Portable, low-cost pathogen detection and strain identification platform

Information

  • Patent Grant
  • 11371081
  • Patent Number
    11,371,081
  • Date Filed
    Thursday, May 25, 2017
    7 years ago
  • Date Issued
    Tuesday, June 28, 2022
    2 years ago
Abstract
Methods for detecting the presence of a pathogen infection are described. In particular, this document provides a method of detecting target nucleic acids, such as pathogen-specific RNA, in a biological sample obtained from a subject, where the method comprises using one or more toehold switch sensors and an isothermal amplification step to detect the target nucleic acid. Methods specific for detecting and identify the presence of a virus such as Zika virus are also provided.
Description
STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT

Not applicable.


SEQUENCE LISTING

The instant application contains a Sequence Listing which has been submitted electronically in ASCII format and is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. Said ASCII copy, created on May 25, 2017, is named 112624_00851_SL.txt and is 217,680 bytes in size.


BACKGROUND

Synthetic biology is an emerging discipline that has great potential to respond to global pandemics. The increasing ability of synthetic biologists to repurpose and engineer natural biological components for practical applications has led to new opportunities for molecular diagnostics.


In the case of viral outbreaks, standard serological approaches such as antibody detection have limited diagnostic value due to cross-reactivity in patients that have previously been infected by other flaviviruses circulating in the region. As a result, accurate diagnosis requires nucleic acid-based detection methods, such as PCR and isothermal nucleic acid amplification. However, such techniques are expensive, require technical expertise to run and interpret, and use equipment that is incompatible with use in remote and low-resource locations where surveillance and containment are critically needed. Accordingly, there remains a need in the art for improved methods and devices for rapid detection of target nucleic acids, including pathogen-specific nucleic acids for infection detection and for accurate strain identification.


BRIEF SUMMARY

In a first aspect, provided herein is a method of detecting a target nucleic acid in a sample. In some cases, the method comprises or consists essentially of the steps of: (a) obtaining nucleic acid from a biological sample obtained from a subject; (b) amplifying the nucleic acid using isothermal amplification; (c) contacting the amplified nucleic acid to a toehold switch, wherein the toehold switch encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains that are complementary to a target nucleic acid or the reverse complement thereof, wherein the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the target nucleic acid but not in the absence of the target nucleic acid, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the target nucleic acid is present in the amplified nucleic acid of the subject; and (d) identifying the target nucleic acid as containing a target protospacer adjacent motif (PAM), wherein identifying comprises: (i) amplifying nucleic acid obtained from the biological sample using a reverse primer designed to append the trigger sequence of one or more toehold switch sequence domains; (ii) contacting the amplified nucleic acid of (i) to CRISPR/Cas under conditions that allow for sequence-specific cleavage of the contacted nucleic acid by CRISPR/Cas when the target PAM is present in the amplified nucleic acid; and (iii) detecting activation of the toehold switch, wherein activation does not occur in the event of CRISPR/Cas-mediated sequence-specific cleavage, thereby indicating the presence of the target PAM. The toehold switch can comprise one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains, a fully or partially double-stranded stem domain comprising an initiation codon, a loop domain comprising a ribosome binding site, and a coding domain. The toehold and stem domains can be complementary in sequence to a naturally occurring RNA. The loop domain can be complementary in sequence to a non-naturally occurring RNA. The target nucleic acid can be an RNA specific to a pathogen. The pathogen is selected from the group consisting of a virus, bacterium, fungus, and parasite. In some cases, the pathogen is a virus. The virus can be Zika virus. The virus can an American Zika variant (GenBank: KU312312). The virus strain can be an African Zika variant (GenBank: KF268950). The toehold switch can comprise an E. coli lacZ gene encoding β-galactosidase. Detecting activation of the one or more toehold switch sensors can comprise performing a LacZ-based colorimetric assay. Isothermal amplification can be selected from the group consisting of NASBA (nucleic acid sequence-based amplification), loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP), recombinase polymerase amplification (RPA), and helicase-dependent amplification (HDA). The biological sample can be selected from the group consisting of blood, serum, urine, saliva, tissue, cell, and organ, or a fraction or portion thereof.


In another aspect, provided herein is a method of detecting a target nucleic acid in a sample. In some cases, the method comprises or consists essentially of: (a) obtaining RNA from a biological sample obtained from a subject; (b) amplifying the RNA using isothermal amplification; (c) contacting the amplified RNA to a toehold switch, wherein the toehold switch encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains that are complementary to a target RNA or the reverse complement thereof, wherein the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the target RNA but not in the absence of the target RNA, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the target RNA is present in the amplified RNA of the subject; and (d) identifying the target RNA as containing a target protospacer adjacent motif (PAM), wherein identifying comprises: (i) amplifying RNA obtained from the biological sample using a reverse primer designed to append the trigger sequence of one or more toehold switch sequence domains; (ii) contacting the amplified RNA of (i) to CRISPR/Cas under conditions that allow for sequence-specific cleavage of the contacted RNA by CRISPR/Cas when the target PAM is present in the amplified RNA; and (iii) detecting activation of the toehold switch, wherein activation does not occur in the event of CRISPR/Cas-mediated sequence-specific cleavage, thereby indicating the presence of the target nucleic acid. The toehold switch can comprise one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains, a fully or partially double-stranded stem domain comprising an initiation codon, a loop domain comprising a ribosome binding site, and a coding domain. The toehold and stem domains can be complementary in sequence to a naturally occurring RNA. The loop domain can be complementary in sequence to a non-naturally occurring RNA. The target nucleic acid can be an RNA specific to a pathogen. The pathogen can be selected from the group consisting of a virus, bacterium, fungus, and parasite. In some cases, the pathogen is a virus. The virus can be Zika virus. The virus can be an American Zika variant (GenBank: KU312312). The virus can be an African Zika variant (GenBank: KF268950). The toehold switch can comprise an E. coli lacZ gene encoding β-galactosidase. Detecting activation of the one or more toehold switch sensors can comprise performing a LacZ-based colorimetric assay. Isothermal amplification can be selected from the group consisting of NASBA (nucleic acid sequence-based amplification), loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP), recombinase polymerase amplification (RPA), and helicase-dependent amplification (HDA). The biological sample is selected from the group consisting of blood, serum, urine, saliva, tissue, cell, and organ, or a fraction or portion thereof.


In a further aspect, provided herein is a method of detecting presence of virus in a sample. The method can comprise or consist essentially of the steps of: (a) obtaining RNA from a biological sample obtained from a subject; (b) amplifying the RNA using isothermal amplification; (c) contacting the amplified RNA to a toehold switch, wherein the toehold switch encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains that are complementary to an endogenous virus RNA sequence or the reverse complement thereof, wherein the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the endogenous virus RNA but not in the absence of the endogenous virus RNA, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the endogenous virus RNA is present in the amplified RNA of the subject. The virus can be Zika virus. The toehold switch can comprise one or more Zika genome-specific single-stranded toehold sequence domains, a thermodynamically stable double-stranded stem domain, a loop domain comprising a ribosome binding site, and a coding domain. The loop domain can be complementary in sequence to a naturally occurring RNA. The loop domain can be complementary in sequence to a non-naturally occurring RNA. The loop domain can be 11 nucleotides or 12 nucleotides. The toehold switch can comprise an E. coli lacZ gene encoding β-galactosidase. Isothermal amplification can be selected from the group consisting of NASBA (nucleic acid sequence-based amplification), loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP), recombinase polymerase amplification (RPA), and helicase-dependent amplification (HDA).


In another aspect, provided herein is a device for identifying a pathogen, comprising a preserved paper test article, wherein a methods described herein is performed using the preserved paper test article. The paper test article can be preserved by freeze-drying.


In another aspect, provided herein is a kit for detecting a pathogen, comprising one or more of a device as described herein and an electronic optical reader.


In a further aspect, provided herein is a method of genotyping a nucleic acid molecule. The method can comprise or consist essentially of contacting the nucleic acid molecule with: a programmable nuclease; and a sgRNA, wherein the combination of the nuclease and sgRNA can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant of the nucleic acid molecule; and detecting the presence or absence of a cut in the nucleic acid molecule generated by the nuclease. In some cases, the method further comprises a first step of performing reverse transcription on a RNA molecule and performing 2nd strand DNA synthesis with a toehold primer to generate the nucleic acid molecule; and wherein the detecting step comprises: transcribing an RNA from the nucleic acid molecule after contacting it with the nuclease, using a primer which initiates transcription from a location distal of the sequence variation site with respect to the location of the toehold primer sequence; and contacting a sensor with the RNA resulting from step a) and detecting the presence or absence of sensor activation; wherein the sensor is activated if the nuclease is not able to cut the nucleic acid molecule in step a). The presence of a cut can indicate that the nucleic acid molecule has a sequence variant to which the sgRNA and nuclease can specifically bind. The presence of a cut can indicate that the nucleic acid molecule has a sequence variant to which the nuclease specifically binds. The programmable nuclease can be Cas. The sequence variant can occur at a PAM site. The nucleic acid molecule can be of human, animal, prokaryotic, eukaryotic, pathogenic, or synthetic origin. The nucleic acid molecule can be of viral origin. The viral nucleic acid molecule can be a Zika virus nucleic acid molecule. The sequence variant being detected can differentiate at least one of the African, American, and Asian Zika strains from the others. The sequence variant can be selected from Table 2. The sequence variant being detected can differentiate the African and American Zika virus strains. The sequence variant can be the SNP occurring at site 7330 of the African (GenBank: KF268950) and American (GenBank: KU312312) Zika strains. The sgRNA can have the sequence of SEQ ID NO: 1.


In another aspect, provided herein is a composition comprising a sgRNA which can specifically bind to a sequence flanking at least one sequence variant selected from Table 2, wherein the sequence variation occurs at a CRISPR/Cas PAM binding site. The sgRNA can comprise SEQ ID NO: 1. The sgRNA can be selected from Table 2.


In a further aspect, provided herein is a composition comprising a CRISPR/Cas nuclease and a sgRNA that specifically binds to a sequence flanking at least one sequence variant occurring in a population. The population can be a viral population. The viral population can be a Zika virus population. The variant can be selected from Table 2. The sgRNA can be selected from Table 2. The sgRNA can comprise SEQ ID NO: 1.


These and other features, objects, and advantages of the present invention will become better understood from the description that follows. In the description, reference is made to the accompanying drawings, which form a part hereof and in which there is shown by way of illustration, not limitation, embodiments of the invention. The description of preferred embodiments is not intended to limit the invention to cover all modifications, equivalents and alternatives. Reference should therefore be made to the claims recited herein for interpreting the scope of the invention.





BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention will be better understood and features, aspects, and advantages other than those set forth above will become apparent when consideration is given to the following detailed description thereof. Such detailed description makes reference to the following drawings, wherein:



FIG. 1 presents an exemplary workflow for rapid prototyping of paper-based, biomolecular sensors. Using sequence information from online databases, primers for isothermal RNA amplification and toehold switch-based RNA sensors were designed in silico using purpose-built algorithms. Once synthesized, the resulting sequence-specific toehold sensors can be assembled and validated in less than 7 hours (hrs.). In under a day, validated sensors can be embedded into paper and freeze-dried along with a cell-free transcription and translation system to be deployed in the field as stable diagnostics. For the diagnostic test, extracted RNA is isothermally amplified via NASBA and used to rehydrate the freeze-dried paper sensors. The detection of the appropriate trigger RNA is indicated by a color change in the paper disc from yellow to purple.



FIGS. 2A-2D demonstrate rapid prototyping of 48 paper-based RNA toehold sensors for Zika virus detection. (A) Series A toehold switch sensor schematic. The sensor design from Green et al., Cell 159:925-939 (2014) was modified with a shortened 11-nucleotide (nt) loop sequence to reduce leakage of output gene expression. (B) Series B toehold switch sensor schematic. Based on the same Zika genomic region as the A series, these sensors include a 12-nt loop and lack the refolding domain. These modifications were made to further reduce LacZ reporter leakage in the OFF state. (C) Maximum fold change in the rate of LacZ production for the Series A Zika virus RNA sensors during the first 90 minutes (min) at 37° C. Fold change of LacZ production rate is determined from the slope of absorbance at 570 nm over time (sensor alone versus sensor with 3,000 nM RNA trigger). Sensors are ordered according to fold change. (D) Maximum fold change in the rate of LacZ production for the Series B Zika virus RNA sensors during the first 90 min at 37° C. Error bars represent SD from three replicates. Inset: average LacZ absorbance of the OFF states at 60 min indicates an overall reduction in LacZ reporter leakage for the Series B sensors. Error bars represent SD across the 24 sensors.



FIGS. 3A-3C demonstrate detection of femtomolar (fM) concentrations of Zika virus RNA fragments. (A) Sensitivity of six of the best performing Series A and B sensors without RNA amplification. Fold change is calculated from absorbance (570 nm) after 30 minutes at 37° C. Error bars represent SD from three replicates. (B) A schematic of NASBA (nucleic acid sequence based amplification)-mediated RNA amplification. (C) Zika RNA fragments diluted in water or 7% human serum were amplified using NASBA with input concentrations ranging from 30 pM down to 3 fM. A 1:7 dilution of the NASBA reaction in water was then used to rehydrate freeze-dried, paper-based reactions containing sensors 27B and 32B. Fold change is calculated as described in (A) after 30 minutes at 37° C.



FIGS. 4A-4F demonstrate sensor specificity and sensitivity. (A) Linear response of sensors 27B, 31B and 32B to corresponding RNA trigger at 0 nM, 3 nM, 30 nM and 300 nM. Each point represents the mean of triplicate data taken at 60 min. (B) Orthogonality of sensors 27B, 7A and 32B to treatments of 3000 nM of trigger RNA from each of the three sensors. The absorbance output (570 nm) of the sensors at each time point was converted to a ratio of the maximum absorbance of respective sensor at the 90 min time point and plotted as a heat map. Yellow indicates no sensor activation and purple indicates maximum sensor activation. (C) Reproducibility of NASBA reactions. Samples of Zika RNA in water or 7% human serum were amplified in three independent 2 hr. NASBA reactions. Each NASBA reaction was diluted 1:7 in water and used to rehydrate three freeze-dried, paper-based reactions containing sensor 27B for a total of nine replicates. Fold change was calculated from absorbance (570 nm) after 30 minutes at 37° C. Error bars represent SD from nine replicates for the 3 pM sample and three replicates for the 0 pM sample. (D) Effect of NASBA reaction time on sensitivity. Samples of Zika RNA in 7% human serum were amplified in NASBA reactions for 30, 60, and 90 minutes. Diluted NASBA reactions (1:7) were tested with sensor 32B. Fold change was calculated as above. Error bars represent SD of three replicates. (E) NASBA with freeze-dried reagents. Samples of Zika RNA in 7% human serum were amplified by NASBA reagents in the standard formulation and by reagents freeze-dried in-house. Fold change and error bars were calculated as above after 60 minutes. (F) Removing the 65° C. step from NASBA protocol. Samples of Zika RNA in 7% human serum incubated at 95° C. for two minutes, mimicking viral lysis, and then amplified by NASBA according to the standard procedure without the 65° C. step. Fold change and error bars were calculated as above after 60 minutes.



FIGS. 5A-5C present sequence alignments and RNA extraction optimization data. (A and B) Sequence alignments of Zika virus and Dengue virus genomic regions targeted by sensors (A) 27B (SEQ ID NOS 777 and 778, respectively) and (B) 32B (SEQ ID NOS 779 and 780, respectively). Red boxes indicates sequences targeted by the respective toehold switches, red and blue boxes indicate the NASBA-amplified regions, and the remaining sequence indicates natural flanking RNA sequences from each virus. The entire Zika 32 sequence shown here was cloned into lentivirus to make proxy Zika virus. (C) Effect of boiling time on RNA extraction. Lentivirus was packaged with the Zika virus RNA fragment corresponding to sensor 32B. Virus was diluted to 10 and 3 fM target RNA in 7% human serum. Twenty-five μL of virus was heated to 95° C. for 1 and 2 minutes. One μL was then used to initiate NASBA-mediated RNA amplification. A 1:7 dilution of 2 hours NASBA reactions in water was then used to rehydrate freeze-dried, paper-based reactions. Fold change was calculated from absorbance (570 nm) after 60 minutes at 37° C. Error bars represent SD of three replicates.



FIGS. 6A-6D present data collected during development of a field-ready diagnostic platform. (A) Sequence specificity of Zika virus sensors 27B and 32B. Sensors were challenged with 3,000 nM of RNA corresponding to target sequences from the Zika virus or the homologous region of the Dengue virus. Fold change is calculated from absorbance (570 nm) at 60 minutes after rehydration and incubation of freeze dried, paper-based reactions at 37° C. Error bars represent SD from three replicates. (B) Zika virus sensors 27B and 32B were tested for specificity using NASBA reaction products derived from 300 fM input RNA corresponding to target genomic regions of the Zika or Dengue viruses in 7% human serum. Fold change was calculated as in (A). (C) Using the portable electronic reader, time-course data were collected for Zika virus sensor 32B in the presence of RNA amplified from 1 fM or 3 fM inputs of trigger RNA in 7% human serum. To increase sensitivity, NASBA reactions were run for 2.5 hours. Graphs plot the relative absorbance of 570 nm wavelength light compared to background, which was collected every minute from freeze-dried, cell-free reactions embedded into paper. (D) Incorporating viral sample processing into the diagnostic workflow. Lentivirus was packaged with Zika RNA or homologous Dengue RNA fragments targeted by sensor 32B. Three femtomolar of virus was spiked into 7% human serum and heated to 95° C. for 2 minutes to extract viral RNA. The boiled lysate was used to initiate NASBA-mediated RNA amplification. A 1:7 dilution of the 2 hours NASBA reaction in water was then used to rehydrate freeze-dried paper-based reactions. Time-course data were collected on the portable electronic reader as in (C).



FIGS. 7A-7C present an exemplary portable electronic optical reader. (A) Line drawings used to cut the housing for the electronic reader from black acrylic using a laser cutter. (B) Image of the 16-reaction reader from the front. Chip containing paper-based sensors slides into the slot illuminated by the green light. Reader dimensions: 106 mm wide×116 mm deep×96 mm high. (C) Components and circuit design used to assemble the electronic optical reader.



FIGS. 8A-8E illustrate an exemplary protocol for strain differentiation at single-base resolution. (A) Schematic representation of NASBA-CRISPR Cleavage (NASBACC)-genotyping following a positive Zika diagnosis. A synthetic trigger sequence is appended to a NASBA-amplified RNA fragment through reverse transcription. The presence of a strain-specific PAM leads to the production of either truncated or full-length trigger RNA, which differentially activates a toehold switch (sensor H) (Pardee et al., 2014). (B) The probability that a non-biased single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) between two strains can be discriminated by CRISPR/Cas9 is 48% (Table S4). Hence, genetic drift between the American and African or Asian strains, while relatively small (14.4% and 4.9% sequence dissimilarity, respectively), has created hundreds of strain-specific PAM sites. (C) A SNP between African (GenBank: KF268950) and American (GenBank: KU312312) strains at site 7330 (SEQ ID NOS 782 and 781, respectively) disrupts an existing PAM site, allowing for Cas9-mediated DNA cleavage only in the American strain. (D) Sensor 32B can distinguish between Dengue and Zika RNA sequences but cannot discriminate between American and African Zika strains. Paper discs containing sensor 32B were rehydrated with 300 nM trigger RNA corresponding to sequences from American-Zika, African-Zika, or Dengue. Colorimetric outputs: a purple color indicates the activation of LacZ expression from the toehold switch, and a yellow color indicates the toehold switch remained inactive. (E) NASBACC can discriminate between American- and African-lineages of Zika virus. Paper discs containing sensor H were rehydrated with a 1:10 dilution of NASBACC reactions initiated with 0.05 μl of a 300 nM RNA sample. In this case, an inactive toehold switch leads to a positive identification of the American Zika strain.



FIGS. 9A-9B present data from a CRISPR nuclease assay using fresh and freeze-dried reactions. (A) Sequence information and location of the gRNA used to target the lacZ gene (SEQ ID NOS 783-788, respectively, in order of appearance). Each sequence was selected for maximum activity using the Doench et al. scoring algorithm (Doench et al., 2014). (B) Gel showing the length of supercoiled versus cut DNA following the in vitro digestion of a lacZ-containing plasmid for fresh and freeze-dried reactions. Note that the activity of some gRNA/Cas9 combinations is improved under freeze-dried conditions.



FIGS. 10A-10D are graphs data from assays validating diagnostic workflow on live Zika virus samples. (A) Specificity of sensor 32B against purified genomic RNA. Sensor 32B was tested for specificity using NASBA reaction products performed on 30 fM RNA purified from Zika virus and three different Dengue virus serotypes. Fold change is calculated from absorbance (570 nm) at 60 minutes (min) after rehydration and incubation of freeze-dried, paper-based reactions at 37° C. Error bars represent SD from three replicates. (B) Detection of live Zika virus. Ten femtomolar (fM) of laboratory-cultured Zika virus was spiked into human serum (7%), heated to 95° C. for 2 min, and used to initiate NASBA-mediated RNA amplification. A 1:7 dilution of the 3 hour (hr.) NASBA reaction in water was then used to rehydrate freeze-dried, paper-based reactions. Time-course data were collected on the portable electronic reader. Graph plots the relative absorbance of 570 nm wavelength light compared to background. Error bars represent SD from three replicates. (C and D) Detection of Zika virus in viremic rhesus macaque plasma using sensors 27B and 32B. Plasma containing 2.8 fM of Zika virus was diluted 1:10 in nuclease free water, heated to 95° C. for 2 minutes, and used to initiate NASBA-mediated RNA amplification. 3 hr. NASBA reactions were monitored on the portable electronic reader as in (B).



FIG. 11 depicts a schematic of NASBA-CRISPR Cleavage (NASBACC).



FIG. 12 demonstrates that Cas9 without guide RNA does not interfere with NASBA.



FIG. 13 demonstrates that Cas9 with a gRNA targeting a site lacking a PAM site does not interfere with NASBA.



FIG. 14 depicts a graph of the effect of primer concentration on NASBACC.





While the present invention is susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, exemplary embodiments thereof are shown by way of example in the drawings and are herein described in detail. It should be understood, however, that the description of exemplary embodiments is not intended to limit the invention to the particular forms disclosed, but on the contrary, the intention is to cover all modifications, equivalents and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.


DETAILED DESCRIPTION

All publications, including but not limited to patents and patent applications, cited in this specification are herein incorporated by reference as though set forth in their entirety in the present application.


The methods and compositions provided herein are based at least in part on the Inventors' development of a diagnostic platform utilizing engineered biomolecular, nucleic acid-based sensors and CRISPR-based technology that permits rapid, specific, and low-cost detection of viral nucleic acids at clinically relevant concentrations. In particular, the inventors developed engineered biomolecular sensors for the specific detection of pathogen genomes such as viral RNA genomes.


Without being bound to any particular theory or mechanism of action, it is believed that the inventors addressed limitations in the practical deployment of nucleic acid-based molecular diagnostics by combining isothermal RNA amplification with toehold switch sensors on a freeze-dried, paper-based platform. By automating the amplification primer and sensor design process using in silico algorithms, the methods described herein provide clinically relevant sensitivity, discriminating between pathogen genotypes with single-base resolution.


Accordingly, in a first aspect, provided herein is a method of detecting a target nucleic acid in a biological sample obtained from a subject. As described herein, the method comprises or consists essentially of (a) obtaining nucleic acid (e.g., DNA, RNA) from a biological sample containing or suspected of containing a target nucleotide sequence; (b) amplifying the nucleic acid using a primer designed to hybridize to the target nucleotide sequence; (c) contacting the amplified nucleic acid to a toehold switch, where the riboregulator encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more toehold sequence domains that are complementary to the target nucleotide sequence, where the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the target nucleic acid but not in the absence of the target nucleic acid, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the target nucleic acid is present in the amplified nucleic acid of the subject.


In certain embodiments, the target nucleotide sequence is a nucleic acid from a pathogen, where the biological sample contains or is suspected of containing the pathogen. Accordingly, the methods provided herein are useful to detect any pathogen or infectious agent. Pathogens and infectious agents may comprise viruses, (e.g., single stranded RNA viruses, single stranded DNA viruses, Zika virus, HIV, hepatitis A, B, and C virus, HSV, CMV EBV, HPV), parasites (e.g., protozoan and metazoan pathogens such as Plasmodia species, Leishmania species, Schistosoma species, Trypanosoma species), bacteria (e.g., Mycobacteria, in particular, M. tuberculosis, Salmonella, Streptococci, E. coli, Staphylococci), fungi (e.g., Candida species, Aspergillus species), Pneumocystis carinii, and prions. In certain embodiments, the pathogen is a virus, and the methods can be used to detect any virus. In other embodiments, the pathogens that are detected are bacteria, fungi, or parasites. An advantage of the methods and systems described herein is that they can be applied for the detection and identification of essentially any nucleic acid-containing organism. Accordingly, the pathogen or infectious agent can be virtually any pathogen or infectious agent for which genetic information (e.g., gene sequences) is available. In other cases, the target nucleic acid is human in origin. In such cases, the methods can be employed to detect one or more target nucleic acids in a biological sample such as a biological sample obtained for forensic analysis, for genotyping, and the like.


In such cases, the methods provided herein can further comprise identifying the pathogen detected in the biological sample. For example, the method can further comprise (i) amplifying RNA obtained from the biological sample; (ii) contacting the amplified RNA of (i) to a nuclease under conditions that allow for sequence-specific cleavage of the contacted RNA by the nuclease when a pathogen strain-specific protospacer adjacent motif (PAM) is present; and (iii) detecting activation of a toehold switch, where activation does not occur in the event of nuclease-mediated sequence-specific cleavage, thereby indicating the presence of the pathogen strain-specific PAM. In other cases, DNA is obtained from the biological sample and amplified as described above.


Other target nucleotide sequences include, without limitation, DNA or RNA sequences that can identify a species (e.g., ribosomal RNAs or DNAs); DNA or RNA sequences that are associated with a particular genetic condition (e.g., where the target comprises a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) for which PAM identification is advantageous, including, without limitation, BRCA1/BRCA2 mutations, cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, hemochromatosis); DNA or RNA sequences for identifying a particular person with high certainty (e.g., identifying a suspect in a criminal investigation; identifying a “high value target” in a military operation).


For forensic applications, the target nucleotide sequence can be a DNA or RNA sequence associated with one or more particular identifiable features (e.g., skin color, hair color, eye color). In such cases, a biological sample can be assayed to detect a target nucleic acid of an unknown subject or for comparison to samples from known individuals. For applications related to pathogen detection, detection of particular RNA sequences is advantageous for determining, for example, the life cycle stage of a pathogen associated with an infection. By way of example, particular target nucleic acids can be detected to detect the presence of malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum and to determine whether the parasite is in a life cycle phase in which it can reproduce and, thus, transmit infection. Other applications for which the methods provided herein include, without limitation, profiling species in an environment (e.g., water); profiling species in an human or animal microbiome; food safety applications (e.g., detecting the presence of a pathogenic species, determining or confirming food source/origin such as type of animal or crop plant); obtaining patient expression profiles (e.g., detecting expression of a gene or panel of genes (e.g., biomarkers) to monitor the patient's response to a therapeutic regimen, to select a therapeutic regimen suitable for the patient, or to detect exposure of the patient to a toxin or environmental agent that affects expression of the gene or panel of genes; and molecular encryption applications such as marking certain products (e.g., high value products) using nucleic acid barcodes.


The nucleic acid molecule can be, e.g., an RNA, a DNA, an mRNA, and/or a genomic nucleic acid. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the nucleic acid molecule can be human, animal, prokaryotic, eukaryotic, or pathogenic in origin. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the nucleic acid molecule can be of viral origin. Nucleic acids and/or other moieties of the invention may be isolated. As used herein, “isolated” means separate from at least some of the components with which it is usually associated whether it is derived from a naturally occurring source or made synthetically, in whole or in part.


Nucleic acids and/or other moieties of the invention may be purified. As used herein, purified means separate from the majority of other compounds or entities. A compound or moiety may be partially purified or substantially purified. Purity may be denoted by a weight by weight measure and may be determined using a variety of analytical techniques such as but not limited to mass spectrometry, HPLC, etc.


Biological samples appropriate for use according to the methods provided herein include, without limitation, blood, serum, urine, saliva, tissues, cells, and organs, or portions thereof.


Since the methods of the present invention provide single-base discrimination, the methods are particularly suited to distinguishing between genomes of a pathogen strain (e.g., to distinguish between pathogen strains) and/or identifying the presence of nucleic acids specific to a particular pathogen. As described herein, the methods incorporate isothermal RNA amplification and the sequence-specific nuclease activity of a CRISPR/Cas system. “Clustered Regularly Interspaced Palindromic Repeats (CRISPRs)/CRISPR associated (Cas)” systems have been employed for targeted genome editing applications across many species. CRISPR systems belong to different classes, with different repeat patterns, sets of genes, and species ranges. The number of Cas genes at a given CRISPR locus can vary between species. The terms “Cas gene” and “CRISPR-associated (Cas) gene” are used interchangeably herein. A comprehensive review of the Cas protein family is presented in Haft et al. (2005) Computational Biology, PLoS Comput. Biol. 1:e60 (doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0010060). At least 41 CRISPR-associated (Cas) gene families have been described.


Without being bound to any particular theory or mechanism of action, Cas enzymes recognize a strain-specific protospacer adjacent motif (PAM) sequence. In one embodiment, in the case of the enzyme Cas9 the PAM sequence is NGG, where N can be any DNA base. Thus, a single base mutation, such as one that changes the sequence AGG to AAG, abolishes the PAM site and prevents Cas nuclease-based cleavage. As used herein, the term “protospacer” refers to the portion of a crRNA (or sgRNA) that is complementary to the genomic DNA target sequence. Generally, protospacers are usually 20 nucleotides in length. Referring to FIG. 8, the methods provided herein can employ pathogen strain-specific “NGG” protospacer adjacent motif (PAM) sequences and isothermal RNA amplification using primers having specificity to the toehold switch domain. In such cases, the amplified DNA will undergo Cas-mediated cleavage only if the appropriate strain-specific PAM sequence is present. The truncated RNA, generated through transcription of the cleaved DNA product, is unable to activate the toehold switch. In the absence of the PAM sequence, the full-length RNA product containing the toehold switch domain is generated, allowing for nucleic acid-based sensor activation. Trigger RNA is only amplified from DNA that is not cut by Cas, thereby allowing for strain-specific detection using the toehold switch. With respect to distinguishing between Zika virus strains, analysis of the sequences of the American Zika variant (GenBank: KU312312) and an African Zika variant (GenBank: KF268950) revealed over 600 sites at which a PAM site was present in one strain and not the other. Since both viruses have genomes of ˜10.5 kb in length, PAM sites that can be used to identify viruses in a strain-specific manner occur approximately every 17 bases within the genomes of the two closely related strains and thus provide considerable opportunities for strain identification according to the methods provided herein.


As used herein, the term “toehold switch” generally refers to a nucleic acid-based regulator of gene expression, configured to repress or activate translation of an open reading frame and thus production of a protein. Toehold switches, which are a type of prokaryotic riboregulator, activate gene expression in response to cognate RNAs with essentially arbitrary sequences. Gene regulation is achieved through the presence of a regulatory nucleic acid element (the cis-repressive RNA or crRNA) within the 5′ untranslated region (5′ UTR) of an mRNA molecule. The cis-repressive nucleic acid element (crRNA) forms a hairpin structure comprising a stem domain and a loop domain through complementary base pairing. The hairpin structure blocks access to the mRNA transcript by the ribosome, thereby preventing translation. In some embodiments, the stem domain of the hairpin structure sequesters the ribosome binding site (RBS). In some embodiments, including for example embodiments involving eukaryotic cells, the stem domain of the hairpin structure is positioned upstream of the start (or initiation) codon, within the 5′ UTR of an mRNA. In some cases, riboregulators comprise synthetic (engineered) molecules. In other cases, toehold switches comprise endogenous, naturally occurring RNAs or regions thereof. See, for example, U.S. 2015/0275203. The stem domain can be as small as 12 bps, but in some cases will be longer than 12 bps, including 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, or more base pairs in length. In some cases, the loop domain is complementary to a naturally occurring RNA. In other cases, the loop domain is complementary to a non-naturally occurring RNA. The toehold domain can be 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, or more nucleotides in length. Referring to FIGS. 2A and 2B, an exemplary toehold switch domain comprises an 11-nt or 12-nt loop domain.


