METHOD FOR PUBLIC-KEY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION WITH RESPECT TO A CONJUNCTIVE LOGICAL EXPRESSION

Abstract

The aim of the present invention is to propose a method for providing attribute-based encryption for conjunctive normal form (CNF) expressions, the said CNF expression comprising at least one clause over a set of attributes, the said method using a key generation engine, an encryption engine and a decryption engine.

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention refers to the field of broadcast encryption, in particular the way to manage authorization rights to access the content described by a logical expression in a broadcast system having a management center and a plurality of receiving devices which have certain characteristics.

INTRODUCTION

The area of broadcast encryption is well known in the art and was discussed for the first time by Fiat and Naor [1]. In this setting, the broadcasting center can send an encrypted message to a set of privileged (i.e., non-revoked) users which is a subset of the set of all possible receivers. Sometimes these terminals can be arranged according to some natural characteristics or attributes like their ZIP code based geographical location, their subscription to certain packages or their software version. Intuitively the broadcaster would like to broadcast to receivers which satisfy some of these properties in a more or less complex manner. For instance the broadcaster may want to enforce the access policy by sending the content only to receivers which are in ((“New York”) OR (“New Jersey”)) AND (with a receiver's firmware not older than 2.1.1). It should be emphasized that in this scenario, the broadcaster does not know the receivers identities and broadcasts to a subsets of receivers according to a logical expression based on their characteristics contrary to the standard broadcast encryption model, where the center broadcasts to a specific subset of receivers by specifying explicitly their identities.

PRIOR ART

The notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) where the center broadcasts to a subset of receivers in terms of descriptive attributes was introduced by Sahai and Waters in [2]. There are two types of ABE, namely: key-policy ABE where the access policy (also called the access structure) is specified in the private key and ciphertext-policy ABE where the access policy is specified in the ciphertext. Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters proposed the first construction of a ciphertext-policy ABE in [3]. Current invention concerns only ciphertext-policy ABE schemes, which will be further referenced simply as ABE schemes.

Those skilled in the art would agree that a logical access policy can be expressed using AND, OR and NOT logical gates. These expressions can be generalized under two forms, namely the disjunctive normal form (DNF) and the conjunctive normal form (CNF). The CNF is the conjunction (in other words a logical AND) of clauses, where a clause is a disjunction (in other words a logical OR) of attributes. The DNF is the disjunction (a logical OR) of conjunctions (a logical AND) of attributes. The NOT gate can be only part of a single attribute. For a set of attributes A₁, A₂, K , A_n an example of a CNF expression would be: (A₁A₂A₃)(A₄A₅A₆)K(A_n-2A_n-1A_n) and an example of a DNF expression would be: (A₁A₂A₃)(A₄A₅A₆)K(A_n-2A_n-1A_n). In the two examples above the symbol represents a logical AND, and the symbol represents a logical OR.

An important notion is the one of a monotonic logical expression. The expression is called monotonic if it can be defined as a composition of logical ANDs and ORs, but without any NOTs.

It should be noted that the prior art describes ABE schemes, methods and systems which operate with DNF types of logical expressions, most of the them being monotonic and restricted to a certain fixed number of clauses or attributes per such expression. For instance, recently, such methods were disclosed in [4], [5] and [6].

Those skilled in the art would notice that the crucial property of an ABE scheme is the so-called attribute-collusion resistance property. This is represented by the fact that provided two decryption keys dk_u1 and dk_u2 for attributes A₁ and A₂ respectively, such that the key dk_u1 is not able to decrypt any ciphertext intended solely for A₂ and vice-versa, these keys can not be used in any way in order to decrypt a cryptogram described by an expression A₁A₂.

Problem to be Solved

The aim of the present invention is to address CNF types of logical expressions for ABE. The benefit of the present application is hence the possibility to efficiently perform ciphertext-policy ABE for CNF expressions with logical ANDs and ORs, as well as logical NOTs.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The aim is achieved thanks to a method for providing attribute-based encryption for conjunctive normal form (CNF) expressions, the said CNF expression consisting of at least one clause over a set of attributes, the said method consisting of a key generation engine, an encryption engine and a decryption engine, and comprising the steps of:

Generating by the key generation engine a random gεG, where G is a prime order group of order p, four random values α, γ, β, rε_RZ/pZ, and for i=1, 2, K, n, n+2, K , 2n computing by the key generation engine 2n values g_i=g^αiεG and v=g^γεG.

