Protecting digital media of various content types

Abstract
Systems and/or methods (“tools”) are described that enable a digital rights management policy to be associated with digital media having an arbitrary content type or transfer control protocol. In some embodiments, the tools encrypt data segments of a media file and add a descriptor to each of those segments. These descriptors can enable a receiver of the encrypted media file to decrypt the file and consume it according to the correct digital rights management policy.
Description
BACKGROUND

Digital Rights Management (DRM) refers to techniques that are used to protect content, such as by controlling or restricting the use of digital media content on electronic devices. One characteristic of DRM is that it can bind the media content to a given machine or device. Thus, a license that pertains to a particular piece of content and that defines rights and restrictions associated with the piece of content will typically be bound to the given machine or device. As a result, a user may not take the piece of content and move it to another machine in order to playback the content.


Current DRM techniques have limitations. They are often compatible with only two types of protocols for transferring digital media—HTTP and RTSP. But other protocols may now or in the future be better suited for transferring digital media. Also, content protected by DRM may be limited to a particular content type. One particular content type—ASF files—permits only one set of rights and restrictions, i.e. “policies”, to apply to an entire ASF file. For example, when a video file is rendered, either Macrovision may be required to be enabled on an analog video output for the whole file, or it may not be required at all.


SUMMARY

Systems and/or methods (“tools”) are described that enable a digital rights management policy to be associated with digital media having an arbitrary content type or transfer control protocol. In some embodiments, the tools encrypt data segments of a media file and add a descriptor to each of those segments. These descriptors can enable a receiver of the encrypted media file to decrypt the file and consume it according to the correct digital rights management policy.


This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.





BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS


FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary registration procedure of a protocol with which the inventive embodiments can be employed in one embodiment.



FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary proximity detection procedure of a protocol with which the inventive embodiments can be employed in one embodiment.



FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary session establishment procedure of a protocol with which the inventive embodiments can be employed in one embodiment.



FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary data transfer procedure of a protocol with which the inventive embodiments can be employed in one embodiment.



FIG. 5 illustrates aspects of a streaming protocol with which the inventive embodiments can be utilized in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 6 illustrates aspects associated with root licenses and leaf licenses, in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 7 illustrates aspects associated with root licenses and leaf licenses, in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary single media file having seven portions associated with five different exemplary digital rights management policies.



FIG. 9 illustrates the single media file of FIG. 8 with exemplary data segments associated with Key IDs (KIDs).



FIG. 10 illustrates, for a data segment shown in FIG. 9, a packet in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 11 is a flow diagram showing one manner in which the tools enable content-independent encryption and decryption.



FIG. 12 illustrates sample encryption in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 13 is a flow diagram showing communication of root and leaf licenses in accordance with one embodiment.





DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Overview


Tools are described that enable a digital rights management policy to be associated with digital media having an arbitrary content type or transfer control protocol. In some embodiments, the tools encrypt data segments of a media file and add a descriptor to each of those segments. These descriptors can enable a receiver of the encrypted media file to decrypt the file and consume it according to the correct digital rights management policy.


In the discussion that follows, a section entitled “Content Security and License Transfer Protocol” is provided and describes one particular system in which the inventive techniques can be employed. Following this, sections entitled “RTSP” and “HTTP” are provided to give the reader who is unfamiliar with these protocols understanding of the inventive techniques in these spaces.


Following this section, a section entitled “Root and Leaf Licenses” is provided and describes the notion of an initial, root license enabling multiple other licenses for a media file. Following this section, a section entitled “A Single, Encrypted Media File with Multiple Leaf Licenses” is provided and describes how a media file can be associated with more than one digital rights management policy using leaf licenses associated with portions of the media file.


Following these sections, two sections, the first entitled “Descriptors” and the second entitled “Content-Independent Data Encryption” describe descriptors for data segments of a media file and manners in which the tools may use these descriptors to enable encryption of a media file regardless of its type of digital content. The last section, “Using Root and Leaf Licenses” describes one way in which the tools may use root and leaf licenses.


Content Security and License Transfer Protocol


The following provides a discussion of an exemplary protocol that provides security and transfers licenses for content flowing over digital links. This protocol constitutes but one exemplary protocol with which the various inventive techniques can be employed. It is to be appreciated and understood that other protocols can be utilized without departing from the spirit and scope of the claimed subject matter.


The following cryptographic notation is used in this description:

    • K{data} data is encrypted with secret key K.
    • K[data] data is signed with secret key K.
    • {data}Device data is encrypted with the device's public key.
    • [data]Device data is signed with the device's private key.


In this particular protocol, there are five primary procedures: Registration, Revalidation, Proximity Detection, Session Establishment, and Data Transfer.


In the Registration procedure, a transmitter (i.e. a device that has content that is to be transmitted to another device) can uniquely and securely identify an intended receiver (i.e. a device to which content is to be transmitted). In this particular protocol, the transmitter maintains a database with registered receivers and ensures that no more than a small predetermined number of receivers are used simultaneously. During the registration process, the transmitter also employs a Proximity Detection procedure to ensure that the receiver is located “near” the transmitter in the network, in order to prevent wide distribution of protected content.


The Revalidation procedure is utilized to ensure that the receiver continues to be “near” the transmitter. Content is not delivered to receivers unless they have been registered or revalidated within a predetermined period of time in the past.


The Session Establishment procedure is used whenever the receiver requests content from the transmitter. The transmitter enforces that devices must be registered and recently validated before the Session Establishment can be completed.


Once the session is established, the Data Transfer of the requested content can take place in a secure way. The receiver may reuse the session to retrieve specific portions of the content (seeking), but must establish a new session in order to retrieve a different content.


Consider now the Registration procedure in connection with FIG. 1 and the table just below that describes the various messages that are passed between the transmitter and the receiver during registration.














Message
Value
Description







Registration Request
Ver
8-bit Protocol Version


Message
Cert
XML digital certificate of the Receiver.



DId
128-bit Serial Number.


Registration Response
Ver
8-bit Protocol Version


Message
{ Seed }Device
128-bit Seed used to derive the Content




Encryption key and Content Integrity key.



SN
128-bit Serial Number.



Address
Address of transmitter's incoming and outgoing




proximity packets socket.



SId
128-bit Random Session Id.








Proximity Detection Algorithm
The Proximity Detection Algorithm is executed



out-of-band.