The toehold switch further comprises a fully or partially double-stranded stem domain comprising an initiation codon, a loop domain comprising a ribosome binding site (RBS), and a coding domain. The unpaired region upstream of the RBS in a toehold switch can be shortened or lengthened to modulate protein output and, in turn, device dynamic range. In some cases, the toehold and stem domains are complementary in sequence to a naturally occurring RNA. In other cases, the sequence detected can also be the complement of the naturally occurring RNA. For example, after isothermal amplification, it is possible to transcribe the antisense of the RNA rather than the sense.


The toehold switch can further comprise a thermodynamically stable double-stranded stem domain, a loop domain comprising a ribosome binding site, and a coding domain. In some cases, the loop domain is complementary in sequence to a naturally occurring Zika virus RNA. In other cases, the loop domain is complementary in sequence to a non-naturally occurring RNA. Preferably, the loop domain is 11 nucleotides or 12 nucleotides in length. In some cases, the length of loop domains can be increased or decreased, for example, to alter reaction thermodynamics.


As shown in FIGS. 2A and 2B, the toehold switch can be operably linked to a reporter element (e.g., an E. coli lacZ reporter element encoding β-galactosidase) that is 3′ to the hairpin structure. As used herein, the term “operably linked” refers to a relationship between two nucleic acid sequences wherein the production or expression of one of the nucleic acid sequences is controlled by, regulated by, modulated by, etc., the other nucleic acid sequence. Reporter proteins appropriate for the methods provided herein include, without limitation, enzymatic reporters (e.g., β-galactosidase, alkaline phosphatase, DHFR, CAT), fluorescent or chemiluminescent reporters (e.g., GFP variants, mCherry, luciferase, e.g., luciferase derived from the firefly (Photinus pyralis) or the sea pansy (Renilla reniformis) and mutants thereof), etc.


Any isothermal amplification protocol can be used according to the methods provided herein. Exemplary types of isothermal amplification include, without limitation, nucleic acid sequence-based amplification (NASBA), loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP), strand displacement amplification (SDA), helicase-dependent amplification (HDA), nicking enzyme amplification reaction (NEAR), signal mediated amplification of RNA technology (SMART), rolling circle amplification (RCA), isothermal multiple displacement amplification (IMDA), single primer isothermal amplification (SPIA), recombinase polymerase amplification (RPA), and polymerase spiral reaction (PSR available at nature.com/articles/srep12723 on the World Wide Web). In some cases, a forward primer is used to introduce a T7 promoter site into the resulting DNA template to enable transcription of amplified RNA products via T7 RNA polymerase. In other cases, a reverse primer is used to add a trigger sequence of a toehold sequence domain.


As used herein, “nuclease” refers to an enzyme capable of cleaving the phosphodiester bonds between the nucleotide subunits of nucleic acids. Nucleases can be site-specific, i.e. site-specific nucleases cleave DNA bonds only after specifically binding to a particular sequence. Therefore, nucleases specific for a given target can be readily selected by one of skill in the art. Nucleases often cleave both strands of dsDNA molecule within several bases of each other, resulting in a double-stranded break (DSB). Exemplary nucleases include, but are not limited to Cas9; Cas13; meganucleases; TALENs; zinc finger nucleases; FokI cleavage domain; RNA-guided engineered nucleases; Cas-derived nucleases; homing endonucleases (e.g. I-AniI, I-CreI, and I-SceI) and the like. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the nuclease is an endonuclease. As used herein, “endonuclease” refers to an enzyme capable of cleaving the phosphodiester bonds between the nucleotide subunits of nucleic acids within a polynucleotide, e.g., cleaving a phosphodiester bond that is not either the 5′ or 3′ most bond present in the polynucleotide. In other embodiments of any of the aspects, the nuclease is a meganuclease. As used herein, “meganuclease” refers to endonucleases, which have a large recognition sequence (e.g., dsDNA sequences of 12-40 bp). Due to the size of the recognition sequences, meganucleases are particularly specific. Meganuclease specificity can be engineered. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the meganuclease can be a LAGLIDADG homing endonuclease (SEQ ID NO: 2).


In some embodiments, the nuclease can be an engineered nuclease. As used herein, the terms “engineered” and “genetically engineered” are used interchangeably and refer to the aspect of having been manipulated by the hand of man. For example, a nuclease is considered to be “engineered” when the sequence of the nuclease is manipulated by the hand of man to differ from the sequence of the nuclease as it exists in nature. As is common practice and is understood by those in the art, progeny and copies of an engineered polynucleotide and/or polypeptide are typically still referred to as “engineered” even though the actual manipulation was performed on a prior entity. Methods of engineering nucleases to achieve a desired sequence specificity are known in the art and are described, e.g., in Kim and Kim. Nature Reviews Genetics 2014 15:321-334; Kim et al. Genome Res. 2012 22:1327-1333; Belhaj et al. Plant Methods 2013 9:39; Urnov et al. Nat Rev Genet 2010 11:636-646; Bogdanove et al. Science 2011 333:1843-6; Jinek et al. Science 2012 337:816-821; Silva et al. Curr Gene Ther 2011 11:11-27; Ran et al. Cell 2013 154:1380-9; Carlson et al. PNAS 212 109:17382-7, Guerts et al. Science 2009 325:433-3; Takasu et al. Insect Biochem Mol Biol 2010 40:759-765; and Watanabe et al. Nat. Commun. 2012 3; each of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.


In some embodiments, the nuclease is a programmable nuclease. As used herein “programmable nuclease” refers to a nuclease that has been engineered to create a double-stranded break (DSB) or nick at a nucleic acid sequence that the native nuclease would not act upon, e.g. the sequence specificity of the nuclease has been altered. As described herein, programmable nucleases can be used to genotype a nucleic acid and/or determine the sequence of a nucleic acid. In particular, programmable nucleases can differentiate between point mutations or SNPs, e.g., SNPs that occur in a PAM site. In one aspect of any of the embodiments, described herein is a method of genotyping a nucleic acid molecule, the method comprising: a) contacting the nucleic acid molecule with: a programmable nuclease; and a single guide (“sgRNA”) which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant of the nucleic acid molecule; and b) detecting the presence or absence of a cut in the nucleic acid molecule generated by the nuclease. In one aspect of any of the embodiments, described herein is a method of genotyping a nucleic acid molecule, the method comprising: a) contacting the nucleic acid molecule with: a programmable nuclease; and a sgRNA wherein the combination of the nuclease and sgRNA can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant of the nucleic acid molecule; and b) detecting the presence or absence of a cut in the nucleic acid molecule generated by the nuclease. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the presence of a cut indicates that the nucleic acid molecule has a sequence variant for which the sgRNA is specific. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the presence of a cut indicates that the nucleic acid molecule has a sequence variant to which the nuclease specifically binds. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the presence of a cut indicates that the nucleic acid molecule has a sequence variant for which the sgRNA is specific and has a sequence variant to which the nuclease specifically binds. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the presence of a cut indicates that the nucleic acid molecule has a sequence variant to which the sgRNA and nuclease can specifically bind.


By way of non-limiting example, the programmable nuclease can be Cas9; Cas13, a Cas nickase mutant; TALEN; ZFNs; Cpf1; and/or SaCas9. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the programmable nuclease is Cas9. In some embodiments, the programmable nuclease is Cas9. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the programmable nuclease is S. pyogenes Cas9 or a variant thereof, e.g., New England Biolabs #M0386 (Ipswich, Mass.). When Cas9 nuclease (or Cas9-derived nuclease) is selected for use, the nuclease will generate a cut and/or nick where the guide RNA hybridizes to the nucleic acid molecule.


In order for a Cas nuclease to recognize and cleave a target nucleic acid molecule, a CRISPR targeting RNA (“crRNA”) and trans-activating crRNA (“tracrRNA”) must be present. crRNAs hybridize with tracrRNA to form a hybrid guide RNA (“gRNA”) which then associates with the Cas9 nuclease. Alternatively, the gRNA can be provided as a single contiguous RNA, and forms a single guide RNA (“sgRNA”). Once the sgRNA is complexed with Cas, the complex can bind to a target nucleic acid molecule. The sgRNA binds specifically to a complementary target sequence via a target-specific sequence in the crRNA portion (e.g., the spacer sequence), while Cas itself binds to a protospacer adjacent motif (CRISPR/Cas protospacer-adjacent motif; PAM). The Cas nuclease then mediates cleavage of the target nucleic acid to create a double-stranded break within the sequence bound by the sgRNA. Different Cas enzymes have different PAM recognition sequences. For example, S. pyogenes Cas9 requires a NGG PAM sequence while other CRISPR/Cas systems have been described in other prokaryotic species, which recognize a different PAM sequence (e.g., CCN, TCN, TTC, AWG, CC, NNAGNN, NGG, NGGNG).


In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the sgRNA is provided as a single continuous nucleic acid molecule. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, a hybrid gRNA is provided as a set of hybridized molecules, e.g., a crRNA and tracrRNA.


In embodiments in which the nuclease to which the amplified DNA or RNA is contacted is a Cas nuclease, a method of detecting a viral nucleic acid comprises or consists essentially of: (a) obtaining DNA or RNA from a biological sample obtained from a subject; (b) amplifying the DNA or RNA using a primer designed to append a trigger sequence of one or more toehold sequence domains; (c) contacting the amplified DNA or RNA to a toehold switch, where the riboregulator encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more toehold sequence domains, where the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the endogenous virus DNA or RNA but not in the absence of the endogenous virus DNA or RNA, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the endogenous virus DNA or RNA is present in the amplified DNA or RNA of the subject; and (d) identifying the strain of virus, where identifying comprises: (i) amplifying DNA or RNA from the biological sample; (ii) contacting the amplified DNA or RNA of (i) to Cas (e.g., Cas9, Cas13) under conditions that allow for sequence-specific cleavage of the contacted RNA by Cas (e.g., Cas9, Cas13) when a virus strain-specific protospacer adjacent motif (PAM) is present; and (iii) detecting activation of the toehold switch, where activation does not occur in the event of Cas-mediated sequence-specific cleavage, thereby indicating the presence of the virus strain-specific PAM. For example, the methods provided herein can be used to distinguish between viral strains, e.g., where one strain comprises a PAM site while the second strain comprises a SNP that eliminates the PAM site, such an American Zika variant (GenBank: KU312312) and an African Zika variant (GenBank: KF268950), and also between other flavivirus strains. See, FIGS. 5A-5B. In such cases the toehold switch comprises one or more Zika genome-specific single-stranded toehold sequence domains. Exemplary sequences of toehold switches suitable for use for Zika RNA detection are provided in Table 8.


In some cases, the one or more toehold sequence domains are complementary to an endogenous virus DNA or RNA sequence. In such cases, where the toehold switch recognizes an endogenous RNA sequence, there is no requirement for a primer that appends a toehold sequence domain.


With respect to the amplification step, the target sequence for a toehold switch is in some cases added via an amplification primer for the NASBACC process. In other cases, a toehold switch that detects an endogenous pathogen DNA or RNA sequence is used.


In another aspect, provided herein is a method of detecting Zika virus in a sample. The methods can comprises, or consist essentially of, (a) obtaining RNA from a biological sample obtained from a subject; (b) amplifying the RNA using isothermal amplification; and (c) contacting the amplified RNA to a riboregulator, wherein the riboregulator encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more toehold domains that is complementary to a Zika virus RNA, wherein the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the Zika virus RNA but not in the absence of the Zika virus RNA, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the Zika virus RNA is present in the amplified RNA of the subject.


In some cases, it may be advantageous to adapt the methods described herein for high-throughput, reproducible, and rapid detection, for example in a clinical setting. When riboregulator output is coupled to a reporter element, such as a LacZ reporter element, the riboregulator acts as a genetically encodable sensor and detectable probe for endogenous DNA or RNA (e.g., endogenous pathogen DNA, endogenous pathogen RNA) in a sample. For example, such toehold switches can be provided in a device configured for rapid, reproducible detection in a clinical setting. In some cases, the device comprises a preserved paper test article, upon which any step(s) of the method provided herein can be performed. In preferred embodiments, the paper test article is preserved by freeze-drying. The reporter element can be a reporter protein, e.g., a polypeptide with an easily assayed enzymatic activity or detectable signal that is naturally absent from the host cell. Exemplary but non-limiting reporter proteins include lacZ, catalase, xy1E, GFP, RFP, YFP, CFP, neomycin phosphotransferase, luciferase, mCherry, and derivatives or variants thereof. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the reporter protein is suitable for use in a colorimetric assay. Examples of genes encoding fluorescent proteins that may be used in accordance with the invention include, without limitation, those proteins provided in U.S. Patent Application No. 2012/0003630 (see Table 59 therein), incorporated herein by reference.


In some cases, the device is used with a portable electronic reader. In this manner, the electronic reader serves as companion technology that provides robust and quantitative measurements of device outputs. As shown in FIGS. 7A-7C, an exemplary electronic reader comprises readily available consumer components, open-source code, and laser-cut acrylic housing, and is powered by a rechargeable lithium ion battery. The electronic reader can further comprise an onboard data storage unit. In some cases, to achieve sensitive detection of toehold switch signal output, an acrylic chip that holds the freeze-dried, paper-based reactions is placed into the reader between an LED light source (570 nm) and electronic sensors. Using onboard electronics, samples can be read at a rate of 29 reads per minute. Accordingly, the portable electronic reader provides low-noise measurements of changes associated with the reporter element including changes in light transmission due to LacZ-mediated color change.


As used herein, “sequence variations” can refer to substitutions, insertions, deletions, duplications, and/or rearrangements. Sequence variations of a locus occurring in a population are referred to as alleles. Sequence variations can be present in (and therefore, detected in) the gDNA and/or mRNA of a gene. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the sequence variation is a point mutation, e.g. a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). As used herein, a “point mutation” refers to the identity of the nucleotide present at a site of a mutation in the mutant copy of a genomic locus (including insertions and deletions), i.e., it refers to an alteration in the sequence of a nucleotide at a single base position from the wild type sequence. A SNP (single nucleotide polymorphism) is one type of point mutation that occurs at the same genomic locus between different individual subjects or entities in a population or different strains in a species. SNPs can be allelic. At least four alleles of a SNP locus are possible, although SNPs that vary only between two nucleotides at the target site are not uncommon.


In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the target nucleic acid is a Zika virus nucleic acid molecule, e.g., a Zika virus genomic molecule or a molecule transcribed from the Zika virus genome.


The methods described herein can permit identification of the species of virus present in a sample (e.g., a sample obtained from a subject), and/or permit identification of the strain of a virus present in a sample based upon sequence variations found between species and/or strains. Such information can be used to direct treatment, e.g., different strains of Zika virus are known to cause different symptoms and secondary conditions at varying frequencies. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the sequence variant being detected differentiates at least one of the African, American, and Asian Zika strains from the others. Exemplary sequence variants that differentiate these strains are provided in Table 5.


In certain embodiments, provided herein is a method for genotyping a nucleic acid molecule. The method can comprise or consist essentially of contacting the nucleic acid molecule with a programmable nuclease and a sgRNA, where the combination of the nuclease and sgRNA can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant of the nucleic acid molecule; and detecting the presence or absence of a cut in the nucleic acid molecule generated by the nuclease. In some cases, the method further comprises a first step of performing reverse transcription on a RNA molecule and performing 2nd strand DNA synthesis with a toehold primer to generate the nucleic acid molecule. In such cases, the detecting step comprises: (i) transcribing an RNA from the nucleic acid molecule after contacting it with the nuclease, using a primer which initiates transcription from a location distal of the sequence variation site with respect to the location of the toehold primer sequence; and (ii) contacting a sensor with the RNA resulting from step (a) and detecting the presence or absence of sensor activation; wherein the sensor is activated if the nuclease is not able to cut the nucleic acid molecule in step (a). As used herein, the term “toehold primer” refers to an oligonucleotide primer configured to add a detectable tag or label sequence, where the tag or label sequence is detectable by a downstream nucleic acid sensor.


Primers and sgRNAs can readily be designed for a given variant according to the principles described herein. Cas9 selectively cleaves DNA only in the presence of an NGG protospacer adjacent motif (PAM). As demonstrated herein, e.g. in Example 1, numerous strain-specific PAM sites exist. The reverse transcription primer is designed to specifically bind near the selected PAM site such that reverse transcription proceeds towards the PAM site. The sgRNA and/or guide RNA is then designed to specifically bind to a sequence located between the PAM site and the sequence to which the reverse transcription primer specifically binds. Tools for designing primers and sgRNAs are known in the art. For example, a primer sequence can be selected to have a desired TM (melting temperature) using any of a number of widely available algorithms (e.g., OLIGO™ (Molecular Biology Insights Inc. Colorado) primer design software and VENTRO NTI™ (Invitrogen, Inc. California) primer design software and programs available on the internet, including Primer3 and Oligo Calculator). Algorithms are also widely available for sgRNA design (e.g., several online tools (e.g., The Broad Institute's sgRNA Design tool, CRISPR Design or CHOPCHOP, which are available on the internet). Methods of making primers and other nucleic acid sequences (e.g., oligonucleotides, sgRNAs) are well known in the art, and numerous commercial sources offer oligonucleotide synthesis services suitable for providing molecules according to the methods and compositions described herein, e.g. INVITROGEN™ Custom DNA Oligos; Life Technologies; Grand Island, N.Y. or custom DNA Oligos from IDT; Coralville, Iowa).


In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the sequence variant being detected differentiates the African and American Zika virus strains. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the sequence variant is the SNP occurring at site 7330 of the African (GenBank: KF268950) and American (GenBank: KU312312) Zika strains. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the sgRNA has the sequence of SEQ ID NO: 1. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the method differentiates the African and American Zika virus strains by detecting the presence or absence of the SNP occurring at site 7330 of the African (GenBank: KF268950) and American (GenBank: KU312312) Zika strains, and the sgRNA has the sequence of SEQ ID NO:1.


Articles of Manufacture


In another aspect, the present invention provides articles of manufacture useful for detecting a virus or identifying a virus strain. In preferred embodiments, the article of manufacture is a kit for detecting a virus, where the kit comprises a plurality of preserved paper test articles and an electronic optical reader. Optionally, a kit can further include instructions for performing the virus detection and/or strain identification methods provided herein.


In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant occurring in a population. In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas9 nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant occurring in a population, wherein the sequence variation occurs at the Cas9 PAM binding site.


In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant occurring in a viral population. In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas9 nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant occurring in a viral population, wherein the sequence variation occurs at the Cas9 PAM binding site.


In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant occurring in a Zika virus population. In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas9 nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant occurring in a Zika virus population, wherein the sequence variation occurs at the Cas9 PAM binding site.


In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant selected from Table 10. In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas9 nuclease and a sgRNA which can specifically bind to at least one sequence variant selected from Table 5, wherein the sequence variation occurs at the Cas9 PAM binding site.


In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas9 nuclease and a sgRNA comprising SEQ ID NO:1. In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition comprising a Cas9 nuclease and a sgRNA comprising SEQ ID NO:1, wherein the sequence variation occurs at the Cas9 PAM binding site. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, the sgRNA consists of SEQ ID NO:1.


In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a sgRNA which can specifically bind to a sequence flanking at least one sequence variant selected from Table 5, wherein the sequence variation occurs at a Cas9 PAM binding site. In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition a sgRNA comprising SEQ ID NO:1. In some aspects of any of the embodiments, described herein is a composition a sgRNA consisting of SEQ ID NO:1.


Methods for sgRNA selection and design are described elsewhere herein. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, a sgRNA which can specifically bind to a sequence flanking a given sequence variant can comprise a 20 nt sequence complementary to a sequence found from 1-30 nucleotides from the sequence variation. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, a sgRNA which can specifically bind to a sequence flanking a given sequence variant can comprise a 20 nt sequence complementary to a sequence found from 1-25 nucleotides from the sequence variation. In some embodiments of any of the aspects, a sgRNA which can specifically bind to a sequence flanking a given sequence variant can comprise a 20 nt sequence complementary to a sequence found from 1-20 nucleotides from the sequence variation.


Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains. All definitions, as defined and used herein, should be understood to control over dictionary definitions, definitions in documents incorporated by reference, and/or ordinary meanings of the defined terms.


All references, patents and patent applications disclosed herein are incorporated by reference with respect to the subject matter for which each is cited, which in some cases may encompass the entirety of the document.


The indefinite articles “a” and “an,” as used herein in the specification and in the claims, unless clearly indicated to the contrary, should be understood to mean “at least one.”


The phrase “and/or,” as used herein in the specification and in the claims, should be understood to mean “either or both” of the elements so conjoined, i.e., elements that are conjunctively present in some cases and disjunctively present in other cases. Multiple elements listed with “and/or” should be construed in the same fashion, i.e., “one or more” of the elements so conjoined. Other elements may optionally be present other than the elements specifically identified by the “and/or” clause, whether related or unrelated to those elements specifically identified. Thus, as a non-limiting example, a reference to “A and/or B”, when used in conjunction with open-ended language such as “comprising” can refer, in one embodiment, to A only (optionally including elements other than B); in another embodiment, to B only (optionally including elements other than A); in yet another embodiment, to both A and B (optionally including other elements); etc.


As used herein in the specification and in the claims, “or” should be understood to have the same meaning as “and/or” as defined above. For example, when separating items in a list, “or” or “and/or” shall be interpreted as being inclusive, i.e., the inclusion of at least one, but also including more than one, of a number or list of elements, and, optionally, additional unlisted items. Only terms clearly indicated to the contrary, such as “only one of” or “exactly one of,” or, when used in the claims, “consisting of,” will refer to the inclusion of exactly one element of a number or list of elements. In general, the term “or” as used herein shall only be interpreted as indicating exclusive alternatives (i.e. “one or the other but not both”) when preceded by terms of exclusivity, such as “either,” “one of,” “only one of,” or “exactly one of” “Consisting essentially of,” when used in the claims, shall have its ordinary meaning as used in the field of patent law.


As used herein, “about” means within 5% of a stated concentration range or within 5% of a stated time frame.


It should also be understood that, unless clearly indicated to the contrary, in any methods claimed herein that include more than one step or act, the order of the steps or acts of the method is not necessarily limited to the order in which the steps or acts of the method are recited.


Having now described the invention, the same will be illustrated with reference to certain examples, which are included herein for illustration purposes only, and which are not intended to be limiting of the invention.


EXAMPLES

Reference is now made to the following examples, which together with the above descriptions illustrate the invention in a non-limiting fashion.


Example 1: Rapid, Low-Cost Detection of Zika Virus Using Programmable Biomolecular Components

Materials and Methods


In Silico Sensor Design and DNA Synthesis:


A set of 48 toehold switch sensors and corresponding NASBA primers were generated using an integrated in silico design algorithm.


DNA Sensor Assembly:


Toehold switch constructs were amplified from DNA templates (Integrated DNA Technologies) and ligated to the lacZ reporter gene via PCR. Plasmids were constructed for characterization of the top six toehold switches (FIG. 3A). The DNA templates were amplified using PCR and inserted into pET system parent plasmids (EMD Millipore) using Gibson assembly (Gibson et al., 2009) with 30 bp overlap regions. Plasmids for sensors 27B and 32B are available through Addgene (plasmid numbers: 75006-75011).


Cell-Free Reactions:


Details of RNA sensor validation are described in Pardee et al. (2014). Briefly, amplified sensor DNA was column purified and tested on paper discs (2 mm) containing freeze-dried, cell-free reactions (NEB, PURExpress) in the presence or absence of trigger RNA coding for a complementary region of the Zika virus genome (128-178 nts). The cell-free reactions consisted of: NEB Solution A (40%) and B (30%), chlorophenol red-b-D-galactopyranoside (Sigma, 0.6 mg/ml), RNase inhibitor (Roche, 03335402001; 0.5%), and linear DNA constructs encoding the toehold sensors (0.33 nM). The paper discs (Whatman, 1442-042) were blocked in 5% BSA overnight prior to use. Trigger RNA was produced using T7 RNAP-based transcription (Epicenter ASF3257) from linear DNA templates. Paper-based reactions (1.8 μl) were incubated at 37° C. using either our companion electronic reader inside a humidified chamber or a plate reader (BioTek Neo). For the in-house reader, paper discs were placed into 2 mm holes in a removable acrylic chip; for the plate reader, paper discs were placed into black, clear bottom 384-well plates (Corning 3544).


NASBA:


For NASBA reactions, the trigger elements (128-178 nts) were extended by 100 nts on the 5′ and 3′ ends with the relevant Zika genome sequence to provide suitable template RNAs. RNA amplicons were spiked into 7% human serum (Sigma H4522) where indicated. Reaction Buffer (Life Sciences NECB-24; 33.5%), Nucleotide Mix (Life Sciences NECN-24; 16.5%), RNase inhibitor (Roche, 03335402001; 0.5%), 12.5 mM of each NASBA primer (2%), nuclease free water (2.5%), and RNA amplicon (20%) were assembled at 4° C. and incubated at 65° C. for 2 min, followed by a 10 min incubation at 41° C. Enzyme Mix (Life Sciences NEC-1-24; 25%) was then added to the reaction (for a final volume of 5 and the mixture was incubated at 41° C. for 2 hr. unless noted otherwise. For output reads with paper-based toeholds, the NASBA reactions were diluted 1:7 in water. See Table 2 for primer sequences.


Lentivirus Preparation and Processing:


HEK293FT cells (Life Technologies, R70007) used for virus packaging were cultured in DMEM supplemented with 10% FBS, 1% penicillin-streptomycin, and 4 mM GlutaMAX (ThermoFisher Scientific). 12 hr. prior to transfection, 6.5×106 cells were seeded in a 10 cm dish. 7.5 mg psPAX2, 2.5 mg pMD2.G, and 10 mg pSB700 modified to include a Zika or Dengue RNA fragment were transfected using the HeBS—CaCl2 method. Media was changed 12 hr. post-transfection. 27 hr. after changing media, viral supernatant was harvested and filtered using a 0.45 mm syringe filter. Viral supernatant was then purified with ViraBind Lentivirus Purification Kit (Cell Biolabs VPK-104) and buffer exchanged into 1×PBS with Lenti-X Concentrator (Clontech, 631231). Viral RNA concentration was quantified using QuickTiter Lentivirus Quantification Kit (VPK-112). Virus samples were spiked into 7% human serum at a final volume of 25 μl. Samples were heated to 95° C. for 1 and 2 min and used as input to NASBA.


Zika Virus Preparation and Processing:


100 μl of Zika virus isolate (MR 766) was utilized for infection of 106 Vero cells in 4 ml of media (DMEM supplemented with 2% fetal calf serum [FCS] and penicillin-streptomycin). The supernatant was removed after 2 hr. of incubation at 37° C. and replaced with fresh media (DMEM, 10% FCS) for 48 hr. of infection. Cell debris was removed by centrifugation at 1,500 rcf for 10 min, and aliquots of the virus were stored at −80° C. until use. The virus was buffer exchanged into 1×PBS with Lenti-X Concentrator (Clontech, 631231). Viral RNA concentrations were determined from virus purified with the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN 52904) and confirmed with qRT-PCR. The titer of the Zika virus used was 6.7×107 infectious units per milliliter (Lambeth et al., 2005). Virus samples were spiked into 7% human serum at a final volume of 30 μl. Samples were heated to 95° C. for 2 min and used as input to NASBA. NASBA primers were re-designed to accommodate the MR 766 strain sequence.


Dengue Orthogonality:


Genomic RNA from three Dengue serotypes was purified using the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN 52904). Dengue 1 (GenBank: KM204119), Dengue 2 (GenBank: KM204118), Dengue 4 (GenBank: AF326573). NASBA reactions using the sensor 32B primer set were performed on 30 pM RNA for 2 hr. NASBA reactions were diluted 1:7 in water and used to rehydrate freeze-dried, paper-based reactions containing sensor 32B.


Electric Optical Reader:


The portable device consists of four layers housed within a laser-cut acrylic box fastened together with metal screws and mounting brackets (FIG. 7; McMaster-Carr, 8505K14, 98164A061; Digi-Key, 36-621-ND). The top layer holds a multiplexer (Sparkfun, BOB-09056), solderable breadboard (Sparkfun, PRT-12702), friction lock connectors (Digi-Key, A31001-ND, A19473-ND) and 16 LEDs (Digi-Key, 754-1262-ND). The LEDs have a very narrow viewing angle and an emission of 570 nm to match the absorbance maximum of the chlorophenol red product from the LacZ reaction. The LEDs were placed in close proximity to the chip in the middle layer, which holds 16 paper disks within 2 mm apertures. The apertures prevented transmission of stray light and were coaxial with the LEDs in the top layer and the array of 16 TSL2591 sensors (Adafruit, 1980) in the third layer below, which also contained two solderable breadboards and connectors as above. The bottom layer contains the Arduino Uno with an attached Power Shield (Adafruit, 2708) connected to a rechargeable 2,000 mAh lithium ion battery (Adafruit, 2011) on which a datalogging shield (Adafruit, 1141) was stacked with connectors (Digi-Key, A30954-ND, A19476) and a 4 GB SD/MicroSD Card (Adafruit, 102). To prevent crosstalk between reads, reactions were read in series by sequentially activating each LED and sensor pair. The read frequency and pattern of the reader can be easily adjusted by modifying and uploading alternative sketches to the Arduino. The raw data (which is the median of 29 100 ms, 4283 gain reads per minute) was saved to the SD card along with the date and time of the run, integration time and gain settings. The data were processed with the MATLAB script and graphed in Prism. A diagram of the circuit and an overview of the laser cut parts can be found in FIG. 7, and laser cutting patterns, the Arduino sketch, and MATLAB script are in Appendix A.


Calculation of Fold Change:


The calculation of fold change for plate reader data was done by first subtracting the background absorbance measured from paper-based reactions that did not contain sensor DNA or trigger RNA. These normalized values were smoothed to reduce measurement noise using a three-point average of the time point and the data collected 10 min before and after. The minimum value of each well was then adjusted to zero. For data presented in FIGS. 3, 6, and 10, fold change was calculated from these zero adjusted values by dividing the wells at each time point by the average signal from the corresponding sensor-alone control wells. For our initial sensor screen (FIG. 2), we used a more sensitive measure of fold change based on the difference in the rate of color change between control and RNA trigger wells. This was done by calculating the rate of change in normalized absorbance (570 nm) values using slope; where, at each 10 min time point, the rate was calculated using Sn=(Tn+1−Tn)/10, where T is the normalized data at a time point (Tn) and the time point 10 min later (Tn+1), and Sn is the slope reported for Tn. Fold change was then calculated as above. MATLAB script to analyze data collected on a plate reader is provided in Appendix A.


NASBA-CRISPR Cleavage (NASBACC):


Reactions were performed in a 5 μl volume containing (NASBA buffer), 1 μl of a 250 nM Cas9 nuclease (NEB, M0386), and 250 nM purified gRNA (GeneArt precision gRNA synthesis kit, ThermoFisher Scientific, A29377) mix, 3 nM NASBACC primers, and 0.4 units of RNase inhibitor (NEB, M0314). The forward NASBACC primer is composed of the reverse complement of the trigger H sequence (5′-GTT TGA ATG AAT TGT AGG CTT GTT ATA GTT ATG TTT-3′ (SEQ ID NO: 3)) and the forward binding sequence of the (region 32) NASBA primers. The reverse NASBACC primer contains the T7 promoter sequence (5′-CTA ATA CGA CTC ACT ATA GG-3′ (SEQ ID NO: 4)) followed by the reverse binding sequence of the (region 32) NASBA primers. The assembled reaction was incubated at 37° C. for 2 to 6 hours. For toehold activation assay on freeze-dried paper, NASBACC reactions were diluted 1:10 in nuclease-free water.


