Portable vulnerability identification tool for embedded non-IP devices

Information

  • Patent Grant
  • 11403405
  • Patent Number
    11,403,405
  • Date Filed
    Thursday, June 27, 2019
    5 years ago
  • Date Issued
    Tuesday, August 2, 2022
    a year ago
Abstract
Embodiments disclosed herein describe systems and methods for assessing vulnerabilities of embedded non-IP devices. In an illustrative embodiment, a system of assessing the vulnerabilities of embedded non-IP devices may be within a portable device. The portable device may include a plurality of wired connectors for various wired communication/data transfer protocols. The portable device may include tools for analyzing the firmware binaries of the embedded non-IP devices, such as disassemblers and modules for concrete and symbolic (concolic) execution. Based upon the disassembly and the concolic execution, the portable device may identify vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and programming flaws in the firmware binaries.
Description
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application relates to U.S. application Ser. No. 16/012,651, filed Jun. 19, 2018, titled “Systems and Methods for Improving the Ranking and Prioritization of Attack-Related Events,” U.S. application Ser. No. 15/485,784, filed Apr. 12, 2017, titled “Software Assurance System for Runtime Environments,” and U.S. application Ser. No. 15/622,434, filed Jun. 14, 2017, titled “Software Assurance for Heterogeneous Distributed Computing Systems,” each of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.


TECHNICAL FIELD

This application is generally directed to evaluating system vulnerabilities of embedded non-internet protocol (IP) devices and more specifically towards portable vulnerability assessment tools for embedded non-IP devices.


BACKGROUND

Complex structures such as ships, submarines, and airplanes use a multitude of embedded non-IP devices. Sensors and controllers form specific use digital devices within these structures that control or access physical devices and run custom-written firmware directly to interact with the hardware of the physical devices. For example, a fuel control unit for a gas turbine engine (e.g., a jet engine) regulates fuel flow to the engine based upon the power demanded by the operator by controlling a fuel valve using a custom-written firmware. These embedded non-IP devices do not communicate over traditional IP-based networks and typically have limited Input Output (I/O) interfaces. The interaction with these devices is generally through direct physical connection, e.g., a wired connection.


Although immune from attacks through the IP channel, these embedded non-IP devices are susceptible to a large range of other security vulnerabilities. The firmware controlling these devices often contain bugs that can be maliciously exploited to hack into these devices. Even without bugs, the firmware for these devices may have weak security protocols. For example, most embedded non-IP devices provide some form of console access for configuration or updates. While many devices incorporate some form of authentication, the encryption/password protection mechanisms in the firmware use weak algorithms, such as random number generator seeded with a constant value. Passwords therefore become easy to extract because such a random number generator generates a sequence of predictable, non-random numbers. Other devices lack defensive coding techniques that makes them vulnerable to buffer overflows and arbitrary code injection. Malicious actors can exploit these vulnerabilities to hack into the entire system containing these embedded non-IP devices.


Performing vulnerability assessments of embedded non-IP devices present numerous technical challenges. Because of the restricted, unconnected operating environment, traditional IP-based vulnerability assessment cannot be performed for these devices. Furthermore, the limited I/O interfaces may be associated with different protocols. In addition, the devices use different microcontroller chips that support different binary formats and instruction sets. These devices are also deployed on highly mobile systems (e.g., airplanes and ships) and may not be accessible to traditional, desktop-type commodity computing systems.


SUMMARY

What is therefore desired are portable vulnerability assessment tools for embedded non-IP devices that may be operable with embedded non-IP devices using different I/O protocols, binary formats, and/or instruction sets.


Embodiments described herein attempt to solve the aforementioned technical problems and may provide other solutions as well. In an illustrative embodiment, a portable vulnerability assessment device may include a plurality of wired connectors based upon a plurality of communication protocols. A wired connector may be selected based upon a communication protocol of an embedded non-IP device to transmit one or more test scripts to the embedded non-IP device. The portable device and an associated platform may provide an application programming interface (API) for a user to generate the test scripts. The portable device may include a machine learning model to suggest test scripts based on the previously created test scripts. The portable device may receive the firmware binaries of the embedded non-IP device based on the transmitted test scripts. The portable device may include modules for disassembling of the firmware binaries and for performing concrete and symbolic (concolic) execution of the firmware binaries. The portable device may identify the vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, programming flaws) in the embedded non-IP device based upon the disassembling and/or the concolic execution of the firmware binaries.


