The invention concerns the domain of conditional access to a digital data stream broadcasted through a wireless channel and received by a plurality of mobile equipments, such as, for example, mobile telephones, PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), portable digital television receivers or a portable computers.
The broadcasted data is encrypted and can be received in plain text only by authorized equipment when the user has acquired the necessary rights. These rights, stored in a security module associated to the mobile equipment, consist of a set of keys that allow the decryption of the control words contained in control messages ECM (Entitlement Control Message) broadcasted in the audio data/video stream.
A security module is considered as a tamper-proof device containing different encryption/decryption keys, information serving to identify a user on a network and the data that defines the rights purchased by the user for reception of a broadcasted content. The security module can take different forms such as a removable smart card inserted into a reader, an integrated circuit soldered onto a mother board or a card of the SIM type (Subscriber Identity Module) that is installed in the majority of mobile equipments.
At present, a mobile equipment configured for the reception of digital television programs is based on standard technologies such as OMA (Open Mobile Alliance), DVB-H (Digital Video Broadcast, Handheld), or DMB (Digital Multimedia Broadcasting) that is in certain ways a broadband extension of (Digital Audio Broadcasting).
OMA technology implements a complete unique solution for a given market such as that of mobile telephones where each equipment and the content suppliers support the OMA technology.
DVB technology has been designed to standardize digital television decoders (set top boxes) with the objective of reducing their costs at large scale. It standardizes the elements involved at the level of conditional access to the content broadcasted in MPEG-2 or MPEG-4 format for mobile television on the Internet. These elements consist of the encryption algorithm of the broadcasted content, the control messages ECM containing the decryption keys or control words, the management messages EMM containing the rights of the users and the interface between the decoder and the security module managing conditional access.
In the particular case of DVB-H mobile television, the protection of the content is developed by the group DVB-CBMS (Digital Video Broadcasting-Convergence of Broadcast and Mobile Services).
Standardization does not extend neither to the content with added value of the ECM and EMM messages, nor to the protection method of the latter. Each conditional access supplier uses its own data structure and its own protection means for a broadcasted content. Therefore, DVB technology offers numerous possibilities for the development of the security of the content.
The drawback of a too advanced standardization as that of OMA technology lies in the fact that additional protection measures are restricted especially when the conditional access system has been pirated by third parties.
In DVB technology, the discovery of one or several control words contained in the control messages ECM allows the decryption of the stream without having to acquire a subscription or pay for the pay-per-view broadcasted programs. This piracy causes damage that affects both the content supplier as well as the supplier of conditional access.
The document WO2004084555 describes an access method using a mobile telephone with information services broadcasted via a first communication channel to a receiver device. This method includes the following steps:
The reception of access control data via a second channel independent of the channel for broadcasting controlled access services certainly allows the improvement of the protection of this data against piracy, but not limiting the extent of the effects of a possible discovery of the decryption keys or of means for their production.
The aim of the present invention is to provide countermeasure means in the event of piracy independently of the type of mobile equipment and at a relatively low cost. These means act on the protection elements that are not related to the standardization and that are preferably adjustable by the conditional access provider.
Another aim is to limit the damaging effects of a possible piracy to a number as reduced as possible of mobile equipments.
These aims are achieved by a method for conditional access to a digital data stream encrypted with at least one first control word and broadcasted via an emitter of a broadcasting network to at least one mobile equipment, the latter also being connected via a mobile communication network to a management center, said stream containing the control messages encrypted with a transmission key and comprising a second control word obtained by means of the encryption of the first control word with a local key, said method comprises the following steps:
The method stands out by the use of a cryptogram containing, for example, localization information of the mobile equipment. The access to the data of the stream is thus only authorized to mobile equipments situated in a given geographic area.
The discovery of a control word encrypting the data of the stream will thus have consequences limited to mobile equipment functioning in a district or in a town without extending to all the equipment in the country, for example.
According to a first embodiment, the broadcasted stream consists of the content encrypted by control words and control messages. The latter each contain control words resulting from the encryption of the original control words with a local key. Each mobile equipment is first connected to a mobile network of the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) or UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) type or another through which it is located by the management center. The mobile equipment receives from this center a cryptogram containing a local identifier corresponding to that of the nearest network cell to its geographical position. This cryptogram transmitted to the security module of the equipment allows the determination of one or more local keys that are defined as functions of the local identifier.
