This disclosure relates to a smartcard, either contact, contactless or both (combo), which is capable of performing biometric authentication of a bearer of the smartcard using an on-board biometric sensor. The card may be powered by a battery, power harvested from the energy radiated by the payment terminal or power supplied through the contact pad. The smartcard is preferably a payment card.
The output from the smartcard, e.g., to authorize a payment transaction, is facilitated by contacting a contact pad as for a contact smartcard or by an NFC signal as for contactless smartcards. There are also combo cards which may be accessed by either means. The management of the security and the transaction is handled by a so called “secure element” which is basically a microprocessor with flexible transaction capability. This microprocessor is usually attached to several contact pads and is loaded with proprietary software which is zealously protected by the issuing banks. Secure elements are manufactured and designed by companies such as Multos, G&D, Gemalto and Oberthur to name just a few.
Another microprocessor running firmware proprietary to the biometric application, referred to herein as the biometric authentication module, is capable of switching on the secure element once a successful biometric match has been confirmed. In previous embodiments, security was handled by a solid state switch for enabling or disabling power and antenna access to the secure element. This method has weak security because a skillful hacker could cut through the surface of the card, locate the necessary conductors, and make the appropriate connections to force the card into a constant enabled state.
A proposed fix for this weakness is to address the secure element in a digital manner using conventional Public Key Infrastructure (“PKI”). PM implementation starts by loading similar keys onto the secure element and the biometric authentication module during manufacture. These keys are used to encode the communications (encrypt) between the secure element and biometric authentication module. This solves some but not all of the problems.
The present disclosure seeks to improve communication between the secure element and the biometric authentication module.
The manufacturers of a secure element define a standard communication protocol for use when communicating with the secure element. However, messages sent in accordance with this protocol do not use all of the bytes received. This disclosure provides additional functions that are achieved by loading different message segments to these existing, but unused bytes.
These and other features and improvements of the present application and the resultant patent will become apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art upon review of the following detailed description when taken in conjunction with the shown drawings and the appended claims.
A preferred embodiment will now be described in greater detail, by way of example only and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
The manufacturer of the secure element 2 defines a standard communication protocol for use when communicating with the secure element 2. However, messages sent in accordance with this protocol do not use all of the bytes received. That is to say, in accordance with the protocol, certain bytes of data that are sent are simply discarded when processing the messages. For example, in the illustrated embodiment, the messages are 8 bytes long but only up to 6 of the bytes have a defined usage in the communications protocol. It will be appreciated that the invention is not restricted to 8-byte messages.
The Figures show how this simple interface may be enhanced by the addition of valuable but previously unused functionality. This disclosure provides additional functions which are achieved by loading different message segments to these existing, but unused bytes.
These bytes may be used, for example, to verify the origin of the message or the time when the message was transmitted, or they may contain random data to prevent an intercepted message from being copied and re-sent multiple times. The bytes may also be used to provide error checking functionality, such a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) as illustrated below.
Further exemplary functions that may be loaded into the previously unused bytes include:
(1) Biometric Erasure and Confirmation. It may be desirable in the case of a card being used fraudulently to actually erase the contents of the smartcard memory removing the biometric template residing there. A confirmation message as shown in
(2) Illegal Command. In the case that the secure element sends a Challenge message to the biometric authentication module. If an illegal message is embedded in the data, the biometric authentication module may respond with a certain coded message embedded in the non-protocol bytes indicating that the Challenge message was corrupt.
By using these currently unused byes, the overall quantity of data transmitted is not increased, which is important on a smartcard where power consumption must be carefully regulated. Furthermore, the use of embedded challenge and response messages allows for continuous monitoring of the integrity of the communication link.
It should be apparent that the foregoing relates only to certain embodiments of the present application and the resultant patent. Numerous changes and modifications may be made herein by one of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the general spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the following claims and the equivalents thereof.
Number | Date | Country | |
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62398753 | Sep 2016 | US |