In one embodiment, a system comprises a plurality of interfaces configured to be connected to embedded non-Internet Protocol (IP) devices; an application programming interface (API) configured to be invoked by a test script; a non-transitory storage medium storing a plurality of computer program instructions; a processor electrically coupled to the non-transitory storage medium and configured to execute the plurality of computer program instructions to: transmit one or more test instructions to an embedded non-IP device based upon the test script through an interface of the plurality of interfaces; receive one or more binary files forming at least a portion of the firmware of the embedded non-IP device in response to the one or more test instructions; disassemble the one or more binary files to generate corresponding one or more assembly code files; perform a symbolic execution of the one or more binary files; and identify a first vulnerability in the embedded non-IP device based upon the one or more assembly code files and the symbolic execution of the one or more binary files.


In one embodiment, a method comprises transmitting, by a computer, one or more test instructions to an embedded non-IP device based upon a test script, the one or more test instructions being transmitted through an interface of a plurality of interfaces associated with the computer; receiving, by the computer through the interface, one or more binary files forming at least a portion of the firmware of the embedded non-IP device in response to the one or more test instructions; disassembling, by the computer, the one or more binary files to generate corresponding one or more assembly code files; performing, by the computer, a symbolic execution of the one or more binary files; and identifying, by the computer, a first vulnerability in the embedded non-IP device based upon the one or more assembly code files and the symbolic execution of the one or more binary files.


It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory and are intended to provide further explanation of the disclosed embodiment and subject matter as claimed.





BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings constitute a part of this specification and illustrate embodiments of the subject matter disclosed herein.



FIG. 1 shows an illustrative system for assessing vulnerabilities of an embedded non-IP device, according to an embodiment;



FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of an illustrative system for assessing vulnerabilities of an embedded non-IP device, according to an embodiment; and



FIG. 3 shows a flow diagram of an illustrative method of assessing vulnerabilities of an embedded non-IP device, according to an embodiment.





DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Reference will now be made to the illustrative embodiments illustrated in the drawings, and specific language will be used here to describe the same. It will nevertheless be understood that no limitation of the scope of the claims or this disclosure is thereby intended. Alterations and further modifications of the inventive features illustrated herein, and additional applications of the principles of the subject matter illustrated herein, which would occur to one ordinarily skilled in the relevant art and having possession of this disclosure, are to be considered within the scope of the subject matter disclosed herein. The present disclosure is here described in detail with reference to embodiments illustrated in the drawings, which form a part here. Other embodiments may be used and/or other changes may be made without departing from the spirit or scope of the present disclosure. The illustrative embodiments described in the detailed description are not meant to be limiting of the subject matter presented here.


Embodiments disclosed herein describe systems and methods for assessing vulnerabilities of embedded non-IP devices. In an illustrative embodiment, a system of assessing the vulnerabilities of embedded non-IP devices may be within a portable device. The portable device may include a plurality of wired connectors for various wired communication/data transfer protocols. The portable device may include tools for analyzing the firmware binaries of the embedded non-IP devices, such as disassemblers and modules for concolic execution. Based upon the disassembly and the concolic execution, the portable device may identify vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and programming flaws in the firmware binaries.



FIG. 1 shows an illustrative system 100 for vulnerability assessment of embedded non-IP devices, according to an embodiment. As shown, the illustrative system 100 may include a portable assessment device 102 and an embedded non-IP device 112. It should however be understood that the shown components are merely illustrative and additional, alternative, or fewer number of components should also be considered within the scope of this disclosure.


The portable assessment device 102 may be any kind of computing device. Non-limiting examples of the portable assessment device 102 may include a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a smartphone, and the like. The portable assessment device 102 may be a customized device that may not necessarily fit into the categorization of a laptop, a tablet, or a smartphone. Regardless of the form factor, the portable assessment device 102 may include a memory (not shown) and a processor (also not shown). The memory may store computer program instructions that may be executed by the processor. The processor may read the instructions and data from the memory, perform operations on the data based upon the instructions, and write a result back to the memory. In addition to the memory and the processor, the portable assessment device 102 may include a storage for a non-volatile storage of the computer program instructions, input data, and the results generated by the processor.


The portable assessment device 102 may include an interface 106 displaying text and/or graphics. The interface 106 may include a display of any type, including but not limited to Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), plasma display, and Light Emitting Diode (LED) display. The interface 106 may display operational details when the portable assessment device 102 interacts with embedded non-IP device 112. The interface 106 may further provide a command line interface (CLI) for a user to enter one or more test/assessment commands. The interface 106 may also provide a graphical user interface (GUI) for the user to select graphical elements associated with the one or more test/assessment commands. The portable assessment device 102 may further include a keyboard 108 with a plurality of keys/buttons for the user to enter and/or select one or more test/assessment commands. It should be understood that the portable assessment device 102 may include other input tools or may be associated with (e.g., through wired/wireless connection) other input tools.