Here, the receiver sends a registration request message that contains, among other information, the receiver's digital certificate. Responsive to receiving the registration request message, the transmitter validates the receiver's certificate, generates a seed and a random session ID, returning the same in the form indicated above to the receiver in a registration response message. The receiver then validates the transmitter's signature, obtains the session ID and performs the other actions indicated in the figure. The receiver and the transmitter can then undergo a proximity detection process which is described below.


With regard to Revalidation, the same procedures as outlined above are performed, with the difference being that during Revalidation, the receiver is already registered in the database.


With regard to Proximity Detection, consider the following in connection with FIG. 2.


During the Proximity Detection procedure, the receiver sends to the transmitter a message containing the Session Id indicated in a Proximity Detection Initialization Message. The transmitter then sends to the receiver a message containing a Nonce (128-bit random value), and measures the time it takes for the receiver to reply with the nonce encrypted using a Content Encryption key. Finally, the transmitter sends a message to the receiver indicating if the proximity detection was successful or not.


The receiver may repeat the process until it has a confirmation that the proximity detection succeeded. When this particular protocol is used over IP-based networks, the proximity detection messages are exchanged over UDP. The receiver learns the transmitter's address via the Registration Response message. The receiver's address does not need to be separately communicated since it can be determined by inspecting the incoming IP header of the UDP packet that carries the Proximity Detection Initialization Message.


The following table describes the messages that are exchanged during Proximity Detection:














Message
Value
Description







Proximity Start
SId
Same 128-bit Session Id value sent by the transmitter.


Message


Proximity Challenge
Seq
8-bit incremental sequence number.


Message
SId
Same 128-bit Session Id.



Nonce
128-bit Random Value.


Proximity Response
Seq
Same sequence number determined by the transmitter.


Message
SId
Same 128-bit Session Id.



KC{Nonce}
128-bit Nonce encrypted using the Content Encryption key.


Proximity Result
SId
Same 128-bit Session Id.


Message
Result
Status code indicating the success or failure of the registration




procedure.









With regard to Session Establishment, consider the following in connection with FIG. 3 and the table just below which describes messages that are exchanged during Session Establishment.














Message
Value
Description







License Request Message
Ver
8-bit Protocol Version



Cert
XML digital certificate of the Receiver.



SN
128-bit Serial Number.



Action
Requested usage for the content. Ex.: “Play”,




“Copy” or “Burn”.



RId
128-bit random Rights Id.



VCRL
Version of the receiver's CRL.


License Response Message
Ver
8-bit Protocol Version



CRL
Transmitter's CRL. Only sent in case it has a




higher version number than the receiver's CRL and




the receiver component also has transmitting




capabilities.











License
KC (encrypted with
128-bit Random Content




receiver's public key)
Encryption key.




KI (encrypted with
128-bit Random Content




receiver's public key)
Integrity key.




VCRL
Version of the





transmitter's CRL.




RId
Same 128-bit random





Rights Id sent by the





receiver.




SN
128-bit Serial Number.









In this example, a License Request Message is sent from the receiver to the transmitter and contains the information described above. In response, the transmitter can send a License Response Message that contains the information described above.


In this particular example, the License is represented in XMR format and includes a Content Encryption key, a Content Integrity key, a Version of the Transmitter's CRL, a 128-bit Rights Id and a 128-bit Serial Number. The License also contains an OMAC calculated using the Content Integrity key using OMAC.


With regard to the Data Transfer procedure, consider the following in connection with FIG. 4. Once the Session Establishment is complete, the data transfer is executed in a control protocol specific manner. Both the Data Transfer request and response must be specifically defined for the control protocol and content type. This is conceptually represented in FIG. 4.


Having now provided a brief overview of an exemplary protocol with which the inventive embodiments can be employed, consider now some background information on RTSP.


RTSP


The Real Time Streaming Protocol or RTSP is an application-level protocol for control over the delivery of continuous media (e.g., data with real-time properties like streaming), as will be appreciated by the skilled artisan. RTSP provides an extensible framework to enable controlled, on-demand delivery of real-time data, such as audio and video. Sources of data can include both live data feeds and stored clips. This protocol is intended to control multiple data delivery sessions, provide a means for choosing delivery channels such as UDP, multicast UDP and TCP, and provide a means for choosing delivery mechanisms based upon RTP.


RTSP establishes and controls either a single or several time-synchronized streams of continuous media such as audio and video. It does not typically deliver the continuous streams itself, although interleaving of the continuous media stream with the control stream is possible. In other words, RTSP acts as a “network remote control” for multimedia servers.


The set of streams to be controlled is defined by a presentation description. In RTSP, there is no notion of an RTSP connection; instead, a server maintains a session labeled by an identifier. An RTSP session is in no way tied to a transport-level connection such as a TCP connection. During an RTSP session, an RTSP client may open and close many reliable transport connections to the server to issue RTSP requests. Alternatively, it may use a connectionless transport protocol such as UDP, as will be appreciated by the skilled artisan.


The streams controlled by RTSP may use RTP, but the operation of RTSP does not depend on the transport mechanism used to carry continuous media.


Consider now a typical RTSP request/response exchange in connection with FIG. 5, between a client/receiver 500 and a server/transmitter 502.


Preliminarily, the RTSP requests/responses have headers which, for the sake of brevity, are not described. In RTSP, a client/receiver 500 typically issues what is known as a DESCRIBE request which is directed to retrieving a description of a presentation or media object identified by a request URL from server 502. The server 502 responds with a description of the requested resource which is represented in the SESSION DESCRIPTION PROTOCOL (SDP). The DESCRIBE response (SDP) contains all media initialization information for the resource(s) that it describes.


Next, client 500 sends a SETUP request for a URI that specifies the transport mechanism to be used for the streamed media. In the FIG. 5 example, a SETUP request is sent for both audio and video. Client 500 also indicates, in the SETUP request, the transport parameters that it will be utilizing. A transport header in the SETUP request specifies the transport parameters acceptable to the client for data transmission. The RESPONSE from server 502 contains the transport parameters selected by the server. The server also generates session identifiers in response to the SETUP requests.


At this point, the client can issue a PLAY request which tells the server to start sending data via the mechanism specified in the SETUP. Responsive to receiving a PLAY request, the server can start streaming the content which, in this example, is the audio/video content. In this example, the streaming content is encapsulated using RTP packets and is sent over UDP, as will be appreciated by the skilled artisan.


The RTSP protocol has other methods of interest which include PAUSE TEARDOWN, GET_PARAMETER, SET_PARAMETER, REDIRECT, and RECORD. For additional background on RTSP, the reader should consult the RTSP RFC, Schulzrinne, H., Rao, A., and R. Lanphier, “Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)”, RFC 2326, April 1998.


