The invention relates to a method for detecting nuclear material by neutron interrogation. The invention also relates to a system for detecting nuclear material which uses the method of the invention.
Nuclear material can be detected by conventional passive measurements, provided there is no shielding forming a screen, between the nuclear material and the detector making the measurements, against the neutron and gamma radiation emitted by the nuclear material. If the neutron emission is masked by shielding, active neutron interrogation systems must be envisaged such as, for example, detection by neutron interrogation.
Nuclear material detection by neutron interrogation is undertaken by provoking fission reactions in the nuclear material. Each fission reaction causes the simultaneous emission of several neutrons (typically 4 to 5 neutrons) and gamma radiation (typically 6 to 8 gamma photons). Neutrons and gamma radiation resulting from a fission reaction are detected coincidentally. Nuclear material is distinguished from non-nuclear material by the fact that a larger number of neutrons and gamma photons are emitted coincidentally than in the case of non-nuclear material. In addition, a time discrimination, implemented by the associated particle technique, enables coincidences due to fission particles to be distinguished from those due to non-nuclear materials.
The neutron and gamma photon detection devices of the known art are formed from detectors placed around the object to be inspected. The detectors are positioned close to one another to obtain satisfactory detection efficiency. An inconvenient phenomenon which appears during detection is the phenomenon of diaphony. Diaphony occurs when a neutron or a gamma photon detected in a first detector scatters into an adjoining detector, where it is also detected. This then causes a false coincidence, since two signals are detected, which do not correspond to two separate particles, but to a single particle.
Current solutions for resolving the problem of diaphony are:
However, these solutions have many disadvantages. Moving the detectors further apart from one another reduces detection efficiency, due to the reduction in useful angular cover, which very greatly affects the probability of detecting the high-order coincidences. Establishing walls between the detectors also reduces the useful angular cover, since the separating walls are not suitable for detection. Furthermore, these walls increase the size and weight of the detection system. Finally, systematic rejection of the coincidences for two adjoining detectors substantially impairs detection efficiency.
Document WO 2007/144589 A2 discloses a high-energy radiation detector and the related method. The detector includes a matrix of detector pixels and an assembly of reading circuits which collect the charges detected by the detector pixels.
Document FR 2 945 631 A1 discloses the principle of analysing an object by neutron interrogation using an associated particle tube.
The detection method of the invention does not have the disadvantages mentioned above.
Indeed, the invention relates to a method for detecting nuclear material in an object by counting events which occur within the object following a neutron interrogation of the object for a duration ΔT, where the method includes multiple steps of detection of coinciding pulses by the associated particle technique, and where a step of detection of coinciding pulses by the associated particle technique is undertaken for a duration δT measured from a time reference associated with an instant of detection of an associated particle, characterised in that it includes, for each coinciding pulse detection:
According to an additional characteristic of the invention, the shot noise detected above the time threshold is subtracted from the number of validated events which occur above the time threshold, such that the determination of the signal of the presence or absence of nuclear material in the object results from a comparison of the number of validated events counted in the counting step, minus the shot noise with the alarm threshold.
According to another additional characteristic of the invention, the step of counting the validated events which occur above a time threshold counted from the time reference is a step of formation of a histogram.
According to yet another additional characteristic of the invention, duration ΔT is predetermined in advance, such that the counting of the number of validated events which occur above a time threshold, the determination of the shot noise, the calculation of the alarm threshold and the step of determination of the signal of the presence or absence of nuclear material are implemented once duration ΔT is completed.
According to yet another additional characteristic of the invention, the counting of the number of validated events which occur above a time threshold, the determination of the shot noise, the calculation of the alarm threshold and the step of determination of the signal of the presence or absence of nuclear material are implemented as the successive coinciding detections occur.
The invention also relates to a detection system which uses the method of the invention.
Major advantages of the detection method of the invention are that it is able to cover a maximum detection solid angle, and that it does not reject an event when adjoining detectors are activated. This thus enables the detection performance to be maximised compared to the methods of the prior art.
Other characteristics and advantages of the invention will appear on reading a preferential embodiment made in reference to the attached figures, among which:
The detection system includes:
In the associated particle tube, an α particle is emitted simultaneously with the emission of a fast neutron n. It is known, furthermore, that the α particle is emitted in a direction opposite the direction in which the fast neutron is emitted. It follows that the detection of the α particle associated with a fast neutron provides information of the instant at which the fast neutron is emitted, and of the direction in which this neutron is emitted. The fast neutron is thus “signed” by the α particle associated with it. In the remainder of the description, the fast neutrons emitted by the associated particle tube will therefore also be called “signed” fast neutrons.
