Patent Application
20120198538
In order to protect a computer system against unauthorized access, it is usual to require a would-be user to identify him or her self to the system when attempting access. Various methods of authentication are known, including requiring a user to enter a username and/or password, requiring a user to present a physical token to the computer system, and requiring a user to present a fingerprint or other biometric parameter to a sensor connected to the system. Two or more of these methods may be used together for added security.
Physical tokens of varying sorts are widely used. At the higher end, they typically consist of a device including a microprocessor chip with encryption capabilities that can exchange authenticating challenges and responses with a “middleware” process running on a host computer, which then controls access to actual resources. The physical format of the token is typically either a “smart card” the size and shape of a credit card, or a compact device with a USB plug on one end. These devices are easily portable, and if the cryptographic authentication of the device itself is combined with a requirement for the bearer of the device to provide a matching personal identification number (PIN) or other passcode, are sufficiently secure for all but the most sensitive uses.
However, many users need to authenticate themselves to multiple systems, each of which typically issues its own identifying token. Both the bulk of multiple tokens and the need to search through them to find the correct one become a nuisance for the user. The problem of bulk is worse with USB tokens, because the thickness of the USB plug means that they do not stack as compactly as card formats.
The Global Platform Functionality (GPF) available within the Java Operating System already makes possible a smart card or other token with multiple user Security Domains. However, the GPF assumes that the token as a whole is controlled by a single “Card Issuer,” who is represented on the token by an Issuer Security Domain. The GPF also permits one or more Supplementary Security Domains, which may represent application providers other than the Card Issuer. The GPF also permits Controlling Authority Security Domains, which are a special sort of Supplementary Security Domain that has the power to enforce a security policy on all application code loaded onto the token. As a result, any application provider other than the Card Issuer is subject to the control of the Issuer and of any Controlling Authorities on the token. Where the token is being used as an authentication token, it is typically unacceptable to the provider for his presence on the card to be subject to the supervision of other entities in that way.
According to one embodiment of the invention, there are provided systems, tokens, methods, and computer programs that make possible a multi-enclave token, compatible with existing authentication tokens and protocols, that maintains multiple application enclaves sufficiently independent to be acceptable as authenticating token enclaves to all but the most stringent of providers.
One aspect of the invention provides a token for use with an electronic system, comprising a processor, non-volatile program storage memory, and non-volatile data storage memory. The non-volatile program storage memory contains a single copy of an operating system. The non-volatile data storage memory comprises a plurality of enclaves each containing policy and setting data usable by the operating system. The non-volatile data storage memory comprises computer readable code operative to permit the processor to access a selected one of the enclaves of the data-storage memory, and to deny said processor access to all other of said enclaves, and to cause the processor to run the operating system using said at least one registry, applet, or key object contained by said one enclave.
An enclave may contain all the policies and settings to enable the token, when using that enclave, to emulate a GPF token with multiple Security Domains.
In an embodiment, a token further comprises an external communication port. The non-volatile program storage memory contains computer readable code operative to cause the processor, on connection of the external communication port to a computer system, to receive through the communication port an enclave query message, in response to the enclave query message to transmit through the communication port an enclave query response message identifying one or more said enclaves defined on the token, to receive through the communication port an enclave select message specifying one of the enclaves identified in the enclave query response message, and in response to the enclave select message, to permit the token to interact with the computer system using only the specified enclave of the non-volatile data storage memory.
In an embodiment, the token is operative, upon receiving an unrecognized message instead of said enclave query message, to permit the token to interact with the computer system using only a pre-defined default enclave.
In an embodiment, the operating system has a data address space smaller than the non-volatile data storage memory, and permitting the processor to access only a selected enclave of the non-volatile data storage memory comprises relating a portion of the non-volatile data storage memory corresponding to the selected enclave to the data address space of the operating system.
In an embodiment, relating a portion of the non-volatile data storage memory to the data address space of the operating system comprises loading contents of only the respective enclave into volatile memory accessible to the operating system.
An embodiment of a token further comprises information identifying its enclaves, stored in a portion of the non-volatile data storage memory that is not accessible to the processor when the processor is permitted to access an enclave.
In an embodiment, data in the non-volatile data storage memory is encrypted, and permitting the processor to access only a selected enclave of the non-volatile data storage memory comprises providing a decryption key specific to the selected enclave.