Root and Leaf Licenses


In the illustrated and described embodiment, the notion of a root license and leaf licenses are employed. Here, the root license is utilized to set up and securely deliver a content key (a root content key) to the client/receiver so that the client/receiver can decrypt subsequently-delivered leaf license(s). Once the root content key is securely delivered to the client/receiver, content keys for various leaf licenses (leaf content keys) can be encrypted by the server/transmitter using the root content key sent to the client/receiver. Using the root content key, the client can decrypt the leaf content keys and associated policies in the leaf licenses. Each of the leaf licenses also have a unique identifier capable of associating the leaf license with a portion of a media file. Here the unique identifier is referred to as the Key ID, or KID and for each leaf license numbered 1 to n (leaf-1, leaf-2, . . . leaf-n), KIDleaf-n.


To provide but one example of how this particular scheme can be implemented, consider the following in connection with FIG. 6. In this particular example, the system of FIG. 6 is configured to use 1024-bit RSA keys for public key cryptographic operation and 128-bit AES keys for symmetric cryptographic operations. Of course, this is provided as but one example and is not intended to limit application of the claimed subject matter.


In this example, client/receiver 600 has a public/private key pair 650 and the server/transmitter 602 has the client/receiver's public key. In this example, each of the client/receiver's public and private keys is a 1024-bit RSA key. Using the client/receiver's public key, the server/transmitter builds a root license that contains a root content key that is encrypted with the client/receiver's public key. The root content key is a 128-bit AES content key. This root license is then sent to the client/receiver. In FIG. 6, this is shown as the first communication that takes place between the client/receiver and server-transmitter, where the encrypted root content key is represented as {content keyroot}CLIENT. It is to be appreciated, however, that other communication prior to the illustrated communication can take place.


Having received the encrypted root content key from the server/transmitter, the client/receiver can now decrypt the root content key using its private key and can securely store the decrypted root content key for future use.


At this point, consider what has occurred. The server/transmitter has securely communicated a key to the client/receiver that can now serve as the basis for subsequent cryptographic operations. More specifically, consider now that multiple, particular policies may pertain to multiple, particular pieces of DRM-protected content in a single media file. In this case, the server/transmitter can prepare multiple leaf licenses each containing a digital rights management policy and an encrypted version of a particular leaf content key. In this example, each leaf content key is a 128-bit AES content key that has been encrypted using the root content key. Thus, the computational complexity and expense experienced and incurred by the client/receiver associated with decrypting new and additional leaf content keys is reduced over that associated with 1024-bit RSA key operations because now, the client/receiver only needs to decrypt using a 128-bit AES content key (i.e. the root content key).


HTTP


Having now discussed the notion of a root and leaf license and how each can be employed in the contexts described above, consider now how the root and leaf license can be delivered using HTTP.


When HTTP is utilized for carrying DRM-protected content, the client issues two requests to the server/transmitter. First, the client issues a POST request to retrieve a root license. Second, the client issues a GET request for retrieving the DRM-protected content. The client issues the requests in this example because in HTTP, the server typically cannot initiate communication with a client.


Specifically, consider FIG. 7 in connection with the following discussion. When a client wishes to receive a root license, it issues a POST request to the server. The POST request contains a license request message, as discussed above. Responsive to receiving this communication, the server responds with a license response message that contains a root license which, in at least one embodiment, is expressed in XMR. Having received the root license and processed it accordingly, the client issues a GET request to the server asking for the DRM-protected content. Responsive to the GET request, the server replies with segments of the requested content interleaved with one or more license response messages. The license response messages each contain a leaf license that pertains to a particular portion of the DRM-protected content. Any suitable mechanism or interleaving technique can be used for formulating the server's reply.


As but one implementation example in one particular context, consider the following.


In but one example, a four-byte framing header is used to encapsulate data and control blocks. The framing header contains a one byte ASCII dollar sign (0×24), followed by a one byte block type identifier, followed by a two byte length of the encapsulated data, represented in network byte order.
















Sections
Fields









Header
8-bit ASCII dollar sign (0x24)




8-bit Block Type



Data Length
16-bit Length of the encapsulated data










A Control block uses an ASCII ‘c’ character (0×63) as its type identifier. This block contains a message, typically a License Response message.


A Data block uses an ASCII ‘d’ character (0×63) as its type identifier. This block contains a Data Segment descriptor immediately followed by media data.


The Data Segment descriptor can be associated with content that is encrypted or in the clear. An encrypted flag in the descriptor conveys this information. A Data Segment descriptor is associated with a portion of the transmitted file to which, if encrypted, a single policy and content encryption key apply. In other words, the content encryption key and policies cannot be changed within the segment.


In accordance with one embodiment, a typical HTTP response with link encryption is comprised of the following blocks:

    • 1. Control block [$c] carrying a License Response message with a Chained License.
    • 2. One or more Data blocks [$d].


In case there is a key or policy change during the transmission of the file, then the following steps are added:

    • 3. A new Control block [$c] carrying a License Response message with a new Chained License.
    • 4. One or more Data blocks [$d].


Note that steps 3 and 4 may occur multiple times in the case of multiple key or policy changes.


A Single, Encrypted Media File with Multiple Leaf Licenses


The tools enable a single encrypted media file to have portions associated with different policies. The single encrypted media file may be of an arbitrary content type (e.g., ASF, MPEG, WAV, or other files) and be transferred using various control protocols.


In the following illustrated and described embodiment of FIG. 8, a single, encrypted media file 800 has seven portions 802, 804, 806, 808, 810, 812, and 814. Assume that this media file is a media program about the history of music videos. The first portion is an introduction to music videos, the second is a music video, the third an advertisement, the fourth is another music video, the fifth is another music video, the sixth is another advertisement, and the seventh is a conclusion to the program.


Here the creator of the media program desires to have different rights for various portions. The creator may be willing to permit users of the media program to play the introduction and conclusion portions and copy them a certain number of times. The creator may not be willing to grant the same rights to the music videos; assume here that the creator of the program does not own these music videos, and so they are subject to different policies of use. The creator may also be willing to have the advertisements used freely—and thus they may be copied, used, and played in any way a user likes.


