This section provides background information related to the present disclosure which is not necessarily prior art.
The invention relates to a method to defend against attempted electronic spying when transmitting image data that are obtained from image signals generated by a camera installed at a self-service terminal. The invention also relates to a device to carry out the method and a self-service terminal.
1. Technical Field
The invention relates in particular to a method and a device to defend against attempted electronic spying when transmitting image data at a self-service terminal that is configured as an automated teller machine, wherein a camera records an area that covers an operating area of the self-service terminal, or the automated teller machine, that is to be monitored.
2. Discussion
It is known to secure self-service terminals, in particular automated teller machines, through camera monitoring in order to determine criminal acts, such as material damage and/or manipulation at the terminals and to record image material as material proof and for analysis. For this purpose, at least one camera is installed at the self-service terminal in question. This camera then continuously provides image signals from which normally digital image data are obtained that are transmitted to an image data memory and remote computers or servers in order to be evaluated there. Terminals in the form of automated teller machines in particular are the subject of such camera monitoring. Typical manipulation of automated banking machines is the installation of what are termed skimming devices. Dishonest parties install counterfeit keypads and/or card readers in the operating area of the automated teller machines in order to gain access to sensitive data, in particular card data and PINs. Recently, attack scenarios in the form of electronic spying attacks or attempted eavesdropping have become more frequent in which the dishonest parties want to gain access to the image signals generated by the camera, or the image data obtained from said signals, by capturing the transmission of these image signals, or image data (known as “tapping”), at the corresponding transmission lines. If such a spying attack is successful, the dishonest party can draw conclusions about the PIN entered by a customer and, possibly, read the card data when the card is inserted into the card slot. In this way, the dishonest party can gain access to the sensitive data without the use of special skimming devices.
It is the object of the invention is to propose a method and a device to provide an effective defense against electronic spying attempts during the transmission of image data at a self-service terminal. In particular, a method, a device and a service terminal thus equipped are to be proposed that secure and protect the transmission of image data against such attempts at electronic spying.
Accordingly, it is proposed that events occurring at the self-service terminal, particularly in the recording area of the camera but also outside said area, are detected, and that, as a function of at least one detected event, the generation of the image signals at the camera and/or the subsequent transmission of the image signals, or the image data acquired, is controlled. Accordingly, an event is detected that represents, for example, the actuation of the keypad and/or the introduction of a card into the card slot in order to control, as a function thereof, the generation, or transmission, of the image signals and/or image data. Accordingly, the generation, or transmission of images is changed when an event is detected such as corresponds to sensitive operation of the self-service terminal. So, even in the event that lines and transmission routes are successfully tapped, the generation or transmission of corresponding sensitive image signals or image data can be prevented altogether. A wrongdoer who might possibly succeed in capturing the camera signals or the image data derived therefrom will not be able to obtain access to sensitive image signals or image data.
In accordance with the invention, a device to carry out the method is proposed that detects events occurring in the recording area of the camera by evaluating the image signals, the image data and/or sensor signals and, as a function thereof, controls the generation and/or transmission of the image signals, or image data.
Additionally, a self-service terminal equipped with such a device is proposed that can be specifically configured as an automated teller machine.
In a preferred embodiment, spying attempts are deterred by totally suppressing the generation of the image signals if at least one event is detected. Alternatively, the transmission of the image data obtained from the image signals generated is suppressed if at least one event is detected. Termination of the generation or transmission of image signals/data is time-controlled at least for as long as the sensitive event is detected. As another alternative to this, at least partial image data are blanked out in the image data acquired or replaced by artificially generated data if at least one event is detected. In this context, preferably those partial image data are involved that refer to at least one partial area of the recording area, in particular that refer to a first and second partial area that cover a keypad, or card slot in the operating area of the self-service terminal.
The events that are detected in particular in the operating area within the recording range of the camera or even outside said area are, for example, operation of a keypad or insertion of a card. The events in the recording area of the camera can be detected by evaluating the image signals and/or the image data. This can be done in the inventive device. As an alternative or in addition to this, the events can be detected by evaluating at least one sensor signal that is generated by a sensor for monitoring an operating element in the operating area of the self-service terminal, also outside the recording area of the camera. In addition, events such as the insertion of a card can be derived from the current status of the self-service terminal, in particular by querying or reading process states or state machines or similar. Appropriate signals can then be sent to the inventive device.
The drawings described herein are for illustrative purposes only of selected embodiments and not all possible implementations, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure.
The invention and the advantages resulting therefrom are described in what follows from one embodiment and with reference to the appended schematic drawings:
Corresponding reference numerals indicate corresponding parts throughout the several views of the drawings.
Example embodiments will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings.