The detector pixels of each of the two matrices are contiguous. The detector pixels are preferentially organic scintillation detectors. The size of each detector pixel is dimensioned such that each detector pixel is able to detect efficiently, by itself alone, fission neutrons and gamma photons. The matrices of pixels M1, M2 are placed side-by-side, at a small distance from one another, and have a detector surface facing object 1 to be inspected. The detector surfaces define a single detection surface interrupted only by the narrow space separating the matrices, a space which allows the interrogator neutrons signed n emitted by tube TPA to pass.
Associated particle tube TPA and object 1 to be inspected are preferentially placed either side of the detector structure consisting of the two matrices M1, M2. Optimisation of the area and thickness of detection matrices M1, M2, and optimisation of the size of the pixels, depend both on physical parameters (average interaction length of the neutrons and gamma radiation in the scintillator, detection efficiency, etc.), and on operational constraints such as portability (weight, volume) and the cost of the system (number of measuring channels).
Associated particle tube TPA emits a succession of interrogator neutrons signed n in direction of object 1. The trajectory of neutrons n passes through the space separating the two matrices of pixels before reaching object 1. When a signed neutron reaches object 1, a nuclear fission reaction occurs in this object if it contains nuclear material. The nuclear fission reaction produces fast neutrons nF and gamma rays γ which are detected by matrices M1, M2. The pulses arising from the detection of the fast neutrons and of the gamma rays are processed by electronic data acquisition units A1, A2 and computer K. As has previously been mentioned, by the associated particle technique, an α particle is detected by tube TPA when a fast neutron n is emitted. The instant of detection of the α particle thus enables a reference instant To to be defined from which the detection instants of the fission neutrons and gamma photons are counted. This reference instant To is a parameter which is applied to electronic data acquisition units A1, A2 and to computer K.
The detection systems represented in
The event validation method includes the following steps in succession:
In the context of the invention, two pixels of a pixel matrix are said to be “adjoining” if they have a given side or a given corner in common. When the system of the invention includes two pixel matrices placed side-by-side, a column of pixels of the first matrix is facing a column of pixels of the other matrix. Each pixel of a column of pixels is then adjoining, for the pixel matrix to which it belongs, to a pixel according to the rule mentioned above and, for the pixel matrix positioned opposite, to any pixel in the facing column of pixels. When the invention relates to a pixel matrix having an aperture, each pixel on the edge of the aperture is adjoining to a pixel of the matrix according to the rule mentioned above and, in addition, to all the other pixels on the edge of the aperture, except for the pixels with which it is aligned, which are located beyond the pixel or pixels which are adjacent to it. Similarly, in the context of the invention, a pixel is said to be “isolated” if it detects a pulse without any of the pixels adjoining to it detecting a pulse.
Preferentially, when an event is validated, whether it includes pulses derived from isolated pixels and/or groups of adjoining pixels, instant T1 which is associated with the validated event, counted from instant To, is defined arbitrarily as the instant when a first pulse is detected.
All the detected particles (neutrons and/or gamma rays) are particles coinciding with an α particle. Matrices M1, M2 are, for example, 8×8 matrices. More generally, however, the matrices used in the context of the invention are I×J matrices, where I and J are integers of any value. The pixels of matrix M1 are referenced Xij (pixel of the line of row i and of the column of row j) and the pixels of matrix M2 are referenced Y1 (pixel of the line of row i and of the column of row j).
In matrix M1:
In matrix M2:
In the case of matrix M1, it is then considered that a particle is detected by pixel X14 and that a single particle is detected by pixels X73, X74, X64 and X63. In the case of matrix M2, it is considered that a single particle is detected by pixels Y24, Y15 and Y14 and that a single particle is detected by pixels Y66 and Y67. In the case of matrices M1 and M2 viewed simultaneously, it is considered that a single particle is detected by pixels X28, and Y61.
Steps E1-E8 mentioned above are repeated for a duration ΔT determined in advance, for example equal to 10 minutes. The number Nc of validated events which occur, over the whole of duration ΔT, beyond a time threshold Ts, is then counted (step E9). Time threshold Ts defines an instant below which it is considered that most of the events having arisen are not fission reactions which occur in nuclear material. Most of the events having occurred below instant Ts are then considered to be due to reactions which occur in the non-fissile materials which surround the nuclear material, such as, for example, inelastic scattering reactions (n, n′γ). Indeed, although nuclear material is present in the analysed object, the latter is, in fact, concealed in packages of benign appearance (packets, luggage, transport containers, etc.) and it is, in addition, surrounded by specific materials intended to form effective screens against neutron and gamma radiation such as, for example, polythene, iron or lead. In the case of these materials, due to the multiple gamma and neutron rays which they may emit simultaneously following their interaction with a signed neutron, the number of hits detected is often very high at instants close to instant To and, although events genuinely due to fission reactions may be detected before instant Ts, the risk of a false alarm would be much higher if these events were taken into account. Depending on the dimensions of the inspected object and on the distance between the detector pixels and the inspected object, a time threshold Ts is therefore defined, counted from time To, below which the events are not taken into account.
