The present disclosure is generally directed toward creating and managing trusted data.
One type of identification technology employs Near Field Communications (NFC). NFC is a set of short-range wireless communication technologies that have devices operate at approximately 13.56 MHz and at rates ranging from 106 kbit/s to 848 kbit/s. NFC standards cover communications protocols and data exchange formats, and are based on existing radio-frequency identification (RFID) standards including ISO/IEC 14443 and FeliCa, each of which are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. The standards include ISO/IEC 18092, which is also incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, and those defined by the NFC Forum.
Another type of technology currently gaining traction and emerging as a viable alternative to NFC is newer versions of the Bluetooth standard (e.g., Bluetooth 4), the entire contents of which are hereby incorporated herein by reference. Bluetooth is a proprietary open wireless technology standard for exchanging data over short distances (using short-wavelength radio transmissions in the ISM band from 2400-2480 MHz) from fixed and mobile devices, creating personal area networks (PANs) with high levels of security. The primary difference between NFC technologies and Bluetooth technologies is that Bluetooth relies on powered devices for both sides of the communication whereas NFC facilitates communications between a powered device and a passive device (e.g., an NFC tag or credential). In other words, under NFC standards, one device can operate without an internal power source, such as a battery.
There are currently three NFC operating modes defined by the NFC Forum: (1) Card Emulation Mode; (2) Reader/Writer Mode; and (3) Peer-to-Peer Mode. In the Card Emulation Mode, an NFC-enabled phone emulates a contactless card in accordance with ISO 14443 and/or ISO 15693, each of which are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. Typical applications of the Card Emulation Mode include payment, ticketing, and access control applications.
In the Reader/Writer Mode, the NFC-enabled phone reads a tag and typically performs some function based on the information obtained from the read tag. Typical applications of the Reader/Writer Mode include reading posters with an NFC tag in proximity thereto, interactive advertising, launching mobile Internet (e.g., automated web-browser activation), automated Short Message Service (SMS), and automated call initiation.
In the Peer-to-Peer Mode, two NFC-enabled phones, or similar types of devices, are allowed to exchange data with one another. Typical applications of the Peer-to-Peer Mode include setting up wireless settings (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, etc.), sharing business cards, or sharing information between NFC-enabled phones.
In most transactions, NFC involves an initiator and a target. The initiator actively generates a Radio Frequency (RF) field that can power a passive target. The NFC protocol enables communications between readers and relatively simple devices such as tags, key fobs, cards, etc., which do not necessarily require batteries.
As with proximity card technologies, NFC is mediated by magnetic induction between two loop antennas located within one another's near field, effectively forming an air-core transformer.
The applications for NFC technology are numerous. In particular, as discussed above, NFC can be implemented in mobile ticketing applications (e.g., extension of secure access system utilizing contactless cards, airline tickets, concert/event tickets, etc.), electronic keys (e.g., as a replacement for car keys, house keys, office keys, hotel room keys, etc.), mobile payment, intelligent advertising, Bluetooth pairing, and so on.
It is one aspect of the present disclosure to provide the ability to leverage NFC and/or Bluetooth technologies to create and manage trusted relationships and objects. Although embodiments of the present disclosure will be primarily discussed in connection with NFC technologies, it should be appreciated that alternatives to NFC technologies can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. For example, Bluetooth 4, other variants of the Bluetooth standard, and/or other comparable medium-to-short-range communication protocols can be employed to create and manage trusted relationships and objects.
The use cases where such trusted relationships and objects can be leveraged are many. As one non-limiting example, the utilization of NFC tags are proposed to help customers, end users, and the like check if a product they have purchased is genuine. As another non-limiting example, an NFC tag can also be used to help a customer determine if the corresponding warranty for the purchased product is valid. As still other non-limiting examples, NFC tags can be used in chain-of-custody, authenticity verification, secure logging, document validation, electronic signatures (e.g., for creative or copyrighted works), notarization, dual notarization, certified appraisals, etc.
It is one aspect of the present disclosure to provide a system and method for writing data to a tag that can be verified and/or proven to be trusted. In some embodiments, a user is allowed to enter data into an NFC or Bluetooth-enabled phone (referred to herein as an “NFC-enabled phone” or “phone” for convenience and simplicity) that will be written to the tag. Before or after the user enters the data into the phone, the phone reads tag data from the tag (e.g., an NFC tag). The phone then collects the user-entered data, the tag data, and/or some other type of metadata describing the circumstances around the entry of the user data (e.g., a timestamp, current geolocation information for the phone, gesture information, biometric information, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF), current network status, combinations thereof, etc.) to send to a trusted authority. The trusted authority analyzes the data received from the phone and, based on some or all of the received data, generates a validation signature (e.g., a notary signature) that is transmitted back to the phone. In some embodiments, the validation signature may correspond to some value or combination of values that was computed based on the received user data, tag data, and/or metadata. Moreover, the validation signature may be encrypted with an encryption key. The phone then writes the validation signature (possibly encrypted) onto the tag where it can be stored along with one or more of the tag data (which was already present on the tag), user data, metadata, etc.
