Patent Application
20200320535
The present invention lies in the general field of electronic devices, and it relates more particularly to an electronic device, e.g. such as a smart card, that is configured to co-operate with an external terminal in order to perform a transaction, e.g. in the field of banking.
The invention applies more particularly, but in non-exclusive manner, to smart cards (or microcircuit cards) that comply with the ISO 7816 standard, for example. The invention relates in particular to making secure a smart card operating in compliance with the Europay Mastercard Visa (EMV) protocol.
In general manner, a smart card is designed to communicate with a device that is external to the card, otherwise known as a terminal or reader. Such cards enable various types of transaction to be carried out, such as for example payment transactions, direct debit transactions, or indeed authentication of the bearer. By way of example, smart cards for banking applications (credit cards, debit cards, etc.) are suitable for co-operating with payment terminals or with automatic teller machines (ATMs) in order to perform various financial operations.
EMV is the standardized protocol that is nowadays in the most widespread use throughout the world, in particular for securing payment transactions carried out with smart cards.
The EMV protocol was designed to reduce the risk of fraud during a payment transaction, in particular by making it possible to authenticate both the smart card and its bearer. The authentication process relies on a combination of cryptograms (or encrypted keys) and of digital signatures, and it optionally requires the bearer of the card to input a secret code (commonly referred to as a personal identification number (PIN)).
Depending on the type of card used, on the situation, or indeed the amount in question, an EMV card may operate on-line or off-line. In on-line mode, the EMV card may communicate via the reader with the corresponding issuing entity (the bank from which the card originates, for example) in order to verify in particular that the current transaction is legitimate. In contrast, if the EMV card is operating in off-line mode, it applies previously-stored verification criteria in order to decide whether the transaction is to be authorized or refused.
While carrying out a transaction, the EMV protocol is organized in three stages, although variants are also possible. During a first stage for authenticating the smart card 100 in use, the terminal 110 and the card 100 exchange a certain number of messages including a RESET message (RST) during S2 followed by an ATR response during S4. During S6, the bearer of the card uses the terminal 110 to select the desired transaction mode, thus causing a “SELECT” command to be sent to the card 100 in order to initiate the beginning of the EMV transaction.
Once the stage of authenticating the card has been completed, the EMV protocol proceeds with a stage (not shown) of authenticating the bearer of the card 100. The terminal 100 determines which bearer authentication method to apply, and in particular it determines whether the transaction is to be carried out in a mode with code verification or in a mode without code verification. If the code verification mode is selected, the smart card 100 verifies the validity of the PIN code input by the bearer to the terminal 110. In contrast, if the mode without code verification is selected, no PIN code verification is performed.
Once the stage of authenticating the bearer has been completed, the EMV protocol initiates a stage of verifying the transaction. To do this, the terminal 110 sends (S8) to the smart card 100 a first APDU command known as GENERATE AC or GAC (written herein GAC1). This well-known command includes information about the current transaction, such as the amount of the transaction, the currency used, the type of transaction, etc. The EMV card then verifies (S9) the transaction using predefined verification criteria, and then sends (S10), in response to the GAC1, a cryptogram (or cryptographic certificate) including a message authentication code (MAC). The response of the card 100 in the ARQC message depends in particular on how the card was set up by the entity 120 that issued said card (referred to as the “issuer”).
If the on-line mode is selected, as shown in the example of
The card 100 determines whether or not it accepts the transaction on the basis of the ARPC response received during S16. If the card 100 accepts the transaction, it responds by sending (S18) a transaction accepted (TC) type cryptogram to the terminal 110. Otherwise, the card 100 sends (S18) an AAC type cryptogram indicating that the transaction is refused. Performing a transaction on-line thus makes it possible to implement security mechanisms serving to identify risky situations and to trigger an appropriate security response. The issuer of the smart card may for example detect abnormal behavior during an on-line transaction and then decline the transaction or trigger additional verification checks.
Present EMV cards are generally configured so as to be capable of performing a certain number of transactions off-line, so that it is not possible for the entity issuing the card to perform a remote security check during an off-line transaction. By way of example, certain EMV cards are configured to operate off-line if the amount of the current transaction does not reach a predefined minimum amount.
Smart cards, and in particular EMV cards, are thus particularly vulnerable to attack and malicious (or abnormal) behavior when they operate off-line. By way of example, if an EMV card is stolen, the thief can then perform numerous successive transactions all for small amounts so as to avoid triggering on-line operation of the card, and thus escape from the vigilance of the card issuer.
