This application claims priority based on parent application Ser. No. 09/712,780, entitled “PPP Domain Name and L2TP Tunnel Selection Configuration Override” by Purnam Anil Sheth, Aravind Sitaraman, Charles T. Yager and Gregory D. Bums, filed on Nov. 13, 2000.
This application is related to the following:
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to the field of data communications. More particularly, the present invention relates to a system and method for static selection of tunnel-based network connections.
2. The Background Art
A significant concern of the individual private and public domains making up the Internet or any other system incorporating multiple networks is the ability to ensure that only those subscribers who are authorized to access the individual private and public domains within the comprehensive network have the capability to access such networks. Serious security risks are posed by the possibility of unauthorized users having the know-how and capability to invade the individual private and public domains within the network.
In today's networking environment, many privately owned domain sites exist on the Internet that allow access only to those individuals which have been granted the proper authorization. For example, these may include company owned private domains containing confidential information and, as such, the company may grant access only to those employed by the company, or they may be communities of interest (i.e. “pay-sites”) that provide information only to those subscribers which subscribe to the privately owned domain. The subscriber who connects to the Internet, typically by means of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Telephone Company (Telco), may also possess the capability to assume the identity of an authorized user. This capability heightens the potential for security violations.
Additionally, it is becoming increasingly more prevalent for individual computer users to have the capability to remotely access privately owned intra networks. Such Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) allow the user to connect with the private intra network of the company from the user's residence by means of the telephone line or other convenient means. The inception of wireless remote connections have even made it possible for users to connect from almost any imaginable locale. The ability to connect remotely to individual private intra networks, once seen as a luxury, has become so commonplace that many working professionals require such access in order to accomplish their everyday job assignments. In many instances, remote users connect to privately owned intra networks through the same means that individuals connect to the Internet, typically Telcos or ISPs. VPNs are cost-effective because users can connect to the Internet locally and tunnel back to connect to corporate resources. This reduces overhead costs associated with traditional remote access methods.
Still referring to
Typically, when the user desires to access a specified domain, such as the first privately owned secured domain site 16, the user runs a network logon application program on the host computer 12 which requires the user to input user identification and authorization information as a means of initiating access to the desired network. This information is then directed to the access point 14 where it is verified to ensure that the host user has the required authorization to permit access to the desired network. Once authorization is granted to the user, a connection is established via the access point 14 with the home gateway 22 of the specified first privately owned secure domain site 16. The connection established may be a tunnel-based connection, such as L2TP (Layer Two Tunneling Protocol) or L2F (Layer Two Forwarding), or an IP-based (Internet Protocol) connection, such as used with ATM or frame relay. The user of the host computer 12, having established such a connection, has the ongoing capability to access the specified domain until the connection is terminated either at the directive of the user or by error in data transmission. The access point 14 will typically have the capability to connect the user to various other privately owned secured domain sites, such as the second private domain site 18 or the public Internet 20. The user of the host computer 12 may use the PPP protocol to connect through the wholesaler networks to another Home Gateway.
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is used in many Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). An L2TP access concentrator (LAC) is a device that the client directly connects to and that tunnels Point-to-Point (PPP) frames to the L2TP network server (LNS). The LAC is the initiator of incoming calls and the receiver of outgoing calls. An L2TP network server (LNS) is the Termination point for an L2TP tunnel and the access point where PPP frames are processed and passed to higher layer protocols. The LNS handles the server side of the L2TP protocol. The LNS terminates calls arriving at any of the LAC's PPP interfaces, including asynchronous, synchronous and ISDN. The LNS is the initiator of outgoing calls and the receiver of incoming calls.