Generating by the encryption engine the encryption key PK=(g^r, g₁^r, K ,g_n^r, g_n+2^r, K, g_2n⁴, v^r, g_n^β, g_n) consisting of 2n+2 group elements, n being the number expressing the size of the attribute set. For the abovementioned CNF expression over a set of attributes, CNF expression consisting of N clauses, generating by the encryption engine N random values t₁, t₂, K, t_Nε_RZ/pZ, computing by the encryption engine the value

$t=\sum _{i=1}^Nt_i\mathrm{mod}p,$

generating by the encryption engine the cryptogram hdr=(g_n^t, hdr₁, K, hdr_N) consisting of 2N+1 group elements with

${\mathrm{hdr}}_i=\left(g^{{\mathrm{rt}}_i},{\left(v^r\prod _{j\in {\beta }_i}g_{n+1-j}^r\right)}^{t_i}\right)$

for each clause β_i in the abovementioned CNF expression and generating the session key SK as SK=e(g₁^r, g_n^β)^t=e(g, g)^βrα(n+1)t, wherein the said session key or parts thereof is used to derive a symmetric key to encrypt the message, or to encrypt the message with the said session key. Generating by the key generation engine a plurality of private decryption keys dk_u=(g₁^r(β+su), g₁^su, K, g_n^su, g_n+2^su, K, g_2n^su, d_i1, K, d_iN, d_j1, K, d_jR) each of the said decryption keys explicitly associated with at least one positive attribute by the mean of the group element d_ij=g_ij^γ·su and explicitly associated with at least one negative attribute by the means of the group element d_jk=g_jk^γ·su wherein the value s_u is a random group element and is unique for every decryption key.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURE

The method of the invention will be better understood thanks to the attached figures in which:

the FIG. 1 illustrates a broadcaster and a plurality of receivers

the FIG. 2 illustrate a management center in communication with a plurality of receivers.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to cryptographic systems and methods and provides an attribute collusion-resistant ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme for conjunctive normal form (CNF) expressions.

Bilinear Maps

The present invention relies on bilinear maps (also called pairings in the related art). Let G and G_T be two cyclic groups of prime order p and a generator gεG. Let e: G×G→G_T be a non-degenerate bilinear map such that for all x,yεG and a,bεZ/pZ , we have e(x^a,y^b)=e(x,y)^ab and e(g,g)≠1 . The function e(.,.) should be also efficiently computable. For example, such maps can be, for instance, Weil or Tate pairings on supersingular elliptic curves. Their usage and implementation is well-known in the art. Weil and Tate pairings are provided here as examples and for the purpose of the preferred embodiment and it should be noted that any admissible pairing function e(.,.) with the above properties can be used. The preferred method involved in the computation of such a function will be the so-called Miller's algorithm for pairing calculation which is well known in the related art [7].

Choice of the Parameters

In the preferred embodiment we are using a supersingular elliptic curve E(F_p) with p≡3(mod4) a prime number of at least 512 bits and the order of E(F_p)=p+1. The group of point on the elliptic curve E(F_p) should also have a subgroup of prime order q of at least 160 bits. The sizes of these parameters correspond to the (block cipher) security equivalent of 80 bits. The generation of such elliptic curves is well known in the related art. Hence the following map is defined based on the Tate pairing function: E[q]×E′(F_p)→F_p2*, where E′(F_p) is defined to be the twisted curve and E[q] is the group of q-torsion points on E. Such parameters selection allows us to use a lightweight version of the Miller's algorithm along with arithmetic operations performed mostly in F_p, which is much faster, contrary to traditional methods of using arithmetic in F_pk. In fact, these methods are also well-known in the art and are disclosed in details in [8]. It should be noted that in this case the group G is represented by the q-torsion subgroup of E(F_p) and has the prime order q.