It is another aspect of the present disclosure to provide a system and method for reading data from a tag and validating the same. In some embodiments, a tag can be read (e.g., by a phone) and the data provided from the tag can include tag data, user-entered data, metadata, and/or a validation signature (possibly encrypted). The device which read the data from the tag then either (1) analyzes the validation signature, user-entered data, metadata, and/or tag data to validate the tag or the data stored thereon or (2) sends the data on to a separate entity for validation. In the situation where a separate entity validates the validation signature, the separate entity analyzes the received information and either returns an acknowledgement or denial back to the device which read the tag. A visual indication of the verification results can then be displayed via the reading device, other data can be displayed via the reading device, and/or an action can be performed by the reading device. As a non-limiting example, the reading device may correspond to an NFC-enabled phone and if the tag corresponds to a trusted tag (e.g., the validation signature or encrypted validation signature was validated) then the NFC-enabled phone can display the fact that the tag is trusted and may perform some other action automatically such as placing a call to a predetermined number (e.g., customer service for the product that was associated with the trusted tag), sending an SMS message to a predetermined number, sending an email to a predetermined address, launching a web browser and directing it to a predetermined URL, opening an application, combinations thereof, etc.
It is another aspect of the present disclosure to leverage NFC and/or Bluetooth technologies to distribute access credentials. In some embodiments, when an NFC-enabled phone is used for physical access to a building, upon successful validation of that phone to a reader, the phone informs a trusted authority. The trusted authority, upon receiving an indication that the phone has been granted access to the building via one reader, then sends the phone applicable Tag Keys that are within the same premises as the reader that already granted access to the phone.
As can be appreciated, concepts of a trusted tag disclosed herein can be used to provide and manage many types of objects that have traditionally required a physical proof of authenticity (e.g., stamps, stickers, seals, physical signatures, etc.). For instance, secure warranty cards can be distributed that are unclonable and are electronically verifiable at any time in the field either by a merchant or an end user that has an NFC-enabled phone. Moreover, the tags can be securely updated through NFC-enabled phones.
As can be appreciated, embodiments of the present disclosure enable a suite of secure warranty card services such as secure issuance services, secure update services, revocation services by the issuer, and/or reporting services.
The present disclosure will be further understood from the drawings and the following detailed description. Although this description sets forth specific details, it is understood that certain embodiments of the invention may be practiced without these specific details. It is also understood that in some instances, well-known circuits, components and techniques have not been shown in detail in order to avoid obscuring the understanding of the invention.
The present disclosure is described in conjunction with the appended figures:
The ensuing description provides embodiments only, and is not intended to limit the scope, applicability, or configuration of the claims. Rather, the ensuing description will provide those skilled in the art with an enabling description for implementing the described embodiments. It being understood that various changes may be made in the function and arrangement of elements without departing from the spirit and scope of the appended claims.
Referring initially to
The phone 104 and tag 108 may exchange data via any known or yet-to-be-established contact or contactless communication protocols. As a non-limiting example, the tag 108 may correspond to a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) device and may be configured to exchange data with the phone 104 in accordance with any well known data-communication protocol (e.g., ISO 14443, ISO 15693, ISO 18092, FeliCa, Near Field Communications (NFC), Bluetooth, Wi-Fi (e.g., 802.11N, variants thereof, or extensions thereto), ZigBee, GSM, combinations thereof, etc.). Alternatively, or in addition, the tag 108 may exchange data with the phone 104 via one or more of optical, magnetic, or acoustic mechanisms. As another non-limiting example, the tag 108 may correspond to a contact-based tag and may either be inserted into a credential acceptor in the phone 104, swiped through a slot in the phone 104, pressed to the phone 104, etc. In general, any type of interface known or yet to be developed that facilitates data communications (secure/encrypted or unsecure/unencrypted) between the tag 108 and phone 104 can be employed. Accordingly, although embodiments of the present disclosure will primarily refer to NFC and related protocols, it should be appreciated that the embodiments described herein are not so limited.
The tag 108 may, in some embodiments, be constructed as a traditional card-shaped RFID credential. The tag 108 may, however, assume form factors other than a traditional card-shaped RFID credential. Examples of form factors suitable for the tag 108 include, without limitation, an Integrated Circuit (IC) card with or without an antenna, a smart card, a key fob, a passport, a credit card, a debit cart, a sticker, paper and a printed tag (e.g., IC chip connected to a printed antenna), a wristband, a shoe insert, a button, and the like.
The tag 108 may be associated with an object 102 that is desired to have a trusted relationship established for it. Suitable mechanisms for associating a tag 108 with an object 102 or multiple objects 102 include fastening the tag 108 to the object 102, connecting the tag 108 to the object 102 (e.g., permanently, with a tamper evidence mechanism, irremovably, removably, directly, indirectly, etc.), placing the tag 108 in a position near the object 102, embedding the tag 108 within the object 102, incorporating the tag 108 into the object 102, molding the tag 108 around or within the object, 102 casting the tag 108 with the object 102, or combinations thereof. Associating the tag 108 with the object 102 will allow for the verification of authenticity of the object 102 via verification of the tag's 108 authenticity.
