The present invention relates generally to optical systems, including what may be referred to as optical communications systems, optical telecommunications systems and optical networks, and more particularly to a method and system for information security in an optical transmission system.
Optical telecommunications is a primary method of transporting information around the world. Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) technology has led to as many as 80 and 160 information-carrying wavelengths on a single fiber at bit rates as high as 10 and 40 gigabits per second per wavelength. While this increase in throughput and capacity is impressive, security is becoming increasingly important as the use of fiber optic WDM and free space optical telecommunication systems continue to expand.
Most existing methods of protecting an optical transmission encrypt a signal in the electrical domain before the signal is transferred to the optical layer. For example, in van Breeman et al, U.S. Pat. No. 5,473,696, the data stream is enciphered by adding, modulo 2, a pseudorandom stream before transmission and recovering the data by addition of the same pseudorandom stream. Rutledge, U.S. Pat. No. 5,864,625, electronically encrypts the information and optically transmits a security key used for the encryption process. These types of protection systems are limited by the electronic processing rate, currently, no better than approximately 2.5 to 10 gigabits per second. Secondly, these electronic methods of protection are costly to implement and can create latency issues.
Brackett et al in U.S. Pat. No. 4,866,699 teaches an analog method of coding and decoding for multi-user communications based on optical frequency domain coding and decoding of coherently related spectral components. Brackett fails to address any secure or privacy communication applications where the spectral components are not coherently related.
In view of the foregoing, one object in accordance with the present invention is to improve optical communications security by providing an analog method of protecting transmissions that is lower in cost, volume, weight and/or power, especially at high transmission bit rates.
The present invention, in a preferred embodiment, provides an analog method and apparatus for effectively protecting electronic communications that may be transmitted, for example, over a fiber optic or free-space network. In a preferred embodiment the present invention may use a combination of an Optical Tapped Delay Line (OTDL), as disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,608,721 (which patent is incorporated herein by reference), with known methods of altering the properties of an analog signal.
A privacy system can be described as a system where the source signal is sufficiently protected to make unauthorized interception exceptionally difficult for the majority of potential adversaries, but not so difficult as to prevent interception by a sophisticated, well-funded and determined adversary, such as a government. A secure system is one in which the transmitted information signal is well protected against unauthorized intrusion by highly sophisticated adversaries having extensive computing resources. The security provided in accordance with the present invention can attain many levels of security, from a privacy system to a truly secure system, by, for example: (1) varying the number of sub-bands; (2) changing the analog properties of the sub-bands by altering the phase, introducing time delays, or shifting the originating signal's frequency components; and (3) controlling the periodicity of the changes.
The rate of signal transmission also affects the probability of signal interception. For example, a 10 gigabit per second signal is inherently more difficult to intercept than a 2.5 gigabit per second signal. The present invention, in a preferred embodiment, is capable of protecting optical signals at bit rates exceeding 1 gigabit per second.
A transmission using a preferred embodiment of the present invention is protected from an attack because any attack requires coherent detection of a large bandwidth of analog data at a high-precision digitization rate, and even if coherently intercepted, the properties of the signal are scrambled to the extent that recovery is virtually impossible. For example, an OTDL device with 128 sub-bands and 10 different phase shift combinations, requires a brute-force attack approaching 10128 tries to coherently recover the signal, a feat not possible with current analog-to-digital conversion technology combined with the fastest supercomputer. To make interception even less likely, the sub-band distortion pattern can be periodically changed.
The various output beams are then directed to an anamorphic optical system having a cylinder lens 242 and a spherical lens 245. The anamorphic optical system 242, 245 performs the functions of: 1) Fourier transformation of the output of the cavity 231 in the vertical dimension y, and 2) imaging of the output beams of the OTDL 231 in the horizontal dimension x onto an output surface 246. The outputs are imaged on plane 246 with each information-carrying wavelength focused at a specific spot on the plane. By properly placing detectors at plane 246, each WDM information channel may be detected for further processing.
The reflective phase modulator array 62 may be implemented in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, a liquid crystal array, a MEMS device, or an array of III-V or II-VI semiconductor devices. The speed at which the phase shifting changes may directly affect the level of security afforded. In this example one modulator element is associated with each sub-band. As each sub-band passes through a modulator element, it is phase shifted in a manner determined by the control computer 64. The mirror part of the modulator array 62 reflects the sub-bands back through lens system 60 to tap locations 57a to 57g. The OTDL 58 recombines the taps into an optical signal for retransmission over a fiber optic carrier 76 to the destination.
