The present disclosure relates to a method for controlling and regulating an internal combustion engine having a common rail system and having a passive pressure limiting valve for discharging fuel out of a rail into the fuel tank, by means of which method the pressure limiting valve may be monitored.
In one known method, a passive pressure limiting valve is monitored for opening. An open pressure limiting valve is detected according to a load shedding, in that the rail pressure exceeds a threshold value, subsequently a steady-state status of the combustion engine is detected, and supplementally a characteristic value of the rail pressure control loop deviates significantly from a reference value. The integral portion of the rail pressure regulator and, for example, a PWM signal for controlling the suction throttle are understood as characteristic values of the rail pressure control loop.
In a second known approach, a method is provided for monitoring a passive pressure limitation valve according to a load shedding. In a first stage, proceeding from a steady-state rail pressure, for example 1800 bar, it checks whether the rail pressure has exceeded a first, higher threshold value, for example 1850 bar. In a second stage, it then checks whether the rail pressure has exceeded a second, still higher threshold value, for example 1920 bar, despite a temporary increase in the control signal for the suction throttle. If both threshold values have been exceeded, then the pressure limiting valve is set as open. Based on the control of the pressure limiting valve, the case can indeed occur in practice that the pressure limiting valve is indeed detected as open by the evaluation program, however, it is still actually closed. The consequence is an operator false alarm and an erroneous follow-up response.
In one aspect of the second approach described above, a method is provided which checks whether the rail pressure has exceeded the second threshold value and subsequently fallen below a further threshold value having a lower pressure level than the second threshold value. Having fallen below the further threshold value, the rail pressure control deviation is then monitored for a predetermined time period. If the rail pressure control deviation is constantly greater than, for example, 20 bar during this time period, then, upon expiration of the time, the pressure limiting valve is set as open. It is critical that a pressure limiting valve can tend towards leakage once it has been opened and can cause undesired leakage during normal operation. The leakage corresponds to that fuel volume flow which discharges undesirably into the fuel tank via the pressure limiting valve. In turn, the leakage also affects a decreasing total efficiency, as the high-pressure pump must convey more fuel into the rail so that the rail pressure is achieved. In the advanced stage, the high-pressure pump can no longer maintain the set rail pressure, that means, the engine output drops and the exhaust values deteriorate with a clearly visible opacity.
One aspect of the exemplary illustrations described herein is to detect an actually opened pressure limiting valve for a conventional common rail system and to determine a handling recommendation.
The problem is addressed by claim 1. Other exemplary approaches are presented in the dependent claims.
According to one exemplary approach, in a first stage, the pressure limiting valve is set as open if, within a first critical time, proceeding from a steady-state rail pressure, the rail pressure exceeds a first threshold value and subsequently falls below a second threshold value. The first threshold value is characterized by a higher pressure level than the steady-state rail pressure, and the second threshold value is characterized by a lower pressure level than the first threshold value. Supplementally, the opening duration of the pressure limiting valve is then monitored, in that upon setting an open pressure limiting valve, a first time limit, for example three hours, and a second time limit, for example five hours, for further operation, are determined. Upon timeout of the first time limit, a yellow alarm is initiated to warn the operator, and after timeout of the second time limit, a red alarm is initiated as a recommendation to replace the pressure limiting valve. The underlying rational for this solution is that the operating duration for the open pressure limiting valve is decisive for the evaluation as to whether the pressure limiting valve is still leak-proof after restarting, or already tends toward leaking.
If a manual engine stop is triggered by the operator, then the opening duration is stored upon detection of the stopped internal combustion engine. Following a restart of the internal combustion engine, the saved opening duration then continues to be counted, if the pressure limiting valve is again set as open during normal operation and the opening duration thereof is monitored.
The first stage of the monitoring of the overpressure valve already offers a safe method for detecting an open overpressure valve. The simple parameterization and implementation of the method are the most important advantages. The only measurement required is which rail pressure is set as the maximum in the case of an open overpressure valve. This is the case during maximum engine speed and minimum load. The second threshold value must then be selected as somewhat greater than this resulting rail pressure value. The first critical time can likewise be easily parameterized, in that an opening procedure is designated and the time is measured from exceeding the first threshold value and from falling below the second threshold value. Since a pressure drop that is caused by a control process, e.g. by load shedding, lasts significantly long, a sufficient buffer time can also be considered. The simple parameterization becomes especially clear in comparison to a method in which the rail pressure gradient is evaluated. In this case, the type of gradient calculation, among others, is very important, since the maximum negative rail pressure gradient is determined and must be compared to the maximum negative rail pressure gradient in controlled operation, in order to obtain a criterion for detecting an open overpressure valve.
