This invention relates generally to encrypted communications and more particularly to wireless over-the-air rekeying.
Encryption methodologies of various kinds are well known in the art. In general, the contents of a so-called plain-text message (which may comprise, for example, an alphanumeric message, digitized voice or vocoded voice, and so forth) are encoded pursuant to an encryption algorithm as a function of one or more encryption keys. Ideally, the resultant data stream will appear, for all intents and purposes, as a random string of data elements (such as alphabetic characters or binary ones and zeros) notwithstanding the underlying pattern of the original informational content itself. Encryption techniques are often employed to protect wireless communications from unauthorized monitoring and eavesdropping.
Maintaining the security of an encrypted communication system usually requires ongoing care and careful observation of specific procedures. For example, the encryption key(s) itself must be well protected as the encryption algorithm utilized by a given system will itself often be known or ascertainable. System operators prefer to arrange for encryption keys to be provided to the communication units of a given system on an as-needed basis (or shortly before such anticipated need). When a system operator has direct physical access to a given communication unit, encryption key(s) can be installed with a relatively high assurance of security as the operator can chose a physical location and the circumstances attending such installation.
It is not always convenient or even possible, however, for all of the wireless communication units in a given system to be brought, more or less simultaneously, to a common location to permit the physical installation of a new encryption key. As a result, the logistic challenge of installing a new encryption key over a wide number of geographically distributed communication units can be challenging enough to discourage some operators from varying their encryption keys in a sufficiently aggressive manner to comport with generally recommended security protocols.
One solution has been to provide a wireless transmission informing the communication units of the encryption key(s). To protect the encryption key(s), a rekeying message, including the encryption key(s), is often encrypted through use of another encryption key. In a relatively closed system, this approach tends to constitute a satisfactory solution. A key management facility of a wireless communication system can readily accommodate the necessary process to effect the installation of encryption keys in the communication units while maintaining a level of security. For example, the key management facility sends rekeying messages to communication units to communicate encryption keys.
However, when the communication unit has moved to another system where the encryption keys are different, communication of encryption keys is a problem. To meet this need, the prior art provides for a communication link between key management facilities of differing systems so that encryption keys can be communicated. For example, a key management system of the first system will provide the encryption keys for communicating with a specific communication unit to a key management facility of a second system. Once the key management facility of the second system knows of the encryptions keys for communicating with the communication unit, the key management facility of the second system sends a message which is encrypted with the encryption keys associated with the first system. In such a fashion, the communication unit is able to communicate on the second system. However, to provide for the communication unit to be able to communicate on the second system, the encryption key(s) of the first system must be disclosed to the second system. This means that the second system's key management facility therefore will have access to the first system's encryption key(s).
For many applications this is acceptable. For other applications, however, this presents an unacceptable breach of security. The second system's access to the first system's encryption key(s) permits a variety of unauthorized and undesired activities, including but not limited to eavesdropping, inappropriate programming of communication units, and so forth. Notwithstanding this attendant risk of compromised security, however, the above-described process, whereby a key management facility of a second system has knowing access to the encryption key(s) of another system in order to thereby effect the proper and timely rekeying of a communication unit that has roamed into the second system, essentially represents a typical and present best available rekeying process.
The above needs are at least partially met through provision of the encryption key rekeying apparatus and method described in the following detailed description, particularly when studied in conjunction with the drawings, wherein:
Skilled artisans will appreciate that elements in the figures are illustrated for simplicity and clarity and have not necessarily been drawn to scale. For example, the dimensions of some of the elements in the figures may be exaggerated relative to other elements to help to improve understanding of various embodiments of the present invention. Also, common but well-understood elements that are useful or necessary in a commercially feasible embodiment are typically not depicted in order to facilitate a less obstructed view of these various embodiments of the present invention.
In an exemplary approach, the first system key management facility communicates a roaming encryption key to a communication unit, wherein at least a portion of the roaming encryption key is encrypted using an encryption scheme that is decipherable by the communication unit. Further, the first system key management facility communicates the roaming encryption key to a second system key management facility, wherein at least a portion of the roaming encryption key is encrypted using an encryption scheme that is decipherable by the second system key management facility. Then, the second system key management facility utilizes the roaming encryption key to send a rekeying message to the communication unit where the communication unit has moved from the first system to the second system. So configured, the communication unit receives the rekeying message where the rekeying message is encrypted with the roaming encryption key. In one embodiment, the rekeying message has a visiting encryption key which is utilized for communications by the communication unit with the second system.