In an embodiment, the single copy of the operating system comprises only code common to all of the enclaves, and operating system code that is different for different enclaves is contained for each enclave in the respective policy and setting data. In an embodiment, the policy and setting data may comprise at least one of a registry, an applet, and a key object. Each enclave then typically contains its own registry, its own complete set of applets, and its own data encryption key objects. The sets of applets may be identical, partly identical, or different, depending on the requirements of the application provider to whom each enclave belongs.
Another aspect of the invention provides a computer system, comprising a processor, a data communication port, and non-volatile storage containing computer readable code. The computer readable code comprises middleware operative to interface with a token connected to said data communication port. The middleware is operative to cause the processor to send an enclave query message through the communication port, to receive through the communication port in response to the enclave query message an enclave query response message identifying one or more enclaves, to determine whether any of the one or more enclaves is an enclave associated with the middleware, and if so to send an enclave select message specifying said associated enclave through said communication port, and subsequently to interact with the token as if the associated enclave were the only active enclave on the token.
A further aspect of the invention provides a method of securing computer systems, communications, and/or data comprising interfacing a token according to the first-mentioned aspect with a computer system according to the second-mentioned aspect, activating the token in a selected enclave, and using the token as if it were an ordinary security token.
Another aspect of the invention provides a non-volatile computer readable storage medium comprising computer readable code for the middleware and/or for the token.
Other aspects of the invention include methods, computers and computer systems, computer programs, and, non-transitory computer-readable storage media containing computer programs.
The above and other aspects, features, and advantages of the present invention may be more apparent from the following more particular description of embodiments thereof, presented in conjunction with the following drawings. In the drawings:
A better understanding of various features and advantages of the present methods and devices may be obtained by reference, to the following detailed description of illustrative embodiments of the invention and accompanying drawings. Although these drawings depict embodiments of the contemplated methods and devices, they should not be construed as foreclosing alternative or equivalent embodiments apparent to those of ordinary skill in the subject art.
Referring to the drawings, and initially to
Referring now also to
The multi-enclave manager 100 is minimal. Its operating function is to configure itself on startup of the card, to conduct initial handshaking with computer 24, determine which application enclave 102, 104, 106, 108, is relevant to the specific interaction with the specific computer 24, and hand off to the appropriate application enclave 102, etc. For this purpose, multi-enclave manager 100 is allocated a memory area 112 in non-volatile storage 54 within which it stores a list of application enclaves giving the status and type of each enclave. The multi-enclave manager acts more analogously to the BIOS in an ordinary computer system than to an operating system, enabling the system to start up to the point where the Java OS 110 can take over, and handling some very basic low-level functions. The multi-enclave manager is as far as possible stored in factory-programmed ROM, to minimize the risk of its becoming compromised.
Multi-enclave manager 100 may then act as a hypervisor, ensuring that the active application enclave 102, etc., accesses only memory and other resources allocated to it. It is preferred, however, that multi-enclave manager 100 merely sets up address translation from the address space of OS 110 to the portion of non-volatile memory 54 belonging to the active application enclave 102, etc., and sets up the decryption key necessary for the OS 110 to use that memory portion. In a preferred embodiment, OS 110 has a limited address space for application data, and the portion 116 of non-volatile memory 54 allocated to each application enclave 102, etc. is equal in size to the entire application data address space of OS 110. The multi-enclave manager 100 maps the application data address space of OS 110 to a window in the physical address space of non-volatile memory 54 containing the specific portion of non-volatile memory 54 belonging to the active application enclave 102. It is then almost impossible for OS 110 to access other portions of non-volatile memory 54 belonging to other application enclaves 102, etc.
Multi-enclave manager 100 may have hard-coded memory control such that multi-enclave manager 100 can access private memory area 112, but never permits Java OS 110 to access private memory area 112, even when the memory space of Java OS 110 is not mapped to an application enclave 102.
In an embodiment, multi-enclave manager 100 controls memory access by copying memory portion 116 into RAM 56, and allowing OS 110 to directly access only the RAM copy. Limiting the amount of physical RAM available for this purpose, and restricting writes from RAM 56 to flash memory 54 to specific address spaces within flash memory 54, provides a further safeguard against an application enclave 102, etc. accessing memory belonging to multi-enclave manager 100 or to another application enclave.