Simultaneously with the repetition of steps E1-E8, measurements of random noise b present outside acquisition windows δT are made (step E10). These measurements of random noise b are made, for example, in a manner known per se, over time intervals which precede instants To (“negative” times). From the measurements of noise b, noise B which is present, beyond successive instants Ts, over the whole of duration ΔT is then determined (step E11).
On conclusion of steps E9 and E11, i.e. at the end of duration ΔT, a step E12 subtracts noise B from the NC events counted in step E9. Step E12 results in a number N of validated events.
Simultaneously with step E12 which calculates number N of validated events, a step E13 of calculation of an alarm threshold Sa1 occurs. Alarm threshold Sa1 is calculated from the value of noise B as being equal, for example, to twice the standard deviation of noise B. Number N of validated events is then compared with alarm threshold Sa1.
By comparing N and Sa1, a signal Sm is obtained which indicates the presence (if Sa1≦N) or absence (if Sa1>N) of nuclear material. Signal Sm is accompanied by a probability P which expresses the level of confidence with which the presence or absence of nuclear material must be considered, i.e. the risk of a false alarm when the presence of nuclear material is announced, and that of non-detection when an absence of nuclear material is announced. Probability P is calculated, in a manner known per se, from N and from noise B.
According to the second variant of the detection method of the invention, duration ΔT is not determined in advance, and the comparison with the alarm threshold of the number of validated events counted which occur beyond successive instants Ts is made as detections which occur in the successive acquisition windows are made. In this case, the steps E17, E15, E16, E18, E19 and E20, implemented over time as the successive detections are made, correspond respectively to the steps E9, E10, E11, E12, E13 and E14 of the first variant of the method of the invention implemented over the whole predetermined duration ΔT.
Step E18 results, in real time, in a number N(t) of counted noise-free events being obtained which may correspond to fission reactions occurring in nuclear material. An alarm threshold Sa1(t) is calculated from noise B(t) in step E19. Number N(t) is then compared with alarm threshold Sa1(t) in step E20. E20 results in a signal Sm(t) which reflects the presence or absence of nuclear material and a probability P(t) which reflects the level of confidence with which signal Sm(t) must be considered. While number N(t) remains less than Sa1(t), signal Sm(t) indicates that there is no nuclear material in the object and new validation steps are undertaken. As soon as number N(t) reaches alarm threshold Sa1(t), signal Sm(t) signals the presence of nuclear material, and probability P(t) gives the rate of confidence associated with this information. Counting is then discontinued. Counting may also be continued, on a decision of the operator, to evaluate the change in the rate of confidence which is associated with the information concerning the presence of nuclear material. Conversely, when signal Sm(t) indicates that there is no nuclear material and that the rate of confidence associated with this information concerning the absence of nuclear material is high for a substantial duration, it is suggested to the operator that they discontinue counting.
According to the first and second variants of the method of the invention described above, the determination of the signal concerning the presence or absence of nuclear material results from a comparison of the number of validated events which occur above time threshold Ts with the alarm threshold, where the number of validated events and the alarm threshold are each reduced by shot noise B. In another embodiment of the invention, the determination of the signal concerning the presence or absence of nuclear material results from a comparison of the number of validated events which occur above time threshold TS with the shot noise, without these values being reduced by the shot noise. A comparison of number NC of events and of the alarm threshold also leads to a signal being obtained which indicates the presence or absence of nuclear material in the inspected object. The probability with which the obtained signal must be considered is also calculated.
The step of counting the validated events is in this case a step of formation of the histogram of all the validated events which occur during duration ΔT. As was previously mentioned, each event is positioned, in the histogram, by an instant T1 counted from instant To. Of the validated events only events located beyond instant Ts are counted. Duration δt of the acquisition window is, for example, equal to 76 ns and time Ts is, for example, equal to 20 ns. Detection of a large number of hits below threshold Ts can be seen clearly in
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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11/50158 | Jan 2011 | FR | national |
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind | 371c Date |
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PCT/EP2012/050163 | 1/6/2012 | WO | 00 | 7/2/2013 |