The present aspects relate generally to data storage devices. More particularly, the present aspects relate to security features in data storage devices.
Mass storage devices are one of many components of modern computers. One type of mass storage device is a disc drive. Such drives are used to store vast amounts of information relating to operating systems, applications, and user data. Some of this information is critical to the functioning of the host system in which the disc drive operates. If application software or other critical information is intentionally or unintentionally overwritten, significant losses could occur. Thus, these applications require sophisticated write protection security features. Further, schemes for prevention of unauthorized access of confidential user data are also required.
In many cases, write protection schemes, and schemes for the prevention of unauthorized access of user data, are primarily implemented in the host computer, with the disc drive having little or no control over the operation of these schemes. Lack of control over such schemes within the disc drive is especially problematic in the case of protection of confidential data because, if the disc drive is stolen or removed from the original host computer, the confidential user data is no longer protected. In addition, when a user returns such a drive to the manufacturer when it malfunctions, for example, conducting failure analysis on the drive can be problematic from a security standpoint, complex and costly.
Aspects of the present disclosure provide solutions to these and/or other problems, and offer other advantages over the prior art.
A data storage device in which access to user data is restricted is provided. The data storage device includes a data memory having memory locations that store user data. The device also has a program memory. The program memory includes first program code that enables a user to create a first device security ID and thereby restrict access to the stored data. Second program code, also included in the program memory, is capable of receiving a security command and comparing a second device security ID associated with the received security command to a stored security key. If the second device security ID and the stored security key correspond, then authentication with the first device security ID is bypassed and access is provided to the stored data. In some data storage device aspects, the stored data is in an encrypted form. In such aspects, if the second device security ID and the stored security key correspond, the second program code provides access to the stored data only in a non-decrypted form. This allows for carrying out operations such as failure analysis of the data storage device without information in the encrypted stored user data being revealed.
These and other features and benefits that characterize aspects of the present disclosure will be apparent upon reading the following detailed description and review of the associated drawings.
Referring now to
Data memory 102 includes a plurality of memory locations 112 that are capable of storing encrypted and/or non-encrypted user data 114, encryption and decryption keys 116 for the encrypted user data, and any other type of encrypted/non-encrypted data 118. Program memory 104 includes, in its memory locations 122, first program code 124, second program code 126, security key 128 and any other program modules 131. In some of the present aspects, security key 128 may be generated at the time of manufacture of the data storage device 100 from manufacturing process data, such as a serial number of device 100 and date of manufacture of device 100, and stored in program memory 104. The manufacturing process data from which security key 128 may be generated can also include a manufactured security ID, which, although also generated at the time of manufacture, may be different from security key 128. The device serial number, date of manufacture of the device and the manufactured security ID, which are collectively denoted by reference numeral 144, are included on a housing of the data storage device 100. In a specific aspect, information 144 may be included on a label that is affixed to a housing of data storage device 100.
In the present aspects, first program code 124 enables a user to create a first device security ID and thereby restrict access to the stored data 114. It should be noted that, the first device security ID is usually encrypted in the device 100 in a manner that does not allow for it to be read from the device. Second program code 126 is configured to receive a security command 127 and responsively compare a second device security ID 129 associated with the received security command to the stored security key 128. If the second device security ID 129 and the stored security key 128 correspond, second program code 126 bypasses authentication with the first device security ID to provide access to the stored data 114.
In some data storage device aspects, the stored data may be in an encrypted form. In such aspects, if the second device security ID 129 and the stored security key 128 correspond, second program code 126 provides access to the stored data 114 only in a non-decrypted form. When access is provided to the stored data 114 only in a non-decrypted form, only encrypted data, which is usually binary data from which no information can be derived, can be read. This feature is especially useful when a user, without disabling the first device security ID, returns the drive 100 to the manufacturer when it malfunctions. Specifically, this allows for carrying out operations such as failure analysis of the data storage device without revealing information in the encrypted stored user data. To further protect the user data, in some aspects, the security command 127 includes a security erase command. In such aspects, if the second device security ID 129 and the stored security key 128 correspond, second program code 126 is configured to execute the security erase command by deleting at least one decryption key 116 associated with the stored encrypted data 114. When decryption key 116, associated with the stored encrypted data 114, is deleted, the data cannot be recovered.
Failure analysis of device 100 may be carried out by a storage device failure analysis system, which can be a suitably configured computer such as host system 108 of
Program memory 134 includes first program code 140 that is configured to generate the second device security ID 129 based on manufacturing process data (such as 144) related to the data storage device 100 and to send the security command (or device unlock command) 127 with the generated security ID 129 to the data storage device 100 via the communication port 138. Second program code 142, also included in program memory 134, is configured to, upon successful execution of the device unlock command 127, perform a failure analysis test on the data storage device 100 and provide failure analysis results.
As indicated above, manufacturing process data used to generate security key 128 and second device security ID 129 is the same or at least similar. Therefore, the same or similar program code can be used to generate security key 128 and second device security ID 129. As noted above, the manufactured security ID, included in manufacturing process data 144, is not stored in any location separate from data storage device 100 and usually cannot be read from any location other than the device housing or outer cover, or label affixed to the device 100. Therefore, in aspects that require the manufactured security ID to generate the second device security ID 129, unlocking of device 100 can only be carried out by a person who has physical possession of device 100 and can read the manufactured security ID from the device. In one of the present aspects, data storage device 100 is a disc drive, described below in connection with
Referring now to
It is to be understood that even though numerous characteristics and advantages of various aspects of the disclosure have been set forth in the foregoing description, together with details of the structure and function of various aspects of the disclosure, this disclosure is illustrative only, and changes may be made in detail, especially in matters of structure and arrangement of parts within the principles of the present disclosure to the full extent indicated by the broad general meaning of the terms in which the appended claims are expressed. For example, the particular elements may vary depending on the particular application for the data storage device while maintaining substantially the same functionality without departing from the scope and spirit of the present disclosure. In addition, although the preferred aspects described herein are directed to a restricted erase and unlock technique for a disc drive, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the teachings of the present disclosure can be applied to any data storage device, without departing from the scope and spirit of the present disclosure.
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