To govern the usage of each of these portions, each is associated with a policy. Here the policy is in a leaf license having a KID and content key. Assume that one root license and five leaf licenses are received for this media program. The leaf licenses are shown in FIG. 8 at 816, 818, 820, 822, and 824. Each of the leaf licenses has a unique KID (KID1, KID2, KID3, KID4, and KID5) and a unique leaf content key (leaf content key1, leaf content key2, leaf content key3, leaf content key4, and leaf content key5). Each leaf license also contains a policy (policy1, policy2, policy3, policy4, and policy5) permitting or excluding certain rights for using the media of each of the associated portions. These leaf licenses are expressed in XMR (eXtensible Media Rights), though other languages may also be used.


The first policy (that of leaf license #1) permits media associated with it to be played up to ten times and copied up to three times. This policy permits, therefore, the introduction and the conclusion of the program to be played and copied a certain number of times.


The second policy permits media associated with it to be played only once and not copied. Thus, the first music video of the program can only be played once. If a user attempts to play the entire program a second time, this video will not play.


The third policy permits media associated with it to be used in any way desired. The policy itself can set this out—that there are no restrictions on the play, copying, or other use of associated media. In some embodiments, however, the portions of the media may instead be in the clear (not encrypted). An example of this is described below. In either case, both the first and second advertisements may be used in any way desired.


The fourth policy permits media associated with it to by played as many times as a user likes, but cannot be copied. Thus, the second music video can be played but not copied.


The fifth policy permits media associated with it to be played as many times as a user likes and copied, but only as an analog file. Thus, the third music video may be played, and copied in a certain way only.


The association between each of the portions and the licenses are shown in FIG. 8 with dashed lines. Ways in which the tools may establish this association are set forth in greater detail below.


Descriptors


The tools can associate policies with portions of a single media file. Continuing the illustrated and described embodiment of FIG. 8, each of the portions is associated with a policy through a leaf license. To better explain how this association may be established, one portion of single media file 800 is illustrated in greater detail.



FIG. 9 illustrates media file 800 with fourth portion 808 expanded to show one way in which this portion can be associated with a policy. Here the media file is received with the portions generally in order. In this example the root license is received, followed by a first leaf license, followed by the first portion of the media file, followed by the second leaf license, followed by the second portion, and so on. Here the leaf licenses are not all received prior to receiving the beginning of the media file as described above. Because of this, the first and third leaf licenses may be sent again prior to the portion associated with them (thus, the first leaf license may be sent before the first portion and again before the seventh portion).


When a new policy is to be followed for a portion of the media file, a new leaf license (here fourth leaf license 822) is sent prior to the portion of the media associated with the fourth leaf license.


Here the leaf license is sent as part of a control block 902, followed by data segments 904-914 of fourth portion 808. In RTSP, however, the licenses are delivered in SDP descriptors or ANNOUNCE messages. This particular embodiment focuses on use of HTTP, though use and communication of leaf licenses and data may also use RTSP, such as is set forth in the description relating to FIG. 7 above. The control block comprises leaf license 822 of FIGS. 8 and 9. The leaf license has the leaf content key4, the policy4, and the KID4. Once received, the fourth leaf license can be decrypted using the root content key. The KID can be sent in the clear or encrypted but capable of being decrypted.


Each of the data segments is associated with a policy, here data segments 904-914 are associated with the corresponding fourth policy. This association is established with the KID of the fourth leaf license. The KID, or an identifier associated with the KID, is stored in each data segment. The KID can be a relatively short piece of information, even an integer taking up less than a byte of memory. Thus, the receiver can associate the data segment with the appropriate policy based on the KID indicating the appropriate policy.


The descriptor can be used with various control and data protocols and packet structures now in existence or that may be created in the future. One such exemplary data protocol is RTP. Here the descriptor is oriented appended to the end of each packet. In another embodiment, an HTTP control protocol is used. Here the descriptor is oriented appended at the beginning of each frame.



FIG. 10 illustrates a descriptor associating a data segment with a leaf license in accordance with RTSP.


In this example, data segment 1000 can include an RTP payload format header 1008 and payload data 1010. Here the payload data and payload format header are encrypted, an example of which is described as part of FIG. 11 below.


Here the descriptor is appended to the end of the payload data according the RTP protocol, though it can be placed at any suitable location permitted by the data protocol. Placing the descriptor at the end of the payload data can mitigate backward compatibility issues, as will be appreciated by the skilled artisan.


In this embodiment, the RTP packet—with the exception of the RTP header—is associated with the descriptor 1012. Descriptor 1012, in turn, carries with it the encryption parameters that can be used in a decryption process that enables payload data 1010 and RTP payload format header 1008 to be decrypted (e.g., the Initialization Vector (IV) associated with the fourth leaf content key). In this particular example, a single policy and content encryption key applies to the payload data 1010.


In accordance with one embodiment, descriptor 1012 comprises a data structure as follows:
















Sections
Fields









Flags
8-bit Flags



Extensions
8-bit Number of Extensions




Multiple Variable Length Extensions



Length
Data Segment Descriptor Length










In this example, the Flags section is a bit-field indicating attributes of the Data Segment. The following bit is currently defined: Bit 0 (Encrypted Data.) When this bit is set to 1, it indicates that the Data Segment is in encrypted form. Otherwise, the Data Segment is in the clear.


The extension section comprises the KID and IV; here the KID is the KID4 and the IV is associated with the leaf content key4.


With regard to the Extensions section, the Number of Extensions field indicates the number of variable length extensions included in this descriptor. With regard to the Variable Length Extension field, each extension has the following format:












Fields

















8-bit Extension Type



16-bit Extension Length



Variable Length Extension










In accordance with one embodiment, the KID and IV are defined as follows:


KID


Extension Type: Must be set to 1 for Key ID Extension.


Extension Length: Must be set to 16, which represents 128 bits (16 bytes).


Extension: Must contain the Key ID value for the encrypted media delivered in conjunction with this descriptor. This extension is only used when the Encrypted Data flag is set to 1.


Initialization Vector (IV)


Extension Type: Must be set to 2 for Initialization Vector Extension.


Extension Length: Must be set to 8, which represents 64 bits (8 bytes).


Extension: Must contain the Initialization Vector for the encrypted media delivered in conjunction with this descriptor. This extension is only used when the Encrypted Data flag is set to 1.


With regard to the Length section, in this embodiment, this section must contain the total length of the descriptor in bytes. This length does not include the size of the media data delivered in conjunction with this descriptor.


Content-Independent Data Encryption



FIG. 11 is a flow diagram that describes steps in a method in accordance with one embodiment. This method can be performed in connection with any suitable hardware, software, firmware or combination thereof In one embodiment, the method can be implemented in connection with systems, such as those illustrated and described above. Additionally, in the discussion that follows, some of the acts that are performed are depicted as being performed by a server/transmitter, and other acts are depicted as being performed by a client/receiver. Examples of server/transmitters and client/receivers are provided above.