Zika Virus Stock Production for Macaque Infection:


ZIKV strain H/PF/2013 (GenBank accession number: KJ776791), originally isolated from a 51-year-old female in France returning from French Polynesia with a single round of amplification on Vero cells, was obtained from Xavier de Lamballerie (European Virus Archive, Marseille France). Virus stocks were prepared by inoculation onto a confluent monolayer of C6/36 mosquito cells. A single harvest of virus with a titer of 1.26×106 PFU/ml for the Asian-lineage (equivalent to 1.43×109 vRNA copies/ml) was used.


Viremic Plasma Processing:


All Indian-origin rhesus macaque monkeys from which plasma was isolated were cared for by the staff at the Wisconsin National Primate Research Center (WNPRC) in accordance with the regulations and guidelines outlined in the Animal Welfare Act and the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and the recommendations of the Weatherall report. This study was approved by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Animal Care and Use Protocol Number G005401). For all procedures (i.e., physical examination, virus inoculation, blood and swab collection), animals were anesthetized with an intramuscular dose of ketamine (10 ml/kg). Blood samples were obtained using a vacutainer system or needle and syringe from the femoral or saphenous vein. For processing, plasma was diluted 1:10 in nuclease free water, heated to 95° C. for 2 min, and immediately added to a NASBA reaction. NASBA was run for 3 hr.


Zika Virus Challenge of Macaques, Plasma Collection, and Processing:


The virus stock was thawed, diluted in PBS to the appropriate concentration for each challenge, and loaded into a 1 ml syringe that was kept on ice until challenge. Animals were anesthetized as described above, and 1 ml of inocula was administered subcutaneously over the cranial dorsum. At the conclusion of the procedure, animals were closely monitored by veterinary and animal care staff for adverse reactions and signs of disease. Fresh plasma and PBMC were isolated from EDTA-treated whole blood by Ficoll density centrifugation at 1860 rcf for 30 min. The plasma layer was collected and centrifuged for an additional 8 min at 670 rcf to remove residual cells. The supernatant plasma was then filtered over a 0.45 μm syringe filter. Collected plasma was diluted 1:10 in nuclease free water. Diluted samples were heated to 95° C. for two minutes and immediately added to a NASBA reaction as described above. NASBA was run for three hours.


qRT-PCR to Determine Macaque Plasma Viral Loads:


Viral RNA was extracted from 300 μl of plasma using the Viral Total Nucleic Acid Purification Kit (Promega) on a Maxwell 16 MDx instrument. Viral RNA was quantified by qRT-PCR using the primers and probe designed by Lanciotti et al. (2008). The RT-PCR was performed using the SuperScript III Platinum one-step quantitative RT-PCR system (Invitrogen) on the LightCycler 480 instrument (Roche Diagnostics). Primers and probe were used at final concentrations of 600 nm and 100 nm, respectively, along with 150 ng random primers (Promega). Cycling conditions were as follows: 37° C. for 15 min, 50° C. for 30 min, and 95° C. for 2 min, followed by 50 cycles of 95° C. for 15 seconds and 60° C. for 1 min. Virus concentration was determined by interpolation onto an internal standard curve composed of seven 10-fold serial dilutions of a synthetic ZIKV RNA fragment based on the Asian lineage.


Results


In Silico Toehold Switch Design:


Toehold switch sensors are programmable synthetic riboregulators that control the translation of a gene via the binding of a trans-acting trigger RNA. The switches contain a hairpin structure that blocks gene translation in cis by sequestration of the ribosome binding site (RBS) and start codon. Upon a switch binding to a complementary trigger RNA, sequestration of the RBS and start codon is relieved, activating gene translation (FIGS. 2A-2B) (Green et al., 2014). To allow for colorimetric detection of trigger RNA sequences, the sensors can be designed to regulate translation of the enzyme LacZ, which mediates a color change by converting a yellow substrate (chlorophenol red-b-D-galactopyranoside) to a purple product (chlorophenol red).


Toehold switch sensors for sequence-based detection of Zika virus were generated using an expanded version of the previously developed in silico design algorithm (Green et al., 2014). The modified algorithm screened the genome of the Zika strain prevalent in the Americas (Genbank:KU312312) for regions compatible with RNA amplification and toehold switch activation. The selected Zika genome regions were then computationally filtered to eliminate potential homology to the human transcriptome and to a panel of related viruses, including Dengue and Chikungunya. A total of 24 unique regions of the Zika genome compatible with downstream sensing efforts were identified.


Two toehold switches, each utilizing a different design scheme, were designed for each region, resulting in a total of 48 sensors. The first design scheme, termed the A series, utilizes a modification to the original toehold switch (Green et al., 2014) that reduces the size of the loop domain from 18 nts to 11 nts (FIG. 2A) to discourage loop-mediated docking of the ribosome and therefore reduce leakage in the OFF state. The second design scheme, termed the B series, features a 12-nt loop and incorporates a more thermodynamically stable stem in order to lower OFF state gene expression (FIG. 2B).


Rapid In Vitro Sensor Assembly and Screening:


In vitro assembly and initial screening of all 48 sensors took place in a 7 hr. time period, with low costs associated with sensor development (DNA input $20 USD/sensor) and testing ($0.10-$1/test). All 48 sensors and 24 targeted genomic regions were assembled in-house using in vitro protocols. Toehold switches were constructed by ligating the sensors (˜130 nt) to a LacZ reporter element in a single 2 hr. PCR-based step. Sensor performance screening to assess each sensor against its respective trigger RNA element (Zika genome fragment) was completed using low volume, cell-free transcription and translation reactions on paper. We found that 25 (52%) of the 48 sensors produce a fold change of five or greater in the presence of the appropriate trigger element (128-178 nucleotide regions of the Zika genome; FIGS. 2C, 2D). The top-ranked sensors exhibited activation as high as 34-fold over sensor alone (sensor 27B) and were activated in as quickly as 20 minutes after incubation at 37° C. (sensors 7A and 8A). For all sensors, maximum fold change occurred within the first 90 min. Averaging the LacZ output from sensors not exposed to trigger RNA confirmed that the low background design of the series B toehold switch sensors successfully reduced signal leakage (FIG. 2D, inset).


Assessing and Improving Zika Virus Sensor Sensitivity:


We selected top performing sensors from both the A and B series for trigger RNA titration experiments and found that all chosen sensors were activated with as little as 30 nM of trigger RNA (FIG. 3A). The sensors displayed a linear response to RNA concentration, providing semi-quantitative information on input trigger RNA values (FIG. 4A). Additionally, our top three sensors were highly orthogonal to each other when challenged with a high dose of trigger RNA from off-target Zika sequences (3,000 nM) (FIG. 4B).


Though the sensors displayed specificity for their respective Zika RNA trigger, they were unable to detect clinically relevant RNA concentrations. Zika viral loads have been documented as high as 202×106 copies/ml (365 fM) in urine (Gourinat et al., 2015). However, viral loads in saliva and serum are reportedly even lower, with 3×106 copies/ml (4.9 fM) (Barzon et al., 2016) documented in patient saliva and 2.5×106 copies/ml (4.1 fM) (Zika Experimental Science Team, 2016) and 7.2×105 copies/ml (1.2 fM) (Lanciotti et al., 2008) in primate and patient serum, respectively. Accordingly, to increase the sensitivity of our diagnostic platform, we incorporated an isothermal RNA amplification technique known as NASBA (nucleic acid sequence-based amplification) into our workflow (FIG. 1).


NASBA is a promising candidate for use with our diagnostic scheme because it is known to be extremely sensitive and has a proven track record in field-based diagnostic applications (Cordray and Richards-Kortum, 2012). The amplification process begins with reverse transcription of a target RNA that is mediated by a sequence-specific reverse primer to create an RNA/DNA duplex. RNase H then degrades the RNA template, allowing a forward primer containing the T7 promoter to bind and initiate elongation of the complementary strand, generating a double-stranded DNA product. T7-mediated transcription of the DNA template then creates copies of the target RNA sequence. Importantly, each new target RNA can be detected by the toehold switch sensors and also serve as starting material for further amplification cycles. NASBA requires an initial heating step (65° C.), followed by isothermal amplification at 41° C. (FIG. 3B) (Guatelli et al., 1990).


NASBA was performed on trigger RNA corresponding to Zika genomic regions for sensors 27B and 32B. Trigger RNAs were spiked into either water or human serum (7%) to more closely mimic clinical samples. NASBA reactions were run for 2 hr. and then applied to freeze-dried, paper-based sensors. We saw detection with Zika sensors from NASBA reactions initiated with as little as 3 fM of trigger RNA (FIG. 3C), a value within the range of reported patient viral loads. Zika sensor detection of NASBA-amplified trigger RNA proved to be reliable on samples spiked into either serum or water (FIG. 4C). Additionally, for reactions initialized with high concentrations of trigger RNA (>300 fM), NASBA reaction times could be reduced to as little as 30 minutes (FIG. 4D). NASBA reagents are compatible with freeze-drying (FIG. 4E) and could therefore be easily deployed and utilized alongside our paper-based sensors. We also demonstrated that NASBA can be run in the absence of the initial heating step (65° C.) (FIG. 4F), further reducing the technical and power requirements for deployment.


Field-Ready Diagnostic Platform:


To move our experiments toward conditions more representative of those found in clinics worldwide, we focused on three key efforts: (1) testing sensor specificity against related viruses that share clinical symptoms, partial homology, and geographic range with Zika virus; (2) building a second-generation portable, battery-powered reader to provide lab-quality results in low resource environments; and (3) developing a low-cost and tractable method for viral RNA extraction.


Although our sensor design algorithm screened for Zika genomic sequences that are mostly distinct from those of related viruses, the targeted Zika sequences do share substantial similarity (51%-59%) with their Dengue virus counterparts (FIGS. 5A-5B). To test the Zika sensors for possible cross-reactivity, we exposed the sensors to regions of the Dengue genome that share a degree of homology with regions targeted in the Zika genome. Sensors 27B and 32B were treated with high concentrations of RNA amplicons (3,000 nM) from either Zika or Dengue genomic regions. As seen in FIG. 6A, Dengue RNA sequences failed to activate the toehold switch sensors. We also tested our NASBA primer sets for specificity to their targeted Zika sequences by applying the NASBA-mediated amplification and paper-based detection scheme to 300 fM inputs of the Dengue and Zika RNA in human serum (7%). Again, no response to the Dengue RNA sequences was observed, demonstrating robust sequence specificity in our amplification and detection scheme (FIG. 6B).


As part of our efforts to advance the paper-based sensor platform toward field-ready diagnostics, we designed a second generation portable electronic reader to serve as an accessible, low-cost companion technology that provides robust and quantitative measurements of sensor outputs. The electronic reader was assembled using readily available consumer components, open-source code, and laser-cut acrylic housing, with a total cost of just under $250 (FIG. 7 and Table 3). The reader is powered by a lithium ion battery (18.5 hr.) that can be re-charged via micro USB and houses onboard data storage (4 GB) to resolve the need for an attached laptop during diagnostic reads (Pardee et al., 2014). To achieve sensitive detection of toehold switch signal output, an acrylic chip that holds the freeze-dried, paper-based reactions is placed into the reader between an LED light source (570 nm) and electronic sensors (FIG. 7B). Using onboard electronics, each sample is read 29 times per minute, providing low-noise measurements of changes in light transmission due to LacZ-mediated color change.


To demonstrate the utility of the companion reader, we monitored detection of 1 fM and 3 fM of Zika RNA amplicons that had been amplified in NASBA reactions for 2.5 hr. The reader detected significant signal from both samples, which are within the reported range of Zika virus in patient serum (1.2 fM) and urine (365 fM) (Gourinat et al., 2015; Lanciotti et al., 2008), after just over 20 min (FIG. 6C).


Our next challenge was to develop a technique to release RNA from the viral capsid using simple methodology compatible with low-resource environments. To this end, we tested the efficacy of boiling viral samples to break down the capsid. For initial development, we engineered lentivirus, which is also an RNA virus, to encapsulate the regions of either the Zika or Dengue genomes that correspond to the sensor 32B target sequence (FIG. 5B). These proxy Zika and Dengue viruses were spiked into human serum (7%) at a final concentration of 3 fM and heated to 95° C. for either 1 or 2 min. The resulting lysates were then immediately used to initiate NASBA reactions, in order to simulate what might be recovered from a patient sample. Boiling the viral samples for one minute was sufficient to release detectable amounts of RNA in our amplification and toehold switch detection scheme (FIG. 5C). NASBA reactions from 2 min boiled samples were also monitored for sensor activation on the portable electronic reader. We detected strong sensor activation in less than 30 minutes from 3 fM of lentivirus carrying Zika RNA. We were also able to demonstrate clear discrimination between lentiviruses containing Zika and Dengue RNA sequences (FIG. 6D).


NASBA-CRISPR Cleavage Assay to Discriminate Between Zika Strains:


During epidemic outbreaks, it is often valuable to monitor pathogen lineage and geographic spread. In some cases, genetic variants may be responsible for different clinical manifestations of infection. For example, the Zika strain found in Brazil has been uniquely connected with higher incidences of fetal microcephaly and Guillain-Barré syndrome (Calvet et al., 2016; Mlakar et al., 2016). To allow for strain-specific detection and tracking, we developed an assay that provides single-base discrimination in a manner that is compatible with our freeze-dried sensor platform. Our assay, which we term NASBA-CRISPR Cleavage (NASBACC), leverages the sequence-specific nuclease activity of CRISPR/Cas9 to discriminate between viral lineages (FIG. 8A). To do this, NASBACC exploits the ability of Cas9 to selectively cleave DNA only in the presence of an NGG protospacer adjacent motif (PAM). Since any non-biased mutation has a 48% probability of either creating a new PAM site or destroying an existing one (Table 4), there are many strain-specific PAM sites that can be used for lineage discrimination (FIGS. 8B-8C). In the NASBACC detection scheme, RNA sequences undergo NASBA amplification utilizing a reverse primer designed to append the trigger sequence of a synthetic toehold switch (sensor H, FIG. 8A) (Pardee et al., 2014). In the presence of the appropriate PAM sequence and guide RNA target site, the double-stranded DNA that is synthesized as part of the NASBA reaction undergoes Cas9-mediated cleavage, resulting in a truncated RNA product that is unable to activate the sensor H toehold switch. In the absence of the PAM sequence, the full-length RNA product containing the sensor H trigger sequence is generated, allowing for sensor H activation. Trigger RNA is only amplified from DNA that is not cut by Cas9, thereby allowing for strain-specific detection using toehold sensor H.


Using the paper-based system, sensor 32B was able to distinguish between Zika and Dengue RNA sequences. However, this sensor could not discriminate between the African (GenBank: KF268950) and American (GenBank: KU312312) Zika variants (FIG. 8D), a feature that may be useful in certain diagnostic applications. To address this, we applied our NASBACC detection scheme to discriminate between the African and American Zika strains. Due to a single-base difference in the trigger regions of these two strains, a PAM site only exists in the American-lineage sequence (FIG. 8C). Thus, only the American strain sequence was cleaved by Cas9, which led to amplification of truncated RNA that did not activate the sensor H toehold switch (FIG. 8E). Conversely, the African strain sequence does not contain the PAM site and was not cleaved by Cas9, which resulted in amplification of full-length RNA that activated the sensor H toehold switch. Incorporating NASBACC into our diagnostic workflow can provide precise genotypic information within a few hours. As with the other biomolecular elements of this workflow, Cas9 is compatible with lyophilization and could be used in the field (FIG. 9).


Diagnostic Workflow Validation with Active Zika Virus:


We next sought to validate our sensor platform with live Zika virus. First, we verified that our amplification and detection scheme could successfully detect full-length genomic RNA purified from Zika virus (Uganda strain MR 766) (FIG. 10A). We designed new NASBA primers to accommodate sequence differences between the Uganda Zika strain (GenBank: AY632535) and the American Zika strain (GenBank: KU312312) that our sensors and primers had originally been designed to detect. Computational analysis suggested that Uganda-lineage Zika RNA would activate sensor 32B despite two base mismatches in the toehold region, and this was confirmed experimentally (FIG. 10A). We also demonstrated sensor orthogonality to full length genomic Dengue RNA isolated from three different Dengue serotypes using these methods (FIG. 10A).


Once we confirmed that the sensors behaved as expected on full-length genomic RNA, we sought to validate the sample preparation scheme and diagnostic workflow from start to finish. Active Zika virus was cultured in the laboratory and spiked into human serum (7%) at a final concentration of 10 fM, to mimic a clinical sample. The viral sample was then heated to 95° C. for 2 min, and the resulting lysate was subjected to NASBA amplification for three hours. Sensor activation from the NASBA-amplified viral sample was monitored on the portable electronic reader. We successfully detected activation of sensor 32B from a diagnostic workflow initiated with live Zika virus (FIG. 10B).


For the final validation of our system, we acquired and tested plasma samples from a viremic macaque infected with Zika virus (GenBank: KJ776791) (Zika Experimental Science Team, 2016). The macaque was found to have a plasma viral load of 1.7×106 copies/ml (2.8 fM) by a standard qRT-PCR protocol, which was within the detection limits of our platform as tested on synthetic RNA amplicons (FIG. 6C). The viremic plasma was diluted 1:10 in water to reduce known inhibitory effects of plasma on downstream reactions and was then taken through our sample processing and diagnostic workflow. The sample was heated to 95° C. for 2 min and then amplified via NASBA for 3 hr. Paper-based reactions were monitored on the portable electronic reader and showed strong activation with both sensors 27B and 32B in less than 30 min (FIGS. 10C-10D).


In Silico Strategy for Toehold Switch Sensor and NASBA Primer Design.


An integrated in silico strategy was developed for generating optimal NASBA primers and toehold switches for detection of Zika. Mirroring the procedure used for running the paper-based diagnostic assay, a set of optimal primers was initially generated for the NASBA reaction and then a series of toehold switch designs screened for activity on the RNA transcripts produced by NASBA was developed.


Identification of Optimal NASBA Primers for Zika Amplification.


A set of potential primer pairs with favorable characteristics for NASBA reactions as described by Deiman et al. (Deiman et al., 2002) was generated. The Zika genome was analyzed to identify all potential forward and reverse priming sites that had the following characteristics:

    • GC content between 40-60%
    • Template hybridization regions of 20- to 24-nts and with DNA melting temperatures above 41° C.
    • No consecutive runs of four or more nucleotides
    • An A base at the final 3′ nucleotide
    • Minimal DNA primer internal secondary structure, including the T7 promoter region
    • Minimal DNA primer dimer formation probability
    • Higher GC content in the 6-nts at the 5′ end of the primer that hybridized to the template
    • Higher AT content in the 6-nts at the 3′ end of the primer


All subsequences from the Zika genome that did not satisfy requirements 1 to 4 were immediately eliminated from consideration. The remaining primers were then analyzed for characteristics 5-8 and the deviation from optimal 50% GC content, with each parameter converted into a numerical score. The forward NASBA primers, which append the T7 promoter site to NASBA DNA intermediate, were modeled with this T7 promoter site present. Accordingly, the prefix sequence AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAGG (SEQ ID NO: 5) (T7 promoter sequence underlined) was appended to the 5′ end of each forward primer. The resulting scores were combined and used to estimate the overall favorability of every potential primer in the Zika genome. Following this initial screen, the top 2% of all the potential primers were then compared to the rest of the Zika genome to determine the longest contiguous region of the primer that matched more than one site in the genome. This comparison provided a coarse check of primer specificity in advance of more detailed primer specificity screening conducted later in the design process. The length of this contiguous region for each primer was then incorporated into a final score for each primer.


The first stage of screening resulted in a set of forward and reverse primers to provide optimal characteristics for binding to the target genome; however, it did not consider other important effects on NASBA efficiency, namely the length and secondary structure of the amplicon produced by NASBA. To consider these amplicon-related effects, the binding sites for each primer on the genome were identified and, if more than one primer acted at the same site, the primer awarded the highest favorability score was selected. A set of potential forward and reverse primer pairs was constructed based on the recommended amplicon lengths for successful NASBA reactions. Although NASBA is known to work best with amplicons having lengths between approximately 120-nts to 250-nts (Deiman et al., 2002), this rapid screening approach initially employs synthetic DNA strands as templates for transcribing the target RNA. Since the length of these DNA oligos (IDT Ultramers) is currently limited to 200-nts including the T7 promoter site, primer pairs were instead examined for amplicons ranging from 120- to 176-nts in length. After applying all the above constraints on primer and amplicon sequences, a set of 4351 potential NASBA primer pairs remained. The RNA amplicons generated for each of these primers pairs were then assessed for their secondary structure. NASBA reactions are known to be more effective when applied to templates having low secondary structure. Consequently, the degree of amplicon single-strandedness was examined using the NUPACK ensemble defect function (Zadeh et al., 2011a, 2011b).


Next, each of the potential NASBA primers were then coarsely screened for sequence similarities with 11 viruses known to be closely related to Zika: Dengue virus 1, Dengue virus 2, Dengue virus 3, Dengue virus 4, West Nile virus, St. Louis encephalitis virus, yellow fever virus, Powassan virus, Semliki Forest virus, O'nyong'nyong virus, and Chikungunya virus. Sequence similarities were estimated by determining the maximum contiguous sequence in the primer that was found in any of the 11 related viruses. More stringent specificity screening was carried out in later stages as described below.


After all the above screening procedures, the final NASBA primer pairs were sorted by quality after taking into account the favorability scores of each primer, the secondary structure of the amplicon, and the potential for non-specific binding with other viruses.


Identification of Optimal Toehold Switches for NASBA Products.


Out of the 4351 NASBA amplicons, the top 1025 were selected as potential targets for toehold switches. The in silico design process for these toehold switches followed closely that previously used for designing mRNA sensors in vivo (Green et al., 2014) and on paper (Pardee et al., 2014). Briefly, toehold switch mRNA sensors were designed that hybridized to the NASBA amplicon at 1-nt increments. This sliding window encompassed the internal region of the NASBA product outside of the primer binding sites. This internal region was selected to avoid any potential for sensor activation or competitive binding by residual NASBA primers. The resulting toehold switches were analyzed for secondary structure and toehold availability, and screened to eliminate any sensors with unwanted in-frame stop codons in the output gene sequence. The target transcript itself was again assayed for single-strandedness and availability of the sensor binding sites. The above factors were incorporated into a sensor design score as described previously (Green et al., 2014). The highest scoring toehold switch sensor for each amplicon was then passed on to the final selection stage.


Final Design Selection Process.


After the above screening and design stages, the set of 1025 NASBA primer pairs was assembled with corresponding optimized toehold switch sensors. The top overall designs were selected by combining the favorability scores obtained from the NASBA and toehold switch evaluation steps. The primer and sensor sequences from these top designs were then tested for specificity against the human transcriptome and the same panel of closely related viral genomes listed above using NCBI/Primer-BLAST. Moreover, they were screened for specificity within the Zika genome itself. Ultimately, the top 24 designs that survived the Primer-BLAST specificity stage were selected for testing using our rapid in vitro screening approach.


Modifying the Toehold Switch Sensor Design for Decreased Signal Leakage.


Detailed studies of the toehold switch design parameters (Green et al., 2014) and thermodynamic considerations suggested two simple strategies for decreasing leakage from the toehold switches: reducing the size of the loop containing the ribosome binding site (RBS) in the sensor, and further stabilization of the sensor stem. Both these strategies were applied in the Zika-specific toehold switches.


The ON and OFF state signals from the toehold switches increase as the size of the loop in the switch RNA increases. This effect is likely due to two factors: increased accessibility of the RBS to the ribosome, which promotes translation in the presence or absence of the target RNA; and entropic effects that discourage stem formation as the loop becomes longer. Conversely, decreasing the size of the loop is associated with lower leakage, albeit with a decrease in ON state activity. Stabilizing the switch RNA stem by adding additional base pairs or by eliminating the downstream refolding domain (Green et al., 2014) increases the free energy required to unwind the sensor stem and thus encourages decreased signal leakage.


In accordance with above factors, two different types of toehold switches were tested aiming to lower leakage. The first type of sensor, referred to as the A series, are nearly identical to those previously used for mRNA sensing (Green et al., 2014; Pardee et al., 2014), except their loop domain has been reduced from 18-nts to 11-nts. These A sensors retained the downstream refolding domain to encourage sensor triggering and they all have the same sequence at the top of the sensor stem-loop (GUUAUAGUUAUGAACAGAGGAGACAUAACAUGAAC (SEQ ID NO: 6)) as illustrated in FIG. 3A.


The second type of sensor, referred to as the B series, possesses a stem that has been lengthened by one base pair overall and a loop region that is only 12-nts. Importantly, the B sensors also lack the downstream refolding domain to further stabilize the OFF state. The parental toehold switch for the B sensors exhibited extremely low leakage in preliminary measurements in paper-based reactions and provided a sizeable ON/OFF ratio of ˜600-fold regulating GFP expression in E. coli. These B sensors all featured the same conserved sequence (GGACUUUAGAACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUG (SEQ ID NO: 7)) at the top of their stem-loops as illustrated in FIG. 2B.


Considerations of Sequence Information in Design of the Biomolecular Diagnostics


Evolutionary drift. At the time we began our experiments, few complete genomes for the Zika virus had been reported. In fact, the first complete genome of the strain circulating in the Americas was only published on January 7 in The Lancet (Enfissi et al., 2016). However, previous comparisons of Zika strains do provide information on the degree of evolutionary drift for the virus. Haddow et al. found that a Zika strain isolated in Malaysia in 1966 differed by only 4.3% in nucleotide sequence from isolates obtained Micronesia and Cambodia in 2007 and 2010, respectively (Haddow et al., 2012). Authors also found ≤11.7% nucleotide sequence difference between African and Asian virus lineages, which they argued provided sufficient conserved sequence for genetic tests for both lineages. More recent studies have shown the rate of mutation of Zika is ˜10-3 nucleotide changes/site/year, which is relatively high among flaviviruses, but a manageable rate for our diagnostic assay (Faria et al., 2016).


Specificity of the NASBA/toehold switch isothermal assay. Since the experiments are performed at mostly 41° C. and 37° C., melting-temperature-dependent tuning of primer specificity is not possible in our assays. The benefit of this temperature limitation is that our NASBA and toehold switch detection schemes are able to tolerate mismatches and compensate for variability in the sequence of the target RNA molecules. The binding between the toehold switch 32B, our highest performing sensor, and RNAs from homologous regions in Zika strains isolated from Africa (Uganda, Nigeria, Senegal) and Asia (Malaysia, Cambodia, French Polynesia) were analyzed. All these strains are predicted to fully activate the toehold sensors even with up to 4-nt (11%) mismatches.


Compensating for evolutionary drift. The above analysis is borne out in data showing that sensor 32B can detect the target sequence from both the American and African strains of the virus (FIG. 8E). This flexibility in sequence detection is balanced with the three combined layers of specificity in our biomolecular approach. This includes the extensive in silico screening of NASBA primers and toehold switch sequences to limit cross-reactivity with off-target sequences and the single-base discrimination of NASBACC. The net result is a programmable platform that can be manufactured to produce diagnostics with both high sequence specificity and the capacity to manage sequence diversity as pathogens evolve. It is also worth mentioning that, in addition to increasing specificity, NASBACC can be used to remove non-specific sequences from samples as well as aid in the discovery mutations in the target regions.


Integration with signature erosion analysis tools. Software such as BioVelocity (Sozhamannan et al., 2015) and TOPSI (Vijaya Satya et al., 2010) are adept at determining conserved sequence regions across multiple genomes and eliminating those shared with other pathogens or humans. Using these valuable tools, a set of specific sites for NASBA priming and toehold switch binding can be generated and then subjected to the same screening by toehold secondary structure and NASBA primer characteristics described in this work.


Freeze-Dried NASBA.


For freeze-dried NASBA experiments, Enzyme Mix was lyophilized separately from the other components. The solution containing reaction buffer, nucleotide mix, RNase inhibitor, and primers was reconstituted in 15% DMSO, while the Enzyme Mix was reconstituted in nuclease-free water.


Freeze-Dried CRISPR/Cas9 Nuclease Assay.


Reactions were performed in a 30 j·tl volume of 1×Cas9 Nuclease Reaction Buffer (NEB #M03865) containing 30 nM of guide RNA (gRNA), 30 nM of Cas9 Nuclease (S. pyogenes, NEB #M03865), and 3 nM of substrate DNA (pAG_TS1_KS001 plasmid). Six gRNA sequences targeting the lacZ gene (Doench et al., 2014) inserted into plasmid pAG_TS1_KS001 were used for the CRISPR/Cas9 freeze-dried assay. All components except substrate DNA were first combined in a 27 μl reaction volume and incubated for 10 minutes at 25° C. to allow Cas9+gRNA to form duplexes. For fresh reactions, 3 μl of a 30 nM solution of substrate DNA was added to the solution. For freeze-dried reactions, the 27 μl solution was lyophilized overnight and reconstituted with 30 j·tl of a solution containing 3 nM of substrate DNA. After the addition of substrate DNA, the solution was incubated for 1 h at 37 C and run on a 1% agarose gel for fragment analysis.


Care and Use of Macaques at the Wisconsin National Primate Research Center.


All Indian-origin rhesus macaque monkeys from which plasma was isolated were cared for by the staff at the Wisconsin National Primate Research Center (WNPRC) in accordance with the regulations and guidelines outlined in the Animal Welfare Act and the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and the recommendations of the Weatherall report. This study was approved by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Animal Care and Use Protocol Number G005401). For all procedures (i.e., physical examination, virus inoculation, blood and swab collection), animals were anesthetized with an intramuscular dose of ketamine (10 ml/kg). Blood samples were obtained using a vacutainer system or needle and syringe from the femoral or saphenous vein.


Zika Virus Stock Production for Macaque Infection.


ZIKV strain H/PF/2013 (GenBank accession number: KJ776791), originally isolated from a 51-year-old female in France returning from French Polynesia with a single round of amplification on Vero cells, was obtained from Xavier de Lamballerie (European Virus Archive, Marseille France). Virus stocks were prepared by inoculation onto a confluent monolayer of C6/36 mosquito cells. A single harvest of virus with a titer of 1.26×106 PFU/ml for the Asian-lineage (equivalent to 1.43×109 vRNA copies/ml) was used.


Zika Virus Challenge of Macaques, Plasma Collection and Processing.


The virus stock was thawed, diluted in PBS to the appropriate concentration for each challenge, and loaded into a 1 ml syringe that was kept on ice until challenge. Animals were anesthetized as described above, and 1 ml of inocula was administered subcutaneously over the cranial dorsum. At the conclusion of the procedure, animals were closely monitored by veterinary and animal care staff for adverse reactions and signs of disease. Fresh plasma and PBMC were isolated from EDTA-treated whole blood by Ficoll density centrifugation at 1860 rcf for 30 min. The plasma layer was collected and centrifuged for an additional 8 min at 670 rcf to remove residual cells. The supernatant plasma was then filtered over a 0.45 μm syringe filter. Collected plasma was diluted 1:10 in nuclease free water. Diluted samples were heated to 95 C for two minutes and immediately added to a NASBA reaction as described above. NASBA was run for three hours.


Example 2

Cas9 Interferes with T7-Mediated RNA Production.


RNA can be produced in vitro from a DNA template containing the T7 promoter sequence (5′-TAATACGACTCACTATAGGG-3′ (SEQ ID NO: 768)). If the DNA template has viable CRISPR-Cas9 target sites, addition of Cas9+gRNA complex to the in vitro RNA production reaction leads to the production of truncated RNA product.


In FIG. 11, RNA was produced from a DNA template using NEB's HiScribe™ T7 Quick High Yield RNA Synthesis Kit. In lane 1, Cas9 without a gRNA was added to the reaction. In lanes 2 and 3, Cas9+gRNA that target the LacZ gene at positions 717 (gRNA: cttcagcctccagtacagcg (SEQ ID NO: 769)) and 360 (gRNA: gttcccacggagaatccgac (SEQ ID NO: 770)) was added to the reaction. Truncated RNA products were produced in lanes 2&3, and full-length RNA only in lane 1. Traces were generated using a BioAnalyzer (Agilent).


Cas9 can be Freeze-Dried and Remain Active.