Several keys can be generated from a cryptogram thus allowing the decryption of the control words broadcasted by nearby emitters when the equipment moves from one district to another, for example.
The mobile equipment gets this function and/or its parameters, via management messages EMM that it can receive, for example, from the management center when connected to the GSM or UMTS mobile network. A particular request by short message SMS, post or telephone call, for instance, would be an alternative for obtaining this function.
The cryptogram can be formed, for example, by carrying out a XOR function (OR exclusive) on the identifier of the cell, according to a simple embodiment. According to an embodiment with a higher security level, a cryptographic function using a random number combined with the identifier of the cell transmitted by the mobile network can be used.
According to one embodiment that allows the mobile equipment to move from one cell to another, two solutions are possible:
a) several cryptograms corresponding to surrounding cells can be transmitted to the mobile equipment when it connects to the first cell. The security module can also determine the local keys necessary for the decryption of the controls words from the following cells.
b) a set of local keys can be determined from only one received cryptogram allowing the decryption of the controls words from different cells. This cryptogram contains, for example, a chain of local keys corresponding to consecutive cells.
The control messages ECM broadcasted in the stream specific to a given region because they contain control words that can only be decrypted by a local key that is determined from parameters specific to a mobile network of a given place.
After decryption of the ECM messages with the transmission key, the control words are extracted. The local key, determined thanks to the received cryptogram, allows determining the original control words for decrypting the content broadcasted on the condition to have the necessary rights in the security module.
These rights are obtained from management messages EMM broadcasted through a conditional access system CAS whose server is connected to that of the operator of the GSM or UMTS mobile network or the management center.
The invention will be better understood thanks to the following detailed description that refers to the annexed figures given as non-limitative examples.
A stream of digital data forming a content (C) encrypted with control words (CW) is broadcasted with control messages ECM. This digital data can also comprise audio/video data of television programs as well as data relating to applications that can be operated by a mobile equipment.
A server of a conditional access supplier (CA) is connected to a server of an operator (OP) managing a broadcasting network (NET1) and a mobile network (NET2). The operator (OP) broadcasts on the broadcasting network (NET1) the content (C) encrypted with the control words CW as well as the ECM messages containing a control word CW′ encrypted with a local key (KL1, KL2). This local key is specific to the geographic location of the emitter (E1, E2) of the broadcasting network such as a district, a town or a region. Moreover, the access supplier (CA) broadcasts management messages EMM that define the access rights to the content according to the user's purchases as a subscription or a pre-payment of selected programs.
The mobile equipments EM1, EM2 are connected respectively to the broadcasting network (NET1) and to the mobile network (NET2). The broadcasting network (NET1) provides the encrypted content while the mobile network (NET2) provides the parameters necessary for the reception of the content (C). The broadcasting network (NET1) can be, for example, of the DVB-H type where the content is broadcasted through a radio channel by a local emitter (E1, E2), the mobile network (NET2) will be of the GSM or UMTS type for example, also allowing communications with the management center (CG) of the operator (OP), (see
The emitters (E1, E2) of the broadcasting network (NET1) broadcast the digital data in a unidirectional way towards the mobile equipment (EM1, EM2) while the data of the mobile network (NET2) flows in a bidirectional way between the mobile equipment (EM1, EM2) and the management center (CG).
The mobile equipments (EM1, EM2) can move from one cell of the mobile network (NET2) towards another maintaining the possibility of receiving the data broadcasted by either of the emitters of the broadcasting network (NET1).
In the example of
Both the broadcasting and mobile networks (NET1, NET2) can be of the same type as long as the bandwidth is sufficient for simultaneous transmission of a digital content and of bidirectional data exchanges. For example, a network of the type UMTS, EDGE (Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution) or another type can be provided.