A user 116 may be allowed to carry and use the phone 104. As used herein, the terms “holder” and “user” are used interchangeably in reference to an individual carrying or a phone 104 or any other device that is being used to either notarize a tag 108, validate a tag 108, gain entry to a secured premises, etc.
The trusted authority 112 may correspond to a single entity or multiple entities that are capable of signing tags 108 (e.g., providing a trusted signature to the tag 108), validating signatures on tags 108, distributing access credentials, and/or any function described herein as being part of a trusted tag service. In some embodiments, the trusted authority 112 represents one or more servers (e.g., web server(s), managed or managing devices under SNMP, etc.) that are configured to execute various trusted tag services. The trusted authority 112 may communicate with the phone 104 or any other communication device using known communication networks and protocols. As an example, the phone 104 and trusted authority 112 may exchange information over a telephone network, a cellular network, an IMS network, a Wide Area Network (e.g., the Internet), a Local Area Network, an IP network, an SNMP network, or any other known type of network architecture. Messages exchanged between the phone 104 and trusted authority 112 may be formatted in any number of formats. As some non-limiting examples, the phone 104 and trusted authority 112 may exchange information via one or more of email messages, SMS messages, one or more messages transmitted using HTTP or SHTTP or variants thereof, one or more messages transmitted using SNMP or variants thereof, one or more messages exchanged via FTP, one or more messages exchanged via RTP or UDP, etc.
In some embodiments, the trusted authority 112 comprises a signature validation module 120 and a signature creation module 124, each of which may be instructions stored in memory and executed by a processor of the server of the trusted authority 112. The signature creation module 124 may be invoked by the trusted authority 112 to create and provide tag signature services. When a new tag 108 is signed (e.g., has data written thereto and that data is to be validated with a signature or multiple signature), the trusted authority 112 may store information in the validation database 128 that can later be used by the signature validation module 120 to analyze and validate data received from a tag 108 during a tag validation procedure. As can be appreciated, some or all of the validation database 128 may be external to the trusted authority 112 or some or all of it may be incorporated into the trusted authority 112. The data exchanges between the trusted authority 112 and validation database 128 may be performed using a known database exchange language (e.g., Structured Query Language (SQL)). Alternatively, or in addition, the trusted authority 112 and validation database 128 may exchange data using a non-structured language or any other type of known communication protocol, such as those described above in connection with the data exchanges between the phone 104 and trusted authority 112.
The validation database 128 may store validation information (e.g., information regarding signature that have been created, keys that were used to encrypt signatures, data that has been written to tags and validated with a signature, and/or any other information that has been distributed or received by the trusted authority 112) as well as information that describes the tag(s) 108 to which the validation information has been distributed. More specifically, the validation database 128 may comprise information that maps a validation signature to a particular tag 108 (e.g., via UID or some other tag information that is specific to a particular tag 108). The validation database 128 may comprise a hierarchical database, a simple table, a pivot table, a spreadsheet, or any other data storage format that is known in the computing arts.
A method of writing secure data to the tag 108 will now be described in connection with the system 100 depicted in
A next step, which actually may be performed before or after step S101, involves the phone 104 obtaining tag data from the tag 108 (step S102). In this step, the phone 104 may operate in a Reader/Writer Mode and activate an IC chip contained in the tag 108. Upon being activated, the tag 108 may transmit data stored in the IC chip (e.g., in memory) back to the phone 104. In some embodiments, the phone 104 and tag 108 follow the data exchange protocols defined for NFC communications. In some embodiments, the phone 104 and tag 108 follow data exchange protocols defined for Bluetooth communications. As a non-limiting example, the tag 108 may provide its UID back to the phone 104 in step S102. The UID and any other information stored on the NFC tag 108 (e.g., site code, manufacturer code, tag type, etc.) may be provided back to the phone 104 in one or more messages transmitted according to predefined data-exchange requirements. The data stored in the NFC tag 108 may be stored in accordance with the NFC Data Encoding Format (NDEF) and may be transmitted to the phone 104 via one or more NDEF messages. Although the arrow depicted in connection with step S102 is shown to be unidirectional from the tag 108 to the phone 104, it should be appreciated that data exchanges between the phone 104 and tag 108 in this step may be bidirectional.
After steps S101 and S102 have been executed, irrespective of order, the method continues with the phone 104 sending the data collected from the tag 108 (e.g., the tag's UID), the data collected from the user 116, and/or metadata information (e.g., timestamp information describing when the transmission or data collection occurred, geolocation information, GPS information, network information, and/or any other information describing the circumstances surrounding the data collection event) to the trusted authority 112 (step S103). Based on the information received from the phone 104 (e.g., tag UID, user-entered information, metadata information, etc.), the trusted authority 112 invokes the signature creation module 124 to generate a unique validation signature and possibly encrypt the unique validation signature. Details of the validation signature or the encryption of the validation signature may be stored in the validation database 128 to allow the trusted authority 112 to validate the tag 108 at a later time.
