The field of the present disclosure relates to information retrieval from a database in a form that preserves the confidentiality of data and requests.
The present disclosure relates, in particular, to the systems for processing personal data, and, in particular, health data.
Databases are an integral part of many applications, such as financial applications and medical e-health applications. Databases can be very sensitive, containing valuable data belonging to a company or individuals. The theft of sensitive data is a growing concern for individuals, companies and governments.
Databases can be made up of collections of raw files or managed using the database management system (DBMS), such as the Oracle database, MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server, etc. A database can be deployed on a server within an organization, on a virtual server in a cloud, or on a DBMS service in a cloud. Data theft is a concern for every type of deployment.
When databases are deployed on a server in a company's premises, the server is physically under the company's control. If the server is compromised or infected by malware or viruses, hackers may be able to access the raw database data file and steal data by bypassing any company access control mechanism. On the other hand, corporate database administrators have the potential to violate privacy and data integrity intentionally or accidentally, as they can access stored data to perform database management tasks. A database system can also be deployed by a company on a virtual server that runs on a cloud such as Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2). In this case, the virtual server underlying the database is physically under the control of the cloud provider, and on the company's virtual server installs DBMS to manage their databases. As in the above case, data theft also occurs in this case, if the cloud infrastructure is compromised by attackers, infected with malware or viruses, and the company's database administrators could violate database confidentiality and integrity.
In addition, if not all cloud providers are trustworthy; they can steal database data from the virtual servers provided by them.
To address these risks, solutions using Homomorphic Encryption (HE) methods for database querying have recently been considered.
Homomorphic encryption methods have been developed for search engine applications, in particular, the user sends an encrypted request to the search engine, without the latter being aware of the request received. It applies a classic search operation to find matching documents and returns the response to the user in an encrypted form. Thus, the search engine never knows the clear content of the request.
These homomorphic encryption methods also make it possible to search among encrypted files on a remote server to retrieve files that contain a term transmitted as an encrypted request to a remote server. The server applies the search without knowing the clear terms of the query and returns the result. The server never knows the requests or documents recorded in the database other than in an encrypted form. An attack on the server therefore does not create any risk with regard to the confidentiality of information, for example, personal data or health data.
Another application relates to biometrics using a database of fingerprints of persons authorized to perform an action, for example, entering a protected building. These fingerprints are naturally encrypted, because they are personal data that cannot be revoked.
Users scan their fingerprints and these are compared with those in the database. Two fingerprints of the same person taken at two different times are never strictly identical and it is therefore not possible to make a simple comparison of the encrypted fingerprints (two encrypted ones of two different fingerprints are obviously different). Thanks to homomorphic encryption, it is possible to compare encrypted fingerprints without ever decrypting them.
It is known in the state of the art a document that presented the basics of homomorphic encryption that is the thesis “A FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION SCHEME: A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY” in September 2009, which describes in Chapter 7 the basic principles of the application to information retrieval.
It is also known that the article “Multi-keyword Similarity Search over Encrypted Cloud Data”; Mikhail Strizhov 1 Indrajit Ray 1 29th IFIP International Information Security Conference (SEC), June 2014, Marrakech, Morocco. Springer, IFIP. This article describes a solution based on homomorphic encryption for searching for encrypted documents on a server without requiring the documents to be decrypted before searching.
Also known is the U.S. Pat. No. 8,904,171 describing a secure search and information retrieval process that includes receiving an encrypted request, creating a swapped search tree with nodes that have been swapped and encrypted.
The search tree is encrypted with a first private encryption key. The server receives a request from a customer that includes a set of keywords, and each request term is encrypted with the first private encryption key. The search is performed using a request and evaluation at each node of the tree to determine if one or more match(es) exist(s). The response is based on the match of keywords for each document and one or more encrypted node(s) with the first private encryption key.
It is also known that the European patent E2865127 describing a homomorphic encryption for database query. Numerical values are encrypted using keys and random numbers to produce encrypted text. The encrypted text is homomorphic and consists of two or more encrypted subtexts. Queries using addition, averaging and multiplication operations can be performed without deciphering the numerical values applicable to the query. Each encrypted subtext is stored in a single record and in separate attributes. The present disclosure relates to methods for the encryption and decryption, the creation of an appropriate table, the interrogation of such a database and the updating of such a database.
In addition, US documents 2010/146299 are known.
One of the disadvantages of homomorphic encryption is that the size of the keys and the cost (in computing time) of the operations are much larger than traditional encryption processes.
Prior art solutions have a major disadvantage resulting from the computing power required to execute, on the server, the homomorphic encryption processing each time a new document is indexed and each time a new request is made. For this reason, prior art solutions are only applicable to very limited corpora, for example, a company directory or a small set of textual documents.
Moreover, prior art solutions are limited to searching for documents on the basis of a binary criterion of presence or absence in the document of a term of the request, without allowing to propose in an efficient way a ranking of the relevance of the documents corresponding to the request; the method according to the present disclosure proposes an efficient solution to information retrieval in a large encrypted corpus.