The portable assessment device 102 may further include wired connectors 104a-104d (collectively and commonly referred to as 104). The wired connectors 104 may be any kind of connector, including but not limited to, Universal Serial Bus (USB), Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART), Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), a Recommended Standard (RS) 232, or an On-board Diagnostics (OBD). The portable assessment device 102 may include, in the storage and/or in the memory, instructions for the protocols supporting the communications through the wired connectors 104. It should be understood that the wired connectors 104 are merely illustrative and the portable assessment device may support wireless connections (e.g., Bluetooth) to communicate with the embedded non-IP device 112.


The embedded non-IP device 112 may be any type of device that may be a part of a larger, more complex system. For example, the embedded non-IP device 112 may be a part of a control system of a ship or an airplane. In the context of the airplane, the embedded non-IP device 112 may be a controller such as a fuel controller. The embedded non-IP device 112 may control the valve regulating the flow of fuel into the engine. An operator (e.g., a pilot) may not directly control the regulation of the fuel to the engine, the operator may provide an instruction for a requisite power to be delivered by the engine. Based on the instruction, the embedded non-IP device 112 may control the valve to regulate the fuel into the engine. Another example of embedded non-IP device 112 may include an engine control unit (ECU) in automobile. The embedded non-IP device may take in an input of various factors such as temperature of the engine of the automobile, speed of the automobile, how far the throttle has been engaged, and other factors to control the flow of fuel into the engine.


The embedded non-IP device 112 may be a highly customized computing device that operates in a specific, restricted environment without a connection to the Internet or any other large network. Therefore, the embedded non-IP device 112 may not be reachable by traditional IP channels. Interaction with the embedded non-IP device 112 may only be possible through one or more interfaces (an illustrative interface 110 is shown in FIG. 1). The interface 110 may receive a wired connector 104. The wired connector 104 may be selected based upon the communication protocol of the interface 110. As described above, the embedded non-IP device 112 may be reachable through a local wireless connection such as Bluetooth.



FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of an illustrative system 200 for assessing vulnerability of an embedded non-IP device, according to an embodiment. As shown, the illustrative system 200 may include an embedded non-IP device (also referred to as a device under test (DUT) 204) and a portable vulnerability assessment device 202. It should be understood that the shown components are merely illustrative, and additional, alternative, and fewer number of components should be considered within the scope of this disclosure.


The vulnerability assessment device 204 may include a user interaction module 206, analysis tools 208, and an interface protocol library 210. It should however be understood that these components in the vulnerability assessment device 204 are merely illustrative and additional, alternative, and fewer number of components should be considered within the scope of this disclosure. The user interaction module 206 may include a user interface 234. The user interface 234 may include, for example, a command line interface (CLI) or a graphical user interface (GUI). Through the CLI and/or the GUI, the user may provide a plurality of instructions to the vulnerability assessment device 204 for the vulnerability assessment device 204 to execute vulnerability assessment operations. In some embodiments, the user interface 234 may also include (or may be defined by) an application programming interface (API). The API may provide a user an interface to develop test scripts. In other words, the test scripts may invoke the API. A test script may include a plurality of test instructions.


The user interaction module 206 may further comprise an attack tree creation sub-module 236. An attack tree may define and describe an operational hierarchy of hardware and software components. For example, a hierarchically higher hardware components may have hierarchically lower hardware sub-components. The attack tree may show the operational relationships of the hierarchical components. More specifically, the attack tree may indicate how if hierarchically lower components are compromised, the hierarchically higher components may be compromised. Attack trees are disclosed in U.S. application Ser. No. 16/012,651, filed Jun. 19, 2018, titled “Systems and Methods for Improving the Ranking and Prioritization of Attack-Related Events,” U.S. application Ser. No. 15/485,784, filed Apr. 12, 2017, titled “Software Assurance System for Runtime Environments,” and U.S. application Ser. No. 15/622,434, filed Jun. 14, 2017, titled “Software Assurance for Heterogeneous Distributed Computing Systems,” each of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. A test execution sub-module 240 within the user interaction module 206 may execute test scripts on the DUT 204. More specifically, the test execution sub-module 240 may provide test instructions to the DUT 204.


