The present invention relates to optical networks, and, more particularly, to systems that provide secure communications in optical networks.
Over the last decade, the amount of information that is conveyed electronically has increased dramatically. As the need for greater communications bandwidth increases, the importance of efficient use of communications infrastructure increases as well. The emergence of dense-wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) technology has improved the bandwidth problem by increasing the capacity of an optical fiber. In wavelength division multiplexing, channels are arranged by a predetermined wavelength interval, and signals are loaded on each channel. Also, a number of channels are optically multiplexed, and the signals are transmitted through an optical fiber. A receiver optically demultiplexes the channels according to their wavelengths and utilizes each channel separately. DWDM is now well established as a principal technology to enable large transport capacities in long-haul communications.
However, the increased capacity creates a serious mismatch with current electronic switching technologies that are designed to process individual channels within a DWDM link. In electronic switching, the optical fiber additionally requires a photoelectric converter for converting an optical signal into an electrical signal and an electro-optic converter for converting an electrical signal into an optical signal, which results in an increased cost. While electronic switching routers such as IP routers can be used to switch data using the individual channels within a fiber, this approach implies that tens or hundreds of switch interfaces must be used to terminate a single DWDM fiber with a large number of channels. This could lead to a significant loss of statistical multiplexing efficiency when the parallel channels are used simply as a collection of independent links, rather than as a shared resource.
In order to solve such problems, there were proposed in the related art optical switching technologies, which do not convert the transferred optical signal into the electrical signal but process the optical signal directly. Optical switching technologies based on wavelength routing (circuit-switching) of a limited pool of wavelengths don't make efficient use of the transmission medium when data traffic dominates the public network. This is the case today where the increasing demand for bandwidth is largely due to a spectacular growth in IP data traffic. All-optical packet switching would be an optimum transfer mode to handle the flood of optical IP packets to and from the Internet core in the most efficient way. However, a number of packet-switching operations (e.g. ultra fast pulsing, bit and packet synchronization, ultra-high-speed switching, buffering and header processing) cannot be performed optically, on a packet-by-packet basis today.
A related art optical burst switching (OBS) network makes use of both optical and electronic technologies. The electronics provides control of system resources by assigning individual user data bursts to channels of a DWDM fiber, while optical technology is used to switch the user data channels entirely in the optical domain. In the OBS, the length of a data packet is variable and packet routing can be performed without an optical buffer by setting a path in advance using a control packet.
In the OBS network, generally, Internet protocol (IP) packets or data stream of any form inputted in an optical domain are gathered as a data burst in an edge node, and such data bursts are routed by way of a core node depending on their destinations or Quality of Services (QoS) and then sent to the destination nodes. Further, a burst header packet and the data burst are respectively transmitted on different channels and at an offset time. That is, the burst header packet is transmitted earlier than the data burst by the offset time and it reserves an optical path through which the data burst is transferred, so that the data burst can be transmitted through the optical network at a high speed without being buffered.
However, optical burst switching networks are vulnerable to security threats. In OBS networks, data can be misdirected and tapped off by undesirable parties.
It is therefore an object of the invention to provide secure measures to optical burst switching networks.
It is another object of the invention to reduce overhead associated with providing security measures to optical burst switching network.
It is another object of the invention to provide a means to realize security measures in OBS edge and core routers.
In accordance with the present invention, there is provided methods to provide secure communications in optical burst switching (OBS) networks. The present invention provides methods for secure transmission of data bursts, as well as authentication of burst headers. The present invention provides methods to implement security measures in OBS edge and core routers.
A complete understanding of the present invention may be obtained by reference to the accompanying drawings, when considered in conjunction with the subsequent, detailed description, in which:
a) and 2(b) shows an example of transmitting a data burst through an optical burst switching network;
a) shows key distribution between the ingress edge router and the first hop core router;
b) shows key distribution between the last hop core router and the egress edge router;
c) shows key distribution between two adjacent core routers;
d) shows key distribution among edge routers.
For purposes of clarity and brevity, like elements and components will bear the same designations and numbering throughout the Figures.
