Nowadays there is a great rise of devices (most of which are personal) equipped with resources that generate lots of data while sensing the surrounding environment, interacting with the user, communicating with external resources, etc.
Examples of such devices are the smartphones or tablets: presently, every smartphone or tablet has 6 to 8 physical sensors onboard (here referred as “physical resources”) and almost a hundred of virtual ones (“virtual resources”). The physical resources are, for instance, the accelerometer, the GPS receiver, the NFC transmission module, etc. The virtual resources are, for instance, the personal account management software, the Bluetooth connection manager, etc. (most of the virtual resources are software). This is not only true for mobile phones since, with the advent of device-independent Operative Systems (like Android), there are kinds of devices with similar capabilities and other novel resources: it is the case of connected TVs, new generation cameras, car interactive equipment, etc.
The above mentioned devices host third-party services and applications that have access to the onboard resources of the devices: these generate an unprecedented amount of data that, since most of the devices are pervasive and personal, can be critical from a privacy point of view.
In the paper by Adrienne Porter Felt, Kate Greenwood, David Wagner, “The Effectiveness of Application Permissions”, University of California, Berkeley, USENIX Conference on Web Application Development (WebApps) 2011, 956 android applications have been analyzed. The authors observed that 93% of free applications (total of 856) and 82% of paid applications (total of 100) have at least one dangerous permission. Dangerous permissions include actions that could cost the user money or leak private information. In particular, the authors show that Internet permission is heavily used, and in most applications, this permission could be used to store personal information from the users.
In the paper by W. Enck, P. Gilbert, B. Chun, L. P. Cox, J. Jung, P. McDaniel, and A. N. Sheth, “TaintDroid: An Information-Flow Tracking System for Realtime Privacy Monitoring on Smartphone”, the authors analyze if and which type of personal data an application stores. They developed a kernel plugin to analyze the data sent to a server by all applications having the Internet connection permission along with other permission such as camera, location, etc. The authors found 358 free applications that required Internet connection permission along with other permissions and they analyzed 20 out of them. Among the latter, two sent Phone Information to Content Servers, seven sent Device ID to Content Servers and 15 sent Location to Advertisement Servers. Thus the authors demonstrated that a large amount of applications could send personal data for different purposes.
In the paper by Adrienne Porter Felt, Elizabeth Ha, Serge Egelman, Ariel Haney, Erika Chin, and David Wagner “Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behavior”, the user attention and understanding during installation of applications is analyzed. Only 17% of participants paid attention to permissions during installation. Only 3% of Internet survey respondents could correctly answer all three questions of permission comprehension. This indicates that current Android permissions warnings do not help most users to make correct security decisions. During this test, only 20% of users were able to provide details about why they did not have an application installed. Moreover, the participants demonstrated very low comprehension of permissions granting during installation.
WO 2012/109512 discloses systems and methods for regulating access to resources at application run-time. A permissions application is invoked. The permissions application accesses an information store comprising a plurality of permissions. Each permission is associated with a corresponding resource in a plurality of device resources. The information store specifies which applications have permission to access which device resources. An application is executed on the device and makes a request for a resource while the application is executing. Responsive to the request, the permissions application determines whether the application has runtime access permission to use the resource. When the application has run-time access permission to use the resource, it is granted run-time access to the resource. When the application does not have run-time access permission to use the resource, it is not granted run-time access to the resource but is permitted to continue executing on the device without the requested resource.
The above overview of the state of the art shows that the issue of security of access to device resource (and to data generated by the device resources) by hosted applications has been studied.
The present invention is not primarily directed to the security issue, being directed to a method for providing the users of devices with an indication of access level to the personal data generated by the resources equipping the device.
According to an embodiment, the method of the present invention evaluates the access level to personal data by providing the user with a numerical and/or graphical indicator that is independent from the access rights enforcement and helps the user in understanding what data have been used by the hosted applications.
The management of the security policies is not the main aim of the present invention, the focus of the present invention being on the measurement of the level of access to personal data generated by an accessed resource.
According to an aspect of the present invention, a method is provided for measuring and monitoring the usage of personal data generated by the resources of a user device by software applications installed on the user device. The method may take into account how the resources available in a device are used (e.g., in terms of time and frequency), the number of resource accessed and the type of data generated by such resources.
The method comprises:
For each application, the respective indication of the calculated application access level is displayed on a display of the user device.
An indication of the calculated device access level to said data by said applications is displayed on the display of the user device.