The signal from transmitter 50 is received by OTDL 72 from fiber 76. The OTDL 72 and lens 70 combination is identical to the OTDL 58 and lens 60 combination. OTDL 72 and lens 70 separate the signal into the identical sub-bands created by OTDL 58 and lens 60. The sub-bands are imaged onto the reflective phase modulator array 68, with each array element receiving the same sub-band as the corresponding modulator in array 62. The control computer 66 causes each sub-band to be phase shifted in the opposite manner as instructed by control computer 64. Each sub-band is then reflected back through lens system 70 to OTDL 72 which together recombine the sub-bands into a single signal that is output to fiber 74 for further processing or routing.
The effect of imparting a phase shift to each sub-band is to introduce distortion. If the amount of distortion is sufficient, the information content becomes undecipherable and security is enhanced. The control computer 64 instructs the modulator array how to modify the phase of the sub-bands in a manner that is unpredictable to anyone not having knowledge of the computer input. The rate at which the phase shifts are changed depends upon the level of security required. A fixed phase shift pattern will sufficiently distort the signal to make it incomprehensible; however, determined interceptors can analyze the signal and eventually determine, and reverse the effects of, the phase shift pattern. To ensure continued security, the fixed phase shift pattern can be changed occasionally, requiring the potential interceptor to start the analysis over again. For the highest security, this change must be made often enough to guarantee that even with the highest performance computational systems anticipated, the phase shifts do not remain static long enough for any known analysis to succeed before the pattern changes. A secure system will result if the phase shifter array settings 62 and 68 in
Preferably, the computer input to the phase modulators may be derived from a deterministic algorithm, the starting point of which may be derived from a key setting provided to the computer. This permits a receiver having knowledge of both the algorithm and the key setting to reproduce the same control computer signal, and thereby, reverse the phase distortions and recover the information signal intact.
For purposes of illustrating the principles of this embodiment of the invention, only a single signal or channel has been described. However, using the multi-port interleaving capability of the OTDL, as described in U.S. Pat. No. 6,608,721 (incorporated herein by reference), embodiments in accordance with the present invention are capable of simultaneously encrypting all channels of a multi-channel WDM communications system. As used herein the term “encrypting” includes all levels of security from low-security to the highest levels of certified security.
For the illustrated embodiment of the present invention to be optimally effective, the sub-band resolution, i.e., the spacing between each sub-band at focal plane 62 of the OTDL in
Each array element may see a portion of the signal in the frequency domain, defined by the equation:
where
Defining
as a sliding Fourier transform (e.g., block of data), Ψ(ω,t) may be perceived as that spectral component of the information signal incident on an element of the reflective phase shifter.
In a preferred embodiment, the present invention imparts a phase shift to each spectral component hitting a specific array element. Specifically, each array element sees a signal defined as a complex number
Aejφ
where φ is the entity to be altered by the phase shifter of the invention. In another embodiment, it would be possible to alter A (amplitude) instead of φ, but doing so would result in a loss of power and, potentially, information content. Altering φ does not produce a power loss, nor is any information content lost.
The embodiment illustrated in
As mentioned earlier, there are two other possible types of distortion techniques: (1) introduction of a random time delay; or (2) frequency shifting the sub-bands. A signal delay could be created by a coil, white cell, loop in a waveguide, or other types of free space delay. There are many methods to shift the frequency of an optical signal, such as using stimulated Brillouin Scattering, four wave mixing, three wave mixing, or use of any optical modulator device, such as a lithium niobate Mach-Zender, indium phosphide electroabsorption, electroabsorption multi-quantum well or an electrorefraction device. Note that the values of the frequency shifts applied must meet other constraints in order to be feasible for the embodiment used. Each of the three methods of signal distortion could be used independently or in any combination to produce a private or secure optical transmission system.
Another preferred embodiment of the present invention involves destroying the coherence of the input carrier by shifting the frequency of the input source. Again, any of the previously mentioned in-line distortion techniques could be used in combination with this method.
As illustrated in the example of
A further enhancement in security may be obtained using an OTDL in the architecture described in U.S. Pat. No. 6,608,721 B1 (incorporated herein by reference) and shown in
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