As would be understood in the art, reference to a router as an ingress or egress router 120 is a relativistic term in that a single router can serve as an ingress or egress router depending on whether it is positioned at an origination point for data or a destination point for data. Similarly, a core router can be identical to an ingress or egress router in that it too can include interface lines enabling it to also serve as an origination point for data or a destination point for data. That is, any of the routers included in an optical communication link can, for a given transmission, operate as an ingress, egress or core router, depending on its location within the communication chain. Thus, the ingress, egress and/or core router can also be referred to herein as a first router, a second router and so on.
In optical burst switching network 100, wavelengths 210 in a WDM link 140 can be divided into a set of control channels 230, and a set of data channels 240 as illustrated in
In optical burst switching network 100, before a data burst 250 is launched on one of the data wavelengths 240, a burst header 260 is launched on the control channel 230. The burst header 260 carries routing information, as well as information specific to the optical burst switching network 100. Some exemplary optical burst switching specific information are (1) offset time, specifying the time difference between the transmission of the first bit of a burst header 260 and the transmission of the first bit of its associated data burst 250; (2) burst length, or burst duration, specifying the duration of the data burst 250; (3) data wavelength identifier, specifying the data channel 240 on which the data burst 250 is transmitted; (4) QoS, specifying the quality of service to be received by the data burst 250.
An important feature of the optical burst switching network 100 is that the data burst 250 and the burst header 260 are transmitted and switched separately. The operation of the optical burst switching network 100 is described as follows. When data chunks or data packets arrive at the electronic ingress edge router 120, they are assembled into data burst 250 based on their destination electronic egress edge router addresses and other attributes such as QoS. Once the data burst 250 is formed, a burst header 260 is generated and sent on the control channel 230 at an offset time ahead of the data burst 250. The burst header 260 is processed electronically at each optical core router 110. Based on the information carried in the burst header 260, the optical core router 110 dynamically sets up an optical path shortly before the arrival of the data burst 250. According to one embodiment, the data burst 250 is not electronically processed in the optical core router 110, and is passed to the output specifying the data wavelength 240 as a pure optical signal. According to another embodiment, the data burst 250 can be converted to electronic signals in the core router 110, but is switched as an entity. In another embodiment, the data burst 250 can be temporarily stored in optical buffers such as Fiber Delay Lines (FDL). In another embodiment, the data burst 250 can be converted to electrical signals and stored in electronic RAMs. This process continues as the data burst 250 traverses the optical burst switching network 100 till it reaches the electronic egress edge router 120, where the data burst 250 is disassembled back into data chunks or data packets.
Optical burst switching allows the burst header 260 to be processed electronically, while providing ingress-egress transparent optical paths in the optical burst switching network 100. Each burst header 260 carries necessary routing and optical burst switching network 100 specific information about the associated data burst 250 such that the data burst 250 can pass through the optical core router 110 as an optical signal.
In optical burst switching network 100, in one embodiment, data bursts 250 are launched without pre-established lightpaths. Lightpaths are set up on-the-fly as data burst 250 approaches the OBS core router 110. Contention occurs when two bursts traveling on the same wavelength compete for the same output port. When contention cannot be resolved, one of the contenting bursts has to be dropped. In another embodiment, data bursts are launched after acknowledge is received. In another embodiment, a burst header is pre-launched before data burst is assembled.
The architecture of an OBS core router 110 is illustrated in
In OBS networks 100, each valid burst 250 is associated with a burst header 260, which is sent ahead of the data burst 250 on a separate control channel 230. The burst header 260 carries the control information and is responsible for making the WDM channel reservation for its corresponding burst 250. If the scheduling request is rejected at one of the OBS core routers 110, there will be no valid optical path set up for the arriving burst 250. Since the burst 250 has been launched, it is going to arrive at the input of the core router 110 in any case. At this point, the burst 250 is no longer associated with its burst header 260 and becomes an orphan burst 710 as shown in
An active attack can be launched by injecting malicious burst headers 820 into the OBS network 100. In an OBS network 100, the data burst 250 bears no routing intelligence to the destination edge router 120 and will follow the optical path set up by its associated burst header 260. If a malicious burst header 820 is injected into the network by a malicious party at an appropriate time, an optical burst 830 can be misdirected to an unauthorized router, even though a path has been set up by the authentic burst header 810. Since the OBS routers 110 have no way of telling the authenticity of the burst headers 260, any active data bursts 250 that appears on the input channels can be misdirected.