In an embodiment, the multi-enclave manager private memory area 112 comprises an OS configuration file 114 that specifies data such as:
the number of application enclaves;
the identity of a default enclave;
which, if any, of the enclaves are disabled;
which, if any, of the enclaves are unused;
a license key used to authenticate any attempt to provision an unused enclave.
In another embodiment, the default enclave may be fixed, for example, as a first enclave 102 on the token 50, and the OS configuration file 114 may then omit the identity of the default enclave.
In an embodiment, the OS configuration file 114 also specifies data for each application enclave, such as:
an enclave ID, enclave Authentication Key, or other identifying information used to connect the token 50 to an external security domain for that application;
an enclave mode flag indicating, for example, whether the enclave runs in a FIPS-compliant or a non-FIPS mode;
an enclave applet type flag indicating, for example, whether the enclave is restricted to running applets that can be authenticated by the multi enclave manager 100, or identifying a root Certification Authority for authenticating applets to run on the enclave.
Application enclaves 102, etc. in this embodiment closely resemble the application domain in a single-user token that the multi-enclave token 102 is intended to emulate. Application enclaves 102, etc. share a single copy of Java OS 110, stored in a shared part 118 of issuer memory area that is accessible to whichever application enclave 102, etc. is active, but each application enclave 102, etc. has its own policy and setting data, such as applets, certificates, cryptographic keys, and card registry, stored in the portion 116 of the non-volatile storage 54 allocated exclusively to that application enclave 102, etc. The applets may include an activation applet, a file manager applet, and an appropriate encryption applet.
As explained in more detail below, separation of the memory areas 116 may also be enforced by encrypting the data in each area 116 with a key exclusive to the associated application enclave 102, etc.
Referring to
In step 206, a middleware process 150 running on computer 24 interrogates token 50, and in step 208 multi-enclave manager 100 determines the nature of the interrogation.
If middleware process 150 is not aware of multi-enclave token 50, then the interrogation will be appropriate to a single-user token. If any interrogation other than a proper “enclave query” or “enclave select” command, as described below, is received, then multi-enclave manager 100 may assume that middleware process 150 is not multi-enclave aware. In step 210, multi-enclave manager 100 then passes control to whichever application enclave 102, etc. is defined as the default enclave. In step 212, the token 50 boots from the chosen enclave 102, etc. If there is no default domain, then instead of proceeding to step 210 the multi-enclave manager 100 may loop back to step 206 to await a valid enclave query, or may shut down.
If middleware process 150 is aware of multi-enclave token 50, then the interrogation in step 208 consists of a “enclave query” command, which may be an arbitrary string of bytes. In step 214 the multi-enclave manager 100 returns an enclave query response providing a list of enclaves, together with a challenge, which may be a random or pseudorandom number. The response may provide, for example, some or all of:
the number of enclaves 102, etc. on the token 50;
the identity of a default enclave;
list of unused enclaves;
list of data for each active enclave from the OS configuration file;
a challenge word, which may be, for example, a pseudorandom number.
In step 216, middleware process 150 inspects the list of data for each enclave, and identifies the enclave 102, etc. corresponding to itself.
In step 218, middleware process 150 returns to token 50 an “enclave select” command specifying the enclave with which the middleware 150 wishes to interact. The enclave may be identified simply by a number indicating its position in the list provided in the response to the enclave query command. Middleware 150 also returns a response to the challenge word, consisting of, for example, a pseudorandom number generated using an enclave. Authentication Key specific to the requested enclave, the enclave ID, and the challenge word. The use of a random or pseudorandom challenge word guards against replay attacks. The use of a pseudorandom function in the response that is a shared secret between middleware process 150 and multi-enclave manager 100, and the use of an enclave Authentication Key that is a shared secret between the middleware process 150 and the desired application enclave 102, etc., provide protection against access by unauthorized middleware processes 150. The inclusion of the enclave ID and/or the Enclave Authentication Key provides protection against the inadvertent selection of the wrong enclave.
In step 220, multi-enclave manager 100 verifies that the response is correct for the enclave requested, and returns a code that may merely indicate successful authentication. In step 224, multi-enclave manager 100 then activates the requested one of application enclaves 102, etc. Activation may comprise defining a memory window, so that the data memory address space of Java OS 110 maps to the portion of flash memory 54 containing data for the appropriate application enclave 102, etc. Activation may comprise loading the appropriate portion of flash memory 54 into RAM 56, and allowing Java OS 100 to access only the RAM copy. In an embodiment, the application data in flash memory 54 is encrypted with a key specific to the application enclave, and activation comprises providing a correct decryption key for that application data.