Preferred Implementation of the Scheme

According to the preferred embodiment of the current invention we consider a system where receivers can be arranger according to some characteristics or attributes, such as geographical position, firmware version, etc. Let n be the total number of such characteristics or attributes and λ be the total number of receivers. Hence for the sake of the preferred embodiment we can name these characteristics with n literals A₁, A₂ , K, A_n.The preferred implementation of the current invention includes three randomized algorithms, namely KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt implemented on a computer or in a dedicated apparatus. It should be also noted that in the below preferred implementation we will use an additive group law notation which is also frequently used in the art.

KeyGen algorithm starts by generating a random point GεE[q] by any well known mean of the art, as well as four random values α, γ, β, rε_RZ/qZ. Then for i=1, 2, K, n, n+2, K, 2n the algorithm computes 2n−1 values G_i=αⁱG and V=γG. The algorithm then generates a public encryption key PK=(rG, rG₁, K, rG_n, rG_n+2, K, rG_2n, rV, βG_n, G_n) consisting of 2n+2 points in the group E[q]. The algorithm will also generate a plurality of individual private decryption keys for each of λ receivers as follows. First the algorithm generates by any known mean of the art a random value s_uεZ/qZ. Then, for i=1, 2, K, n, n+2, K, 2n it sets 2n−1 values s_uG₁, K, s_uG_n, s_uG_n+2, K, s_uG_2n and computes the value r(β+s_u)G_n. Finally, for every defined property among A₁, A₂, K, A_n which characterizes the receiver, the algorithm computes N+R values D_i1, K, D_iN, D_j1, K, D_jR where D_ij=γ·s_uG_ij and D_jk=γ·s_uG_jk. Hence the decryption key for an individual receiver, characterized by N+R properties among n, consists of 2n+N+R group elements (or in the case of the preferred embodiment—points on the elliptic curve E(F_p)), that is dk_u=(r(β+s_u)G₁,s_uG₁,K,s_uG_n,s_uG_n+2,K,s_uG_2n,D_i1,K,D_iN,D_j1,K,D_jR). The said individual decryption key is loaded into the receiver, preferably by loading the said key into the secure and tamper-resistant non-volatile memory using methods known in the corresponding art.

Encryption algorithm is provided with an expression in CNF of the form β₁β₂Kβ_N, wherein every clause β_i consists of a disjunction (logical ORs) of several attributes. First, the algorithm randomly generates N values t₁,K,t_NεZ/qZ by any well known mean of the art and computes the value

$t=\sum _{i=1}^Nt_i\mathrm{mod}q.$

The encryption algorithm also computes the value hdr₀=t·G_n. The algorithm then computes for every clause β_i a pair of values, namely hdr_i,0=t_irG and

${\mathrm{hdr}}_{i,1}=t_i\left(\mathrm{rV}+\prod _{j\in {\beta }_i}{\mathrm{rG}}_{n+1-j}\right).$

It should be noted that the value j corresponds to an attribute in the clause β_i. The said pair of values constitutes the i-th part of the cryptogram. After computing N-th such pair (for the last clause β_N), the encryption algorithm computes the session key SK=e(r·G₁, β·G_n)^t=e(G,G)^βrα(n+1)t. The resulting session key hence has a size of 1024 bits with the parameters of the preferred embodiment. The said session key is then hashed, in the context of the preferred embodiment, using the SHA-256 hash function known in the art. The resulting 128 less significant bits are used as the key for the AES algorithm in encryption mode, the said algorithm also well-known in the art, to encrypt video, audio or other useful messages. Finally, the encryption algorithm outputs the generated cryptogram hdr=(hdr₀,hdr_i,0,hdr_i,1,K,hdr_N,0,hdr_N,1). It should be noted, that the CNF expression is broadcasted along with the cryptogram and the useful message which is encrypted by mean of the session key above to the intended recipients.