It was next tested whether guide RNA targeting the LacZ sequence contained in the LacZ gene would remain active after being freeze-dried. In particular, a reaction containing Cas9+gRNA complex in Cas9 buffer (NEB #m0386) was freeze dried and re-hydrated with a solution containing 3 nM of template DNA. The template DNA is a supercoiled plasmid containing the LacZ gene.


In FIGS. 9A-9B, the sequence of 6 gRNA is listed and the gel image resulting nuclease reaction is shown. Nuclease activity was maintained for all gRNA target sequences, and some gRNA (#1, 2, 3, 4, 5) showed increase activity following the freeze-drying process).


Cas9 without Guide RNA does not Interfere with NASBA.


The presence of Cas9 nuclease alone does not interfere with NASBA reactions. The non-reactivity of NASBA reactions to Cas9 nucleases was demonstrated by adding Cas9 nuclease and Cas9 buffer to a NASBA reaction. Since the stability of thermal Cas9 has not been demonstrated above 37° C., the NASBA reaction was performed at 37° C.



FIG. 12 shows the RNA product from a NASBA reaction (left) and a NASBA reaction with added Cas9, Cas9 buffer, but with no guide RNA (right). Both RNA produces are of the same quality/length. Traces were generated using a BioAnalyzer (Agilent).


Cas9 with a gRNA Targeting a Site Lacking a PAM Site does not Interfere with NASBA.


A key aspect of this invention is that a single base mutation affecting a PAM site will present Cas9 from binding/cleaving template DNA. To demonstrate this, a guide RNA with the 20-bp spacer sequence neg4-noGG (neg4-noGG TTTCAAGAATGGAAAACATC (SEQ ID NO: 771)) was designed to be homologous a region of the American strain (GenBank: KU312312) of Zika RNA, but at a location that lacks a PAM site (ATG): neg4-noNGG, Loc=2621 of GenBank: KU312312, sequence:









(SEQ ID NO: 772)


gegggatctcctagTTTCAAGAATGGAAAACATCATGtggagatcagta





gaa.






For comparison, another guide RNA sequence with the spacer sequence pos4 (pos4: GATCTCCTCTGTTTCAAGAA (SEQ ID NO: 773)) was designed near a PAM site (TGG) to cut the template DNA and interfere with NASBA amplification: pos4, Loc=2610 of GenBank: KU312312, sequence:









(SEQ ID NO: 774)


agatggtatctgcggGATCTCCTCTGTTTCAAGAATGGaaaacatcatg





tgga.







FIG. 13 depicts the resulting RNA tract of the NASBA amplification reaction as quantified on a BioAnalyzer. The “pos4” gRNA cuts the intermediate template DNA and results in a shorter RNA product compared with the “neg4-noNGG” gRNA (66 bp vs. 148 bp).


Cas9 with a gRNA that Targets Reverse-Transcribed RNA Interferes with NASBA.


This is demonstrated in FIGS. 8A-8E.


Cas9 can Interfere with NASBA Amplification when Using Low Reverse Transcription (RT) Primers Concentration of 3 nM or Less.


The amount of template DNA that is generated during the reverse-transcription step of a NASBA reaction has to remain low. Using the conditions detailed above herein (250 nM final concentration of Cas9+gRNA), it was found that the amount of reverse transcription primer present in the NASBA has to be 3 nM or lower in order to efficiently cleave any intermediate template DNA generated during a NASBA reaction. A final concentration of 1 nM is preferable.



FIG. 14 depicts the RNA product generated from three reactions containing 1 nM, 3 nM, or 10 nM of NASBA primers. The guide RNA with the spacer sequence TGGAGTCCCGCTGCTAATGA (SEQ ID NO: 775) was designed to target the African strain (GenBank: KF268950) of the Zika virus. The expected size following a successful Cas9 cleavage is 50 base pairs (bp). The full-length, uncut RNA is 200 bp. 8gRNA, Loc=7208 of (GenBank: KF268950)









Sequence: 


(SEQ ID NO: 776)


ttatgcatgggacttTGGAGTCCCGCTGCTAATGATGGgttgctactca





caat






Table Showing the PAM Site Creation/Annihilation Following a Random Mutation (Table 4).


This table shows all the possible outcomes of a random mutation, where a PAM site can be created or annihilated.


Algorithm to Detect Diverging PAM Sites Between Two Strains.


List of PAM sites that differ between the American-African strains (572, FIGS. 8A-8E): see Table 5. Each gRNA sequence in Table 5 provides the 30-nt region immediately 5′ to the PAM sequence in the last column. To generate the full sgRNA sequence used, the 20 bases adjacent to the 3′ end of each gRNA sequence column are identified, and the following sequence is appended to the 3′ end of that 20-base sequence (an example is shown in paragraph 000145):









(SEQ ID NO: 789)


5′-GTTTTAGAGCTAGAAATAGCAAGTTAAAATAAGGCTAGTCCGTTATC





AACTTGAAAAAGTGGCACCGAGTCGGTGCTTTT-3′.





sgRNA sequence: Region 8 (8gRNA) + crRNA/tracrRNA


(SEQ ID NO: 1)



TGGAGTCCCGCTGCTAATGA
GTTTTAGAGCTAGAAATAGCAAGTTAAAAT







AAGGCTAGTCCGTTATCAACTTGAAAAAGTGGCACCGAGTCGGTGCTTTT.







The present invention has been presented by way of illustration and is not intended to be limited to the disclosed embodiments. Accordingly, those skilled in the art will realize that the invention is intended to encompass all modifications and alternative arrangements within the spirit and scope of the invention as set forth in the appended claims.









TABLE 2 





Sequences of NASBA Primers Used for Zika RNA Amplification



















Toehold Switch













Sensor

SEQ










A
B
NASBA Primers for Zika Virus from the Americas (KU312312)
ID












Series
series
Forward
SEQ ID NO:
Reverse
NO:





1A 
25B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
8
GCCCAGCTAAAGACTTGGGT
32




GCAGTGATCTAGGCTACTGGA

ATGA






2A 
26B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
9
CATCCAGTGATCCTCGTTCA
33




GGTGCCAGAGTTGTGTGTACA








3A 
27B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
10
CCTGTCCTCGGTTCACAATCAA
34




GGCACAGTGGGATGATCGTTA








4A 
28B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
11
AATCTCTGTGGACCTCTCCA
35




GCGGGATCTCCTCTGTTTCAA








5A 
29B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
12
GAGGCCAACAATTCCGACACTA
36




GCCATCACTGGGTCTCATCAA








6A 
30B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
13
CTGTCCTCGGTTCACAATCA
37




GAATGCTGTCAGTTCATGGCTCCCA








7A 
31B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
14
CCAGAACCTTGGATCGTTCA
38




GATGGTCTCTTCCTGGTTGTGGA








8A 
32B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
15
CCATCCACAACAGGGTTCTTCA
39




GGACCCTAATAGTGGCCATCA








9A 
33B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
16
CAGCCCTGGGATCAAGTACATG
40




GGTTTGGTATGGGCAAAGGGA

TA






10A
34B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
17
GCCCATACCAAACAACACTCCA
41




GGCCATCTATGCTGCCTTGACAA








11A
35B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
18
GCTTAGCCAGGTCACTCATTGA
42




GGTGATTCTGCTCATGGTGCA








12A
36B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
19
AAGTTGGCGCCCATCTCTGAAA
43




GGTTTGTTCCAAGCGTGAGGA








13A
37B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
20
GTTCTTTCCTGGGCCTTATCTC
44




GAGATCAACCACTGCAAGCGGAA

CA






14A
38B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
21
CCTTCTTGACTCCCTAGAACCA
45




GAGTGGTTCCACGACATTCCA








15A
39B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
22
ATCTCTCTGTCATGTGTCCTGG
46




GTGGACGCCAGAGTTTGTTCAGA

CA






16A
40B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
23
TCTGAACAAACTCTGGCGTCCA
47




GGCCGGAATAACCTACACAGA








17A
41B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
24
GCCCAGCTAAAGACTTGGGTAT
48




GGGCTACTGGATTGAGAGTGAGA

GA






18A
42B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
25
TGTTCTCTCCAACCATCCGA
49




GCAGCCAGAATTGCATGTGTCCTCA








19A
43B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
26
GCTCTGCAACCAGTTAGTCA
50




GGGAGCGGACAAGTTGTCACTTA








20A
44B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
27
ATCTTCCCAGGCTTGCTTGA
51




GGTGCTCGGTGGACTTCTCAAAGAA








21A
45B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
28
TGCCATTCGTTTGAGCCTATCC
52




GAGTGGTGCAACTCATTCGGA

CA






22A
46B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
29
GCAGTGGTTGATCTCAGAGA
53




GCAATACCAGAGAGGGCTACA








23A
47B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
30
CGCAGGTCAATGTCCATTGAGA
54




GAGTAGGTCTTCTGGGCTTGA








24A
48B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
31
CCACTCTTGTGTGTCCTTCCTA
55




GGCTCAAACGAATGGCAGTCA











Toehold Switch



Sensor
NASBA Primers for MR 766 Zika Virus (AY632535)










A Series
B series
Forward
Reverse





1A 
25B







2A 
26B







3A 
27B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG
CCTGTCCTCGGTTCACAATCAA




GGCACAGTGGGATGATCGTTA 
(SEQ ID NO: 58)




(SEQ ID NO: 56)






4A 
28B







5A 
29B







6A 
30B







7A 
31B







8A 
32B
AATTCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAGAAG 
CCATCCACAACGGGATTCTTCA




GACTCTGATAGTAGCTATCA 
(SEQ ID NO: 59)




(SEQ ID NO: 57)






9A 
33B







10A
34B







11A
35B







12A
36B







13A
37B







14A
38B







15A
39B







16A
40B







17A
41B







18A
42B







19A
43B







20A
44B







21A
45B







22A
46B







23A
47B







24A
48B
















TABLE 3







Exemplary Materials for Portable Electronic Reader


total $: 244.238















total




Vendor
quantity
price
price
item #
description















Adafruit
1
24.95
24.95
50
Arduino Uno R3 (Atmega328 - assembled)


Adafruit
1
19.95
19.95
2078
Adafruit PowerBoost 500 Shield - Rechargeable 5 V Power Shield


Adafruit
1
12.5
12.5
2011
Lithium Ion Battery - 3.7 v 2000 mAh


Adafruit
1
19.95
19.95
1141
Adafruit Assembled Data Logging shield for Arduino


Adafruit
1
7.95
7.95
102
SD/MicroSD Memory Card (4 GB SDHC)


Adafruit
16
6.26
100.16
1980
Adafruit TSL2591 High Dynamic Range Digital Light Sensor


Sparkfun
3
2.8
8.4
PRT-12702
SparkFun Solderable Breadboard - Mini


Digi-Key
2
0.49
0.98
A19473-ND
CONN HEADER VERT 9POS.100 TIN


Digi-Key
2
0.643
1.286
A19476-ND
CONN HEADER VERT 13POS.100 TIN


Digi-Key
2
1.21
2.42
A31001-ND
CONN RECEPT 9POS 28AWG MTA100


Digi-Key
2
1.93
3.86
A30954-ND
CONN RECEPT 13POS 28AWG MTA100


Digi-Key
20
0.2246
4.492
36-621-ND
BRACKET RT ANG MOUNT 4-40 STEEL, for reader assembly


McMaster-Carr
1
2.36
2.36
90760A005
Zinc Plated Steel Narrow Hex Nut 4-40 Thread Size, 3/16″ Wide,







1/16″ High, for reader assembly


McMaster-Carr
1
6.74
6.74
8505K11
Black Acrylic, for reader


McMaster-Carr
2
8.04
16.08
92095A453
M2 screws, for attaching sensors


McMaster-Carr
1
1.04
1.04
90592A004
M2 nuts, for attaching sensors


Inventables
1
4.84
4.84
23876-35
Clear acrylic, for bottom half of cassette


Inventables
1
6.28
6.28
24112-04
Black acrylic, for top half of cassette
















TABLE 4





Probabilities of PAM Site Disruption From Single Point Mutations







A. Summary of the effect of single point mutations










12 PAM sites


4 double PAM sites


32 PAM site created


12 double PAM site created


32 PAM site destroyed


12 double PAM site destroyed


4 PAM site inverted


Each mutation has a 23% probability (44/192) of creating a new PAM site, a 23% probability (44/192) of destroying


and existing PAM site, and a 2% probability (4/192) of inverting the orientation of an existing PAM site. Overall,


any given point mutations has a 48% probability (92/192) of disrupting an existing PAM site.










B. Detailed list of all single point mutations on every 3-bp sequences.











Center letter: A

Center letter: C



Last

Last
















First
A
C
G
T
First
A
C
G
T



























A
AAA
ACA
AAC
ACC
AAG
ACG
AAT
ACT
A
ACA
ACA
ACC
AAC
ACG
AAG
ACT
AAT




AGA

AGC

AGG

AGT


AGA

AGC

AGG

AGT




ATA

ATC

ATG

ATT


ATA

ATC

ATG

ATT


C
CAA
CCA
CAC
CCC
CAG
CCG
CAT
CCT
C
CCA
CAA
CCC
CAC
CCG
CAG
CCT
CAT




CGA

CGC

CGG

CGT


CGA

CGC

CGG

CGT




CTA

CTC

CTG

CTT


CTA

CTC

CTG

CTT


G
GAA
GCA
GAC
GCC
GAG
GCG
GAT
GCT
G
GCA
GAA
GCC
GAC
GCG
GAG
GCT
GAT




GGA

GGC

GGG

GGT


GGA

GGC

GGG

GGT




GTA

GTC

GTG

GTT


GTA

GTC

GTG

GTT


T
TAA
TCA
TAC
TCC
TAG
TCG
TAT
TCT
T
TCA
TAA
TCC
TAC
TCG
TAG
TCT
TAT




TGA

TGC

TGG

TGT


TGA

TGC

TGG

TGT




TTA

TTC

TTG

TTT


TTA

TTC

TTG

TTT














Center letter: G

Center letter: T



Last

Last
















First
A
C
G
T
First
A
C
G
T



























A
AGA
AAA
AGC
AAC
AGG
AAG
AGT
AAT
A
ATA
AAA
ATC
AAC
ATG
AAG
ATT
AAT




ACA

ACC

ACG

ACT


ACA

ACC

ACG

ACT




ATA

ATC

ATG

ATT


AGA

AGC

AGG

AGT


C
CGA
CAA
CGC
CAC
CGG
CAG
CGT
CAT
C
CTA
CAA
CTC
CAC
CTG
CAG
CTT
CAT




CCA

CCC

CCG

CCT


CCA

CCC

CCG

CCT




CTA

CTC

CTG

CTT


CGA

CGC

CGG

CGT


G
GGA
GAA
GGC
GAC
GGG
GAG
GGT
GAT
G
GTA
GAA
GTC
GAC
GTG
GAG
GTT
GAT




GCA

GCC

GCG

GCT


GCA

GCC

GCG

GCT




GTA

GTC

GTG

GTT


GGA

GGC

GGG

GGT


T
TGA
TAA
TGC
TAC
TGG
TAG
TGT
TAT
T
TTA
TAA
TTC
TAC
TTG
TAG
TTT
TAT




TCA

TCC

TCG

TCT


TCA

TCC

TCG

TCT




TTA

TTC

TTG

TTT


TGA

TGC

TGG

TGT
















TABLE 5 







Suitable sites in the African, Asian, and American Zika virus


genomes for CRISPR complex cleavage.