In an embodiment, the initial User Key Encryption Key may be generated by an expression such as:
UserKEK=PRF(UserPIN,Enclave ID,DeviceKEK)□MNumb□DeviceKEK
UserKEK is the key to be generated;
PRF is a predefined pseudo-random function;
UserPIN is a PIN entered manually by the user;
DeviceKEK is a key specific to the individual token 50 but common to all enclaves;
MNumb is a random number specific to the individual enclave.
DeviceKEK and MNumb are stored on token 50. The MNumb values may be included in the OS Configuration file 114 entry for each application enclave 102, etc. DeviceKEK may be stored in various places on token 50, depending on the level of security desired, and may be split between two or more storage places. For example, part or all of DeviceKEK may be stored in obfuscated form in flash memory 54, or in protected memory in an ASIC forming part of CPU 52 or cryptographic engine 60.
In step 226, multi-enclave manager 100 then passes control to the requested one of application enclaves 102, etc. The process then proceeds to step 212, and the token 50 boots from the selected enclave 102, etc. If the enclave select message is not correct, in step 222 the multi-enclave manager 100 returns an error code, and either shuts down or loops back to step 206 to await a more correct enclave query, or to step 216 to await a more correct enclave select.
From step 212, the process proceeds to step 228, in which the token 50 serves as a conventional security token. For example, it may provide encryption, digital signing, or user authentication, using user keys that were stored in encrypted form in application enclave space 116 in flash memory 54. The cryptographic engine 60 (if present) or the token CPU 52 may then handle cryptographic processing, so that the active keys are never exposed outside token 50.
Multi-enclave manager 100 remains minimally active, for the sole purpose of ensuring that any writes to flash memory 54 are confined to the memory portion 116 that is under the exclusive control of active application enclave 102.
In step 230, the token 50 is removed from port 42, or computer 24 is shut down. Token 50 then automatically shuts down because it no longer has a power supply.
Other sequences are possible. For example, if middleware process 150 knows which “slot” is occupied by that enclave, it could issue a “enclave select” command without first issuing a “enclave query” command. However, a challenge and response cycle between the middleware process 150 and the multi-enclave manager 100 may still be desirable. Alternatively, the “enclave select” command could specify, for example, an enclave type, instead of specifying the enclave position. The format of the enclave type codes may be determined depending on the expected use of the tokens 50, for example, depending on the number of distinct codes that are needed. In particular, a token 50 should not usually be shared by two different application enclaves with indistinguishable type codes, so the format should allow for a sufficient number of distinct codes.
In general, any information sufficient to uniquely identify the available application enclaves 102, etc., and to enable the middleware process 150 to recognize its proper application enclave 102, etc., may be used in the enclave query and response and enclave select messages.
In an embodiment, where different ones of application enclaves 102, etc. have different security levels, default enclave 102 is the enclave of lowest security level on the token. That minimizes the risk of exposing a high security level application enclave on token 50 to unknown or malfunctioning middleware 150 of lower security level. In other embodiments, however, the choice of default enclave 102, etc. is dictated by the presence of an application provider that cannot or will not support the multi-enclave functionality of token 50.
Referring to
In step 306, an enclave administrator uses the “enclave query” command to identify unused enclaves on token 50. In step 308, the enclave administrator uses the “enclave select” command to select an enclave to configure. Because an unused enclave does not have an enclave Authentication Key, an unauthenticated Enclave Select command is accepted. Usually, the chosen enclave will be the first unused enclave. In step 310, if the application enclave administrator attempts to select an application enclave 102, etc. that is already active, the token 50 will require the authenticated Enclave Select command for that application enclave, preventing a person not authorized on that enclave from altering its configuration. In step 312, if the unauthenticated Enclave Select command is invalid, or is directed to an application enclave 102, etc. that is already active, the multi-enclave manager 100 returns an error message and either shuts down or loops back to step 306 to await a more proper request.
Multi-enclave manager 100 may allow any unused enclave to be initialized by any user who has the correct shared secret pseudorandom function to generate a valid enclave select message, or may require an additional password or other credential. For example, the token 50 may require a license key, separately supplied to application provider by token issuer, in order to permit initialization of an unused enclave.