Decryption algorithm, upon receiving the cryptogram hdr=(hdr₀,hdr_i,0,hdr_i,1,K,hdr_N,0,hdr_N,1), the corresponding expression in CNF and the useful encrypted message, examines the expression and determines whether or not the receiver fulfils the necessary conditions for decrypting the message. In the case where it does fulfil the necessary conditions, the decryption algorithm proceeds as follow. First, for every clause in the expression it computes the values

${\mathrm{SK}}_i^{S_u}=\frac{e\left(S_u·G_k,{\mathrm{hdr}}_{i,1}\right)}{e\left(D_k+\sum _{j\in {\beta }_i,j\ne k}S_u·G_{n+1-j+k},{\mathrm{hdr}}_{i,0}\right)},$

where the values D_k are bonded to the characterizing attributes of the receiver, the said attributes being also listed in the clause β_i. Each of such N computations is performed using two pairing function described above. After computing N such values SK₁^Su, K, SK_N^Su, the decryption algorithm computes the session key as

$\mathrm{SK}=\frac{e\left({\mathrm{hdr}}_0,r\left(\beta +S_u\right)·G_1\right)}{\prod _{i=1}^N{\mathrm{SK}}_i^{S_u}}.$

The said session key is then hashed, in the context of this preferred embodiment, using the SHA-256 hash function and the resulting 128 less significant bits are used as the key for the AES algorithm in decryption mode to decrypt the useful message.

The person skilled in the art would appreciate the fact that the encryption key is public, any party can use it to encrypt any useful contents with respect to any CNF expression and that the said encryption key can not be used to derive the session key or decrypt the useful message without fulfilling a given CNF expression by explicitly possessing the decryption keys corresponding to the said expression. Those familiar with the art would also appreciate the fact that the proposed method fulfills the attribute collusion-resistance property described above. Contrary to the existing schemes of the art, the present invention can support expressions of any number of clauses and attributes without any constraints. Also, the size of the header is linear in the number of clauses and does not depend on the number of the attributes in any clause or in the whole expression.

It is important to note that the use of the particular supersingular elliptic curve over the finite field of a given size, its prime order subgroup, the specific bilinear map function as defined above, its parameters, key sizes, the use of the SHA-256 hash function and AES encryption algorithm is solely defined for the purpose of the preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not, in any case, limiting. Any elliptic curve, or any other group where the bilinear map can be efficiently and securely computed for a given security parameter can be used for the purpose of the present invention. The useful message, such as (but not limited to) video or audio content, can be encrypted or scrambled by any cryptographically secure means using key or keys derived from the session key defined in the scope of the present invention.

The above broadcast encryption scheme can be used to transmit messages from a control center to a plurality of terminals. These messages contain initialization data pertaining to one terminal.

In the FIG. 2, the management center MC stores in its database DB a copy of the key materials sent in the receiving devices RD1, RD2, RD3. According to our example, two subscription packages B1, B2 have been defined, the first one being related to the positive key material K1 and the negative material K1′, the second one being related to the positive key material K2 and the negative material K2′.

The receiving device RD1 being entitled to the subscription package B1 has received the key material K1. Due to the fact that this receiving device RD1 is not entitled to the subscription package B2, the key material K2′ was also sent to it.

The receiving device RD2 being entitled to the subscription package B1 and B2, both key material K1 and K2 were sent to this device.

The receiving device RD2 being entitled to the Subscription package B2, the key material K2 was sent to it. Due to the fact that this receiving device RD3 is not entitled to the Subscription package B1, the key material K1′ was also sent to it.

In case that the management center MC needs to transmit an access key K to only the receiving devices allowed to the second Subscription package B2 and not allowed to the first Subscription package B1, the cryptogram CY sent to the receiving devices RD will contain the access key combined with the negative key material K1′ and the positive key material K2.

In the authorization message containing the cryptogram, another field into the message contains a descriptor of the keys to be used for the decryption. This can be in the form of two bitmap, each active bits defining a subscription package, and one bitmap for the positive keys and the other one for the negative keys. According to the implementation of the invention, it could decided that the positive keys are used first to decrypt the cryptogram and then the negative keys.

The product key can release a single broadcast product, e.g. a film or can release a service for a day or a month.