Step 1102 receives a media file. The media file can have any content type permitting the media file to be broken into data segments, encrypted, transmitted, received, and decrypted. It can be, for instance, an ASF, MPEG2 TS, MPEG2 ES, or WAV file.


Step 1104 divides the media file into data segments. These data segments can comprise packets, other pieces of data, or frames conforming to various controls protocols, such as RTP or HTTP.


Step 1106 encrypts each data segment. Step 1106 may do so according to any of the embodiments described herein. Thus, it may encrypt the payload data with a leaf content key and encrypt that leaf content key with a root content key. With the root content key, a receiver may later decrypt the leaf content key and use that leaf content key to decrypt the payload data.


In one embodiment, step 1106 encrypts each data segment or part thereof using an AES in Counter mode. FIG. 12 illustrates a process for encrypting a single data segment using this technique. In this embodiment, Counter mode creates a stream of bytes that are then XOR'd with the clear text bytes of the data segment to create the encrypted data segment. The Key Stream Generator uses an AES round to generate 16-byte blocks of key stream at a time. The inputs to the AES round are the Content Encryption key (KC) (e.g., the leaf content key) and the 128-bit concatenation of a Data Segment ID and the block number within the data segment.


The output of key stream generator should be XOR'd byte by byte with the data from the corresponding block (i) of the data segment. In the case that the data segment is not evenly divisible by 16 bytes only the valid bytes of the media data from the last block should be XOR'd with the key stream and retained for the encrypted data segment.


Step 1108 adds a descriptor to each encrypted data segment. The descriptor can comprise a KID, IV, or other elements set forth herein. Each descriptor indicates an associated digital rights management policy by which the payload data of the data segment should be governed. This digital rights management policy, according to one embodiment above, is contained within a previously-received leaf license. Each descriptor can also indicate a content key (e.g., a particular leaf content key) usable to decrypt the data segment.


Note that the result of these steps can be a media file of an arbitrary content type broken into data segments, each data segment encrypted and having a descriptor by which the encrypted data can later be associated with a digital rights management policy.


In one embodiment, the descriptor contains a length indicator. With this length indicator, a receiver of an encrypted data segment can determine when the descriptor ends or begins. This length indicator permits the descriptor to be added to an encrypted data segment at various locations in the data segment or its packet. For the RTP protocol, for instance, the descriptor is added to the end of an RTP packet having the data segment. For the HTTP protocol, for instance, the descriptor is added to the beginning of the frame having the data segment. Note that the descriptor, by having a discernable length, can be added to various portions of a data segment and thus enable use of the descriptor with various transfer protocols.


Step 1110 transmits the encrypted data segments (and clear data segments, if any) with descriptors to a receiver. The receiver is enabled to orient (e.g., place in correct order) the data segments in manners known in the art. The receiver may decrypt the data segments using a content key associated with the data segments. Further, the receiver, using the descriptor, can determine what rights policy should be used with the media file or a portion thereof. If the media file has portions that should be governed by different rights policies, this method can also divide the data segments based on their portion of the media file and assign different descriptors to data segments of different portions in step 1104.


Step 1112 receives and decrypts the encrypted data segments. A receiver (such as client/receiver 500 or 600) decrypts the data segments and assigns the appropriate rights policy to them based on their descriptor. In one embodiment, the receiver decrypts the data segments using an Initialization Vector in the descriptor. The receiver determines the appropriate leaf content key based on the KID, which it then uses to decrypt the data segments after decrypting the leaf content key with a root content key.


Step 1114 associates each data segment with a rights policy. In one embodiment, the receiver does so using a Key ID (KID) found in the descriptor and in the leaf license having the rights policy.


Using Root and Leaf Licenses



FIG. 13 is a flow diagram that describes steps in a method in accordance with one embodiment. This method can be performed in connection with any suitable hardware, software, firmware or combination thereof. In one embodiment, the method can be implemented in connection with systems, such as those illustrated and described above. Additionally, in the discussion that follows, some of the acts that are performed are depicted as being performed by a server/transmitter, and other acts are depicted as being performed by a client/receiver. Examples of server/transmitters and client/receivers are provided above.


Step 1300 encrypts a root content key using a public key of a client/receiver. Any suitable content key can be utilized with but one example being given above. Step 1302 sends a root license containing the encrypted root content key to a client/receiver. Any suitable method can be utilized to implement this step. In the discussion that follows, two specific examples that draw upon two different protocols are provided. It is to be appreciated and understood that these constitute examples and are not intended to limit application of the claimed subject matter to only the specific protocols that are described.


Step 1304 receives the root license sent by the server/transmitter and step 1306 decrypts the encrypted root content key. In this example, this step is performed by using the client/receiver's private key to decrypt the encrypted root content key.


Step 1308 prepares a leaf license and encrypts a leaf content key with the root content key. Step 1310 sends the leaf license to the client/receiver. Recall that the leaf license can and typically does contain policies for DRM-protected content. It should be understood and appreciated that steps 1308 and 1310 can be executed multiple times for a given piece of DRM-protected content. That is, for each portion having a different policy, a corresponding leaf license can be prepared and sent to the client/receiver.


Step 1312 receives the leaf license and step 1314 decrypts the leaf content key using the root content key that was previously received. Step 1316 then uses the decrypted leaf content key to decrypt content. It also associates the appropriate leaf license with a portion of the media file (if the media file has portions) using a descriptor described above.


It is to be appreciated and understood that steps 1312, 1314 and 1316 can be performed for each new leaf license that is received by the client/receiver.


CONCLUSION

This document describes techniques by which a digital rights management policy may be associated with digital media having an arbitrary content type or transfer control protocol. In some cases this enables a receiver of an encrypted media file to decrypt the file and consume portions of the file according to different digital rights management policies. In some cases this also permits a transmitter to encrypt many different types of media files with one set of techniques. Although the invention has been described in language specific to structural features and/or methodological steps, it is to be understood that the invention defined in the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features or steps described. Rather, the specific features and steps are disclosed as preferred forms of implementing the claimed invention.

