This invention relates to a method for establishing a secure communication link between a first terminal and a second terminal.
At the present time the technical means used for gaining access to a private company network from an open access network of the internet type are VPN (Virtual Private Network) techniques using IPSEC (Secure Internet Protocol) or SSL (Secure Socket Layer) standards through which an encrypted IP tunnel can be established between the user station and the company's network.
Currently available VPN are generally based on authentication and coding architectures offering either a password created by a generator or PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) architectures based on certifications stored on the user's hard disk or on smart cards inserted into card readers. Thus, depending upon the system, the generator is used to generate a single-use password, or a certification is stored either on the computer's hard disk or in a USB key or in a smart card incorporating a micro-module containing signature certifications and algorithms.
These systems have a number of disadvantages.
The use of a generator to calculate the password is not very convenient as it requires the user to read a code and to retranscribe it onto his computer.
The storage of a software certification on the computer's hard disk provides a low level of security, various attacks having been shown to be possible in a standard computer.
The use of a USB key or smart card incorporating a micro-module means that the user must have such an object, with the resulting risk of loss.
The object of the invention is therefore to overcome these disadvantages by providing a method of establishing a secure connection with a high level of security without the use of a specific object.
The object of the invention is therefore a method for establishing a secure communication link between a first terminal and a second terminal connected together by communication means, the first terminal being connected to a third terminal which is able to connect to a mobile telephone network and which comprises authentication means and the second terminal being connected to authentication means in the mobile telephone system, and in that it comprises the steps of:
a) transferring at least one authentication datum from the third terminal to the authentication means of the network through the first and second terminals,
b) after authentication of the third terminal by the network authentication means, transfer of at least one randomised sequence from the system's authentication means to the third terminal through the second and first terminals,
c) generating at least one session key by the third terminal and also by the system authentication means on the basis of the random sequence or sequences,
d) transmission of the at least one session key from the third terminal to the first terminal and by the system authentication means to the second terminal respectively,
e) generation of a shared key on the basis of the at least one session key by both the first terminal and the second terminal,
f) opening a secure communication link between the first and second terminal using the shared key.
According to embodiments of the invention the method comprises one or more of the following features:
Another object of the invention is a system for establishing a secure communication link between a first and a second terminal connected together by communication means such that
Another object of the invention is a first terminal which further comprises second communication means capable of transferring authentication data from a mobile telephone network to a third terminal which can be connected to a mobile telephone network and authentication means of the said network via a second terminal, and means for establishing a secure communication link with the second terminal capable of using a shared key generated from the mobile telephone network authentication data, and
Other objects of the invention are:
Other advantages and characteristics of the present invention will become clear from the following detailed description which is given with reference to the appended drawings which are provided purely by way of non-limiting example and in which:
In the various figures the same reference number indicates an identical or similar item.
The method according to the invention,
Terminal 2 may be an isolated server or a gateway providing access to an internal network 4.
First terminal 1, or the client terminal, is connected to a mobile telephone 5. This connection 6 is preferably a short wave “Bluetooth” carrier radio link but may also be an infra-red link using the IrDA protocol or any other connection permitting an exchange of data between the two devices.
Any terminal capable of being connected to a mobile telephone network may perform the role of mobile telephone 5. Thus a “Smartphone”, a personal assistant or a personal computer having a connection to a mobile telephone network may be used.
Mobile telephone 5 comprises authentication means 7 in the form of an authentication module. This module is a SIM (subscriber identification module) card or a UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) card.
As mobile telephone 5 preferably operates on the GSM standard, SIM card 7 has a communication interface with mobile telephone 5 which is perfectly defined by the GSM standard and in particular standard ETSI GSM 11.11.
Second terminal 2, which will also be referred to as a gateway, is connected to the authentication means 8 of the telephone network of mobile telephone 5 through a conventional data link 9.
These authentication means 8 comprise an authentication server 10 which is a machine responsible for carrying out the method and providing an interface through a MAP (Mobile Application Part) gateway 11 to the equipment of the telephone network and in particular the HLR (Home Locator Register) servers 12 and AuC (Authentication Centre) 13 which manage users in a GSM network.
Those skilled in the art will be familiar with this equipment which is particularly described in the ETSI standards.
The various steps in the method will now be described.
However, to begin with, in order to allow easier understanding of the method, a reminder of the method for authenticating a user in a GSM network in connection with standard ETSI GSM 11.11 will now be provided.
The SIM card 7,
On the basis of this identifier HLR system 12 causes server AuC13 to calculate a triplet (SRES, Kc, RAND), on the basis of a secret key Ki, paired with the IMSI, in which the signed response SRES and the session key Kc are the results from a pair of standard algorithms A3 and A8 based on a random sequence RAND and key Ki. Random sequence RAND is then sent to the mobile terminal with a request for authentication.