The subscription package can refer to a plurality of services or a single service. The invention thus allows to define the access rule of this product by combining the access to the channel 3 (first subscription package) and not the channel 6 (second subscription package).

The invention has been described in detail with particular reference to the preferred embodiment thereof. It should be however understood that variations and modifications can be produced within the scope and the spirit of the present invention.

REFERENCES

[1] A. Fiat and M. Naor, “Broadcast encryption”, CRYPTO'93, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 773, pp. 480491, Springer-Verlag, 1994.

[2] A. Sahai and B. Waters. Fuzzy identity-based encryption. In Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2005, 24th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Aarhus, Denmark, pages 457-473, 2005.

[3] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. In 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2007), 20-23 May 2007, Oakland, Calif., USA, pages 321-334, 2007.

[4] B. Waters. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption: An expressive, efficient, and provably secure realization. http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/290.pdf, 2008. Unpublished manuscript.

[5] D. Lubicz and T. Sirvent. Attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme made efficient. In S. Vaudenay et al., editor, Proc. of Advances in Cryptology—Africacrypt'08, volume 5023 of LNCS, pages 325-342. Springer-Verlag, 2008.

[6] N. Attrapadung and H. Imai. Conjunctive broadcast and attribute-based encryption. In Pairing-Based Cryptography—Pairing 2009, Third International Conference, Palo Alto, Calif., USA, Aug. 12-14, 2009, pages 248-265, 2009.

[7] V. Miller. Short program for functions on curves. http://crypto.stanford.edu/miller/miller.pdf, 1986. Unpublished manuscript.

[8] P. Barreto, H. Kim, B. Lynn, M. Scott. Efficient Algorithms for Pairing-Based Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2002, 22^nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, pages 354-368, London, UK, 2002. Springer-Verlag.

Claims

1-10. (canceled)

11. A method for providing attribute-based encryption of a message using conjunctive normal form (CNF) expressions, the said CNF expression comprising at least one clause over a set of n attributes, the said method using a key generation engine, an encryption engine and a decryption engine, and comprising the steps of: a. generating by the key generation engine a random gεG, where G is a prime order group of order p where p is a primer number, four random values α, γ, β, rεR Z/pZ , and for i=1, 2, . . . , n, n+2, . . . , 2n where n is the number of attributes, computing by the key generation engine at least 2n−1 values gi=gαiεG and at least one value v=gγεG;b. generating by the encryption engine an encryption key PK=(gr, g1r, . . . , gnr, gn+2r, . . . , vr, gnβ, gn) comprising at least 2n+2 group elements;c. for an abovementioned CNF expression over a set of attributes, CNF expression comprising N clauses, generating by the encryption engine N random values t1, t2, . . . , tNεR Z/pZ, computing by the encryption engine the value

12. The method according to claim 11 wherein the part hdri of the cryptogram is generated by the encryption engine as

13. The method according to claim 11 wherein the session key SK is computed by the encryption engine using a bilinear map as SK=e(gir, gnβ)t=e(g,g)βrα(n+1)t.

14. The method according to claim 11 further comprising providing the decryption engine with the decryption key dku associated with at least one positive and one negative attribute, providing the decryption engine with the cryptogram hdr=(hdr0,hdr1,0,hdr1,1, . . . , hdrN,0, hdrN,1) consisting of at least 2N+1 group elements, and providing the decryption engine with the conjunctive normal form (CNF) expression over a set of attributes of N clauses corresponding to the said cryptogram.

15. The method according to claim 11 further comprising computing for each of N clauses by the decryption engine the intermediate values

16. The method according to claim 14 further comprising computing for each of N clauses by the decryption engine the intermediate values

17. The method according to claim 15 wherein the said intermediate values are computed using bilinear maps.

18. The method according to claim 15 further comprising computing by the decryption engine the value of the session key

19. The method according to claim 17 further comprising computing by the decryption engine the value of the session key

20. The method according to claim 11 further comprising using the session key or parts thereof to derive a symmetric key to decrypt the message, or to decrypt the message with said session key.

21. The method according to claim 11 wherein the said session key SK is computed using a bilinear map.

22. A device for implementing the method of any of claims 11 to 21.