Claims
  • 1. A computer-implemented method with a client-receiver computer having a public/private key pair, and at least one server-transmitter computer having a public key of the client-receiver computer, the method comprising steps of: generating a root content key using the public key of the client-receiver computer;transmitting the root content key to the client-receiver computer, the root content key being decryptable using the client-receiver computer's private key and usable by the client-receiver computer to decrypt leaf content keys;dividing a single media file into multiple data segments, each data segment associated with a different digital rights management policy;encrypting each of the data segments with a respective leaf content key to provide encrypted data segmentsappending a descriptor to each of the encrypted data segments, each descriptor identifying the leaf content key with which the data segment was encrypted and the associated digital rights management policy; andtransmitting the encrypted data segments and descriptors to the client-receiver computer.
  • 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the encrypting the data segments uses an AES in counter mode.
  • 3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein each of the descriptors comprises Initialization Vectors, each Initialization Vector associated with a Key ID identifying the appropriate designated rights policy.
  • 4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein each of the descriptors has a Key ID that is also in the associated digital rights management policy.
  • 5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein each of the descriptors comprises a length indicator enabling differentiation between the encrypted data segment and each of the descriptors.
  • 6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted data segments comprise at least one of a packet conforming to an RTP data protocol or a frame conforming to an HTTP protocol.
  • 7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, wherein the adding descriptors concatenates each of the descriptors to an end of the encrypted data segments if the encrypted data segments comprise a packet conforming to the RTP protocol or the beginning of the encrypted data segments if the encrypted data segments comprise a frame conforming to the HTTP protocol.
  • 8. A system comprising one or more computer-readable media not consisting of a propagated signal, the one or more computer-readable media comprising: a digital media file comprising: one or more data segments, each data segment having a different digital rights management policy, each of the data segments added to a descriptor and comprising: payload data encrypted with a respective leaf content key, each leaf content key encrypted by a root content key that is encrypted using a public key and decryptable using a private key of a public-private key pair, wherein each descriptor includes at least the associated leaf content key enabling decryption of the encrypted payload data and association of the encrypted payload data with the digital rights management policy.
  • 9. The system of claim 8, wherein each descriptor comprises a Key ID that identifies the digital rights management policy.
  • 10. The system of claim 8, wherein each of the encrypted payload data is encrypted using a content key, and each descriptor comprises a Key ID associated with the leaf content key that is usable to decrypt the encrypted payload data.
  • 11. The system of claim 8, wherein the digital media file further comprises one or more portions, each of the first portions having one or more data segments, and wherein further each descriptor enables each of the portions to be associated with the digital rights management policy.
  • 12. The system of claim 8, wherein each of the data segment's payload data is encrypted and its descriptor is not encrypted.
  • 13. The system of claim 8, wherein the digital media file further comprises one or more data segments added to a descriptor and comprises clear payload data, wherein further each data segment's descriptor enables association of the clear payload data with digital rights management policy.
  • 14. The system of claim 8, wherein the digital media file is streaming media.
  • 15. A computer-implemented method for communicating a media file with multiple portions to a client-receiver computer from a server-transmitter computer performing the steps of: encrypting a root content key using a public key of the client-receiver computer, the root content key being decryptable with a private key of the client-receiver computer;transmitting the root content key to the client-receiver computer;dividing the media file into multiple portions, each portion having a different designated rights policy indicating permitted usage of the associated portion;generating multiple leaf content keys, each leaf content key being generated for an associated portion of the media file, wherein generating each leaf content key comprises encrypting each leaf content key with the root content key;building a descriptor for each portion of the media file, each descriptor identifying the leaf content key and the associated designated rights policy;encrypting each portion of the media file with the associated leaf content key;transmitting the encrypted portions and the descriptors to the client-receiver computer; andthe client-receiver computer decrypting each leaf content key using the root content key and decrypting each of the portions using the associated leaf content key specified in the descriptor associated with each portion.