In some embodiments, the validation signature may be computed by providing some or all of the inputs received from the phone into a cryptographic hash function (e.g., MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, SHA-256, SHA-512, etc.), an XOR function, or the like. The resulting value obtained by processing the inputs received from the phone may be referred to as a validation signature. The trusted authority 112 may then further secure or encrypt the validation signature with one or more encryption keys to create an encrypted validation signature. As can be appreciated, the encrypted validation signature may be generated using a private key from a symmetrical or asymmetrical key pair. More specifically, the validation signature can be signed with a private key from a symmetric private-private key pair, a private key from an asymmetric private-private key pair, or a private key from a private-public key pair. It may be desirable to use a private-public key pair if analysis of the validation signature will ultimately be performed by an entity other than the trusted authority that is creating the validation signature. If, however, circumstances dictate that analysis of the validation signature should be performed by the entity that created the validation signature, then it may be desirable to use a private-private key pair.
The trusted authority 112 then transmits the validation signature, the encrypted validation signature, any public validation keys, the user-entered information, the metadata, and/or other information used to create the validation signature back to the phone 104 (step S104). Some or all of the payload may be transmitted to the phone 104 in one or more electronic messages or as attachment(s) to one or more electronic messages transmitted over a communication network.
The phone 104, still operating in the Reader/Writer Mode, then writes some or all of the data received from the trusted authority 112 to the tag 108 (step S105). In particular, it may not be necessary to re-write the tag data back to the tag 108, since it already exists there, but it may be desirable to write the user-entered information, the validation signature, the encrypted validation signature, and/or any metadata used to create the validation signature onto the tag 108. Some or all of this data payload may be written and stored in memory of the tag 108 as one or more NDEF records. The validation signature may be stored in a secure (e.g., encrypted, write-protected, etc.) area of memory or an unsecure area of memory. The phone 104 may also display information to the user 116 indicating that the payload (e.g., validation signature, encrypted validation signature, user-entered information, metadata, etc.) has been successfully written to the tag 108.
With reference now to
The phone 104 then transmits the read data (e.g., the validation signature, the user-information, and/or the UID of the tag 108) to the trusted authority 112 for validation (step S202). It should also be appreciated that the entity or device (e.g., server) that prepared and provided the validation signature for the tag 108 does not necessarily have to be the same entity or device that validates the validation signature stored on the tag 108. In other words, the phone 104 may communicate with a different server during validation than was used during the creation of the signature. In some embodiments, the information provided by the tag 108 may identify which server(s) (e.g., by URL, URI, port number, etc.) the phone 104 should transmit the information to in step S202.
The trusted authority 112 then invokes the signature validation module 120 to analyze the information received from the phone 104. In some embodiments, the trusted authority 112 may compare the validation signature with a validation signature stored in the validation database 128 for the tag 108 that transmitted the validation signature. In other embodiments, the trusted authority 112 may receive the tag data, the user-entered data (stored on the tag 108), the metadata (stored on the tag 108) and re-calculate a second validation signature. The second validation signature may be compared with the validation signature that was originally written to the tag 108. Moreover, the comparison may be performed on encrypted versions of the validation signatures. In other embodiments, if the trusted authority 112 only receives an encrypted validation signature from the tag 108, then the encrypted validation signature may first be decrypted before it is compared with another validation signature. It may also be possible to extract the data from the validation signature (e.g., original tag data, user-entered information, metadata, etc.) and compare that data with similar data stored in the validation database 128.
The method continues with the trusted authority 112 providing results of the validation analysis back to the phone (step S203). The results provided back to the phone 104 may include an acknowledgement or denial of validation. If the validation was denied, the trusted authority 112 may not send any information back to the phone 104 or a null message may be transmitted back to the phone 104.
Upon receiving the message from the trusted authority 112 (or upon failure to receive a message within a predetermined amount of time of sending the data in step S202) the phone 104 may provide a visual indication of the NFC notary's 112 validation analysis to the user 116 (step S204). In some embodiments, the phone 104 may provide a visual or audible indication that the validation of the tag's 108 validation signature was successful and the tag 108 is valid. This may also indicate that the object 102 with which the tag 108 is associated is also authentic (e.g., assuming that there has been no tampering with the association between the tag 108 and object 102). Any type of visual or audible indication can be provided in step S204. As an example, the phone 104 may present a trademark or logo associated with the tag 108 and/or object 102. Additionally, or alternatively, the phone 104 may perform one or more predetermined actions (step S205) in response to receiving the results of the signature validation. As an example, the phone 104 may automatically initiate a call to a predetermined number, generate and/or send a message to a predetermined recipient or address, launch a web browser to a predetermined webpage, display a predetermined image, prompt the user 116 for additional information, or combinations thereof.