In order to address these disadvantages, the present disclosure relates to a first aspect of a method for information retrieval in an encrypted corpus stored on a server, from a digital request calculated on a customer device, containing a sequence of terms, comprising the following steps:
According to an alternative embodiment, the method includes a step of recreating, on the customer device, the index df_A from the encrypted information {Δdfi} stored for each document i in the dedicated space of the server assigned to the user A.
According to an alternative embodiment, the calculations performed on the server are implemented in a parallel and/or distributed manner.
According to another alternative embodiment, the server (2) is constituted by a cloud platform.
The present disclosure also relates to a method for preparing a requestable base of documents i containing a sequence of terms, characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
The present disclosure also relates to a method for information retrieval in an encrypted corpus stored on a server, based on a digital request calculated on a customer device, containing a sequence of terms, characterized in that it includes the following steps:
The present disclosure will be best understood when reading the following description that relates to a non-restrictive exemplary embodiment, while referring to the appended drawings, wherein:
It includes a customer computer device (1) connected to a server (2) by a computer network, for example, the Internet.
The server (2) is associated with a memory (3) for the recording of a database. The server (2) has a processor for performing digital processing.
The server (2) and the memory devices (3) are in a particular example constituted by a set of distributed resources, for example, of the “cloud” type.
The customer device 1 provides initial processing of a document i consisting of a digital file 9 recorded in a working memory.
Optionally, each term of the document is pre-processed by known means such as “stemming”, “stop list” (deletion of current words) and any other usual linguistic processing).
The initial processing is divided into three tasks.
The first task is to apply encryption to the document i with a known cryptographic method, for example, symmetric AES encryption and records an encrypted version (10) of this document on the customer device, and optionally on the server (2) or a third-party storage service. The corpus of thus defined encrypted documents constitutes the document base (32).
A second task, performed in parallel or sequentially, consists in calculating an index of occurrences of the terms present in the file 9, and in recording a table TFi (14) of occurrences, in the form of a list of terms wj present in the document i, each of the terms wj in this list being associated with a number corresponding to the occurrence tfi of the term wj in the document i.
The table TFi (14) is therefore of the {[wi tfu]}j type ; for a document i.
A third task, performed in parallel or sequentially, consists in calculating a table Δdfi 15 corresponding, for each term wj, to the presence or not of the term in the document. This table Δdfi (15) is therefore of the {[Wj|tfij>0]}j type
The table TFi (14) is then encrypted using a homomorphic encryption method, for example, according to a method described in article Zhou, H., & Women, G. (février 2014). Efficient homomorphic encryption on integer vectors and its applications. In Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA), 2014 (pp. 1-9). IEEE.
The result of this encryption of the table TFi (14) is a set of encrypted data (11). Each set of encrypted data (11) is transmitted by the customer device (1) to the server (2).
The grouping of the encrypted data 11 constitutes an encrypted database (30) of all the {TFi}i.
At the same time or sequentially, the table Δdfi (15) is encrypted using a known method, for example, AES and transmitted to the server (2) to record an encrypted file (12) on the server (2).
All the encrypted files (12) recorded on the server form a database (31).
Each encrypted file (12) recorded on the server (2) makes it possible to reconstitute a table df_A 13 by decryption with an algorithm inverse to the one used for the above-mentioned encryption.
This table df_A (13) is calculated only on the customer device 1, from:
This data preparation step leads to the recording, on the server, of data that are not directly requestable and that do not reveal meaningful information about the content or the documents, especially in the event of an attack on the server or a malicious action by a privileged user.
Requesting is performed by sending a text request (20) formed by a combination of words from the customer device (1).
Optionally, this request (20) is pre-processed by known means of “stemming”, “stop list” (deletion of current words) and any other usual linguistic processing.
The request (20) is encrypted using the same homomorphic encryption method as that used for encrypting the table TFi (14=to obtain an encrypted request (21).
The encrypted request (21) is transmitted to the server (2) that records to make a request (40).
By applying a homomorphic calculation on the data in the encrypted database (30) and the request (40), the server (2) calculates an encrypted response (41).
This processing consists in calculating, in the encrypted domain, the number of occurrences of each term qk of the request (40) for each known document i.
For each of the k terms qk and for each document i, the values tfi,j are counted for the cases where qk corresponds to a term wj, from the encrypted database (30) of tables {[wj; tfij}i and in the encrypted space, without decrypting the variables wj, qk and tfi,j.
All these counts constitute a response (41) that is transmitted to the customer device (1) and records it locally as a response (50).
The customer is then able to decrypt the response (50) to calculate a decrypted response (51).
Finally, the customer can combine the response 51 and the table df_A (13) to calculate a score TF-IDF (52) according to a known method.
This score TF-IDF (52) constitutes a classification key for the documents i in the order of relevance to the request (20).
Optionally, the customer device 1 presents the results as a search engine and allows the user to find the corresponding record.
| Number | Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1751241 | Feb 2017 | FR | national |
This application is a national phase entry under 35 U.S.C. § 371 of International Patent Application PCT/FR2018/050276, filed Feb. 5, 2018, designating the United States of America and published as International Patent Publication WO 2018/150119 A1 on Aug. 23, 2018, which claims the benefit under Article 8 of the Patent Cooperation Treaty to French Patent Application Serial No. 1751241, filed Feb. 15, 2017.
| Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/FR2018/050276 | 2/5/2018 | WO | 00 |