A vulnerability assessor sub-module 212 may perform vulnerability assessment of the DUI 204 utilizing the test tools, scripts, and programs 214. The vulnerability assessor sub-module 202 may utilize the test execution sub-module 240 to transmit the test tools, scripts, and programs 214 to the DUT 204. A test suggester sub-module 216 may suggest test scripts based upon previously provided test scripts. The test suggester sub-module 216 may use a machine learning module to suggest the test scripts. More specifically, the test suggester sub-module 216 may continuously monitor the test tools, scripts, and programs 214 received through the user interface 234. Based upon the pattern of the test tools, scripts, and programs 214, the machine learning model in the test suggester sub-module 216 may recommend a new test tools, scripts or programs 214. The test-suggester sub module 216 may display the recommend test tools, scripts, or programs 214 in the user interface 234. The test tool, scripts, or programs may invoke an API.


The analysis tools 208 may include a plurality of analysis sub-modules, including but not limited to a capstone sub-module 218, a driller sub-module 220, an Angr sub-module 222, and an American Fluffy Lop (AFL) sub-module 224. The capstone sub-module 218 may be a disassembler. The disassembler may be a lightweight tool for disassembling assembly language from an executable (binary) file. The capstone sub-module 218 may support a plurality of processor architectures that are used in embedded non-IP devices (e.g., DUT 204), including but not limited to Advanced RISC Machine (ARM), ARM64, Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipeline Stages (MIPS), and x86. The vulnerability assessment device 202 may use the information about a binary file extracted based upon the disassembly operation of the capstone sub-module 218 to identity vulnerabilities within the device firmware binary 234.


The driller sub-module 220 may perform a symbolic execution of at least a portion of the device firmware binary 234. The driller sub-module 220 may rely on an application fuzzing approach using the symbolic execution. The driller sub-module 220 may provide an improvement upon on standard fuzz testing that is confined to user-visible interfaces and inputs. The driller sub-module 220 may instead enable the vulnerability assessment device 202 to fuzz test internal function/method calls within an application. The driller sub-module 202 may therefore find bugs and vulnerabilities in the device firmware binary 234 that may not be found using standard testing methodologies.


The Angr sub-module 222 may perform symbolic execution of the device firmware binary 234. The Angr sub-module 222 may further generate a call-graph based on the method calls within the firmware binary 234. The Angr sub-module 222 may further perform concrete and symbolic (concolic) execution of the firmware binary 234 to identify vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and programming flaws that may lead to arbitrary code execution. The AFL sub-module 224 may provide a fuzz testing functionality to test crashes, failing built-in code assertions, and memory leaks of the device firmware binary 234.


The interface protocol library 210 may support of plurality of interfaces to connect the vulnerability assessment device 202 with the DUT 204. The interface protocol library 210 may include software modules for Universal Serial Bus (USB) protocol 226, Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) protocol 228, Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) protocol 230, and Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) protocol, 232. It should however be understood that the aforementioned protocols 226, 228, 230, 232 supported by the interface protocol library 210 are merely illustrative, and additional, alternative, and fewer number of protocols should be considered within the scope of this disclosure. Other protocol examples may be a Recommended Standard (RS) 232 protocol or an On-board Diagnostics (OBD) protocol.


In operation, a processor in the vulnerability assessment device 202 may execute a protocol based upon a wired connection between the vulnerability assessment device 202 and the DUT 204. For example, if the wired connection between the vulnerability assessment device 202 and the DUT 202 is a USB cable, the processor may execute the USB protocol 226. The processor may detect the wired connection and automatically retrieve and execute one or more protocols 226, 228, 230, 232 based upon the detected wired connection. Therefore, the vulnerability assessment device 202 may seamlessly communicate with the DUT 204 because the processor may automatically detect the wired connection and execute one or more corresponding protocols 226, 228, 230, 232.



FIG. 3 shows a flow diagram of an illustrative method 300 assessing vulnerability of embedded non-IP devices, according to an embodiment. It should be understood that the steps shown in FIG. 3 and described herein are more illustrative and additional, alternate, or fewer number of steps should be considered within the scope of this disclosure. Although multiple computing devices and their constituent components may perform one or more steps of the method 300, this description details a single computer performing all the steps of the method 300. An illustrative computer may be a portable vulnerability assessment tool.