A safety advantage can be achieved in that the single-stage method can be supplemented by a second stage, which is used as a further criterion in addition to the rail pressure control deviation. Specifically, an exemplary method may include setting the pressure limiting valve as open if, after a positively detected first stage, an uninterrupted absolute value of the rail pressure control deviation greater than/equal to a threshold value was detected within a second critical time in the second stage. Therefore, the operator can be alerted in time when the overpressure valve becomes leaky. The operator can thereby replace the pressure limiting valve in time, before an output drop occurs in the internal combustion engine or a deterioration of emissions occurs or black smoke formation occurs, caused by a leaky pressure limiting valve.
In addition to the opening duration, the frequency of the opening procedures may also be supplementally detected. Thus, a yellow alarm is initiated for a first number of opening procedures, and a red alarm is initiated for a second number of opening procedures. The rationale underlying this solution is also the fact that, in addition to the operating duration with an open pressure limiting valve, the number of opening procedures is also decisive for the evaluation as to whether the pressure limiting valve is still leak-proof after restarting or already tends toward leaking.
Exemplary illustrations are described in further detail below, with reference to the figures. As seen in:
The operating mode of the internal combustion engine 1 is determined by an electronic control unit (ECU) 10. The electronic control unit 10 contains the conventional components for a microcomputer system, for example, a microprocessor, I/O modules, buffer and memory components (EEPROM, RAM). Operating data relevant for the operation of the internal combustion engine 1 is applied in characteristic maps/characteristic curves in the memory components. Using said characteristic maps/characteristic curves, the electronic control unit 10 calculates the output variables from the input variables. In
At time t0, the rail pressure pCR corresponds to the steady-state rail pressure pSTAT=2200 bar. After this time, triggered, e.g., by a wire break for the suction throttle and thus a completely open suction throttle, an increase in the rail pressure occurs. At time t1, the rail pressure pCR reaches the first threshold value pLi1. At time t1, a first critical time tKr1 begins to run, which ends at time t3. If, within the first critical time tKr1, a drop of the rail pressure pCR occurs to at least a second threshold value pLi2, then an open pressure limiting valve is detected. This is the case in
Upon detection of an open pressure limiting valve, the monitoring of the open time starts at time t2. If the pressure limiting valve is operated in a open state during a first time limit tLi1, then upon timeout of the first time limit tLi1, for example tLi1=3 hours, a yellow alarm is triggered. This is the case at time t4. The process variable D1 changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1. The operator is warned via the yellow alarm. If the pressure limiting valve is also operated in an open state during the second time limit tLi2, for example tLi2=5 hours, then a red alarm is triggered upon timeout of the second time limit tLi2. This is the case at time t5. The process variable D2 changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1. The internal combustion engine is subsequently turned off by the operator, so that at time t6, an engine stop is detected. The process variable Mst (engine stop) thereby changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1. The pressure limiting valve is now closed, the process variable PLV changes from a value of 1 to a value of 0. The pressure limiting valve should now be replaced by a new valve. If this is carried out, then at time t7, the reset button is pressed, by which means the RS signal changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1. By this means, the alarms are reset, i.e. the two process variables D1 (yellow alarm) and D2 (red alarm) are reset again to a value of 0. The monitoring of the pressure limiting valve can now restart again.
If the internal combustion engine is turned off before the opening time of the first time limit tLi1, or has exceeded the second time limit tLi2, then the current opening time is stored upon detecting the engine stop. If, following a restart of the internal combustion engine at a later time, an open pressure limiting valve is detected again, then the stored opening time is recounted and monitored for limit violation. Safety is increased by these measures, in that an undesired leakage in normal operation due to a previously opened pressure limiting valve is prevented.