The method may further comprise:
The method may further comprise:
The method may further comprise:
Said at least two operating states may comprise:
Said calculating, for each application, the respective application access level preferably comprises giving more weight, in said combining, to the sensitivity values of those resources that enable the connection and the data communication from the device to an external data network.
Giving more weight may comprise squaring the sensitivity values of those resources that enable the connection and the data communication from the device to an external data network.
Said first predetermined function may comprise one among: a product of the sensitivity values of the resources that generate data accessed by said application, a sum of the sensitivity values of the resources that generate data accessed by said application.
Said second predetermined function may comprise a product of the calculated application access levels of the applications installed on the device.
According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer program is provided comprising computer program code portions adapted to perform the method set forth above when the computer program is executed on a data processing device.
According to another aspect of the present invention, a user device is provided, comprising means configured to perform the method of the present invention.
These and other features and advantages of the present invention will better appear by reading the following detailed description of some exemplary and non-limitative embodiments thereof, making reference to the attached drawings, wherein
Referring to the drawings,
The device 100 comprises a processing unit (CPU) 105, a display 110, e.g. a multi-touch screen, ROM and RAM memory resources (not shown), one or more transmitter/receiver units 115 (e.g. for Wi-Fi, 2g-3g-4g cellular networks, Bluetooth, NFC).
A “Resource” r1, r2, . . . , rn is intended as a physical or virtual component (physical resource or virtual resource) of the device 100, such physical or virtual component being capable of generating data d1, d2, d3, . . . , dm by, for instance, sensing the surrounding environment, interacting with the user, communicating with external resources, etc. In the case the device is a smartphone or a tablet, an example of physical resource is the accelerometer, the GPS receiver, the NFC transmission module, etc., while an example of virtual resource is the Bluetooth connection manager.
A Device Resource List RD is the list of Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn available on a device D, like the device 100 [1]:
RD=[r
Each Resource ri (i=1−n) can generate multiple data. For example, referring to
Given the Device Dataset DD that is the list of all possible data d1, d2, d3, . . . , dm that can be generated by the device [2]:
DD={d1,d2,d3, . . . ,dm}
the Resource Dataset v(ri) of a given Resource ri is [2]:
The Resource Datasets v(ri) (i=1−n) of all the Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn of a device D can overlap, meaning that a given data d1, d2, d3, . . . , dm can be generated from multiple Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn.
The generated data d1, d2, d3, . . . , dm can be grouped in classes of generated data referred to similar types of data, e.g. POSITIONING data, COMMUNICATION data, etc. (other classes can be defined).
The table below shows how an example subset of Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn can be grouped in classes (e.g. based on the similarity of the generated data d1, d2, d3, . . . , dm):
A Hosted Application a1, a2, . . . , ap is a service, whether physically or virtually hosted on the device (e.g. through a remote connection), that can access the resources r1, r2, . . . , rn of the device D. The list of Hosted Applications of a device D is called Device Application List AD. Given a device D, the Device Application List AD is defined as the set of applications a1, a2, . . . , ap hosted on the device [4]:
The list of the Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn (and the associated generated data d1, d2, d3, . . . , dm) that can be accessed by a Hosted Application a1, a2, . . . , ap is called Application Report w(ai). Given a Hosted Application ai (i=1−p), its Application Report is defined as [5]:
where reg is the registration function, that is the function applied to every required Resource by a Hosted Application a1, a2, . . . , ap when the Hosted Application is installed on the user device, or when the installed Hosted Application accesses for the first time the Resource (depending on the architecture of the operating system of the user device 100).
From [5] it can be deduced that a Hosted Application ai (i=1−p) has access to the Resource Datasets v(ri) (i=1−n) of all the Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn in its Application Report w(ai) [6]:
{dj|rkεw(ai)djεv(rk)}
An assumption is made that at the first access every Hosted Application ai (i=1−p) explicitly declares the respective Resource Dataset v(ri) (i=1−n), and this grants to that Hosted Application the access to the listed resources.
Security procedures or technologies for avoiding fraudulent access to the resources of the device can be provided for, but this is not the concern of the present invention.
A Hosted Application a1, a2, . . . , ap, at a generic time t, can be in four different statuses:
The measurement method according to an embodiment of the present invention assumes that every Resource in the Device Resource list RD is associated to a respective Resource Sensitivity Value. The Resource Sensitivity Value enables the discrimination of the Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn based on the sensitivity of the data d1, d2, d3, . . . , dm they generate in terms of privacy, accuracy, etc. This comes from the hypothesis that not all the data have the same importance to the user in different contexts (e.g. the GPS position can tell much more about a user than the accelerometer values).