American-African NASBACC genotyping












Target



SEQ ID
PAM-


Strain
Position
strand
gRNA-sequence
NO:
site















African
302
−1
TTTTTCCCCACAGAACCCCATCTGTTGATG
60
AGG





African
406
1
ATGTTGAGAATAATCAATGCTAGGAAGGAG
61
AGG





African
433
−1
TAGTCAGCAGGAGACCAATGATTCCGATGC
62
TGG





African
469
−1
CACTTCCACGTCTGGTAATCTCCGCTGCCA
63
TGG





African
487
−1
CCAAGTACATGTAGTATGCACTTCCACGTC
64
TGG





African
517
1
CGTGGAAGTGCATACTACATGTACTTGGAC
65
AGG





African
547
−1
GGCATTTGTTAACTCCCAAGTTGGTAGCAA
66
AGG





African
578
−1
CACATGTGCCCGAGATCCATGATCTGTACA
67
TGG





African
595
1
AACAAATGCCATGTACAGATCATGGATCTC
68
GGG





African
839
−1
TTCCTAAATATCCAGTTTTCAACCTTGATC
69
AGG





African
842
1
AATCAAGAGAATACACGAAGCACCTGATCA
70
AGG





African
871
1
AAGGTTGAAAACTGGATATTTAGGAACCCC
71
GGG





African
874
−1
AGGCAATGGCAACAGCTGCGAGCGCAAACC
72
CGG





African
904
−1
CTTTTTGGCTCGTCGAGCTTCCCAAAAGCC
73
AGG





African
1036
−1
AACCTCCATGTTCCAAGACGACATCAACCC
74
AGG





African
1075
−1
TGTCAACTGTTGGCTTGTCCTGTGCCATAA
75
CGG





African
1121
1
CAACAGTTGACATAGAGTTGGTCACGACAA
76
CGG





African
1141
−1
TTGATGCCTCATAACAGTAGGATCTTACCT
77
CGG





African
1243
−1
TGTCCACCAATGTTCTTTTGCACACATATT
78
GGG





African
1244
−1
CTGTCCACCAATGTTCTTTTGCACACATAT
79
TGG





African
1262
1
CAGACACCCAATATGTGTGCAAAAGAACAT
80
TGG





African
1285
1
AGAACATTGGTGGACAGAGGTTGGGGAAAT
81
GGG





African
1330
−1
TCCCAGTCATCTTCTTGGAACACGTGAACT
82
TGG





African
1478
1
ATGAAACTGACGAAAACAGAGCGAAAGTCG
83
AGG





African
1562
1
TAGGACTTGATTGTGAACCAAGGACAGGCC
84
TGG





African
1594
−1
CTTTGTGCACCAACCAGTGCTTGTTGTTCA
85
TGG





African
1643
−1
CCGGTATCTGCCCCAGCATGCCAAGGCAAT
86
GGG





African
1691
1
CAGATACCGGAACTCCACACTGGAACAACA
87
AGG





African
1694
1
ATACCGGAACTCCACACTGGAACAACAAGG
88
AGG





African
1723
−1
CTAGAACAACGACGGTTTGCCTCTTGGCGT
89
GGG





African
1724
−1
CCTAGAACAACGACGGTTTGCCTCTTGGCG
90
TGG





African
1741
−1
CGGCTCCTTCCTGGCTCCCTAGAACAACGA
91
CGG





African
1757
1
AGAGGCAAACCGTCGTTGTTCTAGGGAGCC
92
AGG





African
1760
−1
CCAGCAAGAGCCGTGTGAACGGCTCCTTCC
93
TGG





African
1771
−1
CCTCCAGAGCTCCAGCAAGAGCCGTGTGAA
94
CGG





African
1837
−1
TGTCCATTTTTAAGCGGCATTTCAAATGGC
95
CGG





African
1853
−1
CCCTTCAATCTAAGCTTGTCCATTTTTAAG
96
CGG





African
1906
−1
CAGCTGGGACCTTGGTAAATGTGAACGCTG
97
CGG





African
1922
1
CCTTGTGCACCGCAGCGTTCACATTTACCA
98
AGG





African
1993
−1
TGTCCACCGCCATCTGGGCTGGGACCTTGC
99
AGG





African
2003
−1
AGGGTCTGCATGTCCACCGCCATCTGGGCT
100
GGG





African
2008
−1
GGGTCAGGGTCTGCATGTCCACCGCCATCT
101
GGG





African
2032
−1
TGGCGGTTATCAGCCTCCCGACTGGGGTCA
102
GGG





African
2033
−1
TTGGCGGTTATCAGCCTCCCGACTGGGGTC
103
AGG





African
2062
−1
AATTCTCAGTGCTTTCAGTAATCACAGGGT
104
TGG





African
2117
−1
CCTATGACAATGTAAGAATCCCCAAATGGT
105
GGG





African
2210
1
GGAGTGGTAGCACCATCGGAAAAGCATTTG
106
AGG





African
2248
1
GTGAGAGGTGCCAAGAGAATGGCAGTTCTG
107
GGG





African
2249
1
TGAGAGGTGCCAAGAGAATGGCAGTTCTGG
108
GGG





African
2278
1
GGGGATACAGCCTGGGACTTCGGATCAGTC
109
GGG





African
2279
1
GGGATACAGCCTGGGACTTCGGATCAGTCG
110
GGG





African
2318
−1
AACAGTGATTTGAAAGCTGCTCCAAAAATC
111
TGG





African
2378
−1
AAACCCAACCACACCAGCAGCGTGCCTATG
112
AGG





African
2390
1
GGTTCTCACAGATCCTCATAGGCACGCTGC
113
TGG





African
2428
−1
CTCCCCCCAGGGCCAAGCATGTGAGGGAGA
114
TGG





African
2447
1
ATGGATCCATCTCCCTCACATGCTTGGCCC
115
TGG





African
2471
−1
CACCCCACGTCAGCAGAGACAGCCGTGGAG
116
AGG





African
2474
1
CCCTGGGGGGAGTGATGATCTTCCTCTCCA
117
CGG





African
2537
1
ACTTCTCAAAAAGAGAAACGAGATGTGGCA
118
CGG





African
2630
1
CCCCCCGCAGATTGGCAGCAGCAGTCAAGC
119
AGG





African
2642
1
TGGCAGCAGCAGTCAAGCAGGCTTGGGAAG
120
AGG





African
2644
1
GCAGCAGCAGTCAAGCAGGCTTGGGAAGAG
121
GGG





African
2668
−1
ATTTCCACATGATGTTTTCCATTCTTGAAA
122
CGG





African
2699
1
CAAGAATGGAAAACATCATGTGGAAATCAG
123
TGG





African
2792
−1
AGCTCATTCACAGGCACTGGCAATCTTTGT
124
GGG





African
2864
1
AAGCCTGGGGGAAATCATATTTTGTCAGAG
125
CGG





African
2878
−1
GTGTGTCACCATCGACAACAAAACTGTTGT
126
TGG





African
2981
−1
TCTTCTCTAACCTTGAGCCAAACACTGGTG
127
TGG





African
2986
−1
AGTAGTCTTCTCTAACCTTGAGCCAAACAC
128
TGG





African
3032
−1
TTTCCCTTAACAGCTGTTCCTATGACGGCT
129
GGG





African
3070
−1
TTTCAATCCAGTAGCCCAGGTCACTGTGGG
130
CGG





African
3073
−1
CACTTTCAATCCAGTAGCCCAGGTCACTGT
131
GGG





African
3074
−1
TCACTTTCAATCCAGTAGCCCAGGTCACTG
132
TGG





African
3080
1
TTAAGGGAAAGGAGGCCGCCCACAGTGACC
133
TGG





African
3083
−1
TCATTCTTTTCACTTTCAATCCAGTAGCCC
134
AGG





African
3251
−1
GCTTGAGTTCTGTAACCCTCTCTAGTGTTG
135
TGG





African
3317
−1
TGAACCTTGGTGCCTGGACATTCCTCAAAC
136
CGG





African
3340
−1
TAGTTCCGCATGTCTCCTCCACGTGAACCT
137
TGG





African
3542
1
AGAGCAACTTAGTGAGGTCAATGGTGACAG
138
CGG





African
3556
−1
GCACTCCAAGAGAGAAGTGGTCCATGTGAT
139
CGG





African
3668
1
TCATTATGAGCACATCAATGGCAGTGCTGG
140
TGG





African
3676
−1
AGTCACTCATTAAAAATCCTCCCAGGATCA
141
TGG





African
3764
1
CCTTCGCAGAAATGAACACTGGAGGAGATG
142
TGG





African
3779
1
ACACTGGAGGAGATGTGGCTCACTTGGCAT
143
TGG





African
3811
−1
AATTAGCTCTGAAAATAAAGGAGACCAGCA
144
AGG





African
3823
−1
CACGAGGTGTCCAATTAGCTCTGAAAATAA
145
AGG





African
3872
−1
GAGATTGCAGTTTGCAAAAGACACGAAGCC
146
AGG





African
3929
−1
GCCAACCAGGCCAAAGCAAATCCATTGACG
147
AGG





African
3976
−1
TTGCCAGAGCAATGTTGTCAGTGCGTGGCA
148
CGG





African
4058
1
CCCGAGGTACACTGCTCGTGGCATGGAGAG
149
CGG





African
4099
−1
GGTTCTTCTTCACACTACCTTTCCCTTTCA
150
GGG





African
4102
1
TGTGGAGGGTTTATGCTCCTCTCCCTGAAA
151
GGG





African
4130
−1
GCAGTCAATCCCAAGGCCATGACAAATGGC
152
AGG





African
4409
1
TTGAAAGAGCAGGTGACATCACATGGGAAA
153
AGG





African
4639
−1
TGGTCTCTCCTTTTTTCACTTCTTTGGGAG
154
CGG





African
4672
1
AAAGAAGTGAAAAAAGGAGAGACCACAGAT
155
GGG





African
4673
1
AAGAAGTGAAAAAAGGAGAGACCACAGATG
156
GGG





African
4696
−1
CTCCAACCTGTGTTGAACCCAGCAGTCTGC
157
GGG





African
4697
−1
ACTCCAACCTGTGTTGAACCCAGCAGTCTG
158
CGG





African
4703
1
GGGTATACAGAGTGATGACCCGCAGACTGC
159
TGG





African
4715
1
TGATGACCCGCAGACTGCTGGGTTCAACAC
160
AGG





African
4754
−1
GCAGCTCCTTTTGTGACGTGCCACATGGTG
161
TGG





African
4786
1
ATGTGGCACGTCACAAAAGGAGCTGCACTG
162
AGG





African
4819
1
AGCGGTGAAGGGAGACTTGATCCATACTGG
163
GGG





African
4820
1
GCGGTGAAGGGAGACTTGATCCATACTGGG
164
GGG





African
4852
1
GATGTCAAGCAGGACTTAGTGTCATACTGT
165
GGG





African
4865
1
ACTTAGTGTCATACTGTGGGCCTTGGAAGT
166
TGG





African
4924
1
GTGCAGCTCTTGGCAGTACCCCCCGGAGAG
167
AGG





African
4925
1
TGCAGCTCTTGGCAGTACCCCCCGGAGAGA
168
GGG





African
4933
−1
TGAATATTCCAGGCAGAGTCTGAATGTTTC
169
TGG





African
5008
−1
TGTCTAGGATCGGGGATCCTGAAGTTCCTG
170
CGG





African
5026
−1
CTATCACTCTTCCGCATTTGTCTAGGATCG
171
GGG





African
5027
−1
CCTATCACTCTTCCGCATTTGTCTAGGATC
172
GGG





African
5111
1
AGAATGGAAGCTATGTTAGTGCCATAACCC
173
AGG





African
5126
1
TTAGTGCCATAACCCAGGGAAAGAGGGAGG
174
AGG





African
5135
1
TAACCCAGGGAAAGAGGGAGGAGGAGACTC
175
CGG





African
5158
−1
GGACAGTTAGCTGCTTCTTCTTCAGCATCG
176
AGG





African
5186
1
CGATGCTGAAGAAGAAGCAGCTAACTGTCC
177
TGG





African
5189
−1
CTAGTCTTTCCGGCTCCTGGATGCAGATCC
178
AGG





African
5209
−1
CTATTTCAGGAAGAACTCTCCTAGTCTTTC
179
CGG





African
5276
1
CCATAAAAAAGAGACTCCGCACAGTGATTT
180
TGG





African
5330
1
CTGAGATGGAGGAAGCCTTGAGAGGACTTC
181
CGG





African
5371
1
ATGACAACAGCAGTTAACGTCACCCACTCT
182
GGG





African
5416
−1
TAGGGACTCTGATGGGTTGTAATAGGCGTG
183
AGG





African
5423
−1
TTGTAATTAGGGACTCTGATGGGTTGTAAT
184
AGG





African
5434
−1
TGATGTAGAGATTGTAATTAGGGACTCTGA
185
TGG





African
5489
−1
GATATGTATCCTCTTGCAGCTATACTTGAG
186
GGG





African
5678
−1
CTTGGAACGAACCAAACTGTTTTCCCAGAA
187
TGG





African
5680
1
TCAGGCTTTGATTGGGTGACAGACCATTCT
188
GGG





African
5737
−1
GTATGACCCGCTTTCCAGCCTTTGTCAGAC
189
AGG





African
5773
1
AAGGCTGGAAAGCGGGTCATACAACTCAGC
190
AGG





African
5875
1
TCAGAGATGGGCGCGAATTTCAAAGCTGAC
191
CGG





African
5876
1
CAGAGATGGGCGCGAATTTCAAAGCTGACC
192
GGG





African
5941
1
ATACTTGATGGTGAGAGAGTCATCTTGGCT
193
GGG





African
6005
−1
CCATACATGTACTCATCTCCAGGTTTGTTA
194
GGG





African
6055
−1
TTGCTTCAAGCCAGTGTGCATGGTCTTCAT
195
CGG





African
6136
1
CTCCAGGATGGCCTCATAGCCTCGCTCTAC
196
CGG





African
6140
−1
TCAATGGCAGCTACCTTATCGGCCTCAGGC
197
CGG





African
6152
1
TAGCCTCGCTCTACCGGCCTGAGGCCGATA
198
AGG





African
6236
−1
GATGCAACCTGATAGGCTAGCCAAACGGGA
199
AGG





African
6403
1
AGAGTGCTCAAACCAAGATGGATGGATGCG
200
AGG





African
6404
1
GAGTGCTCAAACCAAGATGGATGGATGCGA
201
GGG





African
6418
−1
ATTCTTTGAACGACTTCAGGGCAGCATGAT
202
CGG





African
6457
−1
CCATTACTCCTAAAGCCACTCCTCTTTTCC
203
CGG





African
6485
1
GGAAAAGAGGAGTGGCTTTAGGAGTAATGG
204
AGG





African
6520
1
CTGGGAACATTGCCAGGACACATGACAGAG
205
AGG





African
6587
1
TGCGAGCAGAGACTGGAAGCAGGCCTTACA
206
AGG





African
6661
1
CTCTTAGGCTTGTTGGGAACAGTTTCGTTG
207
GGG





African
6829
−1
TGTCCTGGGGAGATCTTTGCTTCTCTGGCT
208
CGG





African
6881
1
AGGACAACCAGATGGCAATCATCATCATGG
209
TGG





African
6887
1
ACCAGATGGCAATCATCATCATGGTGGCAG
210
TGG





African
6989
1
TAATGGGAAGGAGAGAAGAAGGAGTAACTA
211
TGG





African
7033
−1
TGAGAGTTGTCAGTGCGGCATAGATAGCCC
212
AGG





African
7048
−1
GGACGGCTGGGGTGATGAGAGTTGTCAGTG
213
CGG





African
7082
1
CAACTCTCATCACCCCAGCCGTCCAACACG
214
CGG





African
7206
1
AT-GGGACTTTGGAGTCCCGCTGCTAATGA
215
TGG





African
7358
−1
CAATGTCAGTTACCACTATTCCATCCACAA
216
CGG





African
7526
−1
ATTTGTTTGGAGAACCTTCCCACAAGGTGG
217
AGG





African
7580
−1
GGTAACTTCCTCTGAAGATGTTGCACAGTG
218
AGG





African
7611
−1
GTCACTGTATAAATAAGAGAAGCGCCTGCC
219
AGG





African
7656
−1
TCTCCCGTTCCACCTCCACGTCTCTTGACT
220
AGG





African
7677
1
CTGGCCTAGTCAAGAGACGTGGAGGTGGAA
221
CGG





African
7716
−1
GAGTAGAACTCCAGGGCCGACATCTGATTC
222
AGG





African
7779
1
AAAAGTCAGGCATCACTGAAGTGTGTAGAG
223
AGG





African
7817
−1
CGCTTCCCCGGGATACAGCATGTCCTCCTG
224
TGG





African
7835
1
GGAGTGGCCACAGGAGGACATGCTGTATCC
225
CGG





African
7836
1
GAGTGGCCACAGGAGGACATGCTGTATCCC
226
GGG





African
7890
−1
CTGCCACATCCGAGGTCAACAACCTTTCCA
227
TGG





African
7908
−1
TAATAGCTCCAACCCCCTCTGCCACATCCG
228
AGG





African
7959
1
GCTATTATGCCGCCACCATCCGGAAAGTGC
229
AGG





African
7962
1
ATTATGCCGCCACCATCCGGAAAGTGCAGG
230
AGG





African
7980
1
GGAAAGTGCAGGAGGTGAAAGGATACACAA
231
AGG





African
7994
−1
AGCTTTGCACCAGCATGGGTTCTTCATGAC
232
CGG





African
8081
−1
CTATGTCACACAGCAAGGTATCACACGGCT
233
CGG





African
8096
−1
TAGATGATGACTCACCTATGTCACACAGCA
234
AGG





African
8157
−1
TCAAGCCAGTCCCCCACCATAGAGAGCACT
235
CGG





African
8193
1
CTATGGTGGGGGACTGGCTTGAGAAAAGAC
236
CGG





African
8195
1
ATGGTGGGGGACTGGCTTGAGAAAAGACCG
237
GGG





African
8196
1
TGGTGGGGGACTGGCTTGAGAAAAGACCGG
238
GGG





African
8211
1
TTGAGAAAAGACCGGGGGCCTTCTGTATAA
239
AGG





African
8262
−1
CTGACTAATCCTCCCCCATACCTACGTTGC
240
AGG





African
8315
−1
TTGCTCCAGAGACCCAATACATCTCATGTG
241
TGG





African
8391
−1
ACTGGCCTCCTGGGACCATCCATGCGTCCC
242
AGG





African
8445
−1
CAGCTTGCCACAGCTCGTGTGCCCGAGCCG
243
AGG





African
8448
1
TGAAATATGAGGAAGATGTGAACCTCGGCT
244
CGG





African
8493
1
TGGCAAGCTGTGCTGAAGCTCCCAACATGA
245
AGG





African
8585
−1
CTTGTGTGGGGGCTTCGTAGCTCCCATGGT
246
AGG





African
8588
1
AACCATCCATACAGGACATGGGCCTACCAT
247
GGG





African
8630
−1
TTGACAGGAGTCTAACAACCCCATTCACGA
248
GGG





African
8631
−1
TTTGACAGGAGTCTAACAACCCCATTCACG
249
AGG





African
8724
−1
GTGTCCACTTTTTCTTTGAAGACTCTTTGT
250
TGG





African
8756
−1
GGCGAGTGCCTTCTTGGGGATCTGGCACCC
251
TGG





African
8787
−1
CACAGCCAGGAAGAGACCATGTTCATTGCC
252
TGG





African
8817
1
CAATGAACATGGTCTCTTCCTGGCTGTGGA
253
AGG





African
8823
1
ACATGGTCTCTTCCTGGCTGTGGAAGGAGT
254
TGG





African
8825
1
ATGGTCTCTTCCTGGCTGTGGAAGGAGTTG
255
GGG





African
8895
1
TCATCAACAAGGTGCGCAGCAATGCAGCAC
256
TGG





African
8931
1
CAATATTTGAAGAGGAAAAAGAATGGAAGA
257
CGG





African
8939
−1
CCCAAAACCTTGGATCATTCACAGCCTCCA
258
CGG





African
8940
1
AAGAGGAAAAAGAATGGAAGACGGCCGTGG
259
AGG





African
9105
1
AAGGCAGCCGCGCCATCTGGTACATGTGGT
260
TGG





African
9116
−1
AGAATCCAAGGGCTTCAAACTCCAAGAATC
261
TGG





African
9120
1
TCTGGTACATGTGGTTGGGAGCCAGATTCT
262
TGG





African
9159
−1
CCACCTCCTGAGTTTTCTCTTCCCATCCAA
263
TGG





African
9239
1
AGACTTGGATACATTCTAGAAGAAATGAAT
264
CGG





African
9240
1
GACTTGGATACATTCTAGAAGAAATGAATC
265
GGG





African
9278
−1
CAAACTTACTAATGCGGGTGTCCCAGCCAG
266
CGG





African
9326
−1
TGTGCCCTTCCTCCATTTGGTTGGTAATTA
267
AGG





African
9342
1
AGAATGAAGCCTTAATTACCAACCAAATGG
268
AGG





African
9424
1
CAAAGTGGTGAAGGTCCTCAGACCAGCTGA
269
AGG





African
9459
1
GGAAAACAGTTATGGACATCATTTCAAGAC
270
AGG





African
9494
−1
CCACTAAGTTGGTAAATGTGTTGAGAGCAT
271
AGG





African
9537
−1
ATCTCTAACACTTCCTCAGCCTCCATATTC
272
CGG





African
9595
−1
ATTGCACTGCAACCATCTGGTCACTTTCTC
273
TGG





African
9747
1
ATGACATGGGAAAAGTTAGGAAAGACACAC
274
AGG





African
9795
−1
TGCAGCTTGTTGAAATGGTGGGAGCAGAAC
275
GGG





African
9855
−1
CGGCCAATCAATTCATCTTGGTGGCGGCAA
276
GGG





African
9932
−1
GCCACATCTGTGCATATGATTTTGCTAGAC
277
AGG





African
10014
1
ACCTTCGACTGATGGCCAATGCTATTTGTT
278
CGG





African
10046
−1
CCTTTCCGTGGATTGACCAGGTGGTTCTCC
279
CGG





African
10092
1
TCCACGGAAAGGGAGAATGGATGACTACTG
280
AGG





African
10146
1
GAGTGTGGATTGAGGAGAACGACCATATGG
281
AGG





African
10185
−1
CACCATAAGTCCTCCCTTTTTCCCAGATAG
282
GGG





African
10200
1
GGACAGACATCCCCTATCTGGGAAAAAGGG
283
AGG





African
10223
−1
CCCAAGTGGTGCGGGGCCTGTGCCCTATAA
284
GGG





African
10224
−1
GCCCAAGTGGTGCGGGGCCTGTGCCCTATA
285
AGG





African
10232
1
GACTTATGGTGTGGATCCCTTATAGGGCAC
286
AGG





African
10241
−1
TGTCTTTGATGTTCTCAGCCCAAGTGGTGC
287
GGG





African
10242
−1
GTGTCTTTGATGTTCTCAGCCCAAGTGGTG
288
CGG





African
10332
1
AAGAAAAATACATGGACTACTTATCCACCC
289
AGG





African
10341
−1
CCAGGTGTGGACCCTTCCTCACCCAAGTAG
290
CGG





African
10350
1
ACTTATCCACCCAGGTCCGCTACTTGGGTG
291
AGG





American
188
1
AACGCGGAGTAGCCCGTGTGAGCCCCTTTG
292
GGG





American
229
1
AGGCTGCCAGCCGGACTTCTGCTGGGTCAT
293
GGG





American
275
1
TCTTGGCGATTCTAGCCTTTTTGAGATTCA
294
CGG





American
368
1
TGGAAATAATAAAGAAGTTCAAGAAAGATC
295
TGG





American
452
−1
ACCTCCGCTGCCATAGCTGTGGTCAGCAGG
296
AGG





American
463
−1
CACGTCTAGTGACCTCCGCTGCCATAGCTG
297
TGG





American
476
1
GCCTCCTGCTGACCACAGCTATGGCAGCGG
298
AGG





American
490
1
ACAGCTATGGCAGCGGAGGTCACTAGACGT
299
GGG





American
530
1
ACTATATGTACTTGGACAGAAACGATGCTG
300
GGG





American
552
−1
TATATAACACTTATTCATCCCCAATGTGGT
301
TGG





American
559
1
GGGGAGGCCATATCTTTTCCAACCACATTG
302
GGG





American
646
1
ATGAGCTATGAATGCCCTATGCTGGATGAG
303
GGG





American
647
1
TGAGCTATGAATGCCCTATGCTGGATGAGG
304
GGG





American
719
−1
CTAGATCTCCGTGCTTCACCTTTTTTGTGA
305
TGG





American
769
−1
ACCGCGTTTGCAGCTTCCTAGTGGAATGGG
306
AGG





American
772
−1
GCGACCGCGTTTGCAGCTTCCTAGTGGAAT
307
GGG





American
773
−1
TGCGACCGCGTTTGCAGCTTCCTAGTGGAA
308
TGG





American
809
1
GGAAGCTGCAAACGCGGTCGCAAACCTGGT
309
TGG





American
1000
1
TACAGCATCAGGTGCATAGGAGTCAGCAAT
310
AGG





American
1001
1
ACAGCATCAGGTGCATAGGAGTCAGCAATA
311
GGG





American
1136
1
AGCTGGTTACAACAACAGTCAGCAACATGG
312
CGG





American
1196
−1
TCAAGGTAGGCTTCACCTTGTGTTGGGCAG
313
CGG





American
1357
−1
ACTCCAGATTCTCTGGCTGGATGCTCTTCC
314
CGG





American
1387
1
AAGAGCATCCAGCCAGAGAATCTGGAGTAC
315
CGG





American
1391
−1
TGCTGGGAGCCATGAACTGACAGCATTATC
316
CGG





American
1507
−1
CTAGGCTTCCAAACCCCCCCAGGGTGGCTT
317
CGG





American
1513
−1
CAAGTCCTAGGCTTCCAAACCCCCCCAGGG
318
TGG





American
1517
−1
CAATCAAGTCCTAGGCTTCCAAACCCCCCC
319
AGG





American
1519
1
AATTCACCAAGAGCCGAAGCCACCCTGGGG
320
GGG





American
1535
−1
AGGCCTGTCCTCGGTTCACAATCAAGTCCT
321
AGG





American
1619
1
CTATGAATAACAAGCACTGGCTGGTTCACA
322
AGG





American
1634
−1
GCCCCAGCGTGCCAAGGTAATGGAATGTCG
323
TGG





American
1712
1
GGAACAACAAAGAAGCACTGGTAGAGTTCA
324
AGG





American
1742
1
AGGACGCACATGCCAAAAGGCAAACTGTCG
325
TGG





American
1783
−1
CATCCATCTCAGCCTCCAGAGCTCCAGCAA
326
GGG





American
1784
−1
CCATCCATCTCAGCCTCCAGAGCTCCAGCA
327
AGG





American
1817
1
GAGCTCTGGAGGCTGAGATGGATGGTGCAA
328
AGG





American
1834
−1
CCATTTTCAGGCGACATTTCAAGTGGCCAG
329
AGG





American
1856
−1
ACGCCCTTCAATCTAAGTTTATCCATTTTC
330
AGG





American
1928
1
GTACTGCAGCGTTCACATTCACCAAGATCC
331
CGG





American
1945
1
TTCACCAAGATCCCGGCTGAAACACTGCAC
332
GGG





American
2068
−1
TCTTAGAGTTCTCAGTGCTTTCAGTGATTA
333
CGG





American
2174
−1
TTTCCAATGGTGCTGCCACTCCTGTGCCAG
334
TGG





American
2315
−1
AATGATTTGAAAGCTGCTCCAAAGATTTGA
335
TGG





American
2482
−1
AGTCCACCGAGCACCCCACATCAGCAGAGA
336
CGG





American
2519
1
ATGTGGGGTGCTCGGTGGACTTCTCAAAGA
337
AGG





American
2638
−1
CAGAGGAGATCCCGCAGATACCATCTTCCC
338
AGG





American
2723
1
GATCAGTAGAAGGGGAGCTCAACGCAATCC
339
TGG





American
2747
1
CAATCCTGGAAGAGAATGGAGTTCAACTGA
340
CGG





American
2756
1
AAGAGAATGGAGTTCAACTGACGGTCGTTG
341
TGG





American
2806
−1
TCCAGCCGTGGGGCAGCTCGTTCACAGGCA
342
CGG





American
2834
1
TGCCTGTGAACGAGCTGCCCCACGGCTGGA
343
AGG





American
2891
1
GAGCAGCAAAGACAAATAACAGCTTTGTCG
344
TGG





American
2921
−1
AGAAAGCTGTTCCATGCTCTATGTTTGAGT
345
GGG





American
3175
−1
TCTCTTCTATTCCATCTGTCCACAATGTGT
346
GGG





American
3176
−1
CTCTCTTCTATTCCATCTGTCCACAATGTG
347
TGG





American
3223
−1
TGTGATGGCTGAGTGGCCCAGCTAAAGACT
348
TGG





American
3232
1
AGTGATCTGATCATACCCAAGTCTTTAGCT
349
GGG





American
3259
−1
GCCCTTTCATTTGGGTCCTGTAGCCCTCTC
350
TGG





American
3268
1
CTCAGCCATCACAATACCAGAGAGGGCTAC
351
AGG





American
3277
−1
GCTCTTCACTGTGCCATGGCCCTTTCATTT
352
GGG





American
3278
−1
AGCTCTTCACTGTGCCATGGCCCTTTCATT
353
TGG





American
3332
−1
CATGTTTCCTCCACGTGGACCTTAGTGCCT
354
GGG





American
3427
1
AGCGGAAGGGTGATCGAGGAATGGTGCTGC
355
AGG





American
3428
1
GCGGAAGGGTGATCGAGGAATGGTGCTGCA
356
GGG





American
3457
1
AGGGAGTGCACAATGCCCCCACTGTCGTTC
357
CGG





American
3458
1
GGGAGTGCACAATGCCCCCACTGTCGTTCC
358
GGG





American
3461
−1
TCCATTCCATACCAACAGCCATCTTTAGCC
359
CGG





American
3577
−1
GCACCATGAGCAGAATCACAAGCACTCCAA
360
GGG





American
3578
−1
TGCACCATGAGCAGAATCACAAGCACTCCA
361
AGG





American
3605
1
TTGGAGTGCTTGTGATTCTGCTCATGGTGC
362
AGG





American
3707
−1
GTGGCACCCATCAAAATTGCAAGCTTAGCC
363
AGG





American
3740
1
AGCTTGCAATTTTGATGGGTGCCACCTTCG
364
CGG





American
3850
−1
ACGAGGCCAAGGCCAGCAGCATGCTTTCAC
365
GGG





American
3851
−1
CACGAGGCCAAGGCCAGCAGCATGCTTTCA
366
CGG





American
3863
1
CTAATTGGACACCCCGTGAAAGCATGCTGC
367
TGG





American
3877
−1
AGGCGGAGATCGCAGTTTGCAAAAGACACG
368
AGG





American
3904
−1
TGATGAGAACCATCAGGTCGCCTTCCAAGG
369
CGG





American
3905
1
CGTGTCTTTTGCAAACTGCGATCTCCGCCT
370
TGG





American
3907
−1
CATTGATGAGAACCATCAGGTCGCCTTCCA
371
AGG





American
4000
−1
CCAGTGGTGTCAGAGCAGCCAGGATTGCCA
372
AGG





American
4025
1
CCTTGGCAATCCTGGCTGCTCTGACACCAC
373
TGG





American
4030
1
GCAATCCTGGCTGCTCTGACACCACTGGCC
374
CGG





American
4031
1
CAATCCTGGCTGCTCTGACACCACTGGCCC
375
GGG





American
4075
1
GTGGCGTGGAGAGCAGGCCTTGCTACTTGC
376
GGG





American
4076
1
TGGCGTGGAGAGCAGGCCTTGCTACTTGCG
377
GGG





American
4148
−1
GGGTCGACCAGCCTCACAGCGGTTAGTCCC
378
AGG





American
4159
−1
CCACGTTGATGGGGTCGACCAGCCTCACAG
379
CGG





American
4166
1
TCATGGCCCTGGGACTAACCGCTGTGAGGC
380
TGG





American
4322
1
CAGATATAGAGATGGCTGGGCCCATGGCCG
381
CGG





American
4324
−1
CCACGTAACTGACAATTAGCAGACCGACCG
382
CGG





American
4441
−1
CACCACTCTCATCTAGCGCCACATCGAGCC
383
GGG





American
4442
−1
TCACCACTCTCATCTAGCGCCACATCGAGC
384
CGG





American
4480
−1
CTCTCATGGGGGGACCGTCATCCTCCACCA
385
GGG





American
4501
−1
GGACCACCTTGAGTATGATCTCTCTCATGG
386
GGG





American
4502
−1
AGGACCACCTTGAGTATGATCTCTCTCATG
387
GGG





American
4643
1
GTGGTGCTCTATGGGATGTGCCTGCTCCCA
388
AGG





American
4655
1
GGGATGTGCCTGCTCCCAAGGAAGTAAAAA
389
AGG





American
4657
1
GATGTGCCTGCTCCCAAGGAAGTAAAAAAG
390
GGG





American
4658
1
ATGTGCCTGCTCCCAAGGAAGTAAAAAAGG
391
GGG





American
4741
1
ACACAAGTTGGAGTGGGAGTTATGCAAGAG
392
GGG





American
4742
1
CACAAGTTGGAGTGGGAGTTATGCAAGAGG
393
GGG





American
4783
−1
GATCAAGTCTCCCTTCACCGCTTCTCAGCG
394
CGG





American
4838
1
ATCCATACTGGGGAGATGTCAAGCAGGATC
395
TGG





American
4879
−1
CCAAGAGCTGCACCTCGCTGTGCCCGTCCC
396
AGG





American
4882
1
GGTCCATGGAAGCTAGATGCCGCCTGGGAC
397
GGG





American
4912
−1
GGATGTTCCTCGCTCTCTCTCCGGGGGGCA
398
CGG





American
4930
1
CTCTTGGCCGTGCCCCCCGGAGAGAGAGCG
399
AGG





American
4943
−1
TCCTTTGTCTTAAATATTCCGGGCAGAGTC
400
TGG





American
4954
−1
CAATGTCCCCATCCTTTGTCTTAAATATTC
401
CGG





American
4985
1
TATTTAAGACAAAGGATGGGGACATTGGAG
402
CGG





American
5041
1
ACTTCAGGATCTCCTATCCTAGACAAGTGT
403
GGG





American
5086
1
CTTTATGGCAATGGGGTCGTGATCAAAAAT
404
GGG





American
5116
1
GGGAGTTATGTTAGTGCCATCACCCAAGGG
405
AGG





American
5206
1
CTAACTGTCTTAGACTTGCATCCTGGAGCT
406
GGG





American
5218
−1
CTTCACGGACTATTTCAGGAAGAACTCTCC
407
TGG





American
5312
1
CAACCAGGGTTGTCGCTGCTGAAATGGAGG
408
AGG





American
5321
−1
GTTGTCATATAACGCACTGGAAGCCCTCTA
409
AGG





American
5323
1
GTCGCTGCTGAAATGGAGGAGGCCCTTAGA
410
GGG





American
5446
−1
GGGCCTCATCCATAATATACAGATTATAGT
411
TGG





American
5468
1
TCCCCAACTATAATCTGTATATTATGGATG
412
AGG





American
5548
−1
TTCCTGGTGGCGTGGCGGTCATGAAGATGG
413
CGG





American
5563
−1
GAAATGCGTCACGGGTTCCTGGTGGCGTGG
414
CGG





American
5591
1
CCACGCCACCAGGAACCCGTGACGCATTTC
415
CGG





American
5623
−1
AGCTCCAGGCTCTCTCTGGGACTTCCACTT
416
CGG





American
5669
1
GAGCCTGGAGCTCAGGCTTTGATTGGGTGA
417
CGG





American
5710
1
GGAAAAACAGTTTGGTTTGTTCCAAGCGTG
418
AGG





American
5801
−1
ACAAAGTCCCACTCTTGATGTTTTGTTTTC
419
TGG





American
5863
−1
TGGAATCTATGACACGGTCAGCTTTAAAGT
420
TGG





American
5893
−1
CATCAAGTATGACCGGCTTTAGGCATCTCC
421
TGG





American
5906
1
GTGTCATAGATTCCAGGAGATGCCTAAAGC
422
CGG





American
5968
−1
TGCCTATGCGCCCCCTCCTCTGGGCAGCGC
423
TGG





American
5978
−1
TTGGGATTCCTGCCTATGCGCCCCCTCCTC
424
TGG





American
5980
1
CCTGTCACACATGCCAGCGCTGCCCAGAGG
425
AGG





American
5981
1
CTGTCACACATGCCAGCGCTGCCCAGAGGA
426
GGG





American
6007
−1
CTCCATACAGATACTCATCTCCAGGTTTGT
427
TGG





American
6037
1
AAACCTGGAGATGAGTATCTGTATGGAGGT
428
GGG





American
6095
−1
ATGAGGCCATCTTGGAGGTAAATATTGTCA
429
AGG





American
6188
1
CAGCCATTGAGGGAGAGTTCAAGCTTAGGA
430
CGG





American
6245
1
TCATGAAAAGAGGAGATCTTCCTGTTTGGC
431
TGG





American
6280
−1
TGCCATCAAAGCACCATCTTCTATCTGTGT
432
AGG





American
6341
1
CCAACAACACCATAATGGAAGACAGTGTGC
433
CGG





American
6361
−1
TCGGTTTGAGCACTCTTTTCTCTCCGTGTC
434
TGG





American
6388
1
AGACACGGAGAGAAAAGAGTGCTCAAACCG
435
AGG





American
6406
−1
ACTTCAGGGCCGCATGATCTGAACAAACTC
436
TGG





American
6422
1
GGATGGACGCCAGAGTTTGTTCAGATCATG
437
CGG





American
6440
1
GTTCAGATCATGCGGCCCTGAAGTCATTCA
438
AGG





American
6548
−1
CTTCCAGTCTCTGCCCGCATGAGCACAGCG
439
AGG





American
6559
1
GAAGCCATTGACAACCTCGCTGTGCTCATG
440
CGG





American
6560
1
AAGCCATTGACAACCTCGCTGTGCTCATGC
441
GGG





American
6595
−1
TCTCTAGGGTCTCCGGCAATTGGGCCGCCG
442
CGG





American
6596
1
AGACTGGAAGCAGGCCTTACAAAGCCGCGG
443
CGG





American
6635
1
TGCCGGAGACCCTAGAGACCATTATGCTTT
444
TGG





American
6637
1
CCGGAGACCCTAGAGACCATTATGCTTTTG
445
GGG





American
6806
−1
TCTGGCTCAGGTATGAGCACCACCAGCAAT
446
AGG





American
6913
−1
TTGTTCTCTCCAACCATCCGAGTTCATTGG
447
CGG





American
6916
−1
TCTTTGTTCTCTCCAACCATCCGAGTTCAT
448
TGG





American
6953
−1
CCCTCCTCTCTCCTTCCCATTAGATGGCTT
449
AGG





American
6959
−1
GTTGCCCCCTCCTCTCTCCTTCCCATTAGA
450
TGG





American
6974
1
GTGACCTAAGCCATCTAATGGGAAGGAGAG
451
AGG





American
6977
1
ACCTAAGCCATCTAATGGGAAGGAGAGAGG
452
AGG





American
6979
1
CTAAGCCATCTAATGGGAAGGAGAGAGGAG
453
GGG





American
6980
1
TAAGCCATCTAATGGGAAGGAGAGAGGAGG
454
GGG





American
6991
−1
GCCGCAGGTCAATGTCCATTGAGAATCCTA
455
TGG





American
7016
−1
GCATAGATGGCCCAAGCTGAGGCTGGCCGC
456
AGG





American
7039
−1
GGGTAATGAAAGTTGTCAAGGCAGCATAGA
457
TGG





American
7051
−1
GTTGGACGGCTGGGGTAATGAAAGTTGTCA
458
AGG





American
7096
−1
CCATCGCCATTAAGGAGTAGTTGTTGTATG
459
AGG





American
7242
−1
TGCGCCACGAGCAAAATGATGGCCACTATT
460
AGG





American
7253
−1
AGTACATGTAGTGCGCCACGAGCAAAATGA
461
TGG





American
7289
1
CTCGTGGCGCACTACATGTACTTGATCCCA
462
GGG





American
7329
1
CAGCAGCTGCGCGTGCTGCCCAGAAGAGAA
463
CGG





American
7356
−1
ATGTCAGTCACCACTATTCCATCCACAACA
464
GGG





American
7428
1
TTGACCCCCAAGTGGAGAAAAAGATGGGAC
465
AGG





American
7466
−1
CCCCCCACCCCCAGGCGGTCCGCGACAGTA
466
TGG





American
7484
−1
TGATCAGGGCCCCAGCCTCCCCCCACCCCC
467
AGG





American
7499
1
TCGCGGACCGCCTGGGGGTGGGGGGAGGCT
468
GGG





American
7500
1
CGCGGACCGCCTGGGGGTGGGGGGAGGCTG
469
GGG





American
7508
−1
CCCACAAAGTGGAAGTTGCGGCTGTGATCA
470
GGG





American
7509
−1
TCCCACAAAGTGGAAGTTGCGGCTGTGATC
471
AGG





American
7520
−1
TCGGAGAGCCTTCCCACAAAGTGGAAGTTG
472
CGG





American
7595
1
TCTACAGCCACTTCACTGTGTAACATTTTT
473
AGG





American
7596
1
CTACAGCCACTTCACTGTGTAACATTTTTA
474
GGG





American
7653
1
TAATCTACACAGTAACAAGAAACGCTGGCT
475
TGG





American
7667
1
ACAAGAAACGCTGGCTTGGTCAAGAGACGT
476
GGG





American
7668
1
CAAGAAACGCTGGCTTGGTCAAGAGACGTG
477
GGG





American
7689
1
AGAGACGTGGGGGTGGAACAGGAGAGACCC
478
TGG





American
7691
−1
GGTTCAAGCGGGCCTTCCATTTCTCTCCCA
479
GGG