Because the communication unit utilizes a different encryption key for use on the second system then for use on the first system, access to the first system is not compromised. The second system key management facility neither has nor needs the encryption key that the first system key management facility employs to encrypt the communications on the first system. As a result, the encryption keys of the first system remain secure.
The rekeying message itself can comprise a single message or a plurality of messages as desired and/or as appropriate to the needs of a given system or protocol.
Referring now to the drawings, and in particular to
Encryption keys as utilized by the communication unit 12 are controlled by a first system key management facility 13 such as a key management facility as is known and understood in the art. As shown in
For purposes of this description, the first system key management facility 13 uses the UKEK to encrypt keys on the first system. This means that keys within the first system 10 are encrypted as a function of UKEK. Further, the first system key management facility 13 presently uses the TEK to encrypt traffic on the first system. This means that traffic within the first system 10 is encrypted as a function of the TEK. Thus, to communicate the RKEK and RTEK to the first communication unit 12, first the RKEK and RTEK are encrypted with the UKEK to create an encrypted RKEK and RTEK, e.g. UKEK (RKEK, RTEK) as shown in
With momentary reference to
Thus, the roaming request processor 21 provides the roaming encryption key to a communication unit by sending an encrypted message. This is achieved, in part, by encrypting the message containing the roaming encryption key by using another encryption key, e.g. as described above and termed the TEK. In an embodiment of the present invention, both the UKEK and TEK are possessed by the receiving communication unit so that the communication unit may decrypt the roaming encryption key. Furthermore, in an embodiment, the roaming encryption key will be encrypted using an encryption key that is likely not possessed by an intermediary communication system node (such as, but not limited to, an intermediary other-system key management facility).
Referring again to
In this exemplary embodiment, the second system 14 has a second system key management facility 17. So configured, the second system key management facility 17 can administer the distribution and subsequent usage of an encryption key for use on the second system (which encryption key will typically be different from the encryption key used by the first system 10 and unknown to the latter as well). In an exemplary embodiment, the encryption key for use on the second system is termed a visiting traffic encryption key (VTEK). For the VTEK to be communicated to the communication unit, the first system communicates the roaming encryption key to the second system so that the second system may encrypt the communication containing the VTEK before it is sent wirelessly to the communication unit.
Further, the communication unit 12 of the first system 10 can switch key management facilities without changing base sites. For example, the communication unit 12 can switch from a first key management facility to a second key management facility where both are operably connected to the same base site. Thus, as mentioned above, more than one key management facility may be associated with one base site, e.g. base site 11. In any case, the communication unit 12 can move from being serviced by a first key management facility, e.g. 13, to being serviced by a second key management facility, e.g. 17. Whether the key management facilities are operably connected to one base site or more than one base site, the second system key management facility 17 can administer the distribution and subsequent usage of an encryption key for use on the second system key management facility 17 (which encryption key will typically be different from the encryption key used by the first system key management facility 13 and unknown to the latter as well).
Pursuant to an exemplary embodiment, the second system key management facility 17 has a communication link 19 to the first system key management facility 13 of the first system 10. As shown, this communication link 19 can comprise a dedicated link such as a landline. Other approaches can be used as well, however, including but not limited to a shared intranet or extranet (including, for example, the Internet) link. This link may be fully wireline, wireless, or a combination of both as may suit the needs and requirements of a given application. Further, as described below, the link may be created by manual means.
Pursuant to an exemplary embodiment, the first system key management facility 13 communicates the roaming encryption key to the second system key management facility 17 by utilizing encryption keys that are shared between the two facilities 13, 17. Example keys for encrypting communications between the two facilities 13, 17 include utilizing a shared key encryption key (SKEK) and a shared traffic encryption key (STEK). For example, for the first system key management facility 13 to communicate the roaming encryption key to the second system key management facility 17, the roaming encryption key is first encrypted using the SKEK to create an encrypted roaming encryption key (e.g. SKEK(RKEK,RTEK)). Then, the encrypted roaming encryption key is encrypted with the STEK to create an encrypted message (e.g. STEK [SKEK (RKEK, RTEK)]) that can be sent over the communication link 19. In such a manner, the second system key management facility 17 receives the roaming encryption key to rekey the communication unit that has moved form the first system to the second system.