The process in the time frame t0 to t3 corresponds to that of
At time t1, an open pressure limiting valve is detected after the rail pressure pCR first exceeded the first threshold pLi1 and subsequently fell below the second threshold pLi2. The signal PLV changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1. The number of opening procedures is counted and stored in the counter C. Since at the time t1, the first opening procedure is detected, the counter status changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1. The internal combustion engine is now turned off. At time t2, the engine stop is detected, i.e. the signal Mst (engine stop) changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1. The signal PLV is reset. The internal combustion engine is now restated, so that at time t3 a running internal combustion engine is detected. This means that the signal Mst (engine stop) is reset at this time. At time t4, an open overpressure valve is detected for a second time. The counter C is incrementally increased to the value two. The variable PLV simultaneously takes on a value of 1 again. The internal combustion engine is turned off again, so that at time t5 an engine stop is detected, i.e. the variable engine stop Mst is set to a value of 1 again. The variable PLV is reset to a value of 0. In the following, the number of opening procedures is further counted, i.e. the counter C is incremented at each additional opening procedure. If the pressure limiting valve has opened a total of nD1 times, for example 30 times, then a yellow alarm is triggered, i.e. in this case the variable D1 changes from a value of 0 to a value of 1 (time t7). If the overpressure valve has finally opened nD2 times, for example 50 times, then a red alarm is triggered at time t10. At time t11, an engine stop is detected, the variable Mst is set to a value of 1. At the latest, a replacement of the pressure limiting valve should take place at the current time. If this replacement is carried out, then the reset RS is triggered at time t12, by which means the two alarms D1 and D2 are reset to a value of 0. The counter C, which describes the number of opening procedures, is likewise reset to a value of 0. By this means, the monitoring of the pressure limiting valve can now start anew.
If the check at S3 results in that identifier1 is set (i.e., query result S3:yes), then at S7 the time t1 is compared with a first critical time tKr1. This time t1 serves to check whether the second threshold value pLi2 has been reached or underrun within the first critical time tKr1. If time t1 is greater than the critical time tKr1 (i.e., query result S7:yes), then the identifier1 and the time t1 are reset to values of 0 at S16 and S17, respectively. Afterwards, the program continues at S20. If the first critical time tKr1 was not exceeded by time t1 (i.e., query result S7:no), then the program checks at S8 whether the rail pressure pCR has reached or fallen below a second threshold value pLi2. In one example, a typical value for the second threshold value is pLi2=1000 bar. If this is not the case, then at S9 the time t1 is incremented and the program course is continued at point A. If it was determined at S8 that the rail pressure pCR has reached or fallen below the second threshold value pLi2, then the time t1 is reset to a value t1=0 at S10. The first stage of the monitoring method is thus concluded.
Now at S11 the program checks whether the monitoring method should be implemented in two stages. If the second stage is set (i.e., query result S11:yes), then at S18 the identifier2 is set to a value of 1 and at S19 the time t2 is incremented. This time t2 serves to check whether a rail pressure control deviation ep was steadily present within a second critical time tKr2 during a timeframe dtdp, which absolute value of the control deviation dp is greater than or the same as the threshold value dpLi. If only the single-stage monitoring method is set (i.e., query result S11:no), then at S12 the identifier1 is reset to the value identifier1=0 and at S13 the identifier3 is set to the value identifier3=1, i.e. in this case an open pressure limiting valve is detected. Subsequently, at S14 the counter C, which indicates how often the pressure limiting valve has opened, is incremented. At S15, in a third subroutine UP3, the counter status is queried. The third subroutine UP3 is explained further below in connection with
The first subroutine UP1 is depicted in
The second subroutine UP2 is depicted in
If it is determined at S2 that the rail pressure control deviation ep is less than the threshold value dpLi (i.e., query response S2:no), then at S15 the time t3 is reset to a value of 0. Subsequently, the program checks at S16 whether the rail pressure control deviation ep is less than or equal to dpLi. If this is not the case (i.e., query result S16:no), then at S21 the time t4 is reset to a value of 0, and at S22 the time t12 is incremented. If, in contrast, the condition at S16 is fulfilled (i.e., query result S16:yes), then at S17 the program checks whether the time t4 is greater than or equal to the threshold value dtdp. If this is not the case (i.e., query result S17:no), then at S23 the time t4 and at S24 the time t2 are incremented. Afterwards, the program branches into the main program of
The third subroutine UP3 is depicted in
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
102011100187.9 | May 2011 | DE | national |
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind | 371c Date |
---|---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2012/001815 | 4/27/2012 | WO | 00 | 1/10/2014 |