In step 314, the application enclave administrator initializes the application enclave 102, etc. at the multi-enclave manager 100 level. The multi-enclave manager 100 is provided with the enclave type that will be reported in the response to an enclave query command, and with the Enclave Authentication Key that is used in the enclave select challenge-response.
In step 316, the enclave administrator initializes and provisions the application enclave 102, etc. This step is generally similar to the initialization and provisioning of a single-user token that the multi-enclave token 50 emulates. The initialization and provisioning process at the application enclave level varies from token to token, and is well known to those skilled in the art, so it is not described in more detail here. In general, it involves the installation onto the token of keys, certificates, and applets supplied by the application provider. In an embodiment, the enclave may contain an entire Global Platform GPF domain hierarchy.
In step 318, the token 50 is issued to a user for use as described with reference to
Either before or after step 318, the management process may return to step 306 to initialize and configure additional application enclaves 102, etc. It will typically be necessary to shut down and restart the token 50 in order to access a different enclave. The application enclave administrator responsible may be the same as, or different from, the application enclave administrator for any existing application enclave.
In step 320, management functions may be carried out on an existing active token 50. These functions may be carried out by an application provider remotely, by accessing the card through middleware 150 when the user next connects token 50 to middleware 150 on the relevant security domain. Management functions in the application enclave 102, etc. may include managing applet and Global Platform audit logs, resetting a user PIN for the enclave, and updating or deleting any or all of the applets, keys, or other application data stored in application enclave memory area 116.
In order to carry out management functions at the multi-enclave manager level 100 relating to a specific application enclave, it may be necessary to log on with an application administrator credential at step 218. Management functions may include updating the Enclave Authorization Key, resetting a user PIN for the enclave, and resetting an enclave to “unused.”When an application enclave 102, etc. is reset, all data in the enclave-specific memory area 116 is preferably actively erased.
In order to carry out management functions relating to the multi-enclave manager level 100, it may be necessary to log on with a multi-enclave manager administrator credential at step 212 or step 218. Management functions relating to the multi-enclave manager 100 may include: managing applet and GP audit logs; resetting a user PIN for the token; updating or deleting any or all applets or keys, including a master key-encryption key for the token, and resetting an application enclave. Deleting the DeviceKEK prevents the token 50 from validating an enclave select command, and may effectively render the token useless, or may result in the token operating only as a single-enclave token on the default enclave. Rendering the token useless may be desirable if the card is believed to be lost, stolen, or seriously compromised.
The multi-enclave manager administrator may or may not be allowed to reset or otherwise manage an individual application enclave without also having an application administrator credential for that enclave.
Although specific embodiments have been described, various modifications are possible without departing from the spirit of the invention or the scope of the appended claims, and features of the different embodiments may be combined into one embodiment.
For example, as described, if token 50 is challenged by a middleware process 150 that is not aware of multi-enclave token 50, then control passes to default enclave 102, etc. Consequently, token 50 can support only one provider that does not recognize multi-enclave token 50. It would be possible, in at least some circumstances, for multi-enclave manager 100 to recognize the challenges from different provider middleware 150, and direct each challenge to the appropriate application enclave 102, 104, etc. However, that would depend on the specific initial challenges used by different systems, and would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Alternatively, there may be no default enclave, and the token 50 may reject any initial challenge other than a proper enclave query message or a token-issuer level administrator logon.
In the interests of simplicity, it has been assumed in describing the embodiments that computer 24 is an ordinary general-purpose computer specially programmed that controls user access to valuable resources, and the resources controlled by middleware 150 have not been considered in detail. In an embodiment, the controlled resource may be computer 24 itself. In another embodiment, the controlled resource may be a computing resource on a network 38, where computer 24 is a client computer or terminal on the network. In a further embodiment, the controlled resource may be physical access to space, and the computer 24 may be an electronic door lock. In a further embodiment, computer 24 may be a device handling encrypted communications, and the token 50 may contain encryption and/or decryption keys.
Accordingly, reference should be made to the appended claims, rather than to the foregoing specification, as indicating the scope of the invention.
This application claims benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/436,833, filed 27 Jan. 2011 by Spring et al.
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 61436833 | Jan 2011 | US |