In alternative embodiments, communications between the two facilities 13, 17 over the communication link 19 could use a public key protocol or any industry standard secure protocol, e.g. Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Internet Protocol Secure (IPSec), Secure Shell (SSH), etc. In yet further alternative embodiments, communications between the two facilities 13, 17 could be performed by a user of the first key management facility 13 manually copying information and loading it onto the second key management facility 17. For example, manually means to use a CD, a memory stick, Key Variable Loaders (KVL), etc. to perform the transfer of information. In yet further alternatives, though not recommended, the communications between the two facilities 13, 17 may be clear, e.g. not subject to secure means such as described above.
To illustrate an exemplary method of the present invention, and referring now to
Further, the first system key management facility 13 communicates 34 the roaming information to the second system key management facility via a message. In an exemplary embodiment the message comprising the roaming information is encrypted using a shared encryption key that is known to both the first system and the second system. That is, the second system does not require an intermediary platform to decrypt the message from the first system. Further, in an alternative embodiment, an intermediary communication system may function to forward this message comprising the roaming information from the first system key management facility 13 to the second system the key management facility 17. Optionally, the first system may receive 35 an acknowledgement in response to communicating the message.
Finally, the second system key management facility 17 communicates 36 a rekeying message to the communication unit wherein the rekeying message has information relating to the VTEK where the VTEK allows the communication unit to communicate within the second system securely and wherein the rekeying message is encrypted using the roaming information that was communicated by the first system key management facility 13 to the second system key management facility. Because the communication unit has been configured with the roaming information, the communication unit is able to decrypt the rekeying message upon receipt in the second system. There is no specific need for any encryption keys of the second system to be brought into usage.
Upon successfully receiving the rekeying message, if desired, the communication unit can transmit 37 a corresponding acknowledgement message that is then received by the second system key management facility 13. Of course, if such an acknowledgement is expected and not received, the key management facility can pursue such other course of action as may be desired or appropriate. For example, the key management facility can automatically retransmit the rekeying message. As another example, the key management facility can wait for a new rekeying request from the communication unit prior to taking any subsequent action.
The roaming message can comprise a single message or can be parsed over a plurality of discrete messages as desired. For example, the complete roaming message can include communicating a first roaming message to the communication unit and then providing a second roaming message to the communication unit (in response, for example, to receipt of an acknowledgement message from the communication unit in response to receiving the first roaming message).
The overall flow of these various processes may be better understood upon reference to
The first system key management facility also communicates 45 the roaming information to the second system key management facility where the communication is encrypted with a key that is known to the two facilities. In response, the second system key management facility acknowledges 46 the received information. Now that the second system key management facility has received the roaming information, the communication unit may communicate with the second system securely and without comprising the encryption keys which are specific to either the first or second system.
In one embodiment, for the communication system to communicate with the second system, the second system key management facility sends a rekeying message to the communication unit by first sending 47 a rekeying message to the base site serving the communication unit, e.g. a second system base site. The latter will then transmit 48 that encrypted rekey message to the communication unit. Following receipt of the rekey message, the communication unit transmits an acknowledgment 49 to the base site serving the communication unit, e.g. a second system base site, which forwards 50 that acknowledgement to the second system key management facility. As mentioned above, the same base site may serve both the first system key management facility and the second system key management facility. Thus, the base site in
Where the communication unit may not be configured with the roaming information, namely the roaming encryption key(s), and the communication unit may already be within the second system, there are at least two alternative embodiments disclosed to provide the communication unit with the roaming information. In a first alternative and as illustrated in
In a second alternative and as illustrated in
Further, the first system key management facility sends 63 a message comprising the roaming information, e.g. the roaming encryption key(s), to the second system key management facility by using a shared encryption key that is known to both the key management facilities. Further, both responses 62, 63 can optionally include information regarding when the roaming information, e.g. the roaming encryption key(s), is available for use. Once the second system key management facility knows of the roaming information, e.g. the roaming encryption key(s), it is able to use the roaming information to send 64 the communication unit a message with the visiting traffic encryption key that the communication unit may use for communications on the second system. Thus, by designing for direct communication between the communication unit and the first system key management facility, the second system key management facility is not aware of the encryption keys that are specific to the communications between the first system key management facility and the communication unit. In such a fashion, the encryption keys used on the first system key management facility are maintained securely.
Those skilled in the art will recognize that a wide variety of modifications, alterations, and combinations can be made with respect to the above described embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, and that such modifications, alterations, and combinations are to be viewed as being within the ambit of the inventive concept.
Number | Date | Country | |
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60671197 | Apr 2005 | US |