In this invention, in accordance with one embodiment, the optical burst switching network 100 is secured by providing the following embedded services: 1) Key distribution; 2) Authentication of burst headers 260; and 3) Confidentiality of data bursts 250. The security services will work with various routing schemes in OBS networks 100 (e.g. static routing, deflection routing, and dynamic load balancing). A major differentiating characteristic of the OBS network is its unique network architecture, and the separation of burst headers 260 and data bursts 250.
In OBS networks 100, data bursts 250 assembled at an ingress edge router 120 stay as an entity in the OBS core network, and are only disassembled at the destination egress edge router 120. Since data bursts 250 are transparent to OBS core routers 110, encryption/decryption of data bursts 250 is only needed between a pair of ingress and egress edge routers 120, according to one embodiment.
On the other hand, burst headers 260 are converted back to electronic form and are processed electronically at every OBS core router 110 along the path. Therefore, per hop burst header authentication is needed to ensure that no malicious burst headers 820 can alter the route of optical data bursts 250.
Because data bursts 250 are encrypted at ingress edge routers 120 and decrypted at egress edge routers 120, keys for encrypting and decrypting data bursts 250 only need to be distributed between pairs of ingress and egress routers 120 in the OBS network 100, according to one embodiment.
Since burst headers 260 need to be authenticated on a per hop basis, according to one embodiment, keys for burst header authentication need to be distributed between a) the ingress edge router 120 and the first hop core router 110, b) any connected core router 110 pairs, and c) the last hop core router 110 and the egress edge router 120.
The current invention also provides a method to embed the security services in the OBS edge router 120 and the core router 110 architecture. The embedded secure OBS edge router 120 architecture according to the current invention is shown in
When burst headers 260 arrive at the secure OBS core router 110 shown in
In a block 1216, an encryption key is selected to encrypt the burst header 260. In one embodiment, the selection of the encryption key is according to the next hop core router 110 address. Once an appropriate encryption key is selected, the burst header is encrypted in a block 1218. In a block 1220, the encrypted burst header is sent on the control channel 230.
An encryption key is selected to encrypt the data burst 250 in a block 1222. In one embodiment, the selection of the encryption key is according to the destination egress edge router 120 address. In another embodiment, the selection of the key is according to the egress edge router 120 address, and the security level for the burst 250 to be encrypted. In one embodiment, one encryption key is maintained at the ingress router 120 for each egress edge router 120. In another embodiment, multiple keys are maintained at the ingress edge router 120 for the same egress edge router 120. In one embodiment, the encryption keys are maintained in RAMs. In another embodiment, the encryption keys are maintained in non-volatile memory devices. In another embodiment, the encryption keys are maintained in disk drives. Note that the encryption key to encrypt the data burst 250 is different from the encryption key used to encrypt the burst header 260. Data burst 250 is encrypted at the ingress edge router 120, and is decrypted at the destination egress edge router 120. The data burst 250 remains encrypted in the OBS network 100. On the other hand, the burst header 260 is decrypted, and then encrypted again at each OBS core router 110 for authentication purposes. The data burst 250 is encrypted in a block 1224 using the encryption key chosen in the block 1222. In a block 1226, the encrypted data burst 250 is transmitted on the data channel 240.
The operations in a secure OBS core router 110 according to one embodiment of the current invention are illustrated in a flowchart in
If the received burst header 260 is authentic, associated burst 250 information is extracted from the authenticated burst header 260. The status of the associated burst 250 is first checked for any discard by upstream core routers 110 in a block 1420.