The local ECM or more precisely the local control words CW′ are created by the management center (CG) of the mobile operator (OP) from the original control-words CW by encryption of this word with a local key (KL1, KL2). The new control word CW′=KL1(CW) or KL2(CW) obtained in this way is inserted into the ECM messages broadcasted by the emitter (E1, E2) of the broadcasting network (NET1) to mobile equipments (EM1, EM2) connected to the mobile network (NET2). These equipments are situated in a cell of the mobile network (NET2) where they can receive the cryptogram necessary for obtaining the local key (KL1, KL2). (See
It should be noted that the broadcasted control messages ECM are encrypted with a transmission key (TK) supplied to the mobile equipment (EM1, EM2) by means of management messages EMM delivered by the access supplier (CA) via the management center (CG).
According to a first embodiment, the local key (KL1, KL2) is determined by the mobile equipment when it connects to the mobile network (NET2) by means of localization data or more precisely an identifier of a cell (C1-ID, C2-ID) of this network transmitted by the management center (CG). The local key can be determined in several ways:
calculation carried out by means of an operation or a relatively simple mathematical function such as for example XOR (OR exclusive) or from a random number transmitted by the management center.
combination with a key specific to the mobile network or to a node of the latter provided either when the mobile equipment connects to the management center, or in response to a particular request by a short message SMS, for example.
the transmitted cryptogram can form the local key that can be used as it is, without intermediate calculation by the mobile equipment for decrypting the local control words.
To summarize, this local key is necessary for the decryption of the control words CW′ contained in the local ECM broadcasted in the digital data stream in order to obtain the original control words CW effectively encrypting the broadcasted content.
Beyond the distribution of cryptograms to locally recognized mobile equipments, the management center (CG) verifies the requests on the whole mobile network (NET2) in order to detect if a same security module requests a cryptogram from several cells of the network. This situation occurs when a security module has been cloned, distributed and used in different places. In such a case, the cryptogram or the required key will be refused and the security module is considered as invalid at future connection attempts. The verification is carried out on the basis of the identifier of the security module (ID1, ID2) transmitted by the mobile equipment (EM1, EM2) to the management center (CG) when the cryptogram is requested. The exclusion of a cloned security module can also be carried out by means of management messages (EMM) that can be received only by one mobile equipment at a given place and recognized by the management center. Another mobile equipment in another cell with a same security module will thus not receive this message carrying the data access rights to the broadcasting network (NET1).
According to one alternative the mobile equipment is provided with a Global Positioning System of the GPS type (Global Positioning System) that determines the coordinates corresponding to its geographical position. This data is then used to determine the local key from the received cryptogram.
According to a second embodiment, the transmission key (TK) encrypting the control messages ECM can also depend on the broadcasting emitter. This configuration thus provides two security levels to be overcome in order to access the content broadcasted in the stream. When the mobile equipment is connected to the mobile network, it receives a management message EMM containing the local transmission key (TKL) or elements suited for determining said key (parameters, calculation functions). The message EMM is transmitted in general only if the local transmission key (TKL) is not available in the security module of the mobile equipment or after a key change. In fact, the validity of the latter, for example, can be limited to a certain period for a given emitter.
After having obtained this key (TKL) allowing the decryption of the control messages ECM, the mobile equipment determines the local key(s) (KL1, KL2) necessary for the decryption of the control words CW′ contained in the ECM messages. These local keys (KL1, KL2) are determined according to the processes described above.
The localization data such as the network cell identifiers or the position coordinates of the mobile equipments can be used in order to prevent access to certain content broadcasted to mobile equipments located in a given region. In fact, the ECM broadcasted and associated to a predetermined content contain a control word encrypted with a key which cannot be obtained from certain cell identifiers because, for example, the calculation function of the key does not have the adequate parameters. In other words, this restriction allows certain places to be blocked out from the reception of the broadcasted contents.
According to one configuration, a network key or a node can be specific to a broadcasted channel. When a mobile equipment is situated in a given place, the local identifier provided from the node key or the node key itself cannot be transmitted by the management center, which prohibits the reception of this channel near the node in question.
According to another configuration, (see
The management message EMM can be received either automatically after the establishment of a connection recognized by the mobile network (NET2) or on request by means of a short message SMS, for example.
Of course, it could also be possible for the mobile equipment to receive a set of local transmission keys (TKL) in the EMM message when it connects to a cell of the mobile network (NET2). This set allows decrypting the ECM messages sent from nearby emitters when the mobile equipment moves from one broadcasting area to another without requesting an EMM message from each cell.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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EP 05291046.0 | May 2005 | EP | regional |