  • 16. The computer-implemented method of claim 15, further comprising transmitting the designated rights policy to the receiver.
  • 17. The computer-implemented method of claim 15, wherein the decrypting each of the portions builds a Key ID into the descriptor for each of the portions, wherein the Key ID is used by the client-receiver computer to associate the portion with the appropriate designated rights policy.
  • 18. The computer-implemented method of claim 15, further comprising receiving a media file of an arbitrary content type and encrypting the media file to provide the encrypted media file.
US Referenced Citations (252)
Number Name Date Kind
3718906 Lightner Feb 1973 A
4255811 Adler Mar 1981 A
4323921 Guillou Apr 1982 A
4528643 Freeny, Jr. Jul 1985 A
4658093 Hellman Apr 1987 A
4683553 Mollier Jul 1987 A
4827508 Shear May 1989 A
4916738 Chandra et al. Apr 1990 A
4926479 Goldwasser et al. May 1990 A
4953209 Ryder, Sr. et al. Aug 1990 A
4977594 Shear Dec 1990 A
5005170 Nelson Apr 1991 A
5050213 Shear Sep 1991 A
5103392 Mori Apr 1992 A
5103476 Waite et al. Apr 1992 A
5109413 Comerford et al. Apr 1992 A
5117457 Comerford et al. May 1992 A
5193573 Chronister Mar 1993 A
5222134 Waite et al. Jun 1993 A
5224166 Hartman, Jr. Jun 1993 A
5261002 Perlman et al. Nov 1993 A
5319705 Halter et al. Jun 1994 A
5410598 Shear Apr 1995 A
5410698 Danneels et al. Apr 1995 A
5473692 Davis Dec 1995 A
5490216 Richardson, III Feb 1996 A
5506932 Holmes et al. Apr 1996 A
5509070 Schull Apr 1996 A
5629980 Stefik et al. May 1997 A
5634012 Stefik et al. May 1997 A
5638443 Stefik et al. Jun 1997 A
5673316 Auerbach et al. Sep 1997 A
5691768 Civanlar et al. Nov 1997 A
5710887 Chelliah et al. Jan 1998 A
5715403 Stefik Feb 1998 A
5765152 Erickson Jun 1998 A
5805700 Nardone et al. Sep 1998 A
5809144 Sirbu et al. Sep 1998 A
5845281 Benson et al. Dec 1998 A
5892900 Ginter et al. Apr 1999 A
5917912 Ginter et al. Jun 1999 A
5953420 Matyas, Jr. et al. Sep 1999 A
6073124 Krishnan et al. Jun 2000 A
6078909 Knutson Jun 2000 A
6094487 Butler et al. Jul 2000 A
6094684 Pallmann Jul 2000 A
6133912 Montero Oct 2000 A
6134243 Jones et al. Oct 2000 A
6189146 Misra et al. Feb 2001 B1
6205140 Putzolu et al. Mar 2001 B1
6219652 Carter et al. Apr 2001 B1
6226618 Downs et al. May 2001 B1
6233567 Cohen May 2001 B1
6269368 Diamond Jul 2001 B1
6275531 Li Aug 2001 B1
6278478 Ferriere Aug 2001 B1
6289452 Arnold et al. Sep 2001 B1
6330670 England et al. Dec 2001 B1
6343280 Clark Jan 2002 B2
6456967 Yeom Sep 2002 B1
6476802 Rose et al. Nov 2002 B1
6512778 Jones et al. Jan 2003 B1
6549922 Srivastava et al. Apr 2003 B1
6574609 Downs et al. Jun 2003 B1
6574612 Baratti et al. Jun 2003 B1
6587837 Spagna et al. Jul 2003 B1
6609130 Saulpaugh et al. Aug 2003 B1
6654389 Brunheroto et al. Nov 2003 B1
6681017 Matias et al. Jan 2004 B1
6700895 Kroll Mar 2004 B1
6742176 Million et al. May 2004 B1
6754349 Arthan Jun 2004 B1
6757913 Knox Jun 2004 B2
6832319 Bell et al. Dec 2004 B1
6856997 Lee et al. Feb 2005 B2
6885748 Wang Apr 2005 B1
6918034 Sengodan et al. Jul 2005 B1
6934467 Herz Aug 2005 B1
6944296 Liu et al. Sep 2005 B1
6961430 Gaske et al. Nov 2005 B1
6965646 Firestone Nov 2005 B1
6983049 Wee et al. Jan 2006 B2
6993137 Fransdonk Jan 2006 B2
7010032 Kikuchi et al. Mar 2006 B1
7039643 Sena et al. May 2006 B2
7065787 Ganesan et al. Jun 2006 B2
7080043 Chase, Jr. et al. Jul 2006 B2
7093277 Perlman Aug 2006 B2
7120250 Candelore Oct 2006 B2
7124303 Candelore et al. Oct 2006 B2
7136577 Falco Nov 2006 B1
7136945 Gibbs et al. Nov 2006 B2
7145919 Krishnarajah et al. Dec 2006 B2
7174452 Carr Feb 2007 B2
7200668 Mak et al. Apr 2007 B2
7203316 Nolte Apr 2007 B1
7209892 Galuten et al. Apr 2007 B1
7231516 Sparrell et al. Jun 2007 B1
7242766 Lyle Jul 2007 B1
7243366 Medvinsky et al. Jul 2007 B2
7257641 VanBuskirk et al. Aug 2007 B1
7325139 Ishiguro et al. Jan 2008 B2
7336791 Ishiguro Feb 2008 B2
7337320 Tada et al. Feb 2008 B2
7346160 Michaelsen Mar 2008 B2
7350238 Abe et al. Mar 2008 B2
7401100 Jung et al. Jul 2008 B2
7434052 Rump Oct 2008 B1
7437771 Alkove et al. Oct 2008 B2
7483532 Alkove et al. Jan 2009 B2
7536418 Buchsbaum et al. May 2009 B2
7561696 Oliveira et al. Jul 2009 B2
7574747 Oliveira et al. Aug 2009 B2
7581255 Alkove et al. Aug 2009 B2
7634816 Alkove et al. Dec 2009 B2
7636738 Shibata et al. Dec 2009 B2
7684566 Oliveira et al. Mar 2010 B2
7693280 Evans et al. Apr 2010 B2
7720096 Klemets May 2010 B2
7738778 Agnihotri et al. Jun 2010 B2
7769880 Paka et al. Aug 2010 B2
7801847 Kiilerich et al. Sep 2010 B2
7876896 Alkove et al. Jan 2011 B2
7882257 Kerr et al. Feb 2011 B2
20010052077 Fung et al. Dec 2001 A1
20010052135 Balakrishnan et al. Dec 2001 A1
20010056539 Pavlin et al. Dec 2001 A1
20020002674 Grimes et al. Jan 2002 A1
20020004773 Xu et al. Jan 2002 A1
20020013772 Peinado Jan 2002 A1
20020082845 Sato Jun 2002 A1
20020088136 Tseng Jul 2002 A1
20020107806 Higashi et al. Aug 2002 A1
20020138619 Ramaley et al. Sep 2002 A1
20020152393 Thoma et al. Oct 2002 A1
20020157002 Messerges et al. Oct 2002 A1
20020164018 Wee et al. Nov 2002 A1
20020174135 Pellegrin et al. Nov 2002 A1
20020194010 Bergler et al. Dec 2002 A1
20020198846 Lao Dec 2002 A1
20030001978 Smith et al. Jan 2003 A1
20030041257 Wee et al. Feb 2003 A1
20030056118 Troyansky et al. Mar 2003 A1
20030065918 Willey Apr 2003 A1
20030068040 Wee et al. Apr 2003 A1