If the burst 250 associated with the authenticated burst header 260 is discarded by upstream OBS core routers 110, no wavelength reservation is made. The burst header 260 in this case simply needs to be forwarded to the next hop router, which can be either a core router 110, or an egress edge router 120. To do this, in a block 1428, an appropriate encryption key is selected for the burst header 260. In one embodiment, the encryption key selection is according to the burst header's next hop router address. The burst header 260 is then encrypted using the selected encryption key in a block 1430. The encrypted burst header is then converted to optical signal and sent on the control channel 230 in a block 1432.
If the burst 250 associated with the authenticated burst header 260 is not discarded by upstream core routers 110, wavelength reservation is performed in a block 1422. Results from wavelength reservation are checked in a block 1424.
If the reservation fails, burst information in the authenticated burst header 260 is updated to indicate that the burst 250 is discarded in a block 1426. An optional burst retransmission may be triggered in a block 1440 in one embodiment. The updated burst header 260 is encrypted by the OBS core router 110 before forwarding to the next hop. This includes encryption key selection, encryption of the burst header 260, and transmission of the encrypted burst header 260 on the control channel 230 in blocks 1428, 1430 and 1432 as previously described.
If the wavelength reservation is successful, burst information is updated in the authenticated burst header in a block 1434. In one embodiment, such information includes the outgoing wavelength reserved for the burst 250, offset time between the burst header 260 and the associated burst 250. After the burst header 260 is updated, an encryption is selected in a block 1428. In one embodiment, the encryption key selection is according to the next hop router address. The burst header 260 is encrypted using the selected key in a block 1430. The encrypted burst header 260 is converted to optical signals and sent on the control channel 230 in a block 1432.
In a block 1436, the optical interconnects 450 are configured according to the wavelength reservation to route the data burst 250 to the reserved output wavelength.
In one embodiment of the current invention, burst headers 260 are authenticated at every core router 110 along the path, as well as at the egress edge router 120.
In one embodiment, encryption and decryption keys for burst header authentication are distributed between adjacent routers.
According to one embodiment of the current invention, the data burst 250 is only encrypted at the ingress edge router 120, and decrypted at the egress edge router 120. As shown in
According to the current invention, any encryption mechanisms can be used.
In one embodiment, symmetric cryptography can be used. In symmetric cryptography, each pair of routers (ingress, egress, or core) will have a secret key for use by that pair. Encryption and decryption are performed using the same key. When symmetric cryptography is used, a secret key needs to be securely distributed between the pair of routers.
In another embodiment, asymmetric cryptography can be used. Asymmetric cryptography will require each router to have a distinct pair of keys—public key and private key. The public key associated with each router is distributed to every other router.
In one embodiment, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) can be used. For encrypting data bursts, AES is the preferred embodiment due to its cryptographic strength as well as the high speed it can operate at. Other encryption methods can also be used, including but not limited to DES (Data Encryption Standard), DES3 (Triple DES), RSA, RC4, RC2-40, RC2-64, RC2-128, MD5 (Message Digest), MD4, and SHA-1 (Secure Hash). Furthermore, proprietary encryption schemes may also be employed.
There are a variety of means available for creating and distributing keys in a secure network consisting of interconnected nodes or routers in the optical burst switching network. These would include, but are not limited to, those based on the existence of a public key authority or those based on digital certificates without assuming contact with a public key authority in order to obtain a key. A key exchange based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm is also known as a means of distributing keys as well, according to one embodiment. The Pretty Good Privacy scheme carries an encrypted key along with the payload that is encrypted by that key.
The current invention allows any known means of creating and distributing keys in a network to be used. Any key distribution scheme invented in the future can also be used in the current invention.
Since other modifications and changes varied to fit particular operating requirements and environments will be apparent to those skilled in the art, the invention is not considered limited to the example chosen for purposes of disclosure, and covers all changes and modifications which do not constitute departures from the true spirit and scope of this invention.
The present patent application claims priority to the provisional patent application identified by U.S. Ser. No. 61/055,696, filed May 23, 2008, the entire contents of which is hereby incorporated herein by reference.
Number | Date | Country | |
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61055696 | May 2008 | US |