In accordance with the invention, during the transmission of the image signals or image data specific partial areas A1 and/or A2 are blanked out by means of the method described hereinafter and the corresponding device if a sensitive event is detected corresponding, for example, to the entry of PIN numbers or the insertion of a card. The hidden partial areas A1 and A2 refer in particular to sensitive areas of the recording area A0, here, as an example, the area A1 which covers the keypad KBD and the area A2 which covers the card slot SLT. Using
Between the image processing unit PRC and the external memory MEM there is a second connection Cb over which the digital image data generated Sb or, in the case of a sensitive event in accordance with the invention, the altered digital image data Sb′ are transmitted. This connection Cb thus represents a secure digital data transmission connection that can extend as far as remote computers (servers), for example over data or communication networks such as IP connections. The image data transmitted Sb or Sb′ are then buffered on the receiving end in the memory MEM there and then fed to a data display and/or evaluation in order to evaluate the images captured by the camera.
This second connection Cb in particular offers a potential point of attack for spying attempts as third parties attempt to tap this connection. As a defense under the invention at least the transmission of the digital image data Sb or Sb′ is controlled in such a way that no image data are transmitted that could reproduce sensitive procedures or events, such as keypad entries or the insertion of a bank card. The control is carried out in accordance with the inventive method that is described hereinafter using
In a following step 122, the image data Sb′ are transmitted wherein the sensitive image data have been replaced by artificially generated data (dummy data). In a following step 130, transmission of the altered image data Sb′ is carried out over the second connection Cb.
However, if it was determined in step 120 that no event is present, transmission of the original image data Sb, that is to say transmission of the unaltered image data, takes place in accordance with step 130. This measure ensures that secure monitoring of the self-service terminal, or automated teller machine ATM, can be performed as before but that in the case of events that are sensitive, corresponding image data are not generated or transmitted.
In a simple embodiment, for the event that a sensitive event is detected the device DET can also generate a trigger TR* that directs the camera CAM directly to suppress completely the generation of the image signal Sa. In this case the entire image is suppressed.
The detection of events can not only take place through evaluation of the image signals Sa, or the image data Sb derived therefrom, but, as an alternative or in addition, by using sensor signals. In this case, the device DET is connected to sensors that are mounted on the sensitive operating elements, such as the keypad KBD and/or the card slot SLT. In a simple case, the sensor can be the respective button on the keypad itself or a detector at the opening of the card slot SLT.
A camera of normal construction can be used as the camera CAM which takes analog or digital images. The first connection Ca, for example, can be realized as a coaxial cable for analog image signals or, for example, as a USB cable for digitalized image signals, or image data. Image processing takes place in the image processing unit PRC which can be implemented, for example, as specific electronics or as a software program that runs on a personal computer. The processed image, or the image data obtained, are then forwarded over the second connection Cb to the memory MEM, or to a remote computer, in particular to a server that evaluates the image data further, or brings them up on a display. The server can be located, for example, in a monitoring center that monitors several self-service terminals simultaneously.
Besides the measures already described, the transmitted image signals Sa or Sb can additionally be encrypted in order to be secured even more thoroughly against third party spying attempts. Preferably the camera CAM and the image processing unit PRC form one structural unit in the form of a module MD. As has been described above, those areas of the image are blanked out and/or it is made clear in the image processing from which ones conclusions can be drawn about the PIN entry or about card data. Altering the image data can take the form of setting all pixels in the partial areas mentioned to the same color and/or brightness, for example.
Control of the generation of image signals or transmission of the image data is time-dependent as the blanking out of image data is carried out only at such times as an event is detected. This ensures that no sensitive or critical procedures, such as the entry of PIN number or insertion of cards, are recorded and/or transmitted. The determination of the blanked out or altered partial image data areas can also be further developed in such a manner that only specific partial areas such as writing and number information on bank cards is blanked out or overwritten. The defense against spying attempts can be undertaken in such manner that by means of a trigger the image is completely terminated. This happens, for example, as soon as a hand or finger is positioned over the pin pad KBD and thus a conclusion can be drawn about the process of a PIN entry. The detection of such a situation can be carried out through image recognition techniques by means of which, for example, the appearance of a hand or fingers in the recording area, in particular in the area of the keypad KBD, or the insertion of a bank card in the card slot SLT are detected.
Further, in order to check whether a sensitive event exists, additional information can be brought in besides sensors that is usually available in a self-service terminal. This is, for example, the current status regarding the condition of the self-service terminal. For example, the hand only needs to be masked in the image when entering a PIN number if a PIN number is actually entered. On the other hand, no masking in necessary if the hand is only performing a menu prompt. No masking is necessary either as long as there is a magnetic or chip card in the system.
The proposed invention effectively prevents any spying attack on the transmission of camera signals or image data at a self-service terminal.
The foregoing description of the embodiments has been provided for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention. Individual elements or features of a particular embodiment are generally not limited to that particular embodiment, but, where applicable, are interchangeable and can be used in a selected embodiment, even if not specifically shown or described. The same may also be varied in many ways. Such variations are not to be regarded as a departure from the invention, and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scope of the invention.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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10 2008 039 689.3 | Aug 2008 | DE | national |
This application is a National Stage of International Application No. PCT/EP2009/060774, filed Aug. 20, 2009. This application claims the benefit and priority of German application 10 2008 039 689.3 filed Aug. 26, 2008. The entire disclosures of the above applications are incorporated herein by reference.
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind | 371c Date |
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PCT/EP09/60774 | 8/20/2009 | WO | 00 | 2/11/2011 |