20030070081 Wee et al. Apr 2003 A1
20030081592 Krishnarajah et al. May 2003 A1
20030081776 Candelore May 2003 A1
20030084306 Abburi et al. May 2003 A1
20030103243 Watanabe et al. Jun 2003 A1
20030126608 Safadi et al. Jul 2003 A1
20030131353 Blom et al. Jul 2003 A1
20030152223 Yamada Aug 2003 A1
20030159140 Candelore Aug 2003 A1
20030161473 Fransdonk Aug 2003 A1
20030182450 Ong et al. Sep 2003 A1
20030185542 McVeigh et al. Oct 2003 A1
20030194094 Lampson et al. Oct 2003 A1
20030217011 Peinado et al. Nov 2003 A1
20040001592 Akiwumi-Assani et al. Jan 2004 A1
20040003268 Bourne et al. Jan 2004 A1
20040010469 Lenard et al. Jan 2004 A1
20040042451 Takaku Mar 2004 A1
20040054930 Walker et al. Mar 2004 A1
20040064500 Kolar et al. Apr 2004 A1
20040078822 Breen et al. Apr 2004 A1
20040088557 Malcolm et al. May 2004 A1
20040098583 Weber May 2004 A1
20040123094 Sprunk Jun 2004 A1
20040125757 Mela et al. Jul 2004 A1
20040125791 Hoffmann Jul 2004 A1
20040139336 McLean et al. Jul 2004 A1
20040143736 Cross et al. Jul 2004 A1
20040170277 Iwamura et al. Sep 2004 A1
20040181490 Gordon et al. Sep 2004 A1
20040186854 Choi Sep 2004 A1
20040193680 Gibbs et al. Sep 2004 A1
20040237750 Smith et al. Dec 2004 A1
20040242269 Fadell Dec 2004 A1
20040249759 Higashi et al. Dec 2004 A1
20040249815 Lee Dec 2004 A1
20040260786 Barile Dec 2004 A1
20050002402 Fairman Jan 2005 A1
20050002525 Alkove et al. Jan 2005 A1
20050005760 Hull et al. Jan 2005 A1
20050008240 Bamerji et al. Jan 2005 A1
20050033967 Morino et al. Feb 2005 A1
20050069039 Crinon Mar 2005 A1
20050071278 Simelius Mar 2005 A1
20050099869 Crinon et al. May 2005 A1
20050108746 Futagami et al. May 2005 A1
20050114664 Davin May 2005 A1
20050144470 Takashima et al. Jun 2005 A1
20050157727 Date et al. Jul 2005 A1
20050163052 Savage et al. Jul 2005 A1
20050163093 Garg et al. Jul 2005 A1
20050169303 Toma et al. Aug 2005 A1
20050169444 Inon Aug 2005 A1
20050177875 Kamperman et al. Aug 2005 A1
20050187879 Zigmond et al. Aug 2005 A1
20050216413 Murakami et al. Sep 2005 A1
20050246451 Silverman et al. Nov 2005 A1
20050254526 Wang et al. Nov 2005 A1
20050265555 Pippuri Dec 2005 A1
20050286497 Zutaut et al. Dec 2005 A1
20050289617 Safadi et al. Dec 2005 A1
20060007479 Henry et al. Jan 2006 A1
20060020636 Murotani Jan 2006 A1
20060031889 Bennett et al. Feb 2006 A1
20060069803 Clark et al. Mar 2006 A1
20060104356 Crinon May 2006 A1
20060123064 Kim et al. Jun 2006 A1
20060130104 Budagavi Jun 2006 A1
20060161635 Lamkin et al. Jul 2006 A1
20060167985 Albanese et al. Jul 2006 A1
20060184573 Koori Aug 2006 A1
20060184790 Oliveira et al. Aug 2006 A1
20060190408 Cook et al. Aug 2006 A1
20060227965 Zhu et al. Oct 2006 A1
20060242078 Evans et al. Oct 2006 A1
20060242079 Evans et al. Oct 2006 A1
20060242080 Van Dyke et al. Oct 2006 A1
20060262732 Joutsenvirta et al. Nov 2006 A1
20060268099 Potrebic et al. Nov 2006 A1
20060291475 Cohen Dec 2006 A1
20070003064 Wiseman et al. Jan 2007 A1
20070016594 Visharam et al. Jan 2007 A1
20070016784 Vauclair Jan 2007 A1
20070067242 Lotspiech et al. Mar 2007 A1
20070073747 Jung et al. Mar 2007 A1
20070078898 Hayashi et al. Apr 2007 A1
20070088727 Kindig Apr 2007 A1
20070104105 MeLampy et al. May 2007 A1
20070106814 Son et al. May 2007 A1
20070143346 Matsutani Jun 2007 A1
20070171903 Zeng et al. Jul 2007 A1
20070185909 Kelin et al. Aug 2007 A1
20070220024 Putterman et al. Sep 2007 A1
20070220048 Ott Sep 2007 A1
20070248073 Pattavina et al. Oct 2007 A1
20070260615 Shen Nov 2007 A1
20070274393 Toma et al. Nov 2007 A1
20080046466 Yun Feb 2008 A1
20080052751 Cromarty et al. Feb 2008 A1
20080075168 Toma et al. Mar 2008 A1
20080126812 Ahmed et al. May 2008 A1
20080187284 Ikeda et al. Aug 2008 A1
20080216116 Pekonen et al. Sep 2008 A1
20090070438 Bartholomew Mar 2009 A1
20090202079 Puputti et al. Aug 2009 A1
20090216776 Carol et al. Aug 2009 A1
20100138647 Oliveira et al. Jun 2010 A1
Foreign Referenced Citations (65)
Number Date Country
1498479 May 2004 CN
1643474 Jul 2005 CN
0715246 Jun 1996 EP
0715247 Jun 1996 EP
1041823 Oct 2000 EP
1271830 Jan 2003 EP
1298518 Apr 2003 EP
1175750 Oct 2003 EP
1494425 Jan 2005 EP
H-11-219329 Aug 1999 JP
2000-134193 May 2000 JP
2000287192 Oct 2000 JP
2001-075871 Mar 2001 JP
2002044135 Feb 2002 JP
2002-175084 Jun 2002 JP
2002-342518 Nov 2002 JP
2003-124927 Apr 2003 JP
2003-152544 May 2003 JP
2003-224556 Aug 2003 JP
2003-319322 Nov 2003 JP
2004-046833 Feb 2004 JP
2004-158936 Jun 2004 JP
2004-282731 Oct 2004 JP
2004-287937 Oct 2004 JP
2004-328706 Nov 2004 JP
2004-537191 Dec 2004 JP
2005-109861 Apr 2005 JP
2005-513664 May 2005 JP
2001-51534 Jun 2001 KR
1020030011837 Feb 2003 KR
2003-19398 Mar 2003 KR
2003-27066 Apr 2003 KR
2144736 Jan 2000 RU
2159507 Nov 2000 RU
2163745 Feb 2001 RU
2201036 Mar 2003 RU
2003133468 May 2005 RU
536893 Jun 2003 TW
200301635 Jul 2003 TW
WO 9301550 Jan 1993 WO
WO 9613013 May 1996 WO
WO 9624092 Aug 1996 WO
WO 9627155 Sep 1996 WO
WO 9725798 Jul 1997 WO
WO 9743761 Nov 1997 WO
WO 9809209 Mar 1998 WO
WO 9810381 Mar 1998 WO
WO 9821679 May 1998 WO
WO 9824037 Jun 1998 WO
WO 9837481 Aug 1998 WO
WO 0015221 Mar 2000 WO
WO0011849 Mar 2000 WO
WO 0058811 Oct 2000 WO
WO 0059150 Oct 2000 WO
WO 0116900 Mar 2001 WO
WO 0152021 Jul 2001 WO
WO0251096 Jun 2002 WO
WO03028293 Apr 2003 WO
WO 2004006559 Jan 2004 WO
2004014037 Feb 2004 WO
WO2004023717 Mar 2004 WO
2004030311 Apr 2004 WO
WO2004030364 Apr 2004 WO
WO2004097605 Nov 2004 WO
WO 2005027404 Mar 2005 WO
Related Publications (1)
Number Date Country
20070038873 A1 Feb 2007 US