The Resource Sensitivity value s(ri) of a Resource ri is a numeric value in a Sensitivity Scale S [7]:
S=(0; smax]inR
Such that if s(ri)>s(rj), Resource ri generates data that are more sensitive than those generated by Resource rj according to some parameter, e.g. privacy of the device owner. For example, referring to Table 1, the Resource “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” is characterized by a higher value of sensitivity than the Resource “USE_SIP”: the access to the real position of the device (and thus of its owner) is more sensitive, from a privacy point of view, than the possibility of enabling the SIP Communication Protocol.
The table below shows a subset of all the available Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn (column Resource) grouped by classes (column Class) and, for each Resource ri (i=1−n), an example of the associated Resource Sensitivity value s(ri):
The Sensitivity Scale S can be global or customized at user level, at device level, etc. and is related to the context of the measurement (e.g. privacy, traceability, etc.). In an embodiment of the present invention, smax=100.
Measurement of the Access Level
According to the present invention, the access level to personal data is measured. In particular, the access level to the personal data is measured at the level of the individual hosted applications (access level by hosted application, or application access level), and at the level of the device as a whole (access level by device or device access level).
In an embodiment of the present invention, the access level is measured at three different levels of granularity, hereinafter referred to as:
The Personal Data access level by Hosted Application ranks a Hosted Application ai (i=1−p) based on the number of the Resources required by the Hosted Application and the Resource Sensitivity value s(ri) (i=1−n) of such Resources.
Given a Hosted Application ai (i=1−p) and its Application Report w(ai) the Personal Data access level PA(ai) can be defined as follows [8]:
Where rc is a communication Resource, i.e. a Resource that enables the connection and the data communication from the device (e.g. the Wi-Fi management resource). A communication resource among those in the Application Report w(ai) amplifies the accessibility of Personal Data generated by the device D. Thus, in the calculation of the Personal Data access level by Hosted Application for a certain Hosted Application ai, the presence, in the Application Report w(ai) of that Hosted Application, of a communication Resource rc can be given more weight by, e.g., squaring the sensitivity values of all the Resources required by the Hosted Application.
The higher the value of the Personal Data Access level PA(ai) for a given Hosted Application ai (i=1−p), the more sensitive is the application.
A Normalized Personal Data access level by Hosted Application is a variant of the measure introduced above, that emphasizes the mean value of sensitivity of all the Resources used by a Hosted Application, giving less influence to the sensitivity values of the more sensitive Resources.
Given the definition [8], the Normalized Personal Data access level by Hosted Application can be calculated as follows [9]:
where |w(ai)| denotes the number of Resources in the Application Report w(ai) of the Hosted Application ai.
The ranking of the Personal Data access level by Hosted Application [8], and the Normalized Personal Data access level by Hosted Application [9] can be evaluated by using a sum instead of a product. In this case it is ([8′] and [9′]):
However, the use of the product emphasizes the contribution of the more sensitive Resources.
Functions [8] and [8′] are still valid if, in place of the function “log”, a generic function ƒ(x) is used, such that:
The Instant Personal Data access level by Device is a variant of [8] and [9] that takes into account the actual number of times a Hosted Application makes use of a Resource. This variant is applicable to those devices that make accessible the access events count.
Be tl−1 and tl the instants to be considered in the measurement, where tl is a generic instant, tl−1 is the previous instant, and Tl is the Time Window such that [10]:
Tl=[tl−1,tl],tl−1<tl
and let count(ai,rk,Tl) be the number of accesses to a Resource rk by a Hosted Application ai in the Time Window Tl. The Instant Personal Data access level by Hosted Application at tl is [11]:
The Instant Personal Data access level by Hosted Application at tl is “weighted” in the sense that the Resource Sensitivity values in the formulas are multiplied by a coefficient that represents the number of accesses to the data generated by a Resource in the considered Time Window. Thus, the greater is the number of times a Hosted Application accesses the data of a certain Resource, the higher is the weight given at that Resource in the calculation of the Instant Personal Data access level by Hosted Application.
Possibly, the Time Window Tl can also reduce to a time instant, that is tl−1=tl.
The Instant Personal Data access level by Device indicates, at a certain time, the status of access to personal data based on the Hosted Applications that are currently in execution.
For a given device D, having a Device Application List AD, the Instant Personal Data access level by Device ID in the considered time instant tl is calculated as [12]:
ID(tl)=ΠPA(ai).
∀aiεAD^status(ai,tl)ε{ACTIVE,RUNNING,LISTENING}
or [13]:
ID(tl)=Π{hacek over (P)}A(ai).