Turning now to
Present methods of establishing a tunnel allow an unauthorized user to reach or “Knock on the door” of another Home Gateway 215, merely by changing the domain name provided in the PPP authentication packet to the domain name of the intended Home Gateway 215. In this scenario, all users having access to access point 205 would have the potential to reach the privately owned secured domain site. For example, a user having a domain name of xxx@corpA.com may change the domain name in the PPP authentication packet to xxx@corpB.com, allowing the user's PPP session to be forwarded to the corpB LNS through the L2TP tunnel assigned to corpB. Allowing such unauthorized access to a Home Gateway 215 subjects the Home Gateway 215 to potential security risks, including denial of service attacks.
Denial-of-service attacks typically focus on making a service unavailable for normal use, which is often accomplished by exhausting a resource limitation on the network or within an operating system or application. When involving specific network server applications, these attacks can focus on acquiring and keeping open all of the available connections supported by that server, effectively locking out valid users of the server or service. For example, a user intending to exploit present day L2TP systems could flood the network with many PPP sessions targeted to a Home Gateway for which the user is not authorized. Although the LNS authentication process would typically prevent an unauthorized user from access to the corporate intranet, the resources devoted to handling the large number of PPP sessions could adversely affect the services available to authorized users.
The currently available solutions to this problem are very limited and do not offer the level of security protection that most companies operating secured and confidential private intra networks demand. Companies have been able to minimize the risk by setting up internal access points which effectively cause the user/host to dial-in or connect directly with the private intra network without going through an external ISP or Telco. While this direct-connect service allows some measure of security it does so at the expense of increasing the costs associated with maintaining an internal access point and the additional connection costs related to remote users having to potentially incur long distance telephone service charges.
What is needed is a solution that prevents unauthorized PPP sessions from being forwarded to a destination LNS. A further need exists for such a solution that does not alter the original PPP authentication packet.
A method for controlling subscriber access in a network capable of establishing connections with multiple services includes receiving a communication from a subscriber using a first communication network coupled to a second communication network, the communication optionally including a domain identifier associated with a service on the second communication network, and authorizing the subscriber to access a service on the second communication network using a virtual circuit. The authorization is based upon a domain configuration override attribute associated with the virtual circuit used to receive the communication from the subscriber. An access server capable of forcing subscribers of a communications system to gain access exclusively to a domain network associated with a virtual circuit includes an authorizer to grant service authorization to the subscribers based upon a virtual circuit used to make a service request, a virtual circuit profile request generator to generate virtual circuit profile requests and a calculator to determine whether the service associated with the virtual circuit matches the service associated with a domain configuration override attribute.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will realize that the following description of the present invention is illustrative only and not in any way limiting. Other embodiments of the invention will readily suggest themselves to such skilled persons having the benefit of this disclosure.
In accordance with a presently preferred embodiment of the present invention, the components, processes and/or data structures may be implemented using C++ programs running on high performance computers (such as an Enterprise 2000™ server running Sun Solaris™ as its operating system. The Enterprise 2000™ server and Sun Solaris™ operating system are products available from Sun Microsystems, Inc. of Mountain View, Calif.). Different implementations may be used and may include other types of operating systems, computing platforms, computer programs, firmware and/or general purpose machines. In addition, those of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that devices of a less general purpose nature, such as hardwired devices, devices relying on FPGA (field programmable gate array) or ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) technology, or the like, may also be used without departing from the scope and spirit of the inventive concepts disclosed herein.
The authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) service performs user authentication, user authorization and user accounting functions. It may be a Cisco ACS™ product such as Cisco Secure™, available from Cisco Systems, Inc. of San Jose, Calif., or an equivalent product. In accordance with one embodiment of the present invention, the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) protocol is used as the communication protocol for carrying AAA information. RADIUS is an Internet standard track protocol for carrying authentication, authorization, accounting and configuration information between devices that desire to authenticate their links and a shared AAA or AAA proxy service. Those of ordinary skill in the art will realize that other authentication protocols such as TACACS+ or DIAMETER can be used as acceptable authentication communications links between the various communications devices that encompass the data communications network and still be within the inventive concepts disclosed herein.