The method may begin at step 302, where the computer may transmit test instructions to an embedded non-IP device based upon a test script. The test script may be provided by a user through an application programming interface (API). The test script may include a plurality of test instructions. The test instructions may be configured to interact with the firmware of the embedded non-IP device. For example, the firmware of the embedded non-IP device may execute a test instruction. As another example, the test instructions may be for the embedded non-IP device to send a response to the computer. The computer may transmit the test instructions to the embedded non-IP device through at least one of the wired connectors. Non limiting examples of the wired connectors include USB, UART, JTAG, SPI, RS-22, and OBD. The connection of the computer to the embedded non-IP device may be based upon the connection ports of the embedded non-IP device. For the embedded non-IP device containing a USB port, the computer may communicate with (e.g., transmit the test instruction) to the embedded non-IP device through a USB port of the computer and utilizing the USB protocol. The computer may automatically detect the type of connection and execute a corresponding connection protocol.


At step 304, the computer may receive one or more binary files forming at least a portion of the firmware of the embedded non-IP device. The computer may receive the one or more binary files in response to the test instructions. For example, the test instructions may instruct the firmware to transmit the portion of the firmware back to the computer. It should be understood that the computer may execute one or more authentication processes to authenticate with the embedded non-IP device to receive the one or more binary files.


At step 306, the computer may disassemble the one or more binary files to generate on or more corresponding assembly code files. For example, the computer may use a capstone disassembler to generate the assembly code. The assembly code may include assembly instructions corresponding the binary instructions in the one or more binary files.


At step 308, the computer may perform a symbolic execution of the one or more binary files. In particular, the computer may follow the program using an interpreter with symbolic values as inputs. The computer may determine a correspondence between the symbolic inputs and a portion of the program that may be activated (for execution) based on the symbolic inputs. By performing the symbolic execution, the computer may determine buffer overflows and programming overflows that may lead to an arbitrary code execution. In some embodiments, the computer may perform concolic execution of the one or more binary files.


At step 310, the computer may identify a first vulnerability in the embedded non-IP device based upon the one or more assembly code files and the symbolic execution of the one or more binary files. For example, the computer may identify the first vulnerability based upon the program flow in the assembly code files. As another example, the computer may identify the first vulnerability based upon symbolic/concolic execution. As yet another example, the computer may identify the first vulnerability based upon the combination of the one or more assembly code files and the symbolic execution of the one or more binary files. The vulnerabilities may include, for example, buffer and stack overflows, arbitrary code execution, and weak security and encryption protocols.


At step 312, the computer may receive a test result generated by the firmware of the embedded non-IP device. The embedded non-IP device may generate the test result by executing an executable code in the test instructions. For example, the test instructions may include an executable code to encrypt a password, and the test result may be an encrypted password. At step 314, the computer may identify a second vulnerability based upon the test result. The second vulnerability may include, for example, a weak encryption protocol.


The foregoing method descriptions and the process flow diagrams are provided merely as illustrative examples and are not intended to require or imply that the steps of the various embodiments must be performed in the order presented. The steps in the foregoing embodiments may be performed in any order. Words such as “then,” “next,” etc. are not intended to limit the order of the steps; these words are simply used to guide the reader through the description of the methods. Although process flow diagrams may describe the operations as a sequential process, many of the operations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition, the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process may correspond to a method, a function, a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, and the like. When a process corresponds to a function, the process termination may correspond to a return of the function to a calling function or a main function.


The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of this disclosure or the claims.


Embodiments implemented in computer software may be implemented in software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description languages, or any combination thereof. A code segment or machine-executable instructions may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment may be coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc. may be passed, forwarded, or transmitted via any suitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing, network transmission, etc.


The actual software code or specialized control hardware used to implement these systems and methods is not limiting of the claimed features or this disclosure. Thus, the operation and behavior of the systems and methods were described without reference to the specific software code being understood that software and control hardware can be designed to implement the systems and methods based on the description herein.


When implemented in software, the functions may be stored as one or more instructions or code on a non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage medium. The steps of a method or algorithm disclosed herein may be embodied in a processor-executable software module, which may reside on a computer-readable or processor-readable storage medium. A non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable media includes both computer storage media and tangible storage media that facilitate transfer of a computer program from one place to another. A non-transitory processor-readable storage media may be any available media that may be accessed by a computer. By way of example, and not limitation, such non-transitory processor-readable media may comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other tangible storage medium that may be used to store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that may be accessed by a computer or processor. Disk and disc, as used herein, include compact disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc (DVD), floppy disk, and Blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media. Additionally, the operations of a method or algorithm may reside as one or any combination or set of codes and/or instructions on a non-transitory processor-readable medium and/or computer-readable medium, which may be incorporated into a computer program product.