American
7692
−1
TGGTTCAAGCGGGCCTTCCATTTCTCTCCC
480
AGG





American
7704
1
GAACAGGAGAGACCCTGGGAGAGAAATGGA
481
AGG





American
7712
−1
AGAACTCCAGGGCCGACATCTGGTTCAAGC
482
GGG





American
7713
−1
TAGAACTCCAGGGCCGACATCTGGTTCAAG
483
CGG





American
7722
−1
TTGTAGGAGTAGAACTCCAGGGCCGACATC
484
TGG





American
7748
−1
TGCACACCTCGGTGATGCCTGACTTTTTGT
485
AGG





American
7767
1
TCTACTCCTACAAAAAGTCAGGCATCACCG
486
AGG





American
7769
−1
GGGCGCGGCGGGCCTCTTCTCTGCACACCT
487
CGG





American
7790
−1
CCGTTGCCACACCGTCCTTGAGGGCGCGGC
488
GGG





American
7791
−1
CCCGTTGCCACACCGTCCTTGAGGGCGCGG
489
CGG





American
7815
1
CCCGCCGCGCCCTCAAGGACGGTGTGGCAA
490
CGG





American
7827
−1
CTCAGCTTTGCACTTCCTCGGGACACAGCA
491
TGG





American
7868
1
GGAAGTGCAAAGCTGAGATGGTTGGTGGAG
492
CGG





American
7869
1
GAAGTGCAAAGCTGAGATGGTTGGTGGAGC
493
GGG





American
7992
−1
CTTTGCACCAACACGGGTTCTTCATGACCA
494
GGG





American
8043
−1
ATATGAAAGACGTCCACCCCACTCTTAAGA
495
CGG





American
8051
1
TATGGGTGGAACATAGTCCGTCTTAAGAGT
496
GGG





American
8052
1
ATGGGTGGAACATAGTCCGTCTTAAGAGTG
497
GGG





American
8144
1
TCATCATCTAGTCCTGAAGTGGAAGAAGCA
498
CGG





American
8163
−1
CTTTTTTCAAGCCAATCCCCCACCATGGAG
499
AGG





American
8168
−1
CTGGTCTTTTTTCAAGCCAATCCCCCACCA
500
TGG





American
8226
−1
TCCAGGGTTTCCATCATAGTGCTGGTGTAT
501
GGG





American
8253
−1
CCTCCCCCATACCTACGCTGCAGTCGCTCC
502
AGG





American
8283
1
AGCGACTGCAGCGTAGGTATGGGGGAGGAC
503
TGG





American
8306
−1
AGACCCAGTACATCTCATGTGTAGAGTTGC
504
GGG





American
8307
−1
GAGACCCAGTACATCTCATGTGTAGAGTTG
505
CGG





American
8357
−1
GGAGCTGGCTCGTGGTGGACACACTTTTTA
506
TGG





American
8382
−1
CTAGGCCCGTCCATGCGCCCCAAGAGGAGC
507
TGG





American
8390
1
AGTGTGTCCACCACGAGCCAGCTCCTCTTG
508
GGG





American
8402
1
ACGAGCCAGCTCCTCTTGGGGCGCATGGAC
509
GGG





American
8430
1
ACGGGCCTAGGAGGCCAGTGAAATATGAGG
510
AGG





American
8456
1
GAGGAGGATGTGAATCTCGGCTCTGGCACG
511
CGG





American
8457
1
AGGAGGATGTGAATCTCGGCTCTGGCACGC
512
GGG





American
8511
−1
TCCGCGTGCTCACTGCGGATCCTTTCAATG
513
CGG





American
8516
1
AACATGAAGATCATTGGTAACCGCATTGAA
514
AGG





American
8535
1
ACCGCATTGAAAGGATCCGCAGTGAGCACG
515
CGG





American
8568
−1
TAGCTTCCATGGTAAGCCCATGTCCTATAT
516
GGG





American
8598
1
ATAGGACATGGGCTTACCATGGAAGCTATG
517
AGG





American
8627
−1
ACAGGAGCCTGACAACCCCGTTTATTAGAG
518
AGG





American
8645
1
TCAGCGTCCTCTCTAATAAACGGGGTTGTC
519
AGG





American
8670
1
TTGTCAGGCTCCTGTCAAAACCCTGGGATG
520
TGG





American
8699
−1
TTTGCTGACCATACGGTGTGGTGTCGGTCA
521
TGG





American
8705
−1
AAACTCTTTGCTGACCATACGGTGTGGTGT
522
CGG





American
8711
−1
CCTTGAAAACTCTTTGCTGACCATACGGTG
523
TGG





American
8736
1
CCACACCGTATGGTCAGCAAAGAGTTTTCA
524
AGG





American
8769
−1
ATGCTCATAACCTGACGAGTGCCTTCTTGG
525
GGG





American
8897
1
ATCAACAAGGTTCGTAGCAATGCAGCATTA
526
GGG





American
8898
1
TCAACAAGGTTCGTAGCAATGCAGCATTAG
527
GGG





American
8997
−1
TACACACAACTCTGGCACTCTCCTCTCAGG
528
TGG





American
9056
1
AACATGATGGGAAAAAGAGAAAAGAAACAA
529
GGG





American
9057
1
ACATGATGGGAAAAAGAGAAAAGAAACAAG
530
GGG





American
9069
1
AAAGAGAAAAGAAACAAGGGGAATTTGGAA
531
AGG





American
9075
1
AAAAGAAACAAGGGGAATTTGGAAAGGCCA
532
AGG





American
9077
−1
GCCACATATACCAGATGGCGCGGCTGCCCT
533
TGG





American
9107
1
GGCAGCCGCGCCATCTGGTATATGTGGCTA
534
GGG





American
9108
1
GCAGCCGCGCCATCTGGTATATGTGGCTAG
535
GGG





American
9164
1
CTTGGATTCTTGAACGAGGATCACTGGATG
536
GGG





American
9198
1
GAGAGAACTCAGGAGGTGGTGTTGAAGGGC
537
TGG





American
9228
−1
CTTCCTCCTGGTATACGACTCATCTCTTCT
538
AGG





American
9254
1
CTAGAAGAGATGAGTCGTATACCAGGAGGA
539
AGG





American
9299
1
GACACTGCTGGCTGGGACACCCGCATTAGC
540
AGG





American
9353
1
CTAATCACCAACCAAATGGAGAAAGGGCAC
541
AGG





American
9354
1
TAATCACCAACCAAATGGAGAAAGGGCACA
542
GGG





American
9362
−1
GGTATGTGTACTTGATTATGGCCAATGCCA
543
AGG





American
9374
−1
CCACTTTGTTTTGGTATGTGTACTTGATTA
544
TGG





American
9393
−1
GCTGGTCTAAGGACCTTTACCACTTTGTTT
545
TGG





American
9467
1
GTTATGGACATTATTTCGAGACAAGACCAA
546
AGG





American
9587
1
CTAGAGATGCAAGACTTGTGGCTGCTGCGG
547
AGG





American
9632
1
ACTAACTGGTTGCAGAGCAACGGATGGGAT
548
AGG





American
9738
1
GGTTCTTGAATGATATGGGAAAAGTTAGGA
549
AGG





American
9771
1
ACACACAAGAGTGGAAACCCTCAACTGGAT
550
GGG





American
9825
−1
GGAACCACAATGGACCTCCCGTCCTTGAGA
551
TGG





American
9833
1
CACCACTTCAACAAGCTCCATCTCAAGGAC
552
GGG





American
9836
1
CACTTCAACAAGCTCCATCTCAAGGACGGG
553
AGG





American
9857
−1
CCCGGCCAATCAGTTCATCTTGGTGGCGGC
554
AGG





American
9881
1
CCCTGCCGCCACCAAGATGAACTGATTGGC
555
CGG





American
9882
1
CCTGCCGCCACCAAGATGAACTGATTGGCC
556
GGG





American
9903
1
TGATTGGCCGGGCCCGCGTCTCTCCAGGGG
557
CGG





American
9921
−1
GCATATGATTTTGCTAGGCAAGCAGTCTCC
558
CGG





American
9936
−1
AGCTGCCACATTTGCGCATATGATTTTGCT
559
AGG





American
9969
−1
ATCAGTCGGAGGTCCCTTCTGTGGAAATAA
560
AGG





American
9980
1
CAAATGTGGCAGCTCCTTTATTTCCACAGA
561
AGG





American
9981
1
AAATGTGGCAGCTCCTTTATTTCCACAGAA
562
GGG





American
9993
−1
ACAGATGAACAAATGGCATTGGCCATCAGT
563
CGG





American
10010
−1
GAACCCAGTCAACTGGCACAGATGAACAAA
564
TGG





American
10091
−1
CTCTGTTCCACACCACAAGCATGTCTTCAG
565
TGG





American
10160
−1
AATAGGGAATGTCTGTCCATTTCGTAACTG
566
GGG





American
10161
−1
AAATAGGGAATGTCTGTCCATTTCGTAACT
567
GGG





American
10250
−1
TGTTGACTGTGTTTTTAATGTTCTCAGCCC
568
AGG





American
10326
−1
TCTTCACCCAAGTAGCGAACTTGGGTGGAT
569
AGG





Asian
469
−1
CACTCCCACGTCTAGTGACCTCCACTGCCA
570
TGG





Asian
722
−1
CTTCTAGATCTCCGTGCTTCACCTTTTTTG
571
TGG





Asian
839
−1
TTCCTGAATATCCAATTTTCGACTCTAATC
572
AGG





Asian
904
−1
CTTTTTGGCTCGTTGAACTTCCCAAAAGCC
573
AGG





Asian
1075
−1
TGTCGACAGCCGGTTTGTCCTGTGCCATTA
574
CGG





Asian
1091
1
GTTGTGTTACCGTAATGGCACAGGACAAAC
575
CGG





Asian
1172
1
TAAGATCCTATTGCTATGAGGCATCAATAT
576
CGG





Asian
1472
1
CAGGACATGAAACTGATGAGAATAGAGCGA
577
AGG





Asian
1906
−1
CAGCCGGGATCTTGGTGAATGTGAACGCTG
578
CGG





Asian
1993
−1
TGTCCACCGCCATCTGAGCTGGAACCTTGC
579
AGG





Asian
2390
1
GGTTCTCACAAATTCTCATTGGAACGTTGC
580
TGG





Asian
2537
1
ACTTCTCAAAGAAGGAAACGAGATGCGGTA
581
CGG





Asian
2644
1
GCAGCAGCAGTCAAGCAAGCCTGGGRAGAT
582
GGG





Asian
3140
−1
TTTGGCCATTCACATGTTTTCATCTCGATC
583
AGG





Asian
3712
−1
CAAAGGTGGCACCCATCAAAATTGCAAGCT
584
TGG





Asian
3872
−1
GAGATCGCAGTTTGCAGAAGACACGAAGCC
585
AGG





Asian
4102
1
TGCGGGGGGTTCATGCTTCTCTCTCTGAAG
586
GGG





Asian
4106
1
GGGGGTTCATGCTTCTCTCTCTGAAGGGGA
587
AGG





Asian
4130
−1
GCGGTGAGTCCCAAGGCCATGACAAATGGT
588
AGG





Asian
4292
1
TATGCGCGTTGGCCGGAGGGTTCGCCAAGG
589
CGG





Asian
4454
1
CTGGAAACAGTCCCCGGCTCGATGTGGCAC
590
TGG





Asian
4754
−1
GCGGATCCTTTTGTGACGTGCCACATAGTG
591
TGG





Asian
5195
−1
ACTCTCCTGGTTTTCCCAGCTCCAGGATGC
592
AGG





Asian
5371
1
ATGACAACAGCAGTCAATGTCACCCATTCT
593
GGG





Asian
5569
−1
AGTCCGGGAATGCGTCACGGGTTCCTGGTG
594
GGG





Asian
5570
−1
GAGTCCGGGAATGCGTCACGGGTTCCTGGT
595
GGG





Asian
5594
−1
TCGGTGTCCATAATTGGTGAGTTGGAGTCC
596
GGG





Asian
6347
1
ACACCATAATGGAAGACAGTGTGCCGGCAG
597
AGG





Asian
6475
−1
GCAATGTTCCCAGGGCTTCCATCACTCCAA
598
AGG





Asian
6503
1
TTGGAGTGATGGAAGCCCTGGGAACATTGC
599
CGG





Asian
6887
1
ACCAAATGGCAATCATCATCATGATAGCAG
600
TGG





Asian
7082
1
CAACTTTCATCACCCCAGCCGTCCAACATG
601
CGG





Asian
7206
1
AT-GGGACTTTGGAGTCCCGCTGCTAATGA
602
TGG





Asian
7571
−1
CCCTAAAAATGTTACACAGTGAAGTGGCTG
603
TGG





Asian
7677
1
CTGGCTTGGTCAAGAGACGTGGGGGTGGAA
604
CGG





Asian
7716
−1
GAGTAGAACTCTAGGGCCGACATCTGGTTC
605
AGG





Asian
8453
−1
CTTCAGCGCAGCTTACCACAGCCCGCGTGC
606
CGG





Asian
9120
1
TCTGGTATATGTGGCTAGGGGCTAGATTCC
607
TGG





Asian
9123
−1
TCGTTCAAGAATCCAAGGGCTTCGAACTCC
608
AGG





Asian
9516
1
TCACTTACGCTCTTAATACATTCACCAACC
609
TGG





American
650
1
GCTATGAATGCCCTATGCTGGATGAGGGGG
610
TGG





American
1507
−1
CTAGGCTTCCAAACCCCCCCAGGGTGGCTT
611
CGG





American
1519
1
AATTCACCAAGAGCCGAAGCCACCCTGGGG
612
GGG





American
2068
−1
TCTTAGAGTTCTCAGTGCTTTCAGTGATTA
613
CGG





American
2174
−1
TTTCCAATGGTGCTGCCACTCCTGTGCCAG
614
TGG





American
2608
−1
AGGCTTGCTTGACTGCTGCTGCCAATCTAC
615
GGG





American
2609
−1
CAGGCTTGCTTGACTGCTGCTGCCAATCTA
616
CGG





American
2612
1
ACAAGTACCATCCTGACTCCCCCCGTAGAT
617
TGG





American
3277
−1
GCTCTTCACTGTGCCATGGCCCTTTCATTT
618
GGG





American
3278
−1
AGCTCTTCACTGTGCCATGGCCCTTTCATT
619
TGG





American
3569
−1
AGCAGAATCACAAGCACTCCAAGGGAGAAG
620
TGG





American
3877
−1
AGGCGGAGATCGCAGTTTGCAAAAGACACG
621
AGG





American
4007
1
CACGCACTGATAACATCACCTTGGCAATCC
622
TGG





American
4094
−1
TTCTTCACACTGCCTTTTCCCTTCAGAGAG
623
AGG





American
4148
−1
GGGTCGACCAGCCTCACAGCGGTTAGTCCC
624
AGG





American
4262
−1
TTGGCGAACCCTCCAGCCAATGCGCATATC
625
AGG





American
4478
1
TGGCGCTAGATGAGAGTGGTGATTTCTCCC
626
TGG





American
4520
1
ACGGTCCCCCCATGAGAGAGATCATACTCA
627
AGG





American
4985
1
TATTTAAGACAAAGGATGGGGACATTGGAG
628
CGG





American
5312
1
CAACCAGGGTTGTCGCTGCTGAAATGGAGG
629
AGG





American
6095
−1
ATGAGGCCATCTTGGAGGTAAATATTGTCA
630
AGG





American
6166
−1
GCTCCGTCCTAAGCTTGAACTCTCCCTCAA
631
TGG





American
6440
1
GTTCAGATCATGCGGCCCTGAAGTCATTCA
632
AGG





American
6620
−1
CCCAGCAACCCCAAAAGCATAATGGTCTCT
633
AGG





American
6878
1
CCCAGGACAACCAAATGGCAATCATCATCA
634
TGG





American
7039
−1
GGGTAATGAAAGTTGTCAAGGCAGCATAGA
635
TGG





American
7051
−1
GTTGGACGGCTGGGGTAATGAAAGTTGTCA
636
AGG





American
7096
−1
CCATCGCCATTAAGGAGTAGTTGTTGTATG
637
AGG





American
7408
−1
TAGCACCTGTCCCATCTTTTTCTCCACTTG
638
GGG





American
7409
−1
GTAGCACCTGTCCCATCTTTTTCTCCACTT
639
GGG





American
7520
−1
TCGGAGAGCCTTCCCACAAAGTGGAAGTTG
640
CGG





American
7731
1
GGAAGGCCCGCTTGAACCAGATGTCGGCCC
641
TGG





American
7815
1
CCCGCCGCGCCCTCAAGGACGGTGTGGCAA
642
CGG





American
7868
1
GGAAGTGCAAAGCTGAGATGGTTGGTGGAG
643
CGG





American
7869
1
GAAGTGCAAAGCTGAGATGGTTGGTGGAGC
644
GGG





American
8609
−1
CGTTTATTAGAGAGGACGCTGACCCTTGTG
645
TGG





American
9015
−1
CTTTTTCCCATCATGTTGTACACACAACTC
646
TGG





American
9881
1
CCCTGCCGCCACCAAGATGAACTGATTGGC
647
CGG





American
9882
1
CCTGCCGCCACCAAGATGAACTGATTGGCC
648
GGG





American
10278
1
GGGCTGAGAACATTAAAAACACAGTCAACA
649
TGG
















TABLE 6 







Sequences of Toehold Switch Sensors and Corresponding Target Sequences in


Zika Genome.













Target





Target RNA Fragment Used for


sequence





Initial Sensor Screening














in Zika
Location
A Series Sensors
B Series Sensors

Genome
Genome
Genome
















virus
in
Sensor
Sensor
Sensor
Sensor

Start
End
fragment


genome
genome
Name
sequence
Name
sequence
Sequence
site
site
length



















UUGAGAG
3027
1A
UCUUCAGCC
25B
UCUUCAGCC
GGGCAGUGAUCU
3007
3170
164


UGAGAAG


UCCAUGUGU

UCCAUGUGU
AGGCUACUGGAU





AAUGACA


CAUUCUUCU

CAUUCUUCU
UGAGAGUGAGAA





CAUGGAG


CACUCUCAAG

CACUCUCAA
GAAUGACACAUG





GCUGAAG


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
GAGGCUGAAGAG





A (SEQ ID


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
GGCCCAUCUGAU





NO: 650)


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
CGAGAUGAAAAC








AUGAACUUG

GUUGAGAGU
AUGUGAAUGGCC








AGAAACCAAG

GAGUAACCU
AAAGUCCCACAC








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
AUUGUGGACAGA








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
UGGAAUAGAAGA








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
GAGUGAUCUGAU








NO: 674)

698)
CAUACCCAAGUC











UUUAGCUGGGC











(SEQ ID NO: 722)








AUGAUGG
8963
2A
AAAUUCCCCU
26B
AAAUUCCCC
GGGUGCCAGAGU
8941
9098
158


GAAAAAG


UGUUUCUUU

UUGUUUCUU 
UGUGUGUACAAC





AGAAAAG


UCUCUUUUU

UUCUCUUUU
AUGAUGGGAAAA





AAACAAG


CCCAUCAUGU

UCCCAUCAU
AGAGAAAAGAAA





GGGAAUU


UAUAGUUAU

GGACUUUAG
CAAGGGGAAUUU





U (SEQ ID


GAACAGAGG

AACAGAGGA
GGAAAGGCCAAG





NO: 651)


AGACAUAACA

GAUAAAGAU
GGCAGCCGCGCC








UGAACAUGA

GAUGAUGGG
AUCUGGUAUAUG








UGAACCAUG

AAAAAACCU
UGGCUAGGGGCU








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
AGAUUUCUAGAG








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
UUCGAAGCCCUU








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
GGAUUCUUGAAC








NO: 675)

699)
GAGGAUCACUGG











AUGG (SEQ ID











NO: 723)








GACACAG
1373
3A
UUUCGCUCU
27B
UUUCGCUCU
GGGCCAGCACAG
1348
1494
147


GACAUGA


AUUCUCAUCA

AUUCUCAUC
UGGGAUGAUCGU





AACUGAU


GUUUCAUGU

AGUUUCAUG 
UAAUGACACAGG





GAGAAUA


CCUGUGUCG

UCCUGUGUC
ACAUGAAACUGA





GAGCGAA


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
UGAGAAUAGAGC





A (SEQ ID


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
GAAAGUUGAGAU





NO: 652)


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
AACGCCCAAUUC








AUGAACGACA

GGACACAGG
ACCAAGAGCCGA








CAAACGUCGU

ACACAACCU
AGCCACCCUGGG








UAACCUGGC

GGCGGCAGC
GGGGUUUGGAAG








GGCAGCGCAA

GCAAAAG
CCUAGGACUUGA








AAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
UUGUGAACCGAG








NO: 676)

700)
GACAGG (SEQ ID











NO: 724)








UGGAAAA
2610
4A
GCUCCCCUUC
28B
GCUCCCCUU
GGGCGGGAUCUC
2586
2733
148


CAUCAUG


UACUGAUCU

CUACUGAUC
CUCUGUUUCAAG





UGGAGAU


CCACAUGAUG

UCCACAUGA
AAUGGAAAACAU





CAGUAGA


UUUUCCAGU

UGUUUUCCA
CAUGUGGAGAUC





AGGGGAG


UAUAGUUAU

GGACUUUAG
AGUAGAAGGGGA





C (SEQ ID


GAACAGAGG

AACAGAGGA
GCUCAACGCAAU





NO: 653)


AGACAUAACA

GAUAAAGAU
CCUGGAAGAGAA








UGAACUGGA

GUGGAAAAC
UGGAGUUCAACU








AAAACCCAGU

AUCAAACCU
GACGGUCGUUGU








UAACCUGGC

GGCGGCAGC
GGGAUCUGUAAA








GGCAGCGCAA

GCAAAAG
AAACCCCAUGUG








AAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
GAGAGGUCCACA








NO: 677)

701)
GAGAUU (SEQ ID











NO: 725)








GGGGAAA
256
5A
AUUAUUUCC
29B
AACUUCUUU
GGGCCAUCACUG
220
385
166


AAAGAGG


AUAGCCUCU

AACUUCUUU
GGUCUCAUCAAU





CUAUGGA


UUUUUCCCC

AUUAUUUCC
AGAUGGGGUUCA





AAUAAUA


GUUAUAGUU

AUAGCCUCU
GUGGGGAAAAAA





AAGAAGU


AUGAACAGA

UUUUUCCCC
GAGGCUAUGGAA





U (SEQ ID


GGAGACAUA

GGACUUUAG
AUAAUAAAGAAG





NO: 654)


ACAUGAACG

AACAGAGGA
UUCAAGAAAGAU








GGGAAAACCC

GAUAAAGAU
CUGGCUGCCAUG








CGUUAACCU

GGGGGAAAA
CUGAGAAUAAUC








GGCGGCAGC

AAGAAACCU
AAUGCUAGGAAG








GCAAAAG

GGCGGCAGC
GAGAAGAAGAGA








(SEQ ID NO:

GCAAAAG
CGAGGCGCAGAU








678)

(SEQ ID NO:
ACUAGUGUCGGA










702)
AUUGUUGGCCUC











(SEQ ID NO: 726)








GAUAACG
1414
6A
AGGGUGGCU
30B
AGGGUGGCU
GGGAAUGCUGUC
1327
1494
168


CCCAAUU


UCGGCUCUU

UCGGCUCUU
AGUUCAUGGCUC





CACCAAG


GGUGAAUUG

GGUGAAUUG
CCAGCACAGUGG





AGCCGAA


GGCGUUAUC

GGCGUUAUC
GAUGAUCGUUAA





GCCACCC


GUUAUAGUU

GGACUUUAG
UGACACAGGACA





U (SEQ ID


AUGAACAGA

AACAGAGGA
UGAAACUGAUGA





NO: 655)


GGAGACAUA

GAUAAAGAU
GAAUAGAGCGAA








ACAUGAACGA

GGAUAACGC
AGUUGAGAUAAC








UAACAACAUC

CCAUAACCU
GCCCAAUUCACC








GUUAACCUG

GGCGGCAGC
AAGAGCCGAAGC








GCGGCAGCG

GCAAAAG
CACCCUGGGGGG








CAAAAG (SEQ

(SEQ ID NO: 
GUUUGGAAGCCU








ID NO: 679)

703)
AGGACUUGAUUG











UGAACCGAGGAC











AGG (SEQ ID NO:











727)








UUGAAGA
8841
7A
CUUCCACUGC
31B
CUUCCACUG
GGGAGAAGGAUG
8729
8920
192


GGAAAAA


AGUCUUCCAC

CAGUCUUCC
GUCUCUUCCUGG





GAGUGGA


UCUUUUUCC

ACUCUUUUU
UUGUGGAAAGAG





AGACUGC


UCUUCAAGU

CCUCUUCAA
CUAGGCAAACAC





AGUGGAA


UAUAGUUAU

GGACUUUAG
AAACGGCCACGA





G (SEQ ID


GAACAGAGG

AACAGAGGA
GUCUGUACCAAA





NO: 656)


AGACAUAACA

GAUAAAGAU
GAAGAGUUCAUC








UGAACUUGA

GUUGAAGAG
AACAAGGUUCGU








AGAACCAAGU

GAAAAACCU
AGCAAUGCAGCA








UAACCUGGC

GGCGGCAGC
UUAGGGGCAAUA








GGCAGCGCAA

GCAAAAG
UUUGAAGAGGAA








AAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO: 
AAAGAGUGGAAG








NO: 680)

704)
ACUGCAGUGGAA











GCUGUGAACGAU











CCAAGGUUCUGG











GCUCUAGUGGAC











AAGGAAAGA











(SEQ ID NO: 728)








UUUUGC
7188
8A
CUGGGAUCA
32B
CUGGGAUCA
GGGCUGACCCUA
7166
7299
134


UCGUGGC


AGUACAUGU

AGUACAUGU
AUAGUGGCCAUC





GCACUAC


AGUGCGCCAC

AGUGCGCCA
AUUUUGCUCGUG





AUGUACU


GAGCAAAAG

CGAGCAAAA
GCGCACUACAUG





UGAUCCC


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
UACUUGAUCCCA





AG (SEQ


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
GGGCUGCAGGCA





ID NO:


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
GCAGCUGCGCGU





657)


AUGAACUUU

GUUUUGCUC
GCUGCCCAGAAG








UGCAACAAAG

GUGUAACCU
AGAACGGCAGCU








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
GGCAUCAUGAAG








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
AACCCUGUUGUG








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
GAUGG (SEQ ID








NO: 681)

705)
NO: 729)








UUGCUAC
7144
9A
GUCAGGGGU
33B
ACUAUUAGG
GGGUUUGGUAU
7078
7228
151


UCACAAU


GUUAAUUGU

ACUAUUAGG
GGGCAAAGGGAU





UAACACC


GAGUAGCAA

GUCAGGGGU
GCCAUUCUACGC





CCUGACC


GUUAUAGUU

GUUAAUUGU
AUGGGACUUUGG





CUAAUAG


AUGAACAGA

GAGUAGCAA
AGUCCCGCUGCU





U (SEQ ID


GGAGACAUA

GGACUUUAG
AAUGAUAGGUUG





NO: 658)


ACAUGAACU

AACAGAGGA
CUACUCACAAUU








UGCUAAACCA

GAUAAAGAU
AACACCCCUGAC








AGUUAACCU

GUUGCUACU
CCUAAUAGUGGC








GGCGGCAGC

CACUAACCU
CAUCAUUUUGCU








GCAAAAG

GGCGGCAGC
CGUGGCGCACUA








(SEQ ID NO:

GCAAAAG
CAUGUACUUGAU








682)

(SEQ ID NO:
CCCAGGGCUG










706)
(SEQ ID NO: 730)








ACCACCU
7022
10A
AAGGAGUAG
34B
CAUCGCCAUU
GGGCCAUCUAUG
6966
7141
176


CAUACAA


UUGUUGUAU

CAUCGCCAU
CUGCCUUGACAA





CAACUAC


GAGGUGGUG

UAAGGAGUA
CUUUCAUUACCC





UCCUUAA


UUAUAGUUA

GUUGUUGUA
CAGCCGUCCAAC





UGGCGAU


UGAACAGAG

UGAGGUGGU
AUGCAGUGACCA





G (SEQ ID


GAGACAUAAC

GGACUUUAG
CCUCAUACAACA





NO: 659)


AUGAACACCA

AACAGAGGA
ACUACUCCUUAA








CCAACGGUG

GAUAAAGAU
UGGCGAUGGCCA








UUAACCUGG

GACCACCUCA
CGCAAGCUGGAG








CGGCAGCGCA

UAUAACCUG
UGUUGUUUGGU








AAAG (SEQ ID

GCGGCAGCG
AUGGGCAAAGGG








ID NO: 707)

CAAAAG (SEQ
AUGCCAUUCUAC










NO: 683)
GCAUGGGACUUU











GGAGUCCCGCUG











CUAAUGAUA











(SEQ ID NO: 731)








ACCACAA
3563
11A
CACUGCCAUU
35B
CACUGCCAU
GGGAGAAGGGUG
3521
3702
182


AGAUCAU


GAUGUGCUU

UGAUGUGCU
AUUCUGCUCAUG





CAUAAGC


AUGAUGAUC

UAUGAUGAU
GUGCAGGAAGGG





ACAUCAA


UUUGUGGUG

CUUUGUGGU
UUGAAGAAGAGA





UGGCAGU


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
AUGACCACAAAG





G (SEQ ID


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
AUCAUCAUAAGC





NO: 660)


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
ACAUCAAUGGCA








AUGAACACCA

GACCACAAA
GUGCUGGUAGCU








CAAACGGUG

GAUAAACCU
AUGAUCCUGGGA








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
GGAUUUUCAAUG








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
AGUGACCUGGCU








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO: 
AAGCUUGCAAUU








NO: 684)

708)
UUGAUGGGUGCC











ACCUUCGCGGAA











AUGAACACUGGA











GGAGAUGUAGC











(SEQ ID NO: 732)








AGACAGA
5721
12A
CCCACUCUUG
36B
CCCACUCUU
GGGAGAAGGGUU
5628
5850
223


GUUCCAG


AUGUUUUGU

GAUGUUUUG
UGUUCCAAGCGU





AAAACAA


UUUCUGGAA

UUUUCUGGA
GAGGAACGGCAA





AACAUCA


CUCUGUCUG

ACUCUGUCU
UGAGAUCGCAGC





AGAGUGG


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
UUGUCUGACAAA





G (SEQ ID


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
GGCUGGAAAACG





NO: 661)


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
GGUCAUACAGCU








AUGAACAGAC

GAGACAGAG
CAGCAGAAAGAC








AGAACUCUG

UUCCAACCU
UUUUGAGACAGA








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
GUUCCAGAAAAC








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
AAAACAUCAAGA








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
GUGGGACUUUGU








NO: 685)

709)
CGUGACAACUGA











CAUUUCAGAGAU











GGGCGCCAACUU











UAAAGCUGACCG











UGUCAUAGAUUC











CAGGAGAUGCCU











AAAGCCGGUCAU











ACU (SEQ ID NO:











733)








UGCACAA
3368
13A
AUCUUUAGC
37B
AUCUUUAGC
GGGAGAUCAACC
3316
3445
130


UGCCCCC


CCGGAACGAC

CCGGAACGA
ACUGCAAGCGGA





ACUGUCG


AGUGGGGGC

CAGUGGGGG
AGGGUGAUCGAG





UUCCGGG


AUUGUGCAG

CAUUGUGCA
GAAUGGUGCUGC





CUAAAGA


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
AGGGAGUGCACA





U (SEQ ID


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
AUGCCCCCACUG





NO: 662)


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
UCGUUCCGGGCU








AUGAACUGC

GUGCACAAU
AAAGAUGGCUGU








ACAAACGCAG

GCCGAACCU
UGGUAUGGAAUG








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
GAGAUAAGGCCC








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
AGGAAAGAACCA








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
(SEQ ID NO: 734)








NO: 686)

710)









GACACCG
1598
14A
UGCUUCUUU
38B
UGCUUCUUU
GGGAGUGGUUCC
1555
1711
157


GAACUCC


GUUGUUCCA

GUUGUUCCA
ACGACAUUCCAU





ACACUGG


GUGUGGAGU

GUGUGGAGU
UACCUUGGCACG





AACAACA


UCCGGUGUC

UCCGGUGUC
CUGGGGCAGACA





AAGAAGC


GUUAUAGUU

GGACUUUAG
CCGGAACUCCAC





A (SEQ ID


AUGAACAGA

AACAGAGGA
ACUGGAACAACA





NO: 663)


GGAGACAUA

GAUAAAGAU
AAGAAGCACUGG








ACAUGAACGA

GGACACCGG
UAGAGUUCAAGG








CACCAACGUC

AACAAACCU
ACGCACAUGCCA








GUUAACCUG

GGCGGCAGC
AAAGGCAAACUG








GCGGCAGCG

GCAAAAG
UCGUGGUUCUAG








CAAAAG (SEQ

(SEQ ID NO:
GGAGUCAAGAAG








ID NO: 687)

711)
GAGCAGUUCACA











CG (SEQ ID NO:











735)








GUUUGCC
6379
15A
ACUCCAAAAG
39B
ACUCCAAAA
GGGUGGACGCCA
6330
6458
129


GCUGGGA


CCGCUCCUCU

GCCGCUCCU
GAGUUUGUUCAG





AAAGAGG


UUUCCCAGC

CUUUUCCCA
AUCAUGCGGCCC





AGCGGCU


GGCAAACGU

GCGGCAAAC
UGAAGUCAUUCA





UUUGGA


UAUAGUUAU

GGACUUUAG
AGGAGUUUGCCG





GU (SEQ


GAACAGAGG

AACAGAGGA
CUGGGAAAAGAG





ID NO:


AGACAUAACA

GAUAAAGAU
GAGCGGCUUUUG





664)


UGAACGUUU

GGUUUGCCG
GAGUGAUGGAAG








GCAACAACGU

CUGCAACCU
CCCUGGGAACAC








UAACCUGGC

GGCGGCAGC
UGCCAGGACACA








GGCAGCGCAA

GCAAAAG
UGACAGAGAGAU








AAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
(SEQ ID NO: 736)








NO: 688)

712)









GGCAGAA
6277
16A
ACUCUUUUC
40B
ACUCUUUUC
GGGCUGCCGGAA
6198
6351
154


GUGUGG


UCUCCGUGU

UCUCCGUGU
UAACCUACACAG





ACCAGAC


CUGGUCCACA

CUGGUCCAC
AUAGAAGAUGGU





ACGGAGA


CUUCUGCCG

ACUUCUGCC
GCUUUGAUGGCA





GAAAAGA


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
CGACCAACAACA





GU (SEQ


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
CCAUAAUGGAAG





ID NO:


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
ACAGUGUGCCGG





665)


AUGAACGGC

GGGCAGAAG
CAGAAGUGUGGA








AGAAACGCCG

UGUAAACCU
CCAGACACGGAG








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
AGAAAAGAGUGC








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
UCAAACCGAGGU








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
GGAUGGACGCCA








NO: 689)

713)
GAGUUUGUUCAG











A (SEQ ID NO:











737)








CUGAUCG
3071
17A
GGACUUUGG
41B
GGACUUUGG
GGGCUACUGGAU
3017
3170
154


AGAUGAA


CCAUUCACAU

CCAUUCACA
UGAGAGUGAGAA





AACAUGU


GUUUUCAUC

UGUUUUCAU
GAAUGACACAUG





GAAUGGC


UCGAUCAGG

CUCGAUCAG
GAGGCUGAAGAG





CAAAGUC


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
GGCCCAUCUGAU





C (SEQ ID


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
CGAGAUGAAAAC





NO: 666)


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
AUGUGAAUGGCC








AUGAACCUG

GCUGAUCGA
AAAGUCCCACAC








AUCAACCAGG

GAUGAACCU
AUUGUGGACAGA








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
UGGAAUAGAAGA








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
GAGUGAUCUGAU








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
CAUACCCAAGUC








NO: 690)

714)
UUUAGCUGGGC











(SEQ ID NO: 738)








GAGCCAG
6761
18A
UUGGUUGUC
42B
UUGGUUGUC
GGGCAGCCAGAA
6702
6874
173


AAAAGCA


CUGGGGAGA

CUGGGGAGA
UUGCAUGUGUCC





AAGAUCU


UCUUUGCUU

UCUUUGCUU
UCAUUGUUGUGU





CCCCAGG


UUCUGGCUC

UUCUGGCUC
UCCUAUUGCUGG





ACAACCA


GUUAUAGUU

GGACUUUAG
UGGUGCUCAUAC





A (SEQ ID


AUGAACAGA

AACAGAGGA
CUGAGCCAGAAA





NO: 667)


GGAGACAUA

GAUAAAGAU
AGCAAAGAUCUC








ACAUGAACGA

GGAGCCAGA
CCCAGGACAACC








GCCAAACCUC

AAAGAACCU
AAAUGGCAAUCA








GUUAACCUG

GGCGGCAGC
UCAUCAUGGUAG








GCGGCAGCG

GCAAAAG
CAGUAGGUCUUC








CAAAAG (SEQ

(SEQ ID NO: 
UGGGCUUGAUUA








ID NO: 691)

715)
CCGCCAAUGAAC











UCGGAUGGUUGG











AGAGAACA (SEQ











ID NO: 739)








CUUAACA
9431
19A
AAUGAGUUG
43B
AAUGAGUUG
GGGAGCGGACAA
9404
9581
178


CAUUUAC


CACCACUAGG

CACCACUAG
GUUGUCACUUAC





CAACCUA


UUGGUAAAU

GUUGGUAAA
GCUCUUAACACA





GUGGUG


GUGUUAAGG

UGUGUUAAG
UUUACCAACCUA





CAACUCA


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
GUGGUGCAACUC





UU (SEQ


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
AUUCGGAAUAUG





ID NO:


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
GAGGCUGAGGAA





668)


AUGAACCUU

GCUUAACAC 
GUUCUAGAGAUG








AACAACAAGG

AUUGAACCU
CAAGACUUGUGG








UUAACCUGG

GGCGGCAGC
CUGCUGCGGAGG








CGGCAGCGCA

GCAAAAG
UCAGAGAAAGUG








AAAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO: 
ACUAACUGGUUG










NO: 692)
CAGAGCAACGGA








716)


UGGGAUAGGCUC











AAACGAAUGG











(SEQ ID NO: 740)