With reference now to
Furthermore, upon successful access validation, the phone 104 may be configured to inform the trusted authority 112 that it has successfully gained access to an asset of the premises 308 at the first reader 304A (step S302). As with the system 200, it should be appreciated that the phone 104 used in this method does not necessarily have to correspond to the phone 104 that wrote the validation signature to a tag 108 or a phone 108 that was used to validate a tag 108. Likewise, the trusted authority 112 that receives the information from the phone 104 in step S302 does not necessarily have to be the same entity or device that provided a signed validation signature for writing to a tag 108 or that validated a tag 108.
Upon receiving the indication of successful access validation, the trusted authority 112 may obtain and return application tag keys that are useable within the premises 308 (step S303). These additional tag keys can then be written to the other readers 304B-N within the premises 308. Alternatively or additionally, the additional tag keys can be used by the phone 104 to gain access to assets protected by the other readers 304B-N in the premises 308.
The premises 308 may correspond to a building, multiple buildings, rooms within a building, rooms in a hotel, a computer network, or some other collection of assets that are distributed or co-located with one another and under the ownership/protection of a single entity (e.g., a company, a person, a school, a hotel, etc.). The other readers 304B-N may or may not correspond to non-networked readers. Each of the readers 304A-N may be configured to protect physical and/or logical assets.
With reference now to
The method begins when the phone 104 reads data from the tag 108 (step S401). This step may be similar or identical to step S201. Thereafter, the phone 104 may invoke an internally-maintained version of the signature validation module 120 (step S402). This step may be similar or identical to the validation steps performed by the trusted authority 112 except that the phone 104 refers to the validation database 128, which may be internal to the phone 104 or external to the phone 104, and performs the analysis of the validation signature and/or tag UID received from the tag 108. In this particular embodiment, it may be desirable for the phone 104 to use a public key that corresponds to a private key that was used to generate the encrypted validation signature, if the validation signature was encrypted with such a private key. This enables multiple different phones 104 to validate the same validation signature on the tag 108 without compromising the private key that was used to encrypt the validation signature.
Based on the results of the validation analysis, the phone 104 may perform one or more predetermined actions and/or provide indications of the validation results to the user 116 (step S403). This step may be similar or identical to step S204 and/or step S205.
With reference now to
The memory 504 generally comprises software routines facilitating, in operation, pre-determined functionality of the phone 104. The memory 504 may be implemented using various types of electronic memory generally including at least one array of non-volatile memory cells (e.g., PROM, EPROM, EEPROM, etc.) and/or at least one array of DRAM cells. Some portions of the memory 504 may be pre-programmed and write-protected thereafter, whereas other portions of the memory 504 may selectively be modified or erased. The memory 504 can either be a temporary data storage location or a permanent data storage location. Accordingly, the memory 504 may alternatively, or additionally, include long-term memory devices, such as RAM, ROM, a magnetic storage device, a solid-state storage device, an optical storage device, a logic circuit, or any combination of such devices. It should further be appreciated that the programs and data that may be maintained in the memory 504 can comprise software, firmware or hardware logic, depending on the particular implementation of memory 504.
In some embodiments, instructions contained in memory 504 can be implemented or executed by the processor 524. Alternatively, or in addition, various capabilities of the phone 104 may be implemented in firmware 528.
The processor 524 may include any general-purpose programmable processor, digital signal processor (DSP) or controller for executing application programming. Alternatively, the processor 524 may comprise a specially configured application specific integrated circuit (ASIC). The processor 524 generally functions to run programming code implementing various functions performed by the phone 104.
Some of the applications or sets of instructions that may be stored in memory 504 and/or firmware 528 include an Operating System (O/S) 508, an access control module 512, a signature validation module 516, and/or a notary module 520. The O/S 508 may be a high-level application that executes the primary operational functions of the phone 104 such as power-up functions, tamper detection functions, communication functions, and any other function that supports the basic operation of the phone 104.
The access control module 512 may contain instructions that enable the phone 104 to perform access control operations (e.g., determine access permissions for itself) and/or instructions for providing access credentials from the phone 104 to a reader (e.g., in Card Emulation Mode). Accordingly, in some embodiments the access control module 512 may contain instructions that cause the phone 104 to analyze reader/door information, timestamp information, etc. in connection with making an access control decision. Alternatively, or additionally, the access control module 512 may comprise one or more access control credentials that can be transmitted to a reader for verification thereby.
It should be appreciated that some or all of the access control module 512 may be provided on a control panel or host computer that is located remote from the phone 104 and a reader 304A-N. The access control module 512 is depicted as being included in the phone 104 only to simplify the description and should not be construed as limiting embodiments of the invention.
The signature validation module 516 and notary module 520 may be similar or identical to the signature validation modules and notary module discussed in connection with the trusted authority 112. The only difference is that one or both modules 516, 520 may be executed locally by the phone 104 and the need for an external trusted service may not be required in all circumstances.