Turning now to
The host computers 305, 310, 315 in this particular computer network are connected to a Publicly Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 325 via a transmission means 330, 335, 340, such as copper wire or cable. Broadcast mechanisms such as ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) may be used. Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that other types of broadcast mechanisms may be provided by an ISP or Telco such as Ethernet™, frame relay, leased lines, ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) or the like. Access points 345 are located within a wide area network (WAN) 350 and are operated by Telcos or ISPs. The access points 345 house AAA servers 355, Service Selection Gateways (not shown in
In order for a user host to gain access to a public domain network, such as the Internet, users must first dial-in or otherwise make a connection with the SSG through a data-receiving interface (not shown in
According to one embodiment of the present invention, an access point 345 includes one or more DSLAMs 365, 370, 375 that service the copper loops between the access point 345 and the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) 305, 310, 315. DSLAMs 365, 370, 375 may link locally or via an inter-central office (CO) link to LAC 360. Traffic enters and exits the DSLAM chassis through ports, each of which is assigned a port address. A virtual circuit or channel (VC) is a logical circuit created to ensure reliable communication between two network devices. A VC is defined by a Virtual Path Identifier (VPI)/Virtual Channel Identifier (VCI) pair, which is directly tied to a particular DSLAM port used by a particular subscriber.
The LAC 360 is linked to a separate server/memory device 355, herein referred to as an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server 355. The LAC 360 and the AAA server 355 communicate with one-another according to the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) protocol. The specific details of the RADIUS protocol are well known by those of ordinary skill in the art. Moreover, as will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art, the RADIUS protocol has limited applicability to the present invention and, therefore a detailed discussion of this protocol is deemed unnecessary. The preferred methods of the present invention described herein are not limited to the use of the RADIUS protocol and other equivalent authentication protocols may be used.
When the LAC 360 receives a PPP authentication request, a virtual circuit profile request generator (not shown in
The virtual circuit profile packet travels from the AAA server 350 to a second receiving interface (not shown in
In accordance with one embodiment of the present invention, the LAC service and the LNS may be implemented using a Cisco 6400 Universal Access Concentrator, available from Cisco Systems, Inc. of San Jose, Calif.
Turning now to
According to another embodiment of the present invention, the information regarding the mapping between virtual circuit ID and tunnel ID is maintained by the LAC or similar device.
Turning now to
Turning now to
The domain configuration override attribute is requested by the domain owner to be placed in virtual circuit profiles. It allows the service provider the capability to ensure that a PPP session originating from a DSLAM port allocated to a particular domain can connect with only that particular domain, regardless of what domain name is entered in the PPP authentication packet. This provides added security to the owner of the private domain by lessening the likelihood of an unauthorized access to the home gateway of a corporate intranet. The service provider would have the control over which ports are allocated to which domains. The service provider would also have control over which ports have the domain configuration attribute in their virtual circuit profile and are, thus, limited to one domain and which virtual circuit profiles do not contain the domain configuration override attribute and are, thus, free to connect to more than one domain.
Although embodiments of the present invention is have been described with respect to virtual circuits in an ATM networking environment, it should be understood that a virtual circuit assigned to a subscriber in system may be defined in any suitable networking environment using any suitable communication technologies and protocols, without deviating from the scope of the present invention.
In accordance with a specific embodiment of the present invention, the components, process steps, and/or data structures are implemented using software. This implementation is not intended to be limiting in any way. Different implementations may be used and may include other types of operating systems, computing platforms, and/or computer programs. In addition, those of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that devices of a less general purpose nature, such as hardwired devices, devices relying on FPGA (field programmable gate array) or ASIC (application specific integrated circuit) technology, or the like, may also be used without departing from the scope and spirit of the inventive concepts disclosed herewith.
While embodiments and applications of this invention have been shown and described, it would be apparent to those skilled in the art having the benefit of this disclosure that many more modifications than mentioned above are possible without departing from the inventive concepts herein. The invention, therefore, is not to be restricted except in the spirit of the appended claims.