There thus exists at present a need for a security mechanism that enables smart cards, e.g. cards of the EMV type, to be protected effectively against abnormal and/or suspect behaviors taking place, in particular during off-line transactions. Greater security is necessary in particular for protecting smart cards against fraudulent use, e.g. in the event of theft. More generally, a need exists for better monitoring of the use of an electronic device such as a smart card for example (of EMV or other type), including when the device is operating off-line in order to carry out a transaction.
To this end, the invention provides a security method performed by an electronic device, said method comprising:
In this example, the predefined time period is a moving time period that terminates at the current time point.
The present invention serves advantageously to provide electronic devices with protection that is effective, and in particular to do so with smart cards (of EMV or other type) that are configured to co-operate with a terminal in order to carry out a transaction (a bank or other transaction).
The invention serves in particular to make such electronic devices secure against abnormal or suspect behaviors occurring during off-line transactions.
In a particular implementation, the current time point comprises at least one of the current date and the current time of the current transaction.
In a particular implementation, determining the current point comprises receiving time data representative of the current time point from a terminal with which the electronic device is co-operating.
In a particular implementation, said selection comprises calculating the time point for the beginning of the predefined time period from the current time point and from a predefined duration given to said predefined time period;
each transaction that is selected being later than the time point for the beginning of the predefined time period.
In a particular implementation, during said selection, the electronic device:
In a particular implementation, said at least one first predefined condition comprises at least one of the following conditions:
In a particular implementation, during said selection, the electronic device filters the transactions stored in the log file so as to select only those transactions that satisfy at least one second predefined condition.
In a particular implementation, the second predefined condition comprises a condition about the type of terminal with which the electronic device co-operated during said transactions.
In a particular implementation, during said risk analysis, the electronic device detects whether abnormal use of said electronic device has taken place during said predefined time period on the basis of at least one of the following:
In a particular implementation, during said risk analysis, the electronic device detects that an abnormal use has occurred during said predefined time period if at least one of the following third predefined conditions is satisfied:
In a particular implementation, said at least one security operation comprises at least one of the following:
In a particular implementation, the electronic device is a smart card.
In a particular embodiment, the various steps of the security method are determined by computer program instructions.
Consequently, the invention also provides a computer program on a data medium (or recording medium), the program being suitable for being implemented in an electronic device such as a smart card, the program including instructions adapted to implementing steps of a security method as defined above.
The computer program may use any programming language, and be in the form of source code, object code, or code intermediate between source code and object code, such as in a partially compiled form, or in any other desirable form.
The invention also provides a computer-readable data medium (or recording medium) that includes instructions of a computer program as mentioned above.
The data medium may be any entity or device capable of storing the program. For example, the medium may comprise storage means, such as a read only memory (ROM), e.g. a compact disk (CD) ROM or a microelectronic circuit ROM, or indeed magnetic recording means, e.g. a floppy disk or a hard disk.
Furthermore, the data medium may be a transmissible medium such as an electrical or optical signal suitable for being conveyed via an electrical or optical cable, by radio, or by other means. The program of the invention may in particular be downloaded from an Internet type network.
Alternatively, the data medium may be an integrated circuit in which the program is incorporated, the circuit being adapted to execute or to be used in the execution of the method in question.
The invention also provides an electronic device comprising:
In this example, the predefined time period is a moving time period terminating at the current time point.
In a particular implementation, the invention is performed by means of software and/or hardware components. In this context, the term “module” may correspond in this document equally well to a software component, to a hardware component, or to a combination of hardware and software components.
In a particular embodiment, the electronic device is a smart card, e.g. of EMV type. In a particular embodiment, the smart card complies with the ISO 7816 standard.
In a particular embodiment, the electronic device of the invention includes a memory in which the log file is stored.
It should be observed that the various implementations mentioned above with respect to the security method of the invention and also the associated advantages apply in analogous manner to the electronic device of the invention.
Other characteristics and advantages of the present invention appear from the following description made with reference to the accompanying drawings, which show implementations having no limiting character. In the figures:
As mentioned above, the present invention relates to electronic devices, e.g. such as smart cards, that are configured to co-operate with an external terminal in order to carry out a transaction, e.g. in the field of banking.
The invention relates more particularly to making configured smart cards secure, in particular when they are configured to carry out a transaction off-line, as explained above.
In the example shown in
Nevertheless, that technique presents a drawback insofar as it is not always possible to detect a large and potentially abnormal increase in the amounts of transactions.