The mobile terminal then requests SIM card 7 to execute the command RUN GSM ALGORITHM (data=<<RAND>>).
The SIM card, having in its possession the same secret key Ki and the algorithms A3 and A8, can generate SRES′ and Kc, which are returned to terminal 5.
Using Kc as the session key and the standard coding algorithm A5, terminal 5 returns SRES*=A5 (SRES′, Kc) to authentication server 12, where SRES* corresponds to SRES′ coded by algorithm A5 and key Kc.
After decoding, the HLR authentication server 12 checks that the SRES′ sent by the terminal is the same as the SRES calculated by AuC server 13. If this is the case, the terminal is then authenticated and can gain access to the network.
It should be noted that, once authenticated, mobile telephone 5 receives a temporary identifier TMSI which will have the same role as the IMSI in subsequent authentications. By thus restricting transfers of IMSI on the network the security of the system is heightened.
The method described therefore uses this authentication mechanism.
In fact the various means are related as described previously in connection with
In step 34 client terminal 1 then transmits a request for establishing a secure link together with the IMSI identity to gateway 2.
In step 35 this IMS identity is transmitted by gateway 2 to authentication means 8 of the mobile telephone network, in particular to HLR server 12.
In return, step 36, gateway 2 receives one or more random sequences A1, . . . An as well as the corresponding session keys Kc1, . . . , Kcn.
Several pairs (Ai, Kci) can easily be obtained by successive execution of algorithms A3 and A8 by AuC server 13.
Gateway 2 then transmits random sequences A1, . . . , An to terminal 1 in step 37, which transfers them to mobile telephone 5 in step 38.
This then in step 39 provides a RUN GSM ALGORITHM request to SIM card 7 in order to obtain keys Kci and results SRES′i in step 40. This request is executed as many times as there are random sequences Ai.
Session keys Kci are then transmitted to first terminal 1 in step 41.
At this step in the method client terminal 1 and gateway 2 each have the set of session keys Kc1, . . . , Kcn.
Terminal 1 and separately gateway 2 calculate a shared key PSK from set of keys Kc1 . . . Kcn in step 42. A pseudo-random function such as SHA1 is typically used for this purpose.
As each terminal then has a common shared key PSK, and establishment of a secure link takes place in step 43 in accordance with normal protocols.
In order to implement the method described the system for establishing a secure communication link therefore comprises, in addition to the items described in connection with
Likewise, mobile telephone 5 in the network must comprise means 6 for communication with terminal 1, typically “Bluetooth” communication, and it must be capable of transmitting and receiving authentication data from the network through these communication means 6.
In order to do this the mobile telephone has a “Sim Access Profile” enabling access to the SIM card commands from the “Bluetooth” link.
This profile is advantageously controlled form terminal 1 by a PC/SC programming interface which thus enables the VPN application to consider the mobile telephone and its “Bluetooth” link assembly as a single smart card reader.
In a variant of the method, a single pair (RAND, Kc) is calculated. Key Kc is then used as a shared key PSK. Step 42 is therefore reduced to an identity operation.
Although simpler, this variant has the disadvantage that it increases the exposure of key Kc to attacks and thus makes the security system for the GSM network less robust.
In another variant, shared key PSK is calculated by applying a function SHA1 to key Kc and SRES, both of which have been obtained by the command RUN GSM ALGORITHM.
In a second variant,
This is in fact calculated in SIM card 7 and authentication means 8 separately in steps 35A and 39A on the basis of the Kci keys, as described previously, and then transferred to terminals 1 and 2, in steps 36A, 40A and 41A.
In order not to have an adverse effect on clarity of description many details of implementation which are known to those skilled in the art have not been described.
For example, many exchanges need to be encrypted in order to obtain a high level of security. This applies to the IMSI or TMSI identifier, which it is desirable should be transmitted encrypted in steps 32 to 35 in
Likewise, in the variant in which the PSK key is calculated by the mobile terminal and the network's authentication means, it is desirable that this key should be transmitted to the terminals in coded form.
It is also possible, in a variant implementation, to replace authentication means 8, previously described with reference to
In another embodiment the authentication step between mobile telephone 5 and the network's authentication means 12, 13 takes place conventionally through the intermediary of the telephone network. Thus only the session keys Kci and shared keys PSK are transferred to terminals 1 and 2.
A method and an associated system through which a secure communication link, in particular of the VPN type, can be established between two terminals with a high level of security and using equipment such as mobile telephones which are normally possessed by users has thus been described.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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05 02441 | Mar 2005 | FR | national |
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind | 371c Date |
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PCT/FR2006/000473 | 3/2/2006 | WO | 00 | 10/10/2007 |