The user interface 532 may comprise a user input and/or user output. Examples of user outputs that may be included in the user interface 532 include one or more lights, speakers, LEDs, an array of LEDs, plasma displays, and so on. Examples of suitable user inputs that may be used for the user interface 532 include one or more of a button, microphone, keyboard, PIN pad, keypad, group of buttons, camera, etc. The user interface 532 may also comprise a combination user input and user output, such as a touch-sensitive display (e.g., capacitive sense display, optical finger navigation device, etc.).
The NFC interface 536 may provide the hardware and drivers that enable the phone 104 to exchange data with the tag 108 and any other NFC-enabled device (e.g., another NFC-enabled phone when operating in a Peer-to-Peer mode). The NFC interface 536 may also comprise a generic credential interface (e.g., non-NFC-compatible portion) that utilizes contact-based and/or contactless communications other than NFC. In some embodiments, the NFC interface 536 may facilitate the reading of NFC tags 108 as well as other non-NFC-enabled devices (e.g., magstripe cards, Wiegand cards, smart cards, proximity cards or prox cards, QR codes, barcodes, optical cards, etc.). A viable alternative to the NFC interface 536 is a Bluetooth interface.
The network interface 540 may correspond to a device or collection of devices that enable the phone 104 to connect with and exchange messages over a communication network (e.g., cellular network, TCP/IP network, SNMP network, etc.). Accordingly, the network interface 540 may comprise multiple different devices or communication ports. Examples of the network interface 540 include, without limitation, a network interface card, a modem, a USB port, a parallel port, a serial port, a Small Computer Systems Interface (SCSI) port, an RS-232 port, a Wiegand port, an Ethernet port, an infrared port, an RF interface, a cellular communication interface, an 802.11N network interface, and/or other wired or wireless communication network interfaces.
The power supply 544 may comprise an internal source of power (e.g., a battery). Alternatively, or in addition, the power supply 544 may comprise a specially-adapted port along with a power conditioner configured to convert AC power from an external outlet into DC power that is useable by the phone 104. The power supply 544 may further comprise the ability to charge the internal source of power with power from an external source.
With reference now to
The IC chip 620 may correspond to any type of integrated circuit, processor, microprocessor, and/or memory device. As noted above, in some embodiments, the memory 604 is incorporated into the IC chip 620.
The NFC interface 624 may correspond to an antenna, multiple antennas, and/or drivers thereof that enable the tag 108 to communicate with the NFC interface 540 of the phone 104. In particular, the NFC interface 624 may help create an air core coupler with the NFC interface 540.
It should be appreciated that the tag 108 may correspond to an NFC Forum Tag or a non-NFC Forum tag. In particular, the tag 108 may correspond to any type of NFC tag that is capable of storing NDEF formatted data and operates with ISO 14443 or ISO 15693 infrastructure and NFC devices as defined by the NFC Forum. An NFC Forum Tag is compatible to one of four NFC Forum Tag platforms capable of storing NDEF formatted data. ICODE or Mifare™ Classics can be NFC tag, but not NFC Forum Tags. Mifare UltraLight™, ULC, NTAG, DESFire, SmartMX, Topax, and FeliCa can be NFC Forum Tags. As noted above, the tags 108 can be provided in various shapes and sizes.
With reference now to
At some point, the data structure 700 may be updated to include user data 708. The user data 708 may be added to the data structure 700 by the phone 104 or by some other device that reads the tag 108. In some embodiments, the user data 708 may store any type of user-entered information described above, such as URLs, names, descriptions of service, descriptions of conditions of the object 102, PINs, passwords, etc. Depending upon the type of information stored in the user data 708, the data may be encrypted or password protected to protect the data. Although not depicted, the use data 708 may also include metadata describing the user-entered information or any other conditions surrounding the entry of the user data.
The data structure 700 may be further amended to include a validation signature 712. As discussed above, the validation signature 712 may be generated based on the information contained in the tag data 704 and/or user data 708. The validation signature 712 may correspond to a value generated with a cryptographic hash function, an XOR function, or a similar signature-generating algorithm. Thus, the validation signature 712 can be used to validate the user data 708 that will eventually be written onto the tag 108, especially if the validation signature 712 is also written to the tag.
In some embodiments, the validation signature 712 may be encrypted with one or more encryption keys 716 to produce an encrypted validation signature 720. As can be appreciated, it may be desirable to only provide the encrypted validation signature 720 to the phone 104 for writing to the tag 108. In other embodiments, it may be desirable to write the validation signature 712 to the tag 108. Depending upon the type of encryption keys 716 used, it may be desirable to maintain the encryption keys in a secure location (e.g., validation database 128, trusted authority 112, etc.). In some embodiments, it may be desirable to distribute at least a public encryption key 716 to facilitate local signature validation. In some embodiments, the final data structure 700 may be stored in the validation database 128 whereas only parts of the final data structure 700 may be provided back to the phone 104 for writing to the tag 108 or for local storage at the phone 104.
As noted above, many different use cases can be envisioned wherein trusted tag(s) can be employed. A few non-limiting examples will be discussed in turn.