As shown in
The invention specifically proposes mitigating these drawbacks by using a security mechanism that makes it possible to detect abnormal or suspect behaviors effectively, including when the smart card is operating in off-line mode, so that an appropriate security response can be applied, where necessary.
In various implementations, the method of the invention performed by an electronic device such as a smart card, for example, comprises the following steps: determining a current time point during which a current transaction is or is to be carried out by the electronic device; selecting, from a log file in which at least one (or each) past transaction is stored, at least one transaction carried out by said electronic device during a predefined time period terminating at the current time point; analyzing risk from log data stored in the log file in association with each selected transaction in order to detect whether an abnormal use of said electronic device has occurred during said predefined time period; and if so, triggering at least one security operation for the electronic device in response to said current transaction.
The invention also provides such an electronic device suitable for performing the above-defined security method.
Other aspects and advantages of the present invention appear from the implementations and embodiments described below with reference to the above-mentioned drawings.
In the present disclosure, implementations of the invention are described with reference to a smart card of the EMV type. It should be understood that the invention is not limited exclusively to EMV cards, but that it applies more generally to any electronic device configured to carry out a transaction, including devices other than smart cards, the device possibly using the EMV standard, or other transaction standards.
In a particular example, the electronic device of the invention is a smart card complying with the ISO 7816 standard.
It should also be observed that the concept of a “transaction” should be understood broadly herein and includes, by way of example, in the field of banking, not only a payment transaction or a transfer transaction, but also consulting a bank account on a bank terminal. The various implementations of the invention are described herein in the context of a payment card configured to perform bank transactions. It should be understood that other types of transaction or operation can be envisaged in the ambit of the invention.
Unless indicated to the contrary, elements that are common or analogous in a plurality of figures are given the same reference signs and present characteristics that are identical or analogous, such that these common elements are generally not described again, for reasons of simplicity.
It should be understood that certain elements that are generally present in a smart card are voluntarily omitted since they are not necessary for understanding the present invention. It should also be observed that the smart card CD shown in
The smart card CD is configured to co-operate with a terminal (or reader) T in order to perform a transaction TR, such as a financial or bank transaction (payment or other transaction) in the present example.
The terminal T is configured to act as an interface between the smart card CD and a remote server SV. In the present example, the server SV is a server of the entity EM (e.g. a banking institution) that issues the smart card CD. In this example, the card CD is capable of communicating via the terminal T with the remote server SV in order to use the EMV protocol to carry out a so-called “on-line” transaction, i.e. a transaction involving an exchange with the issuer EM as explained above.
More precisely, the smart card CD in this example has external contacts 4 suitable for co-operating with the reader T, at least one processor 6, a volatile rewritable memory of the random access memory (RAM) type 8, and a non-volatile rewritable memory 10 (e.g. of the flash type).
In this example, the memory 10 constitutes a data medium (or recording medium) in accordance with a particular embodiment that is readable by the smart card CD and that stores a computer program PG in accordance with a particular embodiment. The computer program PG includes instructions for executing steps of a security method in a particular implementation. The main steps of the method in particular implementations of the invention are shown in
In a particular embodiment, the smart card CD complies with the ISO 7816 standard. Under such circumstances, the external contacts 4 present characteristics complying with that standard. Nevertheless, it should be understood that other embodiments are possible. By way of example, the smart card CD may co-operate with the reader T in a contactless mode using a radio frequency (RF) antenna integrated in the card CD.
Still in the example presently under consideration, a log file LG and at least one predefined rule criterion (or parameter) CR are stored in the non-volatile rewritable memory 10 of the card CD.
In this example, at least one transaction TR that has been carried out by the smart card CD in the past is stored in the log file LG. The log file LG stores log data DLG in association with each transaction TR. By way of example, the log data DLG may be transaction data characterizing the corresponding transaction TR. The log file LG enables the card CD to keep a record of useful data DLG relating to the transactions it carries out, which data, if necessary, can subsequently be consulted, processed, and/or sent by the card CD.
A particular example of such a log file LG in which transactions TR are stored (and more particularly in which log data associated with those transactions is stored) is described below with reference to
Furthermore, the criterion or criteria CR stored in the memory 10 may comprise at least one selection criterion CR1 and/or at least one analysis criterion CR2. Where appropriate, the selection and analysis criteria CR1, CR2 configure the way in which the card performs the method of the invention, as explained below. In the example shown in
The criteria CR and the log file LG are described in greater detail below for a particular implementation with reference to
In a particular implementation, the processor 6 controlled by the computer program PG implements a certain number of modules as shown in
In this particular example, the determination module MD2 is configured to determine a current point (or position) in time, written PC, during which a current transaction is or is to be carried out by the smart card CD. The term “current point in time” is used to mean a given instant in time at which a current transaction is or is to be carried out by the smart card CD. By way of example, a point in time may be defined by means of a date and/or a time, and more generally by any time data enabling a given position in time to be defined.