Number | Name | Date | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
4644532 | George et al. | Feb 1987 | A |
4669113 | Ash et al. | May 1987 | A |
4896319 | Lidinsky et al. | Jan 1990 | A |
4995074 | Goldman et al. | Feb 1991 | A |
5014265 | Hahne et al. | May 1991 | A |
5115427 | Johnson, Jr. et al. | May 1992 | A |
5159592 | Perkins | Oct 1992 | A |
5239537 | Sakauchi | Aug 1993 | A |
5265245 | Nordstrom et al. | Nov 1993 | A |
5274634 | Babiarz | Dec 1993 | A |
5274643 | Fisk | Dec 1993 | A |
5280470 | Buhrke et al. | Jan 1994 | A |
5305311 | Lyles | Apr 1994 | A |
5347511 | Gun | Sep 1994 | A |
5371852 | Attanasio et al. | Dec 1994 | A |
5406643 | Burke et al. | Apr 1995 | A |
5408469 | Opher et al. | Apr 1995 | A |
5416842 | Aziz | May 1995 | A |
5422882 | Hiller et al. | Jun 1995 | A |
5426636 | Hiller et al. | Jun 1995 | A |
5428607 | Hiller et al. | Jun 1995 | A |
5430715 | Corbalis et al. | Jul 1995 | A |
5437013 | Rubin et al. | Jul 1995 | A |
5452297 | Hiller et al. | Sep 1995 | A |
5461624 | Mazzola | Oct 1995 | A |
5469556 | Clifton | Nov 1995 | A |
5510777 | Pilc et al. | Apr 1996 | A |
5539884 | Robrock, II | Jul 1996 | A |
5555244 | Gupta et al. | Sep 1996 | A |
5570361 | Norizuki et al. | Oct 1996 | A |
5578955 | Matsue et al. | Nov 1996 | A |
5583862 | Callon | Dec 1996 | A |
5588003 | Ohba et al. | Dec 1996 | A |
5602918 | Chen et al. | Feb 1997 | A |
5604803 | Aziz | Feb 1997 | A |
5617417 | Sathe et al. | Apr 1997 | A |
5621721 | Vatuone | Apr 1997 | A |
5623605 | Keshav et al. | Apr 1997 | A |
5631897 | Pacheco et al. | May 1997 | A |
5642515 | Jones et al. | Jun 1997 | A |
5649108 | Spiegel et al. | Jul 1997 | A |
5655077 | Jones et al. | Aug 1997 | A |
5671354 | Ito et al. | Sep 1997 | A |
5673265 | Gupta et al. | Sep 1997 | A |
5684950 | Dare et al. | Nov 1997 | A |
5689566 | Nguyen | Nov 1997 | A |
5708812 | Van Dyke et al. | Jan 1998 | A |
5715399 | Bezos | Feb 1998 | A |
5717690 | Peirce, Jr. et al. | Feb 1998 | A |
5734654 | Shirai et al. | Mar 1998 | A |
5740171 | Mazzola et al. | Apr 1998 | A |
5740176 | Gupta et al. | Apr 1998 | A |
5740371 | Wallis | Apr 1998 | A |
5742604 | Edsall et al. | Apr 1998 | A |
5745708 | Weppler et al. | Apr 1998 | A |
5764636 | Edsall | Jun 1998 | A |
5768519 | Swift et al. | Jun 1998 | A |
5796732 | Mazzola et al. | Aug 1998 | A |
5802290 | Casselman | Sep 1998 | A |
5815665 | Teper et al. | Sep 1998 | A |
5852607 | Chin | Dec 1998 | A |
5864542 | Gupta et al. | Jan 1999 | A |
5918019 | Valencia | Jun 1999 | A |
5944824 | He | Aug 1999 | A |
5949755 | Uphadya et al. | Sep 1999 | A |
5991828 | Horie et al. | Nov 1999 | A |
