated key on keyboard 208. In a preferred embodiment, upon entry of code 272a, the postage metering system utilizes the second cryptographic module 258 and the inspection key 256 (which is the same as key 264b) to decrypt the user entered message authentication code 272a (step S30). At step S32, the postage metering system 202 compares the results of the decryption process to determine if the postage metering serial number and inspection date which it has stored within memory 226 matches the decrypted values. If the answer is “NO”, the user is advised via the monitor 206 that an incorrect code has been entered and requests the user to try again (step S34). However, if the answer at step 32 is “YES”, the user entered code 272a is stored within memory 226 (step S36) for use at the next communication between the postage metering system 202 and the data center 222. The above code authentication procedure precludes the situation where a user inadvertently enters a wrong code and loses the challenge card 272. In this situation, at the time of the inspection process described below, the improperly stored code will not permit postage metering system 202 location verification and the user will not be able to reenter the proper code since the challenge card has been lost.
Subsequent to step S36 at the next communication between the data center 222 and the postage metering system 202, whether for a postage funds refill or any other required inspection, the data center 222 determines that the flag for the particular postage metering system 202 has been set and will request that the stored code 272a be uploaded from the postage metering system 202 to the data center (step S38). In response to the data center request, the postage metering system 202 sends the code 272a to the data center 222 (step S40). At step S42 the data center 222 compares the received code 272a to that which was sent to the postage metering system 202 on the challenge card 272. If the codes do not match, the data center 222 advises the user of the error via a message displayed on monitor 206 (step S34). On the other hand, if the codes match the data center 222 resets the flag to acknowledge successful completion of the location inspection and verification of the postage metering system 202 location (step S46). Subsequent to this action, the data center 222 can then request other conventional inspection data to be sent from the postage metering system 202 to the data center 222; such as the current ascending/descending register values (step S47). Moreover, in order to ensure that the postage metering system 202 is correctly producing an indicium, the data center 222 can request that the user perform a zero dollar postage action (step S48). Thus, when the user performs the zero dollar postage action, instead of a zero dollar indicium being printed, it is electronically sent to the data center 222 via modem 220 together with the other inspection data (step S50). The data center 222 can then perform a conventional indicium verification based on the electronic indicium image in the same manner that a printed indicium is verified except that no scanning of a printed image is required (step S52).
Additional advantages and modifications will readily occur to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the invention in its broader aspects is not limited to the specific details and representative devices, shown and described herein. Accordingly, various modifications may be made without departing from the spirit or scope of the general inventive concept as defined by the appended claims. For example, the challenge card 272 could be a smart card, floppy disk, or CD-ROM which has the code 272a stored thereon. In this configuration the accounting subsystem 218 (or the computer 204) can have a corresponding card reader 276 therein which could automatically read the code 272a. This would preclude the incorrect entry of code 272a by a user. Additionally, while the cryptographically secure code 272a was discussed in connection with a secret key system, a public key system could be used to sign the code 272a in lieu thereof. Furthermore, upon receipt of the code 272a, it does not necessarily have to be immediately entered and stored in the postage metering system 202 but can be entered at the request of the data center during communication with the postage metering system 202 for a postage refill or a required inspection. Furthermore, the verification at the postage metering system 202 of the code 272a is not required, and while the invention has been described in connection with a postage metering system 202 it is applicable to any metering or value dispensing system and for carrier services other than the post. Finally, while at step 30 decryption is used for verification, alternatively the second cryptographic module can encrypt the data itself and compare it to the received encrypted data to determine if a match exists which would complete the verification process.
Number | Name | Date | Kind |
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4812965 | Taylor et al. | Mar 1989 | A |
5731980 | Dolan et al. | Mar 1998 | A |
5799093 | French et al. | Aug 1998 | A |
5812400 | Eddy et al. | Sep 1998 | A |
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Number | Date | Country |
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2 213 302 | Aug 1989 | GB |