GCGGUAC
2466
20A
CUUCAACGUC
44B
CUUCAACGU
GGGUGCUCGGUG
2429
2578
150


AGGGGU


GUUAUAGAC

CGUUAUAGA
GACUUCUCAAAG





GUUCGUC


GAACACCCCU

CGAACACCCC
AAGGAGACGAGA





UAUAACG


GUACCGCG U

UGUACCGCG
UGCGGUACAGGG





ACGUUGA


UAUAGUUAU

GACUUUAGA
GUGUUCGUCUAU





AG (SEQ


GAACAGAGG

ACAGAGGAG
AACGACGUUGAA





ID NO:


AGACAUAACA

AUAAAGAUG
GCCUGGAGGGAC





669)


UGAACGCGG

GCGGUACAG
AGGUACAAGUAC








UAAACCGCGU

GGAAACCUG
CAUCCUGACUCC








UAACCUGGC

GCGGCAGCG
CCCCGUAGAUUG








GGCAGCGCAA

CAAAAG (SEQ
GCAGCAGCAGUC








AAG (SEQ ID

ID NO: 717)
AAGCAAGCCUGG








NO: 693)


GAAGAU (SEQ ID











NO: 741)








GAGGCUG
9476
21A
CCACAAGUCU
45B
CCACAAGUC
GGGAGUGGUGCA
9451
9584
134


AGGAAGU


UGCAUCUCU

UUGCAUCUC
ACUCAUUCGGAA





UCUAGAG


AGAACUUCCU

UAGAACUUC
UAUGGAGGCUGA





AUGCAAG


CAGCCUCGU

CUCAGCCUC
GGAAGUUCUAGA





ACUUGUG


UAUAGUUAU

GGACUUUAG
GAUGCAAGACUU





G (SEQ ID


GAACAGAGG

AACAGAGGA
GUGGCUGCUGCG





NO: 670)


AGACAUAACA

GAUAAAGAU
GAGGUCAGAGAA








UGAACGAGG

GGAGGCUGA
AGUGACUAACUG








CUAACCUCGU

GGACAACCU
GUUGCAGAGCAA








UAACCUGGC

GGCGGCAGC
CGGAUGGGAUAG








GGCAGCGCAA

GCAAAAG
GCUCAAACGAAU








AAG (SEQ ID

(SEQ ID NO:
GGCAG (SEQ ID








NO: 694)

718)
NO: 742)








GGCACAG
3225
22A
AUUCCUCAAA
46B
AUUCCUCAA
GGGCAAUACCAG
3184
3334
151


UGAAGAG


CCGAAUUUCA

ACCGAAUUU
AGAGGGCUACAG





CUUGAAA


AGCUCUUCAC

CAAGCUCUU
GACCCAAAUGAA





UUCGGU


UGUGCCGUU

CACUGUGCC
AGGGCCAUGGCA





UUGAGGA


AUAGUUAUG

GGACUUUAG
CAGUGAAGAGCU





AU (SEQ


AACAGAGGA

AACAGAGGA
UGAAAUUCGGUU





ID NO:


GACAUAACAU

GAUAAAGAU
UGAGGAAUGCCC





671)


GAACGGCACA

GGGCACAGU
AGGCACUAAGGU








AACGCCGUUA

GAAAAACCU
CCACGUGGAGGA








ACCUGGCGG

GGCGGCAGC
AACAUGUGGAAC








CAGCGCAAAA

GCAAAAG
GAGAGGACCAUC








G (SEQ ID NO:

(SEQ ID NO:
UCUGAGAUCAAC








695)

719)
CACUGCAAGC











(SEQ ID NO: 743)








CAUCUAA
6890
23A
UAUGGUUGC
47B
UAUGGUUGC
GGGAGUAGGUCU
6820
6952
133


UGGGAAG


CCCCUCCUCU

CCCCUCCUCU
UCUGGGCUUGAU





GAGAGAG


CUCCUUCCCA

CUCCUUCCC
UACCGCCAAUGA





GAGGGG


UUAGAUGGU

AUUAGAUGG
ACUCGGAUGGUU





GCAACCA


UAUAGUUAU

GACUUUAGA
GGAGAGAACAAA





UA (SEQ


GAACAGAGG

ACAGAGGAG
GAGUGACCUAAG





ID NO:


AGACAUAACA

AUAAAGAUG
CCAUCUAAUGGG





672)


UGAACCAUCU

CAUCUAAUG
AAGGAGAGAGGA








AAACAUGGU

GGAAACCUG
GGGGGCAACCAU








UAACCUGGC

GCGGCAGCG
AGGAUUCUCAAU








GGCAGCGCAA

CAAAAG (SEQ
GGACAUUGACCU








AAG (SEQ ID

ID NO: 720)
GCGG (SEQ ID








NO: 696)


NO: 744)








GAUAGGU
9620
24A
AUCAUUCAA
48B
AUCAUUCAA
GGGAUAGGCUCA
9561
9688
128


UUGCACA


GAACCUGAG

GAACCUGAG
AACGAAUGGCAG





UGCCCUC


GGCAUGUGC

GGCAUGUGC
UCAGUGGAGAUG





AGGUUCU


AAACCUAUCG

AAACCUAUC
AUUGCGUUGUGA





UGAAUGA


UUAUAGUUA

GGACUUUAG
AGCCAAUUGAUG





U (SEQ ID


UGAACAGAG

AACAGAGGA
AUAGGUUUGCAC





NO: 673)


GAGACAUAAC

GAUAAAGAU
AUGCCCUCAGGU








AUGAACGAU

GGAUAGGUU
UCUUGAAUGAUA








AGGAACAUC

UGCUAACCU
UGGGAAAAGUUA








GUUAACCUG

GGCGGCAGC
GGAAGGACACAC








GCGGCAGCG

GCAAAAG
AAGAGUGG (SEQ








CAAAAG (SEQ

(SEQ ID NO:
ID NO: 745)








ID NO: 697)

721)





NOTES:


1. The sequence GGG was added to the 5′ end of all sensor RNA and RNA fragment sequences for efficient expression by T7 RNA polymerase. If the RNA target sequence began with G or GG, only GG or G, respectively, was added to the 5′ end of the sequence. prefix is not shown in the sensor sequences in the table so that the target


2. The GGG RNA be readily identified.


3. The coding sequence of the reporter protein lacZ binding site can was after the switch RNA sequences in the tables. 4. Two Zika virus strains added immediately AY632535) (KU312312, have sufficient sequence homology to be detected using the same switch sensors toehold (27B, 32B).


5. Target RNAs fragments for sensors 7A/3 1B and 11A/35B have a GGGAGAAGG sequence added at the 5′ end.


6. Target RNA fragments for sensors 12A/36B have a GGGAGAAG sequence added at the 5′ end.














TABLE 7 







Zika virus
ACAGGUUUUAUUUUGGAUUUGGAAACGAGAGUUUCUGGUCAUGAAAAACCCAA


from the
AAAAGAAAUCCGGAGGAUUCCGGAUUGUCAAUAUGCUAAAACGCGGAGUAGCC


Americas
CGUGUGAGCCCCUUUGGGGGCUUGAAGAGGCUGCCAGCCGGACUUCUGCUGGG


genome
UCAUGGGCCCAUCAGGAUGGUCUUGGCGAUUCUAGCCUUUUUGAGAUUCACGG


sequence
CAAUCAAGCCAUCACUGGGUCUCAUCAAUAGAUGGGGUUCAGUGGGGAAAAAA


(Accession
GAGGCUAUGGAAAUAAUAAAGAAGUUCAAGAAAGAUCUGGCUGCCAUGCUGA


number:
GAAUAAUCAAUGCUAGGAAGGAGAAGAAGAGACGAGGCGCAGAUACUAGUGU


KU312312;
CGGAAUUGUUGGCCUCCUGCUGACCACAGCUAUGGCAGCGGAGGUCACUAGAC


10,374-nts)
GUGGGAGUGCAUACUAUAUGUACUUGGACAGAAACGAUGCUGGGGAGGCCAUA



UCUUUUCCAACCACAUUGGGGAUGAAUAAGUGUUAUAUACAGAUCAUGGAUCU



UGGACACACGUGUGAUGCCACCAUGAGCUAUGAAUGCCCUAUGCUGGAUGAGG



GGGUGGAACCAGAUGACGUCGAUUGUUGGUGCAACACGACGUCAACUUGGGUU



GUGUACGGAACCUGCCAUCACAAAAAAGGUGAAGCACGGAGAUCUAGAAGAGC



UGUGACGCUCCCCUCCCAUUCCACUAGGAAGCUGCAAACGCGGUCGCAAACCU



GGUUGGAAUCAAGAGAAUACACAAAGCACUUGAUUAGAGUCGAAAAUUGGAU



AUUCAGGAACCCUGGCUUCGCGUUAGCAGCAGCUGCCAUCGCUUGGCUUUUGG



GAAGCUCAACGAGCCAAAAAGUCAUAUACUUGGUCAUGAUACUGCUGAUUGCC



CCGGCAUACAGCAUCAGGUGCAUAGGAGUCAGCAAUAGGGACUUUGUGGAAGG



UAUGUCAGGUGGGACUUGGGUUGAUGUUGUCUUGGAACAUGGAGGUUGUGUC



ACUGUAAUGGCACAGGACAAACCGACUGUCGACAUAGAGCUGGUUACAACAAC



AGUCAGCAACAUGGCGGAGGUAAGAUCCUACUGCUAUGAGGCAUCAAUAUCAG



ACAUGGCUUCGGACAGCCGCUGCCCAACACAAGGUGAAGCCUACCUUGACAAG



CAAUCAGACACUCAAUAUGUCUGCAAAAGAACGUUAGUGGACAGAGGCUGGGG



AAAUGGAUGUGGACUUUUUGGCAAAGGGAGCCUGGUGACAUGCGCUAAGUUU



GCAUGCUCCAAGAAAAUGACCGGGAAGAGCAUCCAGCCAGAGAAUCUGGAGUA



CCGGAUAAUGCUGUCAGUUCAUGGCUCCCAGCACAGUGGGAUGAUCGUUAAUG



ACACAGGACAUGAAACUGAUGAGAAUAGAGCGAAAGUUGAGAUAACGCCCAAU



UCACCAAGAGCCGAAGCCACCCUGGGGGGGUUUGGAAGCCUAGGACUUGAUUG



UGAACCGAGGACAGGCCUUGACUUUUCAGAUUUGUAUUACUUGACUAUGAAUA



ACAAGCACUGGCUGGUUCACAAGGAGUGGUUCCACGACAUUCCAUUACCUUGG



CACGCUGGGGCAGACACCGGAACUCCACACUGGAACAACAAAGAAGCACUGGU



AGAGUUCAAGGACGCACAUGCCAAAAGGCAAACUGUCGUGGUUCUAGGGAGUC



AAGAAGGAGCAGUUCACACGGCCCUUGCUGGAGCUCUGGAGGCUGAGAUGGAU



GGUGCAAAGGGAAGGCUGUCCUCUGGCCACUUGAAAUGUCGCCUGAAAAUGGA



UAAACUUAGAUUGAAGGGCGUGUCAUACUCCUUGUGUACUGCAGCGUUCACAU



UCACCAAGAUCCCGGCUGAAACACUGCACGGGACAGUCACAGUGGAGGUACAG



UACGCAGGGACAGAUGGACCUUGCAAGGUUCCAGCUCAGAUGGCGGUGGACAU



GCAAACUCUGACCCCAGUUGGGAGGUUGAUAACCGCUAACCCCGUAAUCACUG



AAAGCACUGAGAACUCUAAGAUGAUGCUGGAACUUGAUCCACCAUUUGGGGAC



UCUUACAUUGUCAUAGGAGUCGGGGAGAAGAAGAUCACCCACCACUGGCACAG



GAGUGGCAGCACCAUUGGAAAAGCAUUUGAAGCCACUGUGAGAGGUGCCAAGA



GAAUGGCAGUCUUGGGAGACACAGCCUGGGACUUUGGAUCAGUUGGAGGCGCU



CUCAACUCAUUGGGCAAGGGCAUCCAUCAAAUCUUUGGAGCAGCUUUCAAAUC



AUUGUUUGGAGGAAUGUCCUGGUUCUCACAAAUUCUCAUUGGAACGUUGCUGA



UGUGGUUGGGUCUGAACGCAAAGAAUGGAUCUAUUUCCCUUAUGUGCUUGGCC



UUAGGGGGAGUGUUGAUCUUCUUAUCCACAGCCGUCUCUGCUGAUGUGGGGUG



CUCGGUGGACUUCUCAAAGAAGGAGACGAGAUGCGGUACAGGGGUGUUCGUCU



AUAACGACGUUGAAGCCUGGAGGGACAGGUACAAGUACCAUCCUGACUCCCCC



CGUAGAUUGGCAGCAGCAGUCAAGCAAGCCUGGGAAGAUGGUAUCUGCGGGAU



CUCCUCUGUUUCAAGAAUGGAAAACAUCAUGUGGAGAUCAGUAGAAGGGGAGC



UCAACGCAAUCCUGGAAGAGAAUGGAGUUCAACUGACGGUCGUUGUGGGAUCU



GUAAAAAACCCCAUGUGGAGAGGUCCACAGAGAUUGCCCGUGCCUGUGAACGA



GCUGCCCCACGGCUGGAAGGCUUGGGGGAAAUCGUACUUCGUCAGAGCAGCAA



AGACAAAUAACAGCUUUGUCGUGGAUGGUGACACACUGAAGGAAUGCCCACUC



AAACAUAGAGCAUGGAACAGCUUUCUUGUGGAGGAUCAUGGGUUCGGGGUAU



UUCACACUAGUGUCUGGCUCAAGGUUAGAGAAGAUUAUUCAUUAGAGUGUGA



UCCAGCCGUUAUUGGAACAGCUGUUAAGGGAAAGGAGGCUGUACACAGUGAUC



UAGGCUACUGGAUUGAGAGUGAGAAGAAUGACACAUGGAGGCUGAAGAGGGC



CCAUCUGAUCGAGAUGAAAACAUGUGAAUGGCCAAAGUCCCACACAUUGUGGA



CAGAUGGAAUAGAAGAGAGUGAUCUGAUCAUACCCAAGUCUUUAGCUGGGCCA



CUCAGCCAUCACAAUACCAGAGAGGGCUACAGGACCCAAAUGAAAGGGCCAUG



GCACAGUGAAGAGCUUGAAAUUCGGUUUGAGGAAUGCCCAGGCACUAAGGUCC



ACGUGGAGGAAACAUGUGGAACGAGAGGACCAUCUCUGAGAUCAACCACUGCA



AGCGGAAGGGUGAUCGAGGAAUGGUGCUGCAGGGAGUGCACAAUGCCCCCACU



GUCGUUCCGGGCUAAAGAUGGCUGUUGGUAUGGAAUGGAGAUAAGGCCCAGGA



AAGAACCAGAAAGCAACUUAGUAAGGUCAAUGGUGACUGCAGGAUCAACUGAU



CACAUGGACCACUUCUCCCUUGGAGUGCUUGUGAUUCUGCUCAUGGUGCAGGA



AGGGUUGAAGAAGAGAAUGACCACAAAGAUCAUCAUAAGCACAUCAAUGGCAG



UGCUGGUAGCUAUGAUCCUGGGAGGAUUUUCAAUGAGUGACCUGGCUAAGCUU



GCAAUUUUGAUGGGUGCCACCUUCGCGGAAAUGAACACUGGAGGAGAUGUAGC



UCAUCUGGCGCUGAUAGCGGCAUUCAAAGUCAGACCAGCGUUGCUGGUAUCUU



UCAUCUUCAGAGCUAAUUGGACACCCCGUGAAAGCAUGCUGCUGGCCUUGGCC



UCGUGUCUUUUGCAAACUGCGAUCUCCGCCUUGGAAGGCGACCUGAUGGUUCU



CAUCAAUGGUUUUGCUUUGGCCUGGUUGGCAAUACGAGCGAUGGUUGUUCCAC



GCACUGAUAACAUCACCUUGGCAAUCCUGGCUGCUCUGACACCACUGGCCCGG



GGCACACUGCUUGUGGCGUGGAGAGCAGGCCUUGCUACUUGCGGGGGGUUUAU



GCUCCUCUCUCUGAAGGGAAAAGGCAGUGUGAAGAAGAACUUACCAUUUGUCA



UGGCCCUGGGACUAACCGCUGUGAGGCUGGUCGACCCCAUCAACGUGGUGGGA



CUGCUGUUGCUCACAAGGAGUGGGAAGCGGAGCUGGCCCCCUAGCGAAGUACU



CACAGCUGUUGGCCUGAUAUGCGCAUUGGCUGGAGGGUUCGCCAAGGCAGAUA



UAGAGAUGGCUGGGCCCAUGGCCGCGGUCGGUCUGCUAAUUGUCAGUUACGUG



GUCUCAGGAAAGAGUGUGGACAUGUACAUUGAAAGAGCAGGUGACAUCACAUG



GGAAAAAGAUGCGGAAGUCACUGGAAACAGUCCCCGGCUCGAUGUGGCGCUAG



AUGAGAGUGGUGAUUUCUCCCUGGUGGAGGAUGACGGUCCCCCCAUGAGAGAG



AUCAUACUCAAGGUGGUCCUGAUGACCAUCUGUGGCAUGAACCCAAUAGCCAU



ACCCUUUGCAGCUGGAGCGUGGUACGUAUACGUGAAGACUGGAAAAAGGAGUG



GUGCUCUAUGGGAUGUGCCUGCUCCCAAGGAAGUAAAAAAGGGGGAGACCACA



GAUGGAGUGUACAGAGUAAUGACUCGUAGACUGCUAGGUUCAACACAAGUUGG



AGUGGGAGUUAUGCAAGAGGGGGUCUUUCACACUAUGUGGCACGUCACAAAAG



GAUCCGCGCUGAGAAGCGGUGAAGGGAGACUUGAUCCAUACUGGGGAGAUGUC



AAGCAGGAUCUGGUGUCAUACUGUGGUCCAUGGAAGCUAGAUGCCGCCUGGGA



CGGGCACAGCGAGGUGCAGCUCUUGGCCGUGCCCCCCGGAGAGAGAGCGAGGA



ACAUCCAGACUCUGCCCGGAAUAUUUAAGACAAAGGAUGGGGACAUUGGAGCG



GUUGCGCUGGAUUACCCAGCAGGAACUUCAGGAUCUCCUAUCCUAGACAAGUG



UGGGAGAGUGAUAGGACUUUAUGGCAAUGGGGUCGUGAUCAAAAAUGGGAGU



UAUGUUAGUGCCAUCACCCAAGGGAGGAGGGAGGAAGAGACUCCUGUUGAGUG



CUUCGAGCCUUCGAUGCUGAAGAAGAAGCAGCUAACUGUCUUAGACUUGCAUC



CUGGAGCUGGGAAAACCAGGAGAGUUCUUCCUGAAAUAGUCCGUGAAGCCAUA



AAAACAAGACUCCGUACUGUGAUCUUAGCUCCAACCAGGGUUGUCGCUGCUGA



AAUGGAGGAGGCCCUUAGAGGGCUUCCAGUGCGUUAUAUGACAACAGCAGUCA



AUGUCACCCACUCUGGAACAGAAAUCGUCGACUUAAUGUGCCAUGCCACCUUC



ACUUCGCGUCUACUACAGCCAAUCAGAGUCCCCAACUAUAAUCUGUAUAUUAU



GGAUGAGGCCCACUUCACAGAUCCCUCAAGUAUAGCAGCAAGAGGAUACAUUU



CAACAAGGGUUGAGAUGGGCGAGGCGGCCGCCAUCUUCAUGACCGCCACGCCA



CCAGGAACCCGUGACGCAUUUCCGGACUCCAACUCACCAAUUAUGGACACCGA



AGUGGAAGUCCCAGAGAGAGCCUGGAGCUCAGGCUUUGAUUGGGUGACGGAUC



AUUCUGGAAAAACAGUUUGGUUUGUUCCAAGCGUGAGGAACGGCAAUGAGAUC



GCAGCUUGUCUGACAAAGGCUGGAAAACGGGUCAUACAGCUCAGCAGAAAGAC



UUUUGAGACAGAGUUCCAGAAAACAAAACAUCAAGAGUGGGACUUUGUCGUGA



CAACUGACAUUUCAGAGAUGGGCGCCAACUUUAAAGCUGACCGUGUCAUAGAU



UCCAGGAGAUGCCUAAAGCCGGUCAUACUUGAUGGCGAGAGAGUCAUUCUGGC



UGGACCCAUGCCUGUCACACAUGCCAGCGCUGCCCAGAGGAGGGGGCGCAUAG



GCAGGAAUCCCAACAAACCUGGAGAUGAGUAUCUGUAUGGAGGUGGGUGCGCA



GAGACUGACGAAGACCAUGCACACUGGCUUGAAGCAAGAAUGCUCCUUGACAA



UAUUUACCUCCAAGAUGGCCUCAUAGCCUCGCUCUAUCGACCUGAGGCCGACA



AAGUAGCAGCCAUUGAGGGAGAGUUCAAGCUUAGGACGGAGCAAAGGAAGACC



UUUGUGGAACUCAUGAAAAGAGGAGAUCUUCCUGUUUGGCUGGCCUAUCAGGU



UGCAUCUGCCGGAAUAACCUACACAGAUAGAAGAUGGUGCUUUGAUGGCACGA



CCAACAACACCAUAAUGGAAGACAGUGUGCCGGCAGAAGUGUGGACCAGACAC



GGAGAGAAAAGAGUGCUCAAACCGAGGUGGAUGGACGCCAGAGUUUGUUCAGA



UCAUGCGGCCCUGAAGUCAUUCAAGGAGUUUGCCGCUGGGAAAAGAGGAGCGG



CUUUUGGAGUGAUGGAAGCCCUGGGAACACUGCCAGGACACAUGACAGAGAGA



UUCCAGGAAGCCAUUGACAACCUCGCUGUGCUCAUGCGGGCAGAGACUGGAAG



CAGGCCUUACAAAGCCGCGGCGGCCCAAUUGCCGGAGACCCUAGAGACCAUUA



UGCUUUUGGGGUUGCUGGGAACAGUCUCGCUGGGAAUCUUCUUCGUCUUGAUG



AGGAACAAGGGCAUAGGGAAGAUGGGCUUUGGAAUGGUGACUCUUGGGGCCA



GCGCAUGGCUCAUGUGGCUCUCGGAAAUUGAGCCAGCCAGAAUUGCAUGUGUC



CUCAUUGUUGUGUUCCUAUUGCUGGUGGUGCUCAUACCUGAGCCAGAAAAGCA



AAGAUCUCCCCAGGACAACCAAAUGGCAAUCAUCAUCAUGGUAGCAGUAGGUC



UUCUGGGCUUGAUUACCGCCAAUGAACUCGGAUGGUUGGAGAGAACAAAGAGU



GACCUAAGCCAUCUAAUGGGAAGGAGAGAGGAGGGGGCAACCAUAGGAUUCUC



AAUGGACAUUGACCUGCGGCCAGCCUCAGCUUGGGCCAUCUAUGCUGCCUUGA



CAACUUUCAUUACCCCAGCCGUCCAACAUGCAGUGACCACCUCAUACAACAACU



ACUCCUUAAUGGCGAUGGCCACGCAAGCUGGAGUGUUGUUUGGUAUGGGCAAA



GGGAUGCCAUUCUACGCAUGGGACUUUGGAGUCCCGCUGCUAAUGAUAGGUUG



CUACUCACAAUUAACACCCCUGACCCUAAUAGUGGCCAUCAUUUUGCUCGUGG



CGCACUACAUGUACUUGAUCCCAGGGCUGCAGGCAGCAGCUGCGCGUGCUGCC



CAGAAGAGAACGGCAGCUGGCAUCAUGAAGAACCCUGUUGUGGAUGGAAUAGU



GGUGACUGACAUUGACACAAUGACAAUUGACCCCCAAGUGGAGAAAAAGAUGG



GACAGGUGCUACUCAUAGCAGUAGCCGUCUCCAGCGCCAUACUGUCGCGGACC



GCCUGGGGGUGGGGGGAGGCUGGGGCCCUGAUCACAGCCGCAACUUCCACUUU



GUGGGAAGGCUCUCCGAACAAGUACUGGAACUCCUCUACAGCCACUUCACUGU



GUAACAUUUUUAGGGGAAGUUACUUGGCUGGAGCUUCUCUAAUCUACACAGUA



ACAAGAAACGCUGGCUUGGUCAAGAGACGUGGGGGUGGAACAGGAGAGACCCU



GGGAGAGAAAUGGAAGGCCCGCUUGAACCAGAUGUCGGCCCUGGAGUUCUACU



CCUACAAAAAGUCAGGCAUCACCGAGGUGUGCAGAGAAGAGGCCCGCCGCGCC



CUCAAGGACGGUGUGGCAACGGGAGGCCAUGCUGUGUCCCGAGGAAGUGCAAA



GCUGAGAUGGUUGGUGGAGCGGGGAUACCUGCAGCCCUAUGGAAAGGUCAUUG



AUCUUGGAUGUGGCAGAGGGGGCUGGAGUUACUACGCCGCCACCAUCCGCAAA



GUUCAAGAAGUGAAAGGAUACACAAAAGGAGGCCCUGGUCAUGAAGAACCCGU



GUUGGUGCAAAGCUAUGGGUGGAACAUAGUCCGUCUUAAGAGUGGGGUGGAC



GUCUUUCAUAUGGCGGCUGAGCCGUGUGACACGUUGCUGUGUGACAUAGGUGA



GUCAUCAUCUAGUCCUGAAGUGGAAGAAGCACGGACGCUCAGAGUCCUCUCCA



UGGUGGGGGAUUGGCUUGAAAAAAGACCAGGAGCCUUUUGUAUAAAAGUGUU



GUGCCCAUACACCAGCACUAUGAUGGAAACCCUGGAGCGACUGCAGCGUAGGU



AUGGGGGAGGACUGGUCAGAGUGCCACUCUCCCGCAACUCUACACAUGAGAUG



UACUGGGUCUCUGGAGCGAAAAGCAACACCAUAAAAAGUGUGUCCACCACGAG



CCAGCUCCUCUUGGGGCGCAUGGACGGGCCUAGGAGGCCAGUGAAAUAUGAGG



AGGAUGUGAAUCUCGGCUCUGGCACGCGGGCUGUGGUAAGCUGCGCUGAAGCU



CCCAACAUGAAGAUCAUUGGUAACCGCAUUGAAAGGAUCCGCAGUGAGCACGC



GGAAACGUGGUUCUUUGACGAGAACCACCCAUAUAGGACAUGGGCUUACCAUG



GAAGCUAUGAGGCCCCCACACAAGGGUCAGCGUCCUCUCUAAUAAACGGGGUU



GUCAGGCUCCUGUCAAAACCCUGGGAUGUGGUGACUGGAGUCACAGGAAUAGC



CAUGACCGACACCACACCGUAUGGUCAGCAAAGAGUUUUCAAGGAAAAAGUGG



ACACUAGGGUGCCAGACCCCCAAGAAGGCACUCGUCAGGUUAUGAGCAUGGUC



UCUUCCUGGUUGUGGAAAGAGCUAGGCAAACACAAACGGCCACGAGUCUGUAC



CAAAGAAGAGUUCAUCAACAAGGUUCGUAGCAAUGCAGCAUUAGGGGCAAUAU



UUGAAGAGGAAAAAGAGUGGAAGACUGCAGUGGAAGCUGUGAACGAUCCAAG



GUUCUGGGCUCUAGUGGACAAGGAAAGAGAGCACCACCUGAGAGGAGAGUGCC



AGAGUUGUGUGUACAACAUGAUGGGAAAAAGAGAAAAGAAACAAGGGGAAUU



UGGAAAGGCCAAGGGCAGCCGCGCCAUCUGGUAUAUGUGGCUAGGGGCUAGAU



UUCUAGAGUUCGAAGCCCUUGGAUUCUUGAACGAGGAUCACUGGAUGGGGAGA



GAGAACUCAGGAGGUGGUGUUGAAGGGCUGGGAUUACAAAGACUCGGAUAUG



UCCUAGAAGAGAUGAGUCGUAUACCAGGAGGAAGGAUGUAUGCAGAUGACACU



GCUGGCUGGGACACCCGCAUUAGCAGGUUUGAUCUGGAGAAUGAAGCUCUAAU



CACCAACCAAAUGGAGAAAGGGCACAGGGCCUUGGCAUUGGCCAUAAUCAAGU



ACACAUACCAAAACAAAGUGGUAAAGGUCCUUAGACCAGCUGAAAAAGGGAAA



ACAGUUAUGGACAUUAUUUCGAGACAAGACCAAAGGGGGAGCGGACAAGUUGU



CACUUACGCUCUUAACACAUUUACCAACCUAGUGGUGCAACUCAUUCGGAAUA



UGGAGGCUGAGGAAGUUCUAGAGAUGCAAGACUUGUGGCUGCUGCGGAGGUCA



GAGAAAGUGACUAACUGGUUGCAGAGCAACGGAUGGGAUAGGCUCAAACGAAU



GGCAGUCAGUGGAGAUGAUUGCGUUGUGAAGCCAAUUGAUGAUAGGUUUGCA



CAUGCCCUCAGGUUCUUGAAUGAUAUGGGAAAAGUUAGGAAGGACACACAAGA



GUGGAAACCCUCAACUGGAUGGGACAACUGGGAAGAAGUUCCGUUUUGCUCCC



ACCACUUCAACAAGCUCCAUCUCAAGGACGGGAGGUCCAUUGUGGUUCCCUGC



CGCCACCAAGAUGAACUGAUUGGCCGGGCCCGCGUCUCUCCAGGGGCGGGAUG



GAGCAUCCGGGAGACUGCUUGCCUAGCAAAAUCAUAUGCGCAAAUGUGGCAGC



UCCUUUAUUUCCACAGAAGGGACCUCCGACUGAUGGCCAAUGCCAUUUGUUCA



UCUGUGCCAGUUGACUGGGUUCCAACUGGGAGAACUACCUGGUCAAUCCAUGG



AAAGGGAGAAUGGAUGACCACUGAAGACAUGCUUGUGGUGUGGAACAGAGUG



UGGAUUGAGGAGAACGACCACAUGGAAGACAAGACCCCAGUUACGAAAUGGAC



AGACAUUCCCUAUUUGGGAAAAAGGGAAGACUUGUGGUGUGGAUCUCUCAUAG



GGCACAGACCGCGCACCACCUGGGCUGAGAACAUUAAAAACACAGUCAACAUG



GUGCGCAGGAUCAUAGGUGAUGAAGAAAAGUACAUGGACUACCUAUCCACCCA



AGUUCGCUACUUGGGUGAAGAAGGGUCUACACCUGGAGUGCUGUAAGCACCAA



UCUUAAUGUUGUCAGGCCUGCUAGUCAGCCACAGCUUGGGGAAAGCUGUGCAG



CC (SEQ ID NO: 746)





