The invention relates to a method and a device for monitoring train integrity. Train integrity is conventionally monitored by means of route-mounted axle counters or track circuits. In modern operating concepts, such as for example FFB—Funkfahrbetrieb [radio controlled operation]—or ETCS—European Train Control System—Level 3, efforts are made to move as many functions as possible, for example location determination, to the rail vehicle. The integrity of the train also has to be monitored on the vehicle side. However, this mainly relates to trains whose cars are frequently newly combined, i.e. in particular goods trains. In the case of multiple unit trains whose car sequence or train length is changed very rarely, the probability of separation of the train is generally so small that additional monitoring is not required.
In a known approach to a solution, a connection between the locomotive and the last car is used to determine the train integrity. This connection may be brought about, for example, electrically, pneumatically, in a radio-based fashion or optically. A special EOTD—End of Train Device—is frequently used. If the connection between the locomotive and the EOTD is ruptured, separation of the train is detected. In particular, the considerable expenditure, in particular for planning, is disadvantageous since explicit identification has to take place between the locomotive and the EOTD. Problems also arise with respect to inter-operability, loss and management.
Another approach to a solution is based on all the cars being equipped with a TIM—Train Integrity Module. These are modules which communicate with one another in a wireless fashion over short distances. The considerable expenditure which inter-operability problems entail is also disadvantageous here.
The invention is based on the object of specifying a method and a device for monitoring train integrity, which is characterized by relatively low expenditure and improved reliability and availability.
According to the method, the object is achieved in that train integrity modules—TIMs—are arranged in at least some of the cars of the train, wherein the TIMs have a digital map with shunting regions, close-range communication means for the mutual exchange of data and long-range communication means for transmitting data to an operational control center and are connected to at least one sensor for detecting TIM-specific data, in particular the speed, position and direction of travel, cyclically up to the point of entry into a second shunting region, wherein the TIMs detect separation of the train on the basis of predefined logic criteria and, if appropriate, transmit the sensor data to an operational control center.
To this end, in accordance with the device, provision is made that train integrity modules—TIMs—are arranged in at least some of the cars of the train, wherein the TIMs have a digital map with shunting regions, close-range communication means for the mutual exchange of data and long-range communication means for transmitting data to an operational control center and are connected to at least one sensor for detecting TIM-specific data, in particular the speed, position and direction of travel.
Firstly, the TIMs are equipped with a digital map which contains the regions in which cars can be newly combined, i.e. the shunting regions. No particular requirements with respect to accuracy are made of this map; as it were a rough overview is sufficient. The train integrity is only monitored outside the shunting regions.
When exiting out of the shunting region occurs, firstly mutual identification of the TIMs which are present on the train in accordance with the car sequence takes place in a calibration phase. To do this, each TIM attempts to find the further TIMs located in its vicinity, during which process data are exchanged. Such data may be, for example, the speed and/or position and direction of travel which are determined by sensor and provided with a time stamp. These characteristics may be acquired by means of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System). On the basis of the stability of the received data during a planned time period, the TIMs which are located on the same train identify one another. If specific characteristics of the train are also exchanged, such as for example the speed, plausibility criteria for the mutual identification of the TIMs can be additionally or alternatively used. For example, the speed which is transmitted by the individual TIMs must correspond over the planned time period. Finally, the hypothesis that the identified TIMs are located in the same train results from formal model checking against a formal model of the train.
Subsequent to the short calibration phase, the actual monitoring for train integrity takes place by sensor data being cyclically exchanged between the TIMs.
In addition to the use of the speed as a comparison criterion, the distance between the individual TIMs which can be determined from the position and direction of travel is also advantageous. Threshold values are used here to determine the deviation, for example with respect to distance and/or speed, at and above which the hypothesis that the TIMs are located in the same train is infringed. All that is necessary is formal verification of the validity or non-validity of the train integrity hypothesis.
When the hypothesis is infringed, each TIM which has detected the infringement signals this detected train separation to the operational control center. The affected train is detected in the operational control center on the basis of the position signaling of the TIMs or of the train, with the result that suitable operational measures can be initiated without delay.
Particular robustness with respect to individual or else multiple failures of TIMs can be achieved by virtue of the fact that redundancies and pluasibilities are taken into account. For example, the failure of an adjacent TIM can be ignored if a TIM which is further away in the same direction is still detected.
On entry into the next shunting region, the monitoring of the train integrity on the basis of the map information is suspended and is initialized again with renewed calibration after this shunting region is exited.
According to the claimed invention the TIMs form corresponding clusters in the calibration phase of their data range. Overlapping clusters, resulting in single or even multiple redundancy, are particularly advantageous.
The method can also be configured more robustly if, according to the claimed invention, the TIMs pass on sensor data received from first TIMs to second TIMs. This results, as it were, in a global picture of the train, with the result that it is possible to determine which TIM is the first TIM and which is the last TIM in the direction of travel. The checking conditions for the monitoring of the train integrity can be simplified by this but at the same time the method becomes more complex and the communication overheads increase.
The device for carrying out the method can be embodied particularly advantageously according to the claimed invention by virtue of the fact that the TIMs are embodied as wireless modules which are planned in accordance with the method and are provided per se for other functionalities. For example, the VICOS CT modules from Siemens, which are primarily provided for optimizing operational control, are suitable for this. These modules are, as it were, used in an unintended way or additionally for monitoring the train integrity. The GNSS locating system which is already present and the mobile radio link to the operational control center and the local close-range wireless connection are used for the TIM function, wherein the digital map is additionally planned and the TIM function is initially configured. The train integrity is subsequently monitored autonomously. Software updates or map updates can be implemented over the existing mobile radio link.
Although it would be desirable operationally to arrange a car which is equipped with a TIM as far as possible at the start and at the end of the train to be monitored during the shunting process, but also in the event that this is not possible, at least partial monitoring takes place as a function of the TIM equipment level of the train. In this context, in the double-use variant as claimed it can be assumed that a large percentage, for example 20 to 30% of a fleet of cars is already equipped with wireless modules, wherein the TIM functionality would lead to a further increase in the equipment level.
The invention will be explained in more detail below with reference to figurative illustrations, in which,
In the exemplary embodiment according to
After the TIMs 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 have identified each other as being associated with the train 3 on the basis of continuous data stability in the calibration phase, the actual monitoring of the train integrity begins. In this case, measurement data relating to the speed 4 and distance data 5 derived from the measurement data relating to the position and direction of travel are exchanged and evaluated on the basis of plausibility criteria. In this way it is detected if, for example, the TIM 2.4 in the last car 6.5 of the train 3 has, owing to separation of this car 6.5, a relatively low speed 4 as the distance 5 from the adjacent TIM 2.3 increases. In this case, at least the TIM 2.3 which has detected this dangerous state signals at least its own position data to an operational control center. A mobile radio link is used for this long-range communication, while preferably a WLAN link is used for the short-range communication between the TIMs 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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10 2010 006 949 | Feb 2010 | DE | national |
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind | 371c Date |
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PCT/EP2011/051148 | 1/27/2011 | WO | 00 | 8/3/2012 |
Publishing Document | Publishing Date | Country | Kind |
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WO2011/095429 | 8/11/2011 | WO | A |
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