Patent Application
20080019507
Further characteristics and advantages of the method according to the present invention will be apparent from the following description of an embodiment thereof, made with reference to the annexed drawings, given for illustrative and non-limiting purposes.
With reference to
The plain texts M1, MN are stored in a memory unit of an IC card with at least a secret key ESK for their encryption, for example. The secret key ESK is unknown externally the IC card, and is object of external attacks. In fact, the plain texts M1, . . . , MN enciphered in enciphered texts C1, . . . , CN may be retrieved through the secret key ESK.
The cryptographic operations OP intended to cipher one or more plain texts M1, . . . , MN in corresponding enciphered texts C1, . . . , CN are interleaved by additional cryptographic operations AOP. More particularly, such additional cryptographic operations AOP comprise a plurality of secret parameters, random generated, such as one or more random plain texts RB, for example.
One or more elaborations of the random plain texts RB is inserted in the cryptographic algorithm, for example between one or more cryptographic operations intended to encipher one or more of the plain texts M1, . . . , MN.
The plurality of secret parameters also comprises random secret keys ERK, random generated and used to encipher the one or more plain texts RB. More particularly, a cryptographic operation OP intended to encipher a plain text M1, . . . , MN with the secret key ESK is interleaved by an additional cryptographic operation AOP intended to encipher a random plain text RB with a random secret key ERK.
The additional cryptographic operation AOP on the random plain text RB has the same behavior of cryptographic operation OP on a plain text M, for example requiring a similar time of execution. The additional cryptographic operation AOP generates a garbage output that is not considered by the cryptographic algorithm for the effective ciphering of data.
In such a way, an attack is involved in an additional series of analysis intended to examine the power consumption of the additional cryptographic operations AOP. The medium time of succeeding in finding a secret key ESK is arbitrarily increased. In fact, the attack analyzes not only the cryptographic operations using the secret key ESK but also the cryptographic operations based on the random secret key ERK. More particularly, the random plain texts RB may be inserted in a scattered way in the original plain text M.
Again with reference to
The first additional cryptographic operation AOP encrypts the plain text RB1, randomly generated, through a secret key ERK that is also randomly generated. The corresponding output is marked as garbage output GO since it does not correspond to the plain text M1, MN to cipher.
The second additional cryptographic operation AOP encrypts the plain text RB2, randomly generated, through the secret key ERK. Also in this case, the corresponding output is marked as garbage output GO since it does not correspond to the plain text M1, MN and to a valid cryptographic operation.
All the cryptographic operations executed on these randomly generated plain texts RB do not influence the final output of the cryptographic algorithm. More particularly, the outputs of these additional cryptographic operations AOP are stored in one or more garbage-areas, for example in a portion of the memory unit of the IC card. These outputs are not considered in the successive additional cryptographic operations AOP.
Advantageously, the number and the disposition of additional cryptographic operations AOP between cryptographic operations may not be pre-determined but randomly managed. For example, depending on the use-requirements, a specific maximum number of additional cryptographic operations AOP is associated to the cryptographic algorithm.
With reference to
n
1
v=SizeOf(M)/mbs
where n1v is a number of remaining cryptographic operations at a first iteration, M is a plain text and mbs is the minimum size in bytes of M. For instance, for DES, Triple DES, AES, mbs may be set to 8-bytes.
The step of initialization also provides to set n1f as the number of remaining additional cryptographic operations AOP at the first iteration. For example, n1f is a random integer chosen with uniform distribution in the interval 0, 1, 2, . . . , N. More particularly, the parameter N is fixed and chosen to balance the performance and the security of the cryptographic algorithm.
For example, N is in the interval N [n1v, 2*n1v] The initialization step also provides generation of a random plain text RB such that:
Size Of (RB)=n1f*mbs
A random key KRAN is also generated during the initialization step, so that:
Size Of (KRAN)=Size Of(KSEC)
A plurality of iterations follow the initialization step. More particularly, the i-th iteration is such that
1≦i≦n1v+n1f, and
P(niv)=niv/(niv+nif)≦1
where P(niv) is the probability to compute a cryptographic operation at iteration i-th.
Similarly,
P(nif)=nif/(niv+nif)≦1
where P (nif) is the probability to compute an additional cryptographic operation AOP at iteration i-th, with P(niv)+P(nif)=1 because of the probability function.
At the i-th iteration the next operation is chosen between the remaining niv cryptographic operation and the nif additional cryptographic operation AOP using the probability functions defined above. More particularly, if the next operation is a cryptographic operation, then it is executed using the corresponding valid parameters, the secret key ESK and the plain text M. After the i-th step, ni+1v is set so that
n
i+1
v
=n
i
v−1
and the successive step is executed.
On the contrary, if the next operation is an additional cryptographic operation AOP, it is executed using the corresponding random parameters. For example, the random plain text block RBi and the random secure key KRAN are used. After the i-th step, ni+1f is set so that
n
i+1
f
=n
i
f−1
and the successive step is executed.
Advantageously, the probability function P(n) defined at iteration i-th, is convergent. In fact:
P(niv)≦1,
P(nif)≦1, and
P(niv)+P(nif)=1
for each i with 1≦i≦n1v+n1f
More particularly, for each i with 1<i<n1v+n1f
n
1
v
+n
1
f
<n
i−1
v
+n
i−1
f
If, at iteration (i−1)-th, a cryptographic operation is chosen then:
n
i
v
+n
i
f=(ni−1v−1)+ni−1f
P(niv)<P(ni−1v), and
P(nif)>P(ni−1f)
If, at iteration (i−1)-th, an additional cryptographic operation AOP is chosen then:
n
i
v
+n
i
f
=n
i−1
v+(ni−1f−1)
P(niv)>P(ni−1v), and
P(nif)<P(ni−1f)
At iteration i=n1v+nif:
niv=1, nif=0 with P(niv)=1, P(nif)=0; or
niv=0, nif=1 with P(niv)=0, P(nif)=1
Advantageously, the overall processing time T is a random variable depending on how many additional cryptographic operations AOP are included in the whole ciphering algorithm. The computational time required by the single cryptographic operation T is a random variable with uniform distribution in the interval:
T [t*n1v, t*(n1v+n1f)]
Advantageously, a power analysis attack on IC cards is not only able to dissociate a power consumption by a corresponding cryptographic operation involved in a cryptographic algorithm, but also to mislead such attack through an introducing of additional cryptographic operations AOP. Such additional cryptographic operations AOP sidetrack the attacker, accepting a small loss in terms of performance and providing a countermeasure that makes SPA-DPA and other time attacks more difficult to be implemented.
Advantageously, the order of cryptographic operations and additional cryptographic operations AOP is unpredictable and is balanced according to the required performance of the cryptographic algorithm.
| Number | Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| 06013441.8 | Jun 2006 | EP | regional |