MR 766
AGUUGUUGAUCUGUGUGAGUCAGACUGCGACAGUUCGAGUCUGAAGCGAGAGC


Zika virus
UAACAACAGUAUCAACAGGUUUAAUUUGGAUUUGGAAACGAGAGUUUCUGGU


genome,
CAUGAAAAACCCCAAAGAAGAAAUCCGGAGGAUCCGGAUUGUCAAUAUGCUAA


Uganda
AACGCGGAGUAGCCCGUGUAAACCCCUUGGGAGGUUUGAAGAGGUUGCCAGCC


1947
GGACUUCUGCUGGGUCAUGGACCCAUCAGAAUGGUUUUGGCGAUACUAGCCUU


(Accession
UUUGAGAUUUACAGCAAUCAAGCCAUCACUGGGCCUUAUCAACAGAUGGGGUU


number:
CCGUGGGGAAAAAAGAGGCUAUGGAAAUAAUAAAGAAGUUCAAGAAAGAUCU


AY632535;
UGCUGCCAUGUUGAGAAUAAUCAAUGCUAGGAAAGAGAGGAAGAGACGUGGC


10,794-nts)
GCAGACACCAGCAUCGGAAUCAUUGGCCUCCUGCUGACUACAGCCAUGGCAGC



AGAGAUCACUAGACGCGGGAGUGCAUACUACAUGUACUUGGAUAGGAGCGAUG



CCGGGAAGGCCAUUUCGUUUGCUACCACAUUGGGAGUGAACAAGUGCCACGUA



CAGAUCAUGGACCUCGGGCACAUGUGUGACGCCACCAUGAGUUAUGAGUGCCC



UAUGCUGGAUGAGGGAGUGGAACCAGAUGAUGUCGAUUGCUGGUGCAACACGA



CAUCAACUUGGGUUGUGUACGGAACCUGUCAUCACAAAAAAGGUGAGGCACGG



CGAUCUAGAAGAGCCGUGACGCUCCCUUCUCACUCUACAAGGAAGUUGCAAAC



GCGGUCGCAGACCUGGUUAGAAUCAAGAGAAUACACGAAGCACUUGAUCAAGG



UUGAAAACUGGAUAUUCAGGAACCCCGGGUUUGCGCUAGUGGCCGUUGCCAUU



GCCUGGCUUUUGGGAAGCUCGACGAGCCAAAAAGUCAUAUACUUGGUCAUGAU



ACUGCUGAUUGCCCCGGCAUACAGUAUCAGGUGCAUUGGAGUCAGCAAUAGAG



ACUUCGUGGAGGGCAUGUCAGGUGGGACCUGGGUUGAUGUUGUCUUGGAACAU



GGAGGCUGCGUUACCGUGAUGGCACAGGACAAGCCAACAGUCGACAUAGAGUU



GGUCACGACGACGGUUAGUAACAUGGCCGAGGUAAGAUCCUAUUGCUACGAGG



CAUCGAUAUCGGACAUGGCUUCGGACAGUCGUUGCCCAACACAAGGUGAAGCC



UACCUUGACAAGCAAUCAGACACUCAAUAUGUCUGCAAAAGAACAUUAGUGGA



CAGAGGUUGGGGAAACGGUUGUGGACUUUUUGGCAAAGGGAGCUUGGUGACA



UGUGCCAAGUUUACGUGUUCUAAGAAGAUGACCGGGAAGAGCAUUCAACCGGA



AAAUCUGGAGUAUCGGAUAAUGCUAUCAGUGCAUGGCUCCCAGCAUAGCGGGA



UGAUUGGAUAUGAAACUGACGAAGAUAGAGCGAAAGUCGAGGUUACGCCUAA



UUCACCAAGAGCGGAAGCAACCUUGGGAGGCUUUGGAAGCUUAGGACUUGACU



GUGAACCAAGGACAGGCCUUGACUUUUCAGAUCUGUAUUACCUGACCAUGAAC



AAUAAGCAUUGGUUGGUGCACAAAGAGUGGUUUCAUGACAUCCCAUUGCCUUG



GCAUGCUGGGGCAGACACCGGAACUCCACACUGGAACAACAAAGAGGCAUUGG



UAGAAUUCAAGGAUGCCCACGCCAAGAGGCAAACCGUCGUCGUUCUGGGGAGC



CAGGAAGGAGCCGUUCACACGGCUCUCGCUGGAGCUCUAGAGGCUGAGAUGGA



UGGUGCAAAGGGAAGGCUGUUCUCUGGCCAUUUGAAAUGCCGCCUAAAAAUGG



ACAAGCUUAGAUUGAAGGGCGUGUCAUAUUCCUUGUGCACUGCGGCAUUCACA



UUCACCAAGGUCCCAGCUGAAACACUGCAUGGAACAGUCACAGUGGAGGUGCA



GUAUGCAGGGACAGAUGGACCCUGCAAGAUCCCAGUCCAGAUGGCGGUGGACA



UGCAGACCCUGACCCCAGUUGGAAGGCUGAUAACCGCCAACCCCGUGAUUACU



GAAAGCACUGAGAACUCAAAGAUGAUGUUGGAGCUUGACCCACCAUUUGGGGA



UUCUUACAUUGUCAUAGGAGUUGGGGACAAGAAAAUCACCCACCACUGGCAUA



GGAGUGGUAGCACCAUCGGAAAGGCAUUUGAGGCCACUGUGAGAGGCGCCAAG



AGAAUGGCAGUCCUGGGGGAUACAGCCUGGGACUUCGGAUCAGUCGGGGGUGU



GUUCAACUCACUGGGUAAGGGCAUUCACCAGAUUUUUGGAGCAGCCUUCAAAU



CACUGUUUGGAGGAAUGUCCUGGUUCUCACAGAUCCUCAUAGGCACGCUGCUA



GUGUGGUUAGGUUUGAACACAAAGAAUGGAUCUAUCUCCCUCACAUGCUUGGC



CCUGGGGGGAGUGAUGAUCUUCCUCUCCACGGCUGUUUCUGCUGACGUGGGGU



GCUCAGUGGACUUCUCAAAAAAGGAAACGAGAUGUGGCACGGGGGUAUUCAUC



UAUAAUGAUGUUGAAGCCUGGAGGGACCGGUACAAGUACCAUCCUGACUCCCC



CCGCAGAUUGGCAGCAGCAGUCAAGCAGGCCUGGGAAGAGGGGAUCUGUGGGA



UCUCAUCCGUUUCAAGAAUGGAAAACAUCAUGUGGAAAUCAGUAGAAGGGGAG



CUCAAUGCUAUCCUAGAGGAGAAUGGAGUUCAACUGACAGUUGUUGUGGGAUC



UGUAAAAAACCCCAUGUGGAGAGGUCCACAAAGAUUGCCAGUGCCUGUGAAUG



AGCUGCCCCAUGGCUGGAAAGCCUGGGGGAAAUCGUAUUUUGUUAGGGCGGCA



AAGACCAACAACAGUUUUGUUGUCGACGGUGACACACUGAAGGAAUGUCCGCU



UGAGCACAGAGCAUGGAAUAGUUUUCUUGUGGAGGAUCACGGGUUUGGAGUC



UUCCACACCAGUGUCUGGCUUAAGGUCAGAGAAGAUUACUCAUUAGAAUGUGA



CCCAGCCGUCAUAGGAACAGCUGUUAAGGGAAGGGAGGCCGCGCACAGUGAUC



UGGGCUAUUGGAUUGAAAGUGAAAAGAAUGACACAUGGAGGCUGAAGAGGGC



CCACCUGAUUGAGAUGAAAACAUGUGAAUGGCCAAAGUCUCACACAUUGUGGA



CAGAUGGAGUAGAAGAAAGUGAUCUUAUCAUACCCAAGUCUUUAGCUGGUCCA



CUCAGCCACCACAACACCAGAGAGGGUUACAGAACCCAAGUGAAAGGGCCAUG



GCACAGUGAAGAGCUUGAAAUCCGGUUUGAGGAAUGUCCAGGCACCAAGGUUU



ACGUGGAGGAGACAUGCGGAACUAGAGGACCAUCUCUGAGAUCAACUACUGCA



AGUGGAAGGGUCAUUGAGGAAUGGUGCUGUAGGGAAUGCACAAUGCCCCCACU



AUCGUUUCGAGCAAAAGACGGCUGCUGGUAUGGAAUGGAGAUAAGGCCCAGGA



AAGAACCAGAGAGCAACUUAGUGAGGUCAAUGGUGACAGCGGGGUCAACCGAU



CAUAUGGACCACUUCUCUCUUGGAGUGCUUGUGAUUCUACUCAUGGUGCAGGA



GGGGUUGAAGAAGAGAAUGACCACAAAGAUCAUCAUGAGCACAUCAAUGGCAG



UGCUGGUAGUCAUGAUCUUGGGAGGAUUUUCAAUGAGUGACCUGGCCAAGCUU



GUGAUCCUGAUGGGUGCUACUUUCGCAGAAAUGAACACUGGAGGAGAUGUAGC



UCACUUGGCAUUGGUAGCGGCAUUUAAAGUCAGACCAGCCUUGCUGGUCUCCU



UCAUUUUCAGAGCCAAUUGGACACCCCGUGAGAGCAUGCUGCUAGCCCUGGCU



UCGUGUCUUCUGCAAACUGCGAUCUCUGCUCUUGAAGGUGACUUGAUGGUCCU



CAUUAAUGGAUUUGCUUUGGCCUGGUUGGCAAUUCGAGCAAUGGCCGUGCCAC



GCACUGACAACAUCGCUCUACCAAUCUUGGCUGCUCUAACACCACUAGCUCGA



GGCACACUGCUCGUGGCAUGGAGAGCGGGCCUGGCUACUUGUGGAGGGAUCAU



GCUCCUCUCCCUGAAAGGGAAAGGUAGUGUGAAGAAGAACCUGCCAUUUGUCA



UGGCCCUGGGAUUGACAGCUGUGAGGGUAGUAGACCCUAUUAAUGUGGUAGGA



CUACUGUUACUCACAAGGAGUGGGAAGCGGAGCUGGCCCCCUAGUGAAGUUCU



CACAGCCGUUGGCCUGAUAUGUGCACUGGCCGGAGGGUUUGCCAAGGCAGACA



UUGAGAUGGCUGGACCCAUGGCUGCAGUAGGCUUGCUAAUUGUCAGCUAUGUG



GUCUCGGGAAAGAGUGUGGACAUGUACAUUGAAAGAGCAGGUGACAUCACAUG



GGAAAAGGACGCGGAAGUCACUGGAAACAGUCCUCGGCUUGACGUGGCACUGG



AUGAGAGUGGUGACUUCUCCUUGGUAGAGGAAGAUGGUCCACCCAUGAGAGAG



AUCAUACUCAAGGUGGUCCUGAUGGCCAUCUGUGGCAUGAACCCAAUAGCUAU



ACCUUUUGCUGCAGGAGCGUGGUAUGUGUAUGUGAAGACUGGGAAAAGGAGU



GGCGCCCUCUGGGACGUGCCUGCUCCCAAAGAAGUGAAGAAAGGAGAGACCAC



AGAUGGAGUGUACAGAGUGAUGACUCGCAGACUGCUAGGUUCAACACAGGUUG



GAGUGGGAGUCAUGCAAGAGGGAGUCUUCCACACCAUGUGGCACGUUACAAAA



GGAGCCGCACUGAGGAGCGGUGAGGGAAGACUUGAUCCAUACUGGGGGGAUGU



CAAGCAGGACUUGGUGUCAUACUGUGGGCCUUGGAAGUUGGAUGCAGCUUGGG



AUGGACUCAGCGAGGUACAGCUUUUGGCCGUACCUCCCGGAGAGAGGGCCAGA



AACAUUCAGACCCUGCCUGGAAUAUUCAAGACAAAGGACGGGGACAUCGGAGC



AGUUGCUCUGGACUACCCUGCAGGGACCUCAGGAUCUCCGAUCCUAGACAAAU



GUGGAAGAGUGAUAGGACUCUAUGGCAAUGGGGUUGUGAUCAAGAAUGGAAG



CUAUGUUAGUGCUAUAACCCAGGGAAAGAGGGAGGAGGAGACUCCGGUUGAAU



GUUUCGAACCCUCGAUGCUGAAGAAGAAGCAGCUAACUGUCUUGGAUCUGCAU



CCAGGAGCCGGAAAAACCAGGAGAGUUCUUCCUGAAAUAGUCCGUGAAGCCAU



AAAAAAGAGACUCCGGACAGUGAUCUUGGCACCAACUAGGGUUGUCGCUGCUG



AGAUGGAGGAGGCCUUGAGAGGACUUCCGGUGCGUUACAUGACAACAGCAGUC



AACGUCACCCAUUCUGGGACAGAAAUCGUUGAUUUGAUGUGCCAUGCCACUUU



CACUUCACGCUUACUACAACCCAUCAGAGUCCCUAAUUACAAUCUCAACAUCA



UGGAUGAAGCCCACUUCACAGACCCCUCAAGUAUAGCUGCAAGAGGAUACAUA



UCAACAAGGGUUGAAAUGGGCGAGGCGGCUGCCAUUUUUAUGACUGCCACACC



ACCAGGAACCCGUGAUGCGUUUCCUGACUCUAACUCACCAAUCAUGGACACAG



AAGUGGAAGUCCCAGAGAGAGCCUGGAGCUCAGGCUUUGAUUGGGUGACAGAC



CAUUCUGGGAAAACAGUUUGGUUCGUUCCAAGCGUGAGAAACGGAAAUGAAAU



CGCAGCCUGUCUGACAAAGGCUGGAAAGCGGGUCAUACAGCUCAGCAGGAAGA



CUUUUGAGACAGAAUUUCAGAAAACAAAAAAUCAAGAGUGGGACUUUGUCAU



AACAACUGACAUCUCAGAGAUGGGCGCCAACUUCAAGGCUGACCGGGUCAUAG



ACUCUAGGAGAUGCCUAAAACCAGUCAUACUUGAUGGUGAGAGAGUCAUCUUG



GCUGGGCCCAUGCCUGUCACGCAUGCUAGUGCUGCUCAGAGGAGAGGACGUAU



AGGCAGGAACCCUAACAAACCUGGAGAUGAGUACAUGUAUGGAGGUGGGUGUG



CAGAGACUGAUGAAGGCCAUGCACACUGGCUUGAAGCAAGAAUGCUUCUUGAC



AACAUCUACCUCCAGGAUGGCCUCAUAGCCUCGCUCUAUCGGCCUGAGGCCGA



UAAGGUAGCCGCCAUUGAGGGAGAGUUUAAGCUGAGGACAGAGCAAAGGAAG



ACCUUCGUGGAACUCAUGAAGAGAGGAGACCUUCCCGUCUGGCUAGCCUAUCA



GGUUGCAUCUGCCGGAAUAACUUACACAGACAGAAGAUGGUGCUUUGAUGGCA



CAACCAACAACACCAUAAUGGAAGACAGUGUACCAGCAGAGGUUUGGACAAAG



UAUGGAGAGAAGAGAGUGCUCAAACCGAGAUGGAUGGAUGCUAGGGUCUGUU



CAGACCAUGCGGCCCUGAAGUCGUUCAAAGAAUUCGCCGCUGGAAAAAGAGGA



GCGGCUUUGGGAGUAAUGGAGGCCCUGGGAACACUGCCAGGACACAUGACAGA



GAGGUUUCAGGAAGCCAUUGACAACCUCGCCGUGCUCAUGCGAGCAGAGACUG



GAAGCAGGCCUUAUAAGGCAGCGGCAGCCCAACUGCCGGAGACCCUAGAGACC



AUUAUGCUCUUAGGUUUGCUGGGAACAGUUUCACUGGGGAUCUUCUUCGUCUU



GAUGCGGAAUAAGGGCAUCGGGAAGAUGGGCUUUGGAAUGGUAACCCUUGGG



GCCAGUGCAUGGCUCAUGUGGCUUUCGGAAAUUGAACCAGCCAGAAUUGCAUG



UGUCCUCAUUGUUGUGUUUUUAUUACUGGUGGUGCUCAUACCCGAGCCAGAGA



AGCAAAGAUCUCCCCAAGAUAACCAGAUGGCAAUUAUCAUCAUGGUGGCAGUG



GGCCUUCUAGGUUUGAUAACUGCAAACGAACUUGGAUGGCUGGAAAGAACAAA



AAAUGACAUAGCUCAUCUAAUGGGAAGGAGAGAAGAAGGAGCAACCAUGGGA



UUCUCAAUGGACAUUGAUCUGCGGCCAGCCUCCGCCUGGGCUAUCUAUGCCGC



AUUGACAACUCUCAUCACCCCAGCUGUCCAACAUGCGGUAACCACUUCAUACA



ACAACUACUCCUUAAUGGCGAUGGCCACACAAGCUGGAGUGCUGUUUGGCAUG



GGCAAAGGGAUGCCAUUUAUGCAUGGGGACCUUGGAGUCCCGCUGCUAAUGAU



GGGUUGCUAUUCACAAUUAACACCCCUGACUCUGAUAGUAGCUAUCAUUCUGC



UUGUGGCGCACUACAUGUACUUGAUCCCAGGCCUACAAGCGGCAGCAGCGCGU



GCUGCCCAGAAAAGGACAGCAGCUGGCAUCAUGAAGAAUCCCGUUGUGGAUGG



AAUAGUGGUAACUGACAUUGACACAAUGACAAUAGACCCCCAGGUGGAGAAGA



AGAUGGGACAAGUGUUACUCAUAGCAGUAGCCAUCUCCAGUGCUGUGCUGCUG



CGGACCGCCUGGGGAUGGGGGGAGGCUGGAGCUCUGAUCACAGCAGCGACCUC



CACCUUGUGGGAAGGCUCUCCAAACAAAUACUGGAACUCCUCUACAGCCACCU



CACUGUGCAACAUCUUCAGAGGAAGCUAUCUGGCAGGAGCUUCCCUUAUCUAU



ACAGUGACGAGAAACGCUGGCCUGGUUAAGAGACGUGGAGGUGGGACGGGAGA



GACUCUGGGAGAGAAGUGGAAAGCUCGUCUGAAUCAGAUGUCGGCCCUGGAGU



UCUACUCUUAUAAAAAGUCAGGUAUCACUGAAGUGUGUAGAGAGGAGGCUCGC



CGUGCCCUCAAGGAUGGAGUGGCCACAGGAGGACAUGCCGUAUCCCGGGGAAG



UGCAAAGAUCAGAUGGUUGGAGGAGAGAGGAUAUCUGCAGCCCUAUGGGAAG



GUUGUUGACCUCGGAUGUGGCAGAGGGGGCUGGAGCUAUUAUGCCGCCACCAU



CCGCAAAGUGCAGGAGGUGAGAGGAUACACAAAGGGAGGUCCCGGUCAUGAAG



AACCCAUGCUGGUGCAAAGCUAUGGGUGGAACAUAGUUCGUCUCAAGAGUGGA



GUGGACGUCUUCCACAUGGCGGCUGAGCCGUGUGACACUCUGCUGUGUGACAU



AGGUGAGUCAUCAUCUAGUCCUGAAGUGGAAGAGACACGAACACUCAGAGUGC



UCUCUAUGGUGGGGGACUGGCUUGAAAAAAGACCAGGGGCCUUCUGUAUAAAG



GUGCUGUGCCCAUACACCAGCACUAUGAUGGAAACCAUGGAGCGACUGCAACG



UAGGCAUGGGGGAGGAUUAGUCAGAGUGCCAUUGUGUCGCAACUCCACACAUG



AGAUGUACUGGGUCUCUGGGGCAAAGAGCAACAUCAUAAAAAGUGUGUCCACC



ACAAGUCAGCUCCUCCUGGGACGCAUGGAUGGCCCCAGGAGGCCAGUGAAAUA



UGAGGAGGAUGUGAACCUCGGCUCGGGUACACGAGCUGUGGCAAGCUGUGCUG



AGGCUCCUAACAUGAAAAUCAUCGGCAGGCGCAUUGAGAGAAUCCGCAAUGAA



CAUGCAGAAACAUGGUUUCUUGAUGAAAACCACCCAUACAGGACAUGGGCCUA



CCAUGGGAGCUACGAAGCCCCCACGCAAGGAUCAGCGUCUUCCCUCGUGAACG



GGGUUGUUAGACUCCUGUCAAAGCCUUGGGACGUGGUGACUGGAGUUACAGGA



AUAGCCAUGACUGACACCACACCAUACGGCCAACAAAGAGUCUUCAAAGAAAA



AGUGGACACCAGGGUGCCAGAUCCCCAAGAAGGCACUCGCCAGGUAAUGAACA



UAGUCUCUUCCUGGCUGUGGAAGGAGCUGGGGAAACGCAAGCGGCCACGCGUC



UGCACCAAAGAAGAGUUUAUCAACAAGGUGCGCAGCAAUGCAGCACUGGGAGC



AAUAUUUGAAGAGGAAAAAGAAUGGAAGACGGCUGUGGAAGCUGUGAAUGAU



CCAAGGUUUUGGGCCCUAGUGGAUAGGGAGAGAGAACACCACCUGAGAGGAGA



GUGUCACAGCUGUGUGUACAACAUGAUGGGAAAAAGAGAAAAGAAGCAAGGA



GAGUUCGGGAAAGCAAAAGGUAGCCGCGCCAUCUGGUACAUGUGGUUGGGAGC



CAGAUUCUUGGAGUUUGAAGCCCUUGGAUUCUUGAACGAGGACCAUUGGAUGG



GAAGAGAAAACUCAGGAGGUGGAGUCGAAGGGUUAGGAUUGCAAAGACUUGG



AUACAUUCUAGAAGAAAUGAAUCGGGCACCAGGAGGAAAGAUGUACGCAGAUG



ACACUGCUGGCUGGGACACCCGCAUUAGUAAGUUUGAUCUGGAGAAUGAAGCU



CUGAUUACCAACCAAAUGGAGGAAGGGCACAGAACUCUGGCGUUGGCCGUGAU



UAAAUACACAUACCAAAACAAAGUGGUGAAGGUUCUCAGACCAGCUGAAGGAG



GAAAAACAGUUAUGGACAUCAUUUCAAGACAAGACCAGAGAGGGAGUGGACAA



GUUGUCACUUAUGCUCUCAACACAUUCACCAACUUGGUGGUGCAGCUUAUCCG



GAACAUGGAAGCUGAGGAAGUGUUAGAGAUGCAAGACUUAUGGUUGUUGAGG



AAGCCAGAGAAAGUGACCAGAUGGUUGCAGAGCAAUGGAUGGGAUAGACUCAA



ACGAAUGGCGGUCAGUGGAGAUGACUGCGUUGUGAAGCCAAUCGAUGAUAGGU



UUGCACAUGCCCUCAGGUUCUUGAAUGACAUGGGAAAAGUUAGGAAAGACACA



CAGGAGUGGAAACCCUCGACUGGAUGGAGCAAUUGGGAAGAAGUCCCGUUCUG



CUCCCACCACUUCAACAAGCUGUACCUCAAGGAUGGGAGAUCCAUUGUGGUCC



CUUGCCGCCACCAAGAUGAACUGAUUGGCCGAGCUCGCGUCUCACCAGGGGCA



GGAUGGAGCAUCCGGGAGACUGCCUGUCUUGCAAAAUCAUAUGCGCAGAUGUG



GCAGCUCCUUUAUUUCCACAGAAGAGACCUUCGACUGAUGGCUAAUGCCAUUU



GCUCGGCUGUGCCAGUUGACUGGGUACCAACUGGGAGAACCACCUGGUCAAUC



CAUGGAAAGGGAGAAUGGAUGACCACUGAGGACAUGCUCAUGGUGUGGAAUA



GAGUGUGGAUUGAGGAGAACGACCAUAUGGAGGACAAGACUCCUGUAACAAAA



UGGACAGACAUUCCCUAUCUAGGAAAAAGGGAGGACUUAUGGUGUGGAUCCCU



UAUAGGGCACAGACCCCGCACCACUUGGGCUGAAAACAUCAAAGACACAGUCA



ACAUGGUGCGCAGGAUCAUAGGUGAUGAAGAAAAGUACAUGGACUAUCUAUCC



ACCCAAGUCCGCUACUUGGGUGAGGAAGGGUCCACACCCGGAGUGUUGUAAGC



ACCAAUUUUAGUGUUGUCAGGCCUGCUAGUCAGCCACAGUUUGGGGAAAGCUG



UGCAGCCUGUAACCCCCCCAGGAGAAGCUGGGAAACCAAGCUCAUAGUCAGGC



CGAGAACGCCAUGGCACGGAAGAAGCCAUGCUGCCUGUGAGCCCCUCAGAGGA



CACUGAGUCAAAAAACCCCACGCGCUUGGAAGCGCAGGAUGGGAAAAGAAGGU



GGCGACCUUCCCCACCCUUCAAUCUGGGGCCUGAACUGGAGACUAGCUGUGAA



UCUCCAGCAGAGGGACUAGUGGUUAGAGGAGACCCCCCGGAAAACGCAAAACA



GCAUAUUGACGUGGGAAAGACCAGAGACUCCAUGAGUUUCCACCACGCUGGCC



GCCAGGCACAGAUCGCCGAACUUCGGCGGCCGGUGUGGGGAAAUCCAUGGUUU



CU (SEQ ID NO: 747)
















TABLE 8 







Sequences of Toehold Switch Sensors Used for Zika RNA Detection









Toehold
Toehold Switch RNA Sequences



Switch
for Detection of Zika Virus
Target Sequence in Zika Virus


Name
from the Americas (KU312312)
from the Americas (KU312312)





27B_N1
GGGUUUCGCUCUAUUCUCAUCAGU
GACACAGGACAUGAAACUGAUGAGA



UUCAUGUCCUGUGUCGGACUUUAG
AUAGAGCGAAA (SEQ ID NO: 758)



AACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGGACAC




AGGACACAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCA




AAAG (SEQ ID NO: 748)






27B_N2
GGGCUCAACUUUCGCUCUAUUCUC
GGACAUGAAACUGAUGAGAAUAGA



AUCAGUUUCAUGUCCGGACUUUAG
GCGAAAGUUGAG (SEQ ID NO: 759)



AACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGGGACA




UGAAACAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAA




GAAG (SEQ ID NO: 749)






27B_N3
GGGUUAUCUCAACUUUCGCUCUAU
AUGAAACUGAUGAGAAUAGAGCGA



UCUCAUCAGUUUCAUGGACUUUAG
AAGUUGAGAUAA (SEQ ID NO: 760)



AACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGAUGAA




ACUGAUAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAA




GAAG (SEQ ID NO: 750)






27B_N4
GGGUCGCUCUAUUCUCAUCAGUUU
AUGACACAGGACAUGAAACUGAUGA



CAUGUCCUGUGUCAUGGACUUUAG
GAAUAGAGCGA (SEQ ID NO: 761)



AACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGAUGAC




ACAGGAAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAA




GAAG (SEQ ID NO: 751)






27B_N5
GGGUGGCUUCGGCUCUUGGUGAAU
GAGAUAACGCCCAAUUCACCAAGAG



UGGGCGUUAUCUCGGACUUUAGAA
CCGAAGCCACC (SEQ ID NO: 762)



CAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGGAGAUAA




CGCCAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAAGA




AG (SEQ ID NO: 752)






32B_N1
GGGCUGGGAUCAAGUACAUGUAGU
UUUUGCUCGUGGCGCACUACAUGUA



GCGCCACGAGCAAAAGGACUUUAG
CUUGAUCCCAG (SEQ ID NO: 763)



AACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGUUUUG




CUCGUGUAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCA




AAAG (SEQ ID NO: 753)






32B_N2
GGGCCUGCAGCCCUGGGAUCAAGU
GGCGCACUACAUGUACUUGAUCCCA



ACAUGUAGUGCGCCGGACUUUAGA
GGGCUGCAGGC (SEQ ID NO: 764)



ACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGGGCGCA




CUACAAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAAG




AAG (SEQ ID NO: 754)






32B_N3
GGGCUGCCGUUCUCUUCUGGGCAG
CAGCAGCUGCGCGUGCUGCCCAGAA



CACGCGCAGCUGCUGGGACUUUAG
GAGAACGGCAG (SEQ ID NO: 765)



AACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGCAGCA




GCUGCGAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAA




GAAG (SEQ ID NO: 755)






32B_N4
GGGCAGCCCUGGGAUCAAGUACAU
CUCGUGGCGCACUACAUGUACUUGA



GUAGUGCGCCACGAGGGACUUUAG
UCCCAGGGCUG (SEQ ID NO: 766)



AACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGCUCGU




GGCGCAAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAA




GAAG (SEQ ID NO: 756)






32B_N5
GGGAUGCCAGCUGCCGUUCUCUUC
GCGCGUGCUGCCCAGAAGAGAACGG



UGGGCAGCACGCGCGGACUUUAGA
CAGCUGGCAUC (SEQ ID NO: 767)



ACAGAGGAGAUAAAGAUGGCGCGU




GCUGCAACCUGGCGGCAGCGCAAG




AAG (SEQ ID NO: 757)








Claims
  • 1. A method of detecting a target nucleic acid in a sample, the method comprising the steps of: (a) obtaining nucleic acid from a biological sample obtained from a subject;(b) amplifying the nucleic acid using isothermal amplification;(c) contacting the amplified nucleic acid to a toehold switch, wherein the toehold switch encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains that are complementary to a target nucleic acid or the reverse complement thereof, wherein the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the target nucleic acid but not in the absence of the target nucleic acid, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the target nucleic acid is present in the amplified nucleic acid of the subject; and(d) identifying the target nucleic acid as containing a target protospacer adjacent motif (PAM), wherein identifying comprises:(i) amplifying nucleic acid obtained from the biological sample using a reverse primer designed to append the trigger sequence of one or more toehold switch sequence domains;(ii) contacting the amplified nucleic acid of (i) to CRISPR/Cas under conditions that allow for sequence-specific cleavage of the contacted nucleic acid by CRISPR/Cas when the target PAM is present in the amplified nucleic acid; and(iii) detecting activation of the toehold switch, wherein activation does not occur in the event of CRISPR/Cas-mediated sequence-specific cleavage, thereby indicating the presence of the target PAM.
  • 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the toehold switch comprises one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains, a fully or partially double-stranded stem domain comprising an initiation codon, a loop domain comprising a ribosome binding site, and a coding domain.
  • 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the toehold and stem domains are complementary in sequence to a naturally occurring RNA.
  • 4. The method of claim 2, wherein the loop domain is complementary in sequence to a non-naturally occurring RNA.
  • 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the target nucleic acid is an RNA specific to a pathogen.
  • 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the pathogen is selected from the group consisting of a virus, bacterium, fungus, and parasite.
  • 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the isothermal amplification is selected from the group consisting of NASBA (nucleic acid sequence-based amplification), loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP), recombinase polymerase amplification (RPA), and helicase-dependent amplification (HAD).
  • 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the biological sample is selected from the group consisting of blood, serum, urine, saliva, tissue, cell, and organ, or a fraction or portion thereof.
  • 9. A method of detecting a target nucleic acid in a sample, the method comprising the steps of: (a) obtaining RNA from a biological sample obtained from a subject;(b) amplifying the RNA using isothermal amplification;(c) contacting the amplified RNA to a toehold switch, wherein the toehold switch encodes a reporter protein and comprises one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains that are complementary to a target RNA or the reverse complement thereof, wherein the contacting occurs under conditions that allow translation of the coding domain in the presence of the target RNA but not in the absence of the target RNA, and detecting the reporter protein as an indicator that the target RNA is present in the amplified RNA of the subject; and(d) identifying the target RNA as containing a target protospacer adjacent motif (PAM), wherein identifying comprises:(i) amplifying RNA obtained from the biological sample using a reverse primer designed to append the trigger sequence of one or more toehold switch sequence domains;(ii) contacting the amplified RNA of (i) to CRISPR/Cas under conditions that allow for sequence-specific cleavage of the contacted RNA by CRISPR/Cas when the target PAM is present in the amplified RNA; and(iii) detecting activation of the toehold switch, wherein activation does not occur in the event of CRISPR/Cas-mediated sequence-specific cleavage, thereby indicating the presence of the target RNA.
  • 10. The method of claim 9, wherein the toehold switch comprises one or more single-stranded toehold sequence domains, a fully or partially double-stranded stem domain comprising an initiation codon, a loop domain comprising a ribosome binding site, and a coding domain.
  • 11. The method of claim 10, wherein the toehold and stem domains are complementary in sequence to a naturally occurring RNA.
  • 12. The method of claim 10, wherein the loop domain is complementary in sequence to a non-naturally occurring RNA.
  • 13. The method of claim 9, wherein the target nucleic acid is an RNA specific to a pathogen.
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application represents the national stage entry of PCT International Application No. PCT/US2017/034545, filed on May 25, 2017, and claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/341,221, filed on May 25, 2016, and U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/403,778, filed on Oct. 4, 2016, each of which is incorporated by reference it its entirety as if fully set forth herein.

PCT Information
Filing Document Filing Date Country Kind
PCT/US2017/034545 5/25/2017 WO 00
Publishing Document Publishing Date Country Kind
WO2017/205668 11/30/2017 WO A
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Related Publications (1)
Number Date Country
20200080137 A1 Mar 2020 US
Provisional Applications (2)
Number Date Country
62403778 Oct 2016 US
62341221 May 2016 US