The preceding description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the embodiments described herein and variations thereof. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the subject matter disclosed herein. Thus, the present disclosure is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the following claims and the principles and novel features disclosed herein.


While various aspects and embodiments have been disclosed, other aspects and embodiments are contemplated. The various aspects and embodiments disclosed are for purposes of illustration and are not intended to be limiting, with the true scope and spirit being indicated by the following claims.

Claims
  • 1. A system comprising: a plurality of interfaces configured to be connected to embedded non-Internet Protocol (IP) devices;an application programming interface (API) configured to be invoked by a test script;a non-transitory storage medium storing a plurality of computer program instructions;a processor electrically coupled to the non-transitory storage medium and configured to execute the plurality of computer program instructions to: transmit one or more test instructions to an embedded non-IP device based upon the test script through an interface of the plurality of interfaces;receive one or more binary files forming at least a portion of the firmware of the embedded non-IP device in response to the one or more test instructions;disassemble the one or more binary files to generate corresponding one or more assembly code files;perform a symbolic execution of the one or more binary files; andidentify a first vulnerability in the embedded non-IP device based upon the one or more assembly code files and the symbolic execution of the one or more binary files.
  • 2. The system of claim 1, wherein the non-transitory storage medium, the plurality of interfaces, and the processor are embedded in a portable device.
  • 3. The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of interfaces include at least one of a Universal Serial Bus (USB), a Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART), a Joint Action Group (JTAG) connection, a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus, a Recommended Standard (RS) 232 port, or an On-board Diagnostics (OBD) port.
  • 4. The system of claim 1, further comprising: a machine learning model stored in the non-transitory storage medium; andwherein the processor is further configured to: execute the machine learning model to suggest an additional test instruction based upon the test script.
  • 5. The system of claim 1, wherein the one or more test instructions include executable code configured to be executed by the firmware of the embedded non-IP device.
  • 6. The system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to: receive a test result generated by the firmware of the embedded non-IP device based upon executing the executable code; andidentify a second vulnerability based upon the test result.
  • 7. The system of claim 6, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to: sort the first and the second vulnerabilities based upon the corresponding priorities; anddisplay a priority list including the first and the second vulnerabilities in a graphical user interface.
  • 8. The system of claim 1, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to: generate a command line interface configured to receive an additional test instruction.
  • 9. The system of claim 1, wherein the one or more test instructions are based upon the type of the embedded non-IP device.
  • 10. The system of claim 1, wherein the one or more test instructions are based upon the type of the interface.
  • 11. A method comprising: transmitting, by a computer, one or more test instructions to an embedded non-IP device based upon a test script, the one or more test instructions being transmitted through an interface of a plurality of interfaces associated with the computer;receiving, by the computer through the interface, one or more binary files forming at least a portion of the firmware of the embedded non-IP device in response to the one or more test instructions;disassembling, by the computer, the one or more binary files to generate corresponding one or more assembly code files;performing, by the computer, a symbolic execution of the one or more binary files; andidentifying, by the computer, a first vulnerability in the embedded non-IP device based upon the one or more assembly code files and the symbolic execution of the one or more binary files.
  • 12. The method of claim 11, the computer is a portable device.
  • 13. The method of claim 11, wherein the plurality of interfaces include at least one of a Universal Serial Bus (USB), a Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART), a Joint Action Group (JTAG) connection, a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus, a Recommended Standard (RS) 232 port, or an On-board Diagnostics (OBD) port.
  • 14. The method of claim 11, further comprising: executing, by the computer, a machine learning model to suggest an additional test instruction based upon the test script.
  • 15. The method of claim 11, wherein the one or more test instructions include executable code configured to be executed by the firmware of the embedded non-IP device.
  • 16. The method of claim 15, further comprising: receiving, by the computer, a test result generated by the firmware of the embedded non-IP device based upon executing the executable code; andidentifying, by the computer, a second vulnerability based upon the test result.
  • 17. The method of claim 16, further comprising: sorting, by the computer, the first and the second vulnerabilities based upon the corresponding priorities; anddisplaying, by the computer, a priority list including the first and the second vulnerabilities in a graphical user interface.
  • 18. The method of claim 11, further comprising: generating, by the computer, a command line interface configured to receive an additional test instruction.
  • 19. The method of claim 11, wherein the one or more test instructions are based upon the type of the embedded non-IP device.
  • 20. The method of claim 11, wherein the one or more test instructions are based upon the type of the interface.
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