Brand Protection/Authenticity Verification
An inherent advantage to using trusted tag(s) and specifically NFC technologies for brand protection is that the provider of the product or service (e.g., the Brand) can mark their products or services with trusted tags. Private keys can be distributed to any entity that wants to verify whether a particular product or service is a genuine product or service provided by the Brand. Thus, local validation as described in connection with
An inherent advantage to using trusted tags is that the Brand can learn more about their end customers. Specifically, NFC technologies would enable the Brand to know more about the consumer's purchasing habits to propose additional services (e.g., warranty extensions, special offers, events, etc.). The Brand can also learn more about the sale event in near-real-time thereby allowing them to better manage the global and local supply chain, better control the grey market, and better detect a stolen product and revoke its warranty. In essence, the Brand will be allowed to limit the cost of counterfeit products being sent back to repair in exchange for a genuine one.
Notarization
Notarization services are often required for substantial financial transaction and legal transactions. Current notarization requires a notary to sign or attest to a signature or action and then provide a notary seal on the piece of paper that was signed by the notary. Embodiments of the present disclosure enable an electronic notary that is far more sophisticated and secure that traditional notary services.
In the common fashion, a notary may witness a signature or action and place a tag 108 on an object 102 being notarized. Often times the object 102 will correspond to a piece of paper or a document (e.g., a will, trust, Power of Attorney, cashier's check, piece of commercial paper, etc.), but embodiments of the present disclosure are not so limited. Specifically, the tag 108 can be associated with any type of object 102 by placing the tag 108 on or near the object 102 being notarized. In the example of a piece of paper or a document, the notary may place a sticker-type tag 108 on the piece of paper or document and scan the tag 108 with their phone 104. Alternatively, the paper or document may have the tag 108 embedded therein and the tag 108 can be simply read with the phone 104.
The notary may then enter their user name, PIN, password, picture, etc. to verify their identity and the fact that they are empowered to be a notary. The phone 104 may transmit the information obtained from the tag, the information entered by the notary, and any metadata describing the circumstances around the notary event (e.g., time of day, day, month, year, etc.) to the trusted authority 112.
Upon receiving the information from the tag 108, the trusted authority 112 may generate one or more validation signatures, possibly encrypt the signature(s), and transmit the validation signature(s) back to the phone 104. The phone 104 may then write the validation signature(s) along with some or all of the information entered by the notary into their phone 104 back to the tag 108. This data may be stored by the tag 108 such that it can be subsequently read by other devices to ensure that the notary was valid.
Dual Notarization
Similar to the notarization example described above, dual notarization may be employed where two different users notarize the tag 108. For example, many legal documents and the like require two witness signatures (e.g., notarizations) rather than a single notarization. In a dual notarization example, the first notary may scan the tag 108 and enter their user name, PIN, password, picture, etc. to verify their identity and the fact that they are empowered to be a notary. Then the second notary may scan the tag 108 and enter their user name, PIN, password, picture, etc. to verify their identity and the fact that they are also empowered to be a notary.
In one embodiment, the first and second notary may both use the same phone 104 to scan the tag 108. In this scenario, the phone 104 may store the first notary's information until the second notary enters their information. Once information for both notaries have been received at the phone 104, then the phone may send along the captured information to the trusted authority 112 where it is processed similarly to the way in which the single notary information was processed. If a single phone 104 is being used by both notaries, then it may be possible to only require the phone 104 to read the tag 108 once rather than twice. Likewise, a single transaction between the phone 104 and tag 108 may be executed to write the validation signature onto the tag 108 (e.g., the validation signature may contain information for both notaries).
In another embodiment, the first and second notary may use different phones 104 to read the tag 108. Each notary may enter their user name, PIN, password, picture, etc. to verify their identity and the fact that they are empowered to be a notary. Each notary's phone 104 may then independently send the captured information to the trusted authority 112. The trusted authority 112 may then generate two separate validation signatures and send each signature back to the appropriate phone 104. Thereafter, each phone 104 may write its validation signature onto the tag 108. Alternatively, the trusted authority 112 may capture the information from both phones 104 and combine such data to generate a single validation signature. That single validation signature may be sent to one of the two phones 104 for writing back to the tag 108.
Chain-of-Custody
Another example scenario in which a trusted tag can be utilized is in chain-of-custody. Such scenarios may occur for pieces of evidence, where chain-of-custody is highly important to show. Other scenarios include car ownership, fine art ownership, bailment, etc. Specifically, if chain-of-custody is ever required to be proven or shown for an object 102, a tag 108 may be associated with that object 102. Whenever custody of the object 102 is to change from one entity to another, the trusted tag 108 may have a new validation signature written thereto describing the transfer of custody. The transferring entity, the receiving entity, or both may read the tag 108 with a phone 104 and then enter into their phone 104 any necessary information to describe the situation surrounding the transfer of custody (e.g., names of entities, description of object 102, description of condition of object 102, etc.). This user-entered information along with the tag data and/or metadata can be used to generate one or more validation signatures. These validation signatures can then be written to the tag 108 along with some or all of the user-entered information describing the transfer of the object 102.