Various methods can be used to enable the card CD to determine the current point PC in time during which a current transaction is or is to be carried out by the card CD. In an example described in greater detail below, the determination module MD2 determines the current point PC in time from time data it has received, e.g. from the terminal T. In a variant, the smart card CD includes a unit for calculating the current date and/or time.
In this particular example, the selection module MD4 is configured to select in the log file LG that stores at least one past transaction TR, each (or at least one) transaction TR that has been carried out by the smart card CD during a predefined time period or “window” (written PD) terminating at the current time point PC. Since the time period PD is of fixed duration, it shifts in time so that it always terminates at the current time point PC as determined by the determination module MD2. In other words, the predefined time period PD is a moving time period having its end boundary defined by the current time point PC as determined by the determination module MD2. Each time a new current time period PC is determined by the determination module MD2, the time period PD moves through time so that it always terminates at the current point PC. Example implementations are described below with reference in particular to
In a particular example, the selection module MD4 is configured to select from the transactions TR stored in the log file LG all of those transactions TR that were carried out during the predefined time period PD.
In a particular example, the selection module MD4 is configured to select from the transactions TR stored in the log file LG, those transactions TR that were carried out during the predefined time period PD and that also satisfy at least one predefined selection criterion (or condition) CR1. By way of example, these selection criteria CR1 are stored in the memory 10 of the card CD. As already mentioned,
The risk analysis module MD6 is configured on the basis of log data DLG stored in the log file LG in association with each transaction TR selected by the selection module MD4 to detect whether an abnormal (or suspect) use of the card CD has occurred during said predefined period PD.
The term “abnormal use” is used herein to mean any use of the smart card CD that is judged, in accordance with at least one predefined analysis criterion, as being potentially at risk, fraudulent, or abnormal.
Still in this example, the security module MD8 is configured, in the event of a positive result from the detection by the risk analysis module MD6 (i.e. if an abnormal use of the card CD is detected by the analysis module MD6), to trigger at least security operation of the smart card CD in response to the current transaction TR. Each security operation is configured to make the smart card CD secure in response to the current transaction TR. Examples of such operations are described below with reference to
The steps performed by the smart card CD in a particular implementation of a security method are described below reference to
It is assumed that the smart card CD has co-operated with the terminal T to initiate processing of a transaction TR referred to as the “current” transaction. In a variant, the current transaction TR need not yet have been initiated.
In this example, the transaction TR is in compliance with the EMV protocol.
During a determination step S30, the smart card CD determines a current time point PC during which the current transaction TR is or is to be carried out by the smart card CD. By way of example, this current point PC comprises at least one of the date (referred to as the “current” date) and the time (referred to as the “current” time) of the current transaction.
During S32, the smart card CD selects from the log file LG in which at least one past transaction TR is recorded, each (or at least one) transaction TR carried out by the smart card CD during a predefined time period PD terminating at the current time point PC. As mentioned above, this period PD is a moving time window of predefined duration having its end boundary defined by the current time position PC.
In a particular example, the current time point PC is defined by the current date DC=[Feb. 16 2016] and the current time HC=[16:00], and the duration of the time period PD is set at 30 days. As mentioned below, the duration of the time period PD may be adapted, in particular depending on the configuration desired in the light of the type of events or behaviors that it is desired to monitor in the smart card CD.
Thereafter, the smart card CD analyzes (S34) risk (or the transaction) on the basis of at least one item of log data DLG stored in the log file LG associated with each transaction TR selected during S32 in order to detect whether an abnormal (or suspect) use of the smart card CD has taken place during the predefined time period PD. During S34, and by way of example, the smart card CD may detect that an abnormal use of said card CD has taken place during the predefined time period PD on the basis of at least one of the following:
For example, during this risk analysis S34, the smart card CD detects that abnormal use has occurred during the predefined time period PD if at least one of the following predefined conditions is satisfied:
If an abnormal use is detected during S34, the smart card CD acts during S36 to trigger at least one security action for the smart card CD in response to the current transaction TR.
Each security operation seeks to make the smart card CD secure with respect to the current transaction TR, and more generally with respect to the use that has been made of the smart card CD over the time period PD. The number and the nature of these security operations may vary as appropriate.