∀aiεAD^status(ai,tl)ε{ACTIVE,RUNNING,LISTENING}
or [14]:
ID(tl)=Π{circumflex over (P)}A(ai,tl).
∀aiεAD^status(ai,tl)ε{ACTIVE,RUNNING,LISTENING}
depending on the method used for calculating the Personal Data access level by Hosted Application (i.e., depending on whether formula [8] or [9] or [11] is used for calculating the Personal Data access level by Hosted Application), where tl belongs to Tl as in [10].
The above measurement is calculated based on the Hosted Applications that are in the ACTIVE, RUNNING or LISTENING status, i.e. that can access any of the Resources they have registered to.
The measure of access level to Personal Data by Device can also be global, thus not depending on the instant when it is calculated but related to the whole life of a device D. Given the same assumptions of [12], [13] and [14], the Global Personal Data access level by Device is calculated as [15]:
GD(tl)=ΠPA(ai),∀aiεAD
or [16]:
GD(tl)=Π{hacek over (P)}A(ai),∀aiεAD
or [17]:
GD(tl)=Π{circumflex over (P)}A(ai,tl),∀aiεAD
depending on the method used for calculating the Personal Data access level by Hosted Application. In [17] the considered Time Window Tl coincides with the entire life of the Device.
In case the resulting value of the Global Personal Data access level by Device be very high, it is possible to express this value in decibels:
I′D(tl)=10*log(ID(tl))
The Global Personal Data access level by Device is a more general measurement that gives an indication on the status of the Device D.
The Device Application Ranking is an ordered list indicating the relationship among the Hosted Applications of a Device D based on their measured Personal Data access level.
Given a device D and its Device Application List DA, the Device Application Ranking DR is defined as [18]:
DR=a1,a2, . . . ,an,∀aεAD|PA(a1)>PA(a2)> . . . >PA(an)
The calculated Device Application Ranking can be used to show to the mobile phone users the hosted application on the device ordered by their associated Personal Data access level by Hosted Application (as described later on).
Monitoring
It is possible to monitor how the Global Personal Data access level by Device and the Instant Personal Data access level by Device measurements change over time when a Hosted Application Event happens.
A Hosted Application Event is an event that modifies the Device Application List that is in a given state. The measured Global Personal Data access level by Device and/or the Instant Personal Data access level by Device will change accordingly.
There are five possible Hosted Application Events:
The INSERT event happens when a new Hosted Application with status OFF is added to the Device Application List.
Accordingly, the Instant Personal Data access level by Device measurement will not change but the Global Personal Data access level by Device measurement may increase.
Given the same assumptions of [12], [13] and [14], being te the instant in which the event INSERT related to a Hosted Application a occurs and given an instant t′ such that t′<te, it is:
where ΔGD(a)>0 depends on the method used for calculating the Personal Data access level by Hosted Application:
The DELETE event happens when a new Hosted Application with status OFF is deleted from the Device Application List.
Accordingly, the Instant Personal Data access level by Device measurement will not change but the Global Personal Data access level by Device measurement may decrease.
Given the same assumptions of [12], [13] and [14], being te the instant in which the event DELETED related to a Hosted Application a occurs and given an instant t′ such that t′<te, it is:
where ΔGD(a)>0 depends on the method used for calculating the Personal Data access level by Hosted Application:
The UPDATE event happens when one of the Hosted Applications in the Device Application List changes in a way that the Resources r1, r2, . . . , rn it uses change.
Accordingly, the Global Personal Data access level by Device measurement will change; the Instant Personal Data access level by Device measurement will change only if the application update is not in the OFF status when the event occurs.
Given the same assumptions of [12], [13] and [14], being te the instant in which the UPDATE event related to a Hosted Application a occurs and given an instant t′ such that t′<te, it is:
where ΔP(a) depends on the method used for calculating the Personal Data Access Level by Hosted Application. ΔP(a) is greater or lower than zero depending on the new set of Resources the application a accesses being more or less sensitive than the old one.
The START event happens when one of the Hosted Applications in the Device Application List changes its status from OFF to one of the other three statuses (ACTIVE, RUNNING, LISTENING). Accordingly, the Global Personal Data access level by Device measurement will not change while the Instant Personal Data access level by Device measurement will change.