Signatures (for Creative or Copyrighted Works)
Some objects 102 by their very nature require a signature that will need to be validated at some later time. Examples of such objects include copyrighted works (e.g., paintings, sculptures, photos, etc.). These objects 102 may want to be controlled by the copyright owner as well as validated by potential purchasers. Using the non-limiting example of an original painting, once the artist has completed the painting, the artist may affix a tag 108 to the painting or to something near the painting (e.g., a frame, backing, etc.). Then the artist may implement the methods discussed herein (e.g., the signature process described in connection with
If the creative work corresponds to one copy of a limited number of copies (e.g., copy number 35 of 200 copies of a photo distributed by the photographer), then additional metadata that may be written to the tag 108 (and possibly used to generate the validation signature) may include the 35 of 200 information along with information surrounding when the copy was created, who created the copy, etc.
Secure Logging
Some objects 102 require a specific level of service and the service for such objects 102 is required to be tracked meticulously—sometimes to ensure that warranties are not voided, sometimes to ensure that public safety is maintained, etc. Examples of such objects 102 include high-value objects (e.g., cars, jewelry, clothing, electronics, etc.) as well as other objects like planes and plane parts. When service is performed on such objects, it is current practice to maintain a service log for that object 102. However, the service log is often maintained separate from the object (e.g., on a separate piece of paper). Embodiments of the present disclosure can be employed to maintain the service log on a tag 108 that has been associated with the object 102. For example, if a high-value object is being serviced, then the service technician can write some data regarding the service onto the tag 108 and that data can also be used to generate the validation signature that is written to the tag 108. Specifically, the service technician may enter information describing the service that was performed and the condition of the object 102. It may also be desirable to use geolocation metadata to (1) generate the validation signature and (2) prove that the service occurred at a qualified service location.
Printed Warranty/Document Validation
Much like create and copyrighted works, some documents require validation. Examples of such documents include certified warranties, title documents, legal agreements, etc. When documents of such high value require validation, it may be possible to produce the document with an intergated tag 108 (e.g., the tag 108 may be integrated within a sheet of paper or multiple sheets of paper). Prior to distributing the document, the mechanisms of
Certified Appraisal
Yet another example where a trusted tag 108 can be employed is with certified appraisals. This scenario is similar to the notary or document validation example except that the appraiser may provide user-entered information in the form of the appraisal value, when the appraisal occurred, a description of the object 102 during the appraisal, etc. This information can be used to generate the validation signature as well as be written onto the tag 108.
In the foregoing description, for the purposes of illustration, methods were described in a particular order. It should be appreciated that in alternate embodiments, the methods and steps thereof may be performed in a different order than that described. It should also be appreciated that the methods described above may be performed by hardware components or may be embodied in sequences of machine-executable instructions, which may be used to cause a machine, such as a general-purpose or special-purpose processor or logic circuits programmed with the instructions to perform the methods. These machine-executable instructions may be stored on one or more machine readable mediums, such as CD-ROMs or other type of optical disks, floppy diskettes, ROMs, RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, SIMs, SAMs, magnetic or optical cards, flash memory, or other types of machine-readable mediums suitable for storing electronic instructions. Alternatively, the methods may be performed by a combination of hardware and software.
Specific details were given in the description to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments. However, it will be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art that the embodiments may be practiced without these specific details. For example, circuits may be shown in block diagrams in order not to obscure the embodiments in unnecessary detail. In other instances, well-known circuits, processes, algorithms, structures, and techniques may be shown without unnecessary detail in order to avoid obscuring the embodiments.
Also, it is noted that the embodiments were described as a process which is depicted as a flowchart, a flow diagram, a data flow diagram, a structure diagram, or a block diagram. Although a flowchart may describe the operations as a sequential process, many of the operations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition, the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process is terminated when its operations are completed, but could have additional steps not included in the figure. A process may correspond to a method, a function, a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, etc. When a process corresponds to a function, its termination corresponds to a return of the function to the calling function or the main function.
Furthermore, embodiments may be implemented by hardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description languages, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, firmware, middleware or microcode, the program code or code segments to perform the necessary tasks may be stored in a machine readable medium such as storage medium. A processor(s) may perform the necessary tasks. A code segment may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment may be coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc. may be passed, forwarded, or transmitted via any suitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing, network transmission, etc.
While illustrative embodiments of the disclosure have been described in detail herein, it is to be understood that the inventive concepts may be otherwise variously embodied and employed, and that the appended claims are intended to be construed to include such variations, except as limited by the prior art.
This application is a national stage application under 35 U.S.C. 371 of PCT Application No. PCT/IB2013/002617 having an international filing date of Sep. 5, 2013, which designated the United States, which PCT application claimed the benefit of U.S. Application Ser. No. 61/698,731, filed Sep. 10, 2012, both of which are incorporated by reference in their entirety.
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PCT/IB2013/002617 | 9/5/2013 | WO | 00 |
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WO2014/037812 | 3/13/2014 | WO | A |
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