In a particular implementation, said at least one security operation S36 comprises at least one of any of the following:
The nature(s) of the operating parameter(s) PR that is/are to be modified where appropriate during S36 may vary depending on circumstances. In general manner, an operating parameter PR configures the way in which the smart card CD processes a transaction TR with an external terminal, such as the reader T in this example. By way of example, the operating parameter PR that is to be modified may be a count stored in the smart card CD. By way of example, such a count may represent the number of off-line transactions that have already been performed by the smart card CD, or indeed the total accumulated amount represented by the off-line transactions that have already been performed by the smart card CD. The parameter PR may also relate to a threshold value for such a count. Modifying the parameter PR may constitute updating the configuration of the smart card CD so as to give rise to a change in the processing of transactions TR by the smart card CD.
A particular implementation is described below with reference to
As shown in
Steps A4, A6, A12, and A14 as described below with reference to
During a sending step B2, the terminal T sends time data DNT to the smart card CD which receives it during A2. The time data DNT is representative of a current time point PC. This time data DNT may present any suitable format and in this example comprises the current date DC and the current time HC.
During A4, the smart card CD uses the time data DNT received during A2 to determine the current time point PC during which the current transaction TR6 is to be carried out. In this example, the current point DC is defined by the current date DC and the current time HC when the EMV protocol is initiated between the smart card CD and the terminal T in order to carry out the current transaction TR6. Other techniques for determining the current date and/or time are nevertheless possible.
Thereafter, the smart card CD selects (A6) from the log file LG each transaction TR that was carried out by the smart card CD during the predefined time period PD terminating at the current time point PC as determined during A4. In this example, the time period PD is a time window of predefined duration DT. The value of DT may be adapted depending on the looked-for objectives, as explained below.
More specifically, during selection A6, the smart card CD (and more particularly the selection module MD4) acts in this example to determine the time reference point, written PRef, that corresponds to the beginning of the predefined time period PD (
PRef=PC−DT
In this example, the reference point PRef comprises the date and the time of the beginning of the time period PD.
The reference time point PRef may correspond to a transaction previously carried out by the smart card CD.
Still during A6, the smart card CD then selects (A10) each of the transactions TR that is stored in the log file LG and that is later than the reference time point PRef. In a particular example, the selection during A10 includes the transaction TR, if any, that was carried out at the reference time point PRef (there being no transaction recorded at the point PRef in this example).
In this example, the smart card CD determines the moment at which a transaction TR stored in the log file LG was carried out (or processed) on the basis of the time point PT stored in the log file LG in association with the transaction TR concerned. By way of example, PT comprises the date and/or the time of the corresponding transaction TR.
In this particular example, the smart card CD selects during A10 the transactions TR2, TR3, TR4, and TR5 having time points PT (i.e. date and time) that are later than the reference time position PRef. The smart card CD also selects during A10 the current transaction TR6, even though variants are possible in which the current transaction TR is not selected during A10.
The smart card CD may also be configured to apply at least one selection criterion CR1 in order to refine the selection it performs during A10. In a variant, the smart card CD may for example act during A10 to select from the log file LG the most recent transaction TR in the time period PD that satisfies the first predefined condition CD1, and use it as the reference transaction TRef. The term “most recent” is used herein to mean the transaction TR having the time point PT that is the closest to the current point PC. The smart card CD then selects during A10 only each transaction TR carried out by said card CD subsequent to the reference transaction TRef in the predefined time period PD. In a particular implementation, the first condition CD1 comprises at least one of the following conditions:
When the above condition CD11 is applied, the smart card CD determines for each transaction TR having its time point PT subsequent to the reference transaction TRef, and on the basis of the associated data DN1, whether said transaction TR was an on-line transaction.
When the above condition CD12 is also applied, the smart card CD determines, for each on-line transaction having its time point PT subsequent to the reference transaction TRef, and on the basis of the corresponding data DN2 in the log file LG, whether said transaction TR was successfully authenticated (or validated) by the issuer EM.
In a particular implementation, the smart card CD applies the condition CD11 but not the condition CD12 during A10. In the example shown in
In another implementation, the smart card CD applies the above condition CD12. In the example shown in
As mentioned above, the smart card CD may be configured to apply at least one selection criterion CR1 to refine the selection made during A10. The number and the nature of selection criteria CR1 can vary as appropriate. In a particular example, during selection A10, the smart card CD filters the transactions TR stored in the log file LG so as to select only those transactions TR that satisfy at least one second predefined condition CD2.