Given the same assumptions of [12], [13] and [14], being te the instant in which the START event related to a Hosted Application a occurs and given an instant t′ such that t′<te, it is:
where ΔID(a)>0 depends on the method used for calculating the Personal Data Access Level by Hosted Application:
The STOP event happens when one of the Hosted Applications in the Device Application List changes its status from one of the three statuses ACTIVE, RUNNING OR LISTENING to the status OFF. Accordingly, the Global Personal Data access level by Device measurement will not change while the Instant Personal Data access level by Device measurement will decrease.
Given the same assumptions of [12], [13] and [14], being te the instant in which the STOP event related to a Hosted Application a occurs and given an instant t′ such that t′<te, it is:
where ΔID(a)>0 depends on the method used for calculating the Personal Data Access Level by Hosted Application:
The chart in
The trend of the function GPDAL is explained by the following exemplary events:
Experimental Work
The method of the present invention has been included in an Android application, called “Privacy Owl”.
Such an application gives to the user an indication of the amount of data shared with the providers of the applications installed on his/her smartphone or tablet.
By selecting “Change”, the user can switch the Privacy Owl application between ACTIVE mode and RUNNING mode.
By selecting “Details”, the user can see the application list. Each application Ai has its own logo and an associated icon that (assuming that the user device has a color display 110) can be red, yellow or green; in
If PA(Ai) is the Personal Data Access level by Hosted Application for application Ai, two thresholds p1 and p2 are set, with p1<p2: the color is assigned to an application Ai by the following formula:
By selecting an application, the user can check which data the application can access (
Each Resource in the Application Report has an associated icon 505 that can be red, yellow or green. In
The color is correlated to the Resource Sensitivity Value for that resource; the higher is the Resource Sensitivity Value the darker is the color.
The present invention can be helpful to make users aware of the quantity and quality of data stored on his/her personal devices and shared by the applications installed and used. The measurements introduced as described in the foregoing, expressed by simple indicators, provide an easy-to-understand way for accessing these information.
The present invention has several practical uses.
For example, the present invention can be used to conduct a study to evaluate the modifications to the user's behavior due to such an awareness, making him/her available to monitor the personal data generated by the resources of their device.
The study can be structured as follows:
From the behavioral change perspective, this study makes it possible to track, while the user is provided with the indicators about the quantity and quality of Personal Data used by a certain application, if:
This information can be useful to managers of applications stores and also applications developers, to decide whether to continue or not proposing an application to the users, or to redesign it.
The solution according to the present invention can be advantageously used in systems for sharing and exchanging users' personal data, in which a TLC operator has a role of guaranteeing and certifying the exchanged data, and the proper exchange of the data with third parties.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
MI2013A0325 | Mar 2013 | IT | national |
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2014/054039 | 3/3/2014 | WO | 00 |
Publishing Document | Publishing Date | Country | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
WO2014/135485 | 9/12/2014 | WO | A |
Number | Name | Date | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
8677448 | Kauffman | Mar 2014 | B1 |
20070094281 | Malloy | Apr 2007 | A1 |
20100257577 | Grandison et al. | Oct 2010 | A1 |
20120072991 | Belani | Mar 2012 | A1 |
20130055387 | Kim | Feb 2013 | A1 |
20130212684 | Li | Aug 2013 | A1 |
20130318614 | Archer | Nov 2013 | A1 |
20130340086 | Blom | Dec 2013 | A1 |
20140189873 | Elder | Jul 2014 | A1 |
Number | Date | Country |
---|---|---|
2012109512 | Aug 2012 | WO |
Entry |
---|
Wang et al., “Quantitative Security Risk Assessment of Android Permissions and Applications”, 2013, pp. 226-241. |
Adrienne Porter Felt, et al., “The Effectiveness of Application Permissions”, University of California, Berkeley, USENIX Conference on Web Application Development (WebApps) 2011, pp. 75-86. |
Adrienne Porter Felt, et al., “Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behavior”, Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) 2012, Jul. 11-13, 2012, Wash DC. |
Jul. 24, 2014—(WO) Int'l Search Report and Written Opinion of the ISA—App PCT/EP2014/054039. |
Eric Struse et al.: “PermissionWatcher: Creating User Awareness of Application Permissions in Mobile Systems”, Nov. 13, 2012 (Nov. 13, 2012), Ambient Intelligence, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 65-80, XP047011126, ISBN: 978-3-642-34897-6 abstract p. 69-p. 72; figures 1,2. |
William Enck, et al., “TaintDroid: An Information-Flow Tracking System for Realtime Privacy Monitoring on Smartphone”, 9th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI '10), Vancouver, BC, Canada, Oct. 4-6, 2010, pp. 393-407. |
Number | Date | Country | |
---|---|---|---|
20160012221 A1 | Jan 2016 | US |