5999514 | Kato | Dec 1999 | A |
5999518 | Nattkemper et al. | Dec 1999 | A |
6009103 | Woundy | Dec 1999 | A |
6011910 | Chau et al. | Jan 2000 | A |
6021496 | Dutcher et al. | Feb 2000 | A |
6023474 | Gardner et al. | Feb 2000 | A |
6026441 | Ronen | Feb 2000 | A |
6044402 | Jacobson et al. | Mar 2000 | A |
6047376 | Hosoe | Apr 2000 | A |
6061650 | Malkin et al. | May 2000 | A |
6069895 | Ayandeh | May 2000 | A |
6078957 | Adelman et al. | Jun 2000 | A |
6081508 | West et al. | Jun 2000 | A |
6081518 | Bowman-Amuah | Jun 2000 | A |
6084892 | Benash et al. | Jul 2000 | A |
6091951 | Sturniolo et al. | Jul 2000 | A |
6092178 | Jindal et al. | Jul 2000 | A |
6092196 | Reiche | Jul 2000 | A |
6094437 | Loehndorf, Jr. et al. | Jul 2000 | A |
6108708 | Iwata | Aug 2000 | A |
6115468 | De Nicolo | Sep 2000 | A |
6118785 | Araujo et al. | Sep 2000 | A |
6119160 | Zhang et al. | Sep 2000 | A |
6134666 | De Nicolo | Oct 2000 | A |
6154775 | Coss et al. | Nov 2000 | A |
6212561 | Sitaraman et al. | Apr 2001 | B1 |
6219790 | Lloyd et al. | Apr 2001 | B1 |
6236655 | Caldara et al. | May 2001 | B1 |
6252878 | Locklear, Jr. et al. | Jun 2001 | B1 |
6298043 | Mauger et al. | Oct 2001 | B1 |
6301229 | Araujo et al. | Oct 2001 | B1 |
6308213 | Valencia | Oct 2001 | B1 |
6396838 | Palnati | May 2002 | B1 |
6400716 | Munakata et al. | Jun 2002 | B1 |
6408336 | Schneider et al. | Jun 2002 | B1 |
6412003 | Melen | Jun 2002 | B1 |
6415313 | Yamada et al. | Jul 2002 | B1 |
6430152 | Jones et al. | Aug 2002 | B1 |
6434156 | Yeh | Aug 2002 | B1 |
6438612 | Ylonen et al. | Aug 2002 | B1 |
6446200 | Ball et al. | Sep 2002 | B1 |
6456623 | Kobayasi et al. | Sep 2002 | B1 |
6463475 | Calhoun | Oct 2002 | B1 |
6466976 | Alles et al. | Oct 2002 | B1 |
6498845 | Martz et al. | Dec 2002 | B1 |
6507577 | Mauger et al. | Jan 2003 | B1 |
6519254 | Chuah et al. | Feb 2003 | B1 |
6522627 | Mauger | Feb 2003 | B1 |
6526033 | Wang et al. | Feb 2003 | B1 |
6542919 | Wendorf et al. | Apr 2003 | B1 |
6597689 | Chiu et al. | Jul 2003 | B1 |
6609153 | Salkewicz | Aug 2003 | B1 |
6614809 | Verma et al. | Sep 2003 | B1 |
6615358 | Dowd et al. | Sep 2003 | B1 |
6651096 | Gai et al. | Nov 2003 | B1 |
6654792 | Verma et al. | Nov 2003 | B1 |
6665273 | Goguen et al. | Dec 2003 | B1 |
6665305 | Weismann | Dec 2003 | B1 |
6717944 | Bryden et al. | Apr 2004 | B1 |
6741599 | Dunn et al. | May 2004 | B1 |
6785228 | Vandette et al. | Aug 2004 | B1 |
20020016501 | Okoshi et al. | Feb 2002 | A1 |
Number | Date | Country |
---|---|---|
9923852 | May 1999 | WO |
Number | Date | Country | |
---|---|---|---|
20050086495 A1 | Apr 2005 | US |