In a particular example, the second predefined condition CD2 comprises a condition about the type of transaction T with which the smart card CD co-operated during said transaction TR. In the example shown in
It can be understood that it is possible to configure the smart card CD so that it applies at least one first condition CD1 and/or at least one second condition CD2 as explained above.
Below in this example it is assumed that the smart card CD applies the condition CD11 and consequently selects the transactions TR4 and TR5 during A10.
During an analysis step A12, the smart card CD (and more particularly its risk analysis module MD6) performs risk analysis (or transaction analysis) on the basis of log data DLG stored in the log file LG in associated with each transaction TR as selected during A6 (specifically TR4 and TR5 in this example), in order to detect whether abnormal (or suspect) use of the smart card CD has occurred during the predefined time period PD.
In this implementation, during said analysis A12, the smart card CD detects whether abnormal use of said card CD has occurred during the predefined time period PD on the basis of at least one of the following:
In this example, it is assumed that the number of transactions TR selected during A6 and the total accumulated amount of the transactions TR selected during A6 are both taken into account by the smart card CD when analyzing risk during A12. In the presently-considered example, and as shown in
In a particular example, during the risk analysis A12, the smart card CD detects whether abnormal (or suspect) use has taken place during the predefined time period PD in compliance with at least one analysis criterion CR2 as stored in this example in the memory 10. In this example, during the analysis A12, the smart card CD applies the following predefined conditions CD3 as analysis criteria CR2:
In other words, during analysis A12, the smart card CD detects that abnormal or suspect use has taken place during the predefined time period PD if the conditions CD32 and CD32 are satisfied. The values Lmax1 and Lmax2 are determined depending on specific requirements.
In a variant, only one of the predefined conditions CD31 and CD32 is applied by the smart card CD during the analysis A12.
If no abnormal use is detected during the analysis A12, the security method comes to an end. Under such circumstances, the smart card CD may for example return to normal processing of the transaction using the EMV protocol.
In contrast, if abnormal use is detected during A12, then in A14 the smart card CD triggers at least one security operation for the smart card CD in response to the current transaction TR6. Each security operation is configured to make the smart card CD secure relative to the current transaction TR, and more generally relative to the use made of the smart card CD over the time period PD. The number and the nature of the security operations may vary depending on circumstances.
In this example, the smart card CD acts during A14 to perform at least one of the following operations:
The present invention serves advantageously to protect smart cards, e.g. of the EMV type, effectively against abnormal or suspect behaviors that occur in particular during off-line transactions. A smart card of the invention is thus capable of storing log data in memory relating to the transactions processed by said card over time. On the basis of this log data, the smart card can then analyze the use that is made of the card during a certain time window, i.e. a time window that in this example corresponds to a period of time that immediately precedes the current transaction. It is thus possible to take account of all of the pertinent transactions in each analysis that is undertaken by the smart card, without there being any risk of certain transactions being excluded from the analysis, as happens for example in the security mechanism described above with reference to
It is possible to set the duration DT of the time period PD as a function of the type of abnormal or unauthorized use that it is desired to detect. In order to mitigate the above-described theft problems, it is possible for example to set the duration DT so that DT=10 minutes (or any value less than 60 minutes or 10 minutes). In contrast, if it is desired to detect abnormal behavior by the authentic bearer (e.g. an abnormal or suspect number of transactions and/or accumulated total expenditure amounts), it is possible for example to set the duration DT such that DT=30 days. In this way, the issuer can monitor the consumption habits of the authentic bearer and, if necessary, can contact the bearer or can take any other appropriate measure.
It is thus possible to configure the smart card so as to trigger a security response adapted to the detected abnormal use. Strengthened security for the smart card against fraudulent use (e.g. in the event of theft) is made possible, for example.
In general manner, the invention serves to provide better monitoring of the use of a smart card, in particular of EMV type, including when the card is used off-line.
A person skilled in the art will understand that the above-described implementations and variants merely constitute non-limiting implementations of the invention. In particular, the person skilled in the art can envisage any adaptation or combination of the above-described implementations and variants for the purpose of responding to some particular need.
| Number | Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1654572 | May 2016 | FR | national |
This application is a U.S. National Stage application of International Application No. PCT/FR2017/051254 filed 22 May 2017, which claims priority to French Application No. 1654572 filed 23 May 2016, the entire disclosures of which are hereby incorporated by reference in their entireties.
| Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/FR2017/051254 